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When new circumstances arise we must adapt long-established prin-
ciples to them, for the law is not so stereotyped and narrow that it 
cannot be extended and applied to new cases which arise out of the 
increasing and changing requirements and necessities of the times: 
per Kotze CJ in Houghton Estate Co v McHaffie and 
Barrat (1894) 1 Off Rep 92 104. 
Computers are now a significant facet of modern society. As their 
capabilities advance from basic number crunching into extraordina-
rily sophisticated symbolic manipulation, an area heretofore the 
proprietary domain of human beings, we must adapt to the social, 
legal and ethical consequences. The changes in computer applica-
tions seen to date are minuscule compared to those soon to be 
realized: 
per Cole GS, Esq in Tort Liability for Artificial Intelligence 
and Expert Systems, CLJ Vol X 1990 127-231 129. 
SUMMARY 
Computers have become indispensable in all walks of life, causing people to rely 
increasingly on their accurate performance. Defective computer programs, the 
incorrect use of computer programs and the non-use of computer programs can 
cause serious damage. Expert systems are an application of artificial intelligence 
techniques whereby the human reasoning process is simulated in a computer system, 
enabling the system to act as a human expert when executing a task. Expert 
systems are used by professional users as an aid in reaching a decision and by non-
professional users to solve a problem or to decide upon a specific course of action. 
As such they can be compared to a consumer product through which professional 
services are sold. The various parties that may possibly be held liable in the event 
of damage suffered by the use of expert systems are identified as consisting of two 
main groups, namely the producers and the users. Because of the frequent 
exemption of liability for any consequential loss in standard form computer contracts, 
the injured user may often have only a delictual action at her disposal. The fault-
based delictual actions in SA law give inadequate protection to unsuspecting software 
users who incur ·personal and property damage through the use of defective expert 
systems since it is almost impossible for an unsophisticated injured party to prove the 
negligence of the software developer during the technical production process. For 
this reason it is recommended that software liability be grounded on strict liability in 
analogy to the European Directive on Liability for Defective Products. It is also 
pointed out that software standards and quality assurance procedures have a major 
role to play in the determination of the elements of wrongfulness and negligence in 
software liability and that the software industry should be accorded professional 
status to ensure a safe standard of computer programming. 
Key terms: 
Expert systems; artificial intelligence; software liability; computer malpractice; 
products liability; professional liability; software producers; professional user; 
software standards; information product. 
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Chapter 1 Scope and method of study 1 
CHAPTER 1 
SCOPE AND METHOD OF STUDY 
1. Statement of the problem 
1.1 Introduction 
Automation in the form of computers has brought many benefits, but there are 
concomitant problems. One of them is the question of legal liability where damage 
is sustained when computers are used, misused or even not used. Computer-
controlled processes have become almost indispensable in modern business and 
social life, causing people to rely increasingly on their accurate performance. As 
computer hardware1 is incapable of performing any process on its own, the aspect 
of computer technology that has the greatest impact on people's lives is computer 
software.2 Defective computer programs, the incorrect use of computer programs 
and even the non-use3 of computer programs can cause serious damage. The 
1 This term refers to the physical components of a computer system, eg the 
personal computer itself. See appendix I for definitions of computer technology 
terms used in this study. 
2 This term refers to a computer program which is a set of statements or instructions 
that tell the computer what to do. Although the term "software" is popularly used 
as a synonym for "computer program", it embodies more than that: In terms of the 
definition of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WI PO) "software" may 
be a computer program (set of instructions capable of causing a machine having 
information-processing capabilities to indicate, perform or achieve a particular 
function, task or result), or a program description (underlying information 
determining the instructions to be incorporated in the program}, or supporting 
material (documentation, user instructions, etc), or a set of several of these 
elements. 
3 The term "non-use" refers to situations in which existing computer technology, 
which in some way benefits the task at hand, is not used during the execution of 
the task. The question then arises whether the person responsible may be held 
legally liable for damage incurred in such circumstances. See ch 2 par 10.2.4 
infra. 
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following examples are taken from real-life incidents: 
• a cancer patient is lethally injured after receiving an overdose of radiation 
therapy determined by a faulty computer program;4 
• an aeroplane which is computer-controlled crashes possibly because of a 
fault in the computer system;5 
• 93 000 barrels of crude oil are shipped to the wrong trader because a 
computer system fails to recognise human operator errors;6 and 
• in a New York civil case concerning economic loss caused by the alteration 
of airline tickets, the court held that the airline could have prevented the 
loss by maintaining a capable computer system.7 
In the science fiction film epic 2001: A Space Odyssey, HAL,8 the spaceship 
computer, is capable of solving problems intelligently like a human expert and taking 
action independently of human programming and intervention. HAL's reasoning 
4 See the case of patient Cox referred to by Stuurman and Vandenberghe 1988 NJB 
1668. 
5 In a newspaper article on the third crash within a year of an Airbus A-320 (the first 
passenger plane to be run by computers, using a "fly-by-wire" control system), 
bringing the total of deaths in these crashes to 270 people, aviation officials were 
quoted as suggesting that instead of a pilot error, a "computer software 
malfunction" was responsible for the crash: Staff reporter Pretoria News of 24 
January 1992. 
6 This incident illustrates the damage caused by the incorrect use of a computer 
program: see Staff reporter Computerworld of 30 March 1992. 
7 Swiss Air Transport Company v Benn 467 NYS 2d 341, NY Civ Ct 1983. The facts 
of this case reflect the circumstances in which the non-use of a computer system 
may cause loss. 
8 The name "HAL" was made up by substituting for each letter of IBM the preceding 
letter in the alphabet: see Turley 1988 CLJ 455. 
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ability is due to a deductive process9 based on a compilation of data 10 which is 
continually expanded by its own conclusions and by additional input from outside 
sources. HAL is therefore continuously learning and increasing his existing 
knowledge, surpassing all humans because of his far greater "brain" capacity and 
perfect memory. HAL is, of course, the concrete manifestation, albeit fictional, of a 
specific branch of computer science known as "Artificial Intelligence" (AI) or quite 
simply - a machine that can think. 11 
Computer technology is advancing at such a phenomenal rate that the possibility of 
creating a HAL is fast becoming a reality. One of the means of achieving this is by 
building expert systems (ES's), a particular type of software which captures the 
basic knowledge that allows a human to act as an expert when dealing with 
complicated problems. The expert system (ES) is a collection of computer programs 
or software that solves problems in a specific field12 of knowledge. It consists of a 
knowledge base and a reasoning mechanism, called the inference engine, which 
interacts with data given by the user, or with data acquired through its own 
functioning, to solve a problem in the domain.13 The system works by applying 
deductive principles to the data contained in its knowledge base and is capable of 
functioning at the level or standard of the recognised experts in the domain. It is 
usually developed by a team of people who gain the relevant knowledge from 
9 This process is executed by an "inference engine": see ch 2 par 8.1.3 infra. 
10 The data is embodied in a "knowledge base": see ch 2 par 8.1.2 infra. 
11 See ch 2 par 2 infra on the issue of AI in general and the question whether it can 
ever be said that a machine is capable of thought. After the extraordinary chess-
playing computer of IBM, Deep Blue, beat Garry Kasparov in June 1997, the 
question arises whether Deep Blue has a mind of its own: Gelernter Time of 19 
May 1997 57. Gelernter supra 58 states that computers as we know them will 
never have minds, no matter what feats they perform. However sophisticated the 
computer performs, it will always be a performance. 
12 The field of knowledge is also referred to as a domain of knowledge in ES 
terminology: see ch 2 par 8.2.1 infra. 
13 See ch 2 par 2.2 infra. 
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consultation with the acknowledged human experts in the particular domain of the 
ES.14 
ES's differ from other conventional computer programs in two fundamental ways: 
Firstly, ES's manipulate knowledge whereas ordinary programs manipulate data 15 
and secondly, the knowledge base is separated from the inference mechanism. 16 
Different types of expert systems are determined by the type of output of the 
system, 17 the particular application 18 of the system and the type of user for whom 
it was developed. 19 The following examples illustrate the three basic types of ES's 
currently in existence, and the type of legal problems arising from their use: 
(1) The medical field is a tremendously fertile area for the development and 
use of ES's. 20 One of the earliest developed and best-known ES's is 
MYCIN21 , which diagnoses infectious diseases based on patient history 
and laboratory test results and then advises physicians on the appropriate 
antibiotic treatment. MYCIN is a prime example of the type of ES which is 
designed to be used by a professional person referred to as the 
"professional user", such as a doctor or an engineer, to assist them in the 
execution of their professional duties. This type of ES will henceforth be 
14 Ibid. 
15 On the difference between knowledge and data see ch 2 par 9.1 infra. 
16 See ch 2 par 5.1 infra. 
17 A distinction is made between a material output and an intelligent output: see 
ch 2 par 1 0.1.2 infra. 
18 See ch 2 par 4 infra. 
19 See ch 2 par 8.2.6 infra. 
20 See ch 2 par 4.2 infra. 
21 MYCIN is in fact the first successful ES to be developed and is referred to as the 
ES- prototype in almost all AI literature: Waterman 34 et seq. See also ch 2 par 
4.2 infra. 
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referred to as the Intelligent Assistant. 
• What would the legal position be if a doctor relied on this system in 
diagnosing a patient's illness and the diagnosis turned out to be wrong due 
to a fault in the ES? Would the doctor be liable for the loss sustained by 
the patient or might action be instituted against the producers of the ES? 
• What would the legal position be if the wrong diagnosis was due not to a 
fault in the ES, but to incorrect information supplied by the doctor? Apart 
from a possible malpractice suit against the doctor, would the producers of 
the ES also be held liable for the damage? 
• What would the position be if the doctor neglected to use MYCIN in 
circumstances where such use could have prevented an injury sustained 
by the patient? 
(2) ES's have also been developed to furnish advice on professional matters 
to lay members of the public. 22 Such systems are known as "professional 
kits" and may occur in any type of profession. For example, in the medical 
domain, ES's have been developed to provide a preliminary diagnosis of 
illnesses in the home. 23 The ES's function would be to evaluate a 
particular user's symptoms of illness and decide whether or not medical 
attention was needed. Such an ES will henceforth be referred to as a Self-
Help System. 
• What would the legal position be if the user suffers harm because of wrong 
advice information furnished by a defective ES? In this case there is no 
22 These members of the public are non-professional users. 
23 This type of medical ES is also referred to as a "Doc-in-the-box": Willick 1986 
Rutgers C& TLJ 26-29. 
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intervening professional user to turn to. 
(3) The Airbus 320 is the first computerised aircraft that can land, take off and 
guide itself. It is the first passenger plane to be run almost entirely by 
computers with a "fly-by-wire" control system that was previously only used 
in military aircraft. The system can override the pilot's decisions in certain 
situations. It will, for example, not let the pilot perform a dangerous 
manoeuvre overreaching the safety limits of the aircraft which are 
programmed into the computers. The result is that the pilot's freedom of 
action, for instance in an emergency situation, is greatly reduced. Expert 
systems technology, amongst other sophisticated artificial intelligence 
applications, has been used to achieve this development.24 In February 
1990, an Indian Airbus crashed at Bangalore airport, killing ninety people; 
in June 1991, an Airbus crashed during a French airshow, killing three 
people; and in January 1992, an Airbus 320 crashed in the Vosges, 
France, killing one-hundred-and-seventy-seven people.25 
• Investigations concluded that pilot error was responsible, but some aviation 
officials suggested a computer malfunction.26 If this was indeed the 
case and assuming further that it was an ES malfunction, the question 
arises whether the user (pilot) or the producers are responsible for the loss 
sustained by the passengers. This type of ES will henceforth be referred 
to as an ES Machine and is embodied in a product. An ES Machine may 
be used by a professional user or a non-professional user. 
The examples above illustrate the three basic types of ES's currently in existence and 
24 See Staff reporter Sunday Star of 26 January 1992 and Staff reporter Pretoria 
News of 24 January 1992. 
25 Ibid. 
26 Ibid. 
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which are respectively labelled the Intelligent Advisor, the Self-Help System and 
the ES Machine for purposes of this thesis. 
ES's are thus a particular type of computer program which simulates human experts 
when addressing problems faced by people in the execution of a task. 27 ES's are 
used to perform complicated tasks that could previously only be performed by a 
limited number of highly trained human experts. An ES is applied in a specific 
domain of knowledge and can be used by professional users as an aid to reaching 
a decision (as in the case of the Intelligent Assistant), or by non-professional users 
to solve a problem and decide upon a specific course of action (as in the case of the 
Self-Help System), or by any user to have a task done which brings about a physical 
change in the environment (as in the case of an ES Machine applied in a robot). The 
first two types of ES's have an interactive nature28 and an intellectual output,29 
whereas the third type of ES is usually not interactive and has a material output. 30 
ES's are applied in a wide variety of areas such as diagnosis, planning, forecasting, 
design, instruction and the giving of professional advice in such different spheres of 
knowledge as medicine, business, engineering, architecture and even law.31 They 
are applied in various professions: ES's for financial, investment, medical, legal and 
tax advice have been developed and they are used in architectural design, aerospace 
27 My definition. See ch 2 par 3 infra for a comprehensive description of ES's. 
28 An interactive nature describes the characteristic of an ES of reacting to input data 
from the user as for example in the case of MYCIN, supra. See also ch 2 par 
8.2.6 infra. 
29 An intellectual output is an output that does not effect a material change in the 
environment but has to be acted upon by the user: see ch 2 par 1 0.1.2 infra. 
30 A material output brings about a direct change in the environment. See ch 2 par 
1 0.1.2 infra. 
31 Waterman 39. 
8 Chapter 1 Scope and method of study 
engineering, industrial production and education. 32 It would therefore seem that the 
possibilities for future applications are virtually unlimited. 
Just as a human expert may err in giving advice, an ES may fail to perform correctly, 
or give inaccurate or misleading advice resulting in loss caused by personal and/or 
economic injury. The question then arises as to who should be held liable for this 
loss? Where a human expert acts on his own, be it a natural or legal person, the 
identification of the liable party is obvious, but the nature of an ES results in a variety 
of parties who face possible liability arising from a variety of actions. The reasons 
for this are varied: 
• the ES may embody the expertise of many human experts who may all be 
professionally liable, 
• the separation of the knowledge base and inference engine lends a 
composite nature to the ES, 33 
• various interrelated legal relationships based in contract and delict may 
exist between the producers, users and injured third parties.34 
In the case of a defective ES that causes harm, who will the liable party be? If, for 
example, the defect can be traced to an error in the knowledge base, it will then have 
32 Numerous examples of ES applications have been reported in the press: In 
Tennessee a prison ES determines the prison time of inmates: see Staff reporter 
Sunday Star of 23 August 1992; a marketing ES has been developed at the Wits 
Graduate School of Business: Grant Computer Mail of 25 August 1989; and 
various medical ES's consisting of drug dispensing systems, patient administration 
systems and interactive diagnostic systems are in use throughout the RSA: Bidoli 
Computer Mail of 26 June 1992. At UN ISA an expert registration system is saving 
the University millions of rands in terms of training and overtime: see Staff reporter 
UN/SA News of January 1993. See also appendix II for a list of application areas. 
33 See ch 2 par 5.1 infra. 
34 See ch 2 par 10.2 infra. 
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to be determined whether it is due to a mistake by the consulted expert or the 
computer scientist. The developers of an ES, namely the programmers or 
toolbuilders, the domain expert (DE), the knowledge engineer (KE) as well as the 
suppliers or distributors of ES's are collectively referred to as the producers of an 
ES.35 The producers, together with the users, professional or non-professional, 
form the two main categories of parties under discussion. 
Bad advice given by the system may cause loss in several ways: conduct 
undertaken in reliance on the advice by the user of the ES can amount to a delict vis-
a-vis a third party, or to breach of contract by the user vis-a-vis a co-contractant. 
Moreover, such an occurrence can amount to a delict or breach of contract by the 
developer(s) or supplier of the ES vis-a-vis the user, or even to a delict vis-a-vis the 
third party affected by the user's conduct. Who can be held liable in the various 
instances and what is the basis of liability? Should the consulted DE or the 
programmers or the supplier or even the users of the system be sued for the various 
types of loss? In cases where the Intelligent Assistant type of ES can be used, the 
interesting question arises of whether the professional user should be held liable for 
the non-use of such an existing system. 
Legal issues regarding the use, misuse and non-use of ES's constitute a new 
application of the law of delict and contract which has not yet been addressed in 
South African law. However, as ES's are used more and more often, these issues 
will have to be clarified. The producers of ES's usually have no control over the use 
of the ES's they have produced once these have been mass-distributed and even 
when they build a system for a particular person or organisation in terms of a 
development contract, there is no authority over the use thereof outside contractual 
terms, except in terms of copyright legislation. 36 If someone sustains physical or 
35 See ch 2 par 8.2 infra. 
36 The Copyright Act 98 of 1978 as amended by the Copyright Amendment Act 125 
of 1992: see ch 4 par 5 infra. 
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economic injury as a result of the defective functioning or use of a product that 
contains an ES, or of incorrect advice or information supplied by an ES as a result 
of a system defect or incorrect conclusions, he or she could conceivably sue all of the 
parties involved in its production, distribution and use.37 
1.2 The research question 
The problem with which this study concerns itself can be divided into three parts: 
(1) The identification of all parties who could possibly be held civilly liable in 
South African Jaw when the use of an ES causes loss to some person or 
institution; 
(2) The determination of the various contractual and delictual causes of 
action for the institution of claims for damages arising from such use; and 
(3) A full discussion of the various forms of delictual liability arising from the 
use of an ES.38 
1.3 Need for the study 
The use of computers in the real world has increased phenomenally and as the 
dependence of people in all walks of life on their use has become firmly established, 
so the need for an understanding of the legal problems surrounding their use has also 
increased. The subject of computers and law actually embodies a two-way 
relationship whereby computers are being used to support legal practice and research 
on the one hand, and, on the other hand, cognisance must be taken of the legal 
37 See ch 3 infra. 
38 A detailed discussion of contractual liabilities does not form part of this thesis: see 
par 1.4.2 infra and the reasons stated there. 
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problems that are caused by their use. In this regard, Van der Merwe39 prefers to 
use Marcel Storme's40 distinction between rechtsinforrnatica and inforrnaticarecht, 
where the first concept refers to the use of computers by lawyers and the second one 
to the legal effects of the use of computers in society. 
Ideally there should be a part of South African law called "computer law" which deals 
with those principles of law that govern the use of computer technology and proposes 
solutions to common problems even though such an area of law actually covers a 
wide range of well-trodden subjects. In this study in particular, well-known principles 
of the law of contract and the law of delict are applied to a novel situation. 
Computer and information technology have invaded all aspects of modern life. Hardly 
a business or institution exists today that does not make use of some form of 
computer-technology and very few homes, at least in affluent societies, are without 
a personal computer. Although ever-increasing automation has many benefits, it is 
also a process which can cause great harm because of computer programming errors 
as well as the incorrect use of such programs. In order to deal with these problems, 
it is necessary for legal development to keep abreast of new developments in high 
technology. ES's especially have a great potential as the subject of litigation, on the 
one hand because of their complex nature,41 and on the other hand because of their 
application in areas such as safety-related products and the rendering of professional 
services. 42 
39 At vii-iv. 
40 Cited in Vandenberghe G Informatica und Recht series 1 as quoted by Van der 
Merwe at vii. 
41 See par 1.1 supra. 
42 As the information age progresses and the electronic world enlarges it is becoming 
apparent that sophisticated application software such as ES's is changing 
traditional relationships and the ways in which they function. A pertinent example 
is the relationship that exists between a professional and her client: see ch 2 par 
11 infra. 
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Although the appearance of expert computer programs known as ES's is not at all 
new to the field of computer science, it is a definite newcomer to the law in terms of 
legal liability for computer use. One of the reasons for this may be that whereas ES's 
have previously only been developed as part of research programs, they have now 
reached the stage of being available on the commercial market where their potential 
for cau·sing loss or harm, and thus of leading to litigation, has much increased. That 
this potential has been realised by other Western countries can be seen from the fair 
amount of academic writing on the legal issues involved.43 Although there are many 
ES's in operation in various areas of commerce, industry and the professions in South 
Africa,44 there has as yet not been any mention of the legal issues involved when 
damage is caused by their use. 
1.4 Scope and limitations of the study 
This study comprises an enquiry into civil liability issues arising from the use of ES's, 
defined and limited in the following respects: 
43 The spurt of academic discussion, especially in common law countries, has been 
brought on mainly by the necessity of classifying an ES as either a product or a 
service because of the very different consequences in legal liability: a product is 
usually governed by strict liability principles in terms of product liability and a 
service by liability based on fault which involves principles of negligence: see 
Zeide and Liebowitz 1987 IEEE Expert 19; Reed 1987 CL&P 12; Gill 1986 HTLJ 
483; Turley 1988 CLJ 455; Cole 1990 CLJ 127; Tuthill 1991 AI Expert 45. 
44 During a conference on "Technical applications of expert systems" held in 
Johannesburg on 25 and 26 June 1991 by the CSIR, it became apparent that 
expert system technology in the field of the engineering industry is already being 
used extensively in the areas of diagnostics and repair, production decisions, 
safety acts and regulations, troubleshooting, equipment selection and design and 
problem recognition. According to the engineers, the main advantage of ES's in 
the fiercely competitive industrial environment is the saving of development time 
and costs together with the ability to assist in making split second decisions 
precisely and without the time-consuming need to consult with all the experts who 
are not always available: CSIR 1. 
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1.4.1 Use of expert systems 
The use of an ES refers to the use of a defective ES, the incorrect use of a sound 
ES and the non-use of an existing ES. A defective ES is an ES that contains an error 
or a fault which originates either from faulty design or development in any part(s) of 
the ES, or from improper execution in a part(s) of the ES.45 Execution errors that 
arise from faulty input or unjustified reliance by the user on the information supplied 
by the ES, constitute the incorrect use of an ES, and the non-use of an ES refers to 
the situation where an existing ES is not used.46 ES's are categorized into three 
types of ES's namely the Intelligent Assistant, the Self-Help System and the ES 
Machine. 47 
1.4.2 Civil liability 
The discussion of civil liability is limited to contractual and delictual liability. Liability 
incurred through the infringement of immaterial property rights and through the 
application of the doctrine of estoppel is excluded from this discussion because of the 
particular description of the manner in which liability is incurred when ES's are used, 
namely through the use of a defective ES, the incorrect use of an ES or the non-use 
of an available system.48 The main objective is therefore to recompense an injured 
party for damage suffered because of a fault in the ES or the faulty use of an ES. 
The discussion of contractual liability is further limited to a discussion of only those 
aspects which are necessary to determine the cause of action for the institution of 
claims for damages in circumstances where a contractual nexus exists between the 
45 See ch 2 par 9.2.2 infra. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Par 1.1 supra. 
48 Par 1.4.1 supra. 
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parties concerned. A comprehensive discussion of contractual liability with 
comparisons from other legal systems is not undertaken. However, the discussion 
of delictual liabilities is treated in detail after a comparative study of relevant 
principles applied in other countries has been made. The contention is that the 
producers' contractual liability for breach of contract arising from defective software 
and the incorrect use or non-use of such software, will be excluded in most software 
contracts49 leaving the injured party with only a delictual action. In many cases 
there will also be no contract between the developer of the ES and the user or the 
injured party, either because no contract was entered into or because it was not 
validly concluded.50 
The discussion of delictual liability is limited to the causing of harm through negligent 
conduct in regard to the creation of a defective ES, the incorrect use or non-use of 
such a system. Delictual liability arising from fraudulent behaviour or 
misrepresentation and other kinds of conduct intended to induce the conclusion of a 
contract are not addressed. Although it is possible to cause damage by the 
intentional use, misuse or nonuse of ES's, it is unlikely that such practices will occur 
among legitimate producers and users of ES software. 
2. · Method of research 
The type of research must be appropriate to solving the problem statement. 51 
Traditionally there are two methods in legal research: the historical method and the 
comparative method.52 Comparative law denotes the process of comparing rules 
of law from different legal systems, usually with a certain purpose in mind because 
49 The relevant software contracts may consist of acquisition and licensing 
agreements: see ch 3 par 2 infra. 
50 See ch 3 par 2 infra. 
51 Venter et a/219. 
52 Venter et a/ 220. 
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"comparison for comparison's sake is likely to be barren". 53 Van Zyl54 sees 
comparative law as (a method comprising of) "die verge/yking uit sowel histories as 
kontemporere oogpunt gesien, van vreemde regstelsels en hul/e regsinste/lings 
oftewel regsbeginsels met mekaar." According to Hahlo and Kahn55 the 
comparative study of different legal systems is especially rewarding if done with one 
or more of the following objects in mind: 
• producing effective local legislation; 
• helping to find solutions to problems on which there is no authority in our 
law; 
• assisting in the understanding of legal transactions involving foreign law; 
and 
• contributing to the uniformity of principles in the world's legal systems. 
The comparative law approach has been chosen for this study for the following 
reasons: 
53 Hahlo and Kahn 111. Gutteridge 7 distinguishes between descriptive 
comparative law, which is a comparison for the sole purpose of obtaining 
information regarding foreign law; and applied comparative law, which is a 
comparison with a definite aim in view. Zweigert and Kotz(1) 2 define 
"comparative law" as the comparison of different legal systems of the world. They 
distinguish between macrocomparison which is the comparison of the spirit and 
style, and the methods of thought and procedures of different legal systems; and 
microcomparison which denotes the comparison of specific legal institutions or 
rules used to solve particular problems. In terms of this distinction, the 
comparative law study undertaken here amounts to microcomparison as the object 
is to compare the ways in which different legal systems solve the problem of ES 
liability: see ch 5 infra. 
54 At 5. 
55 At 111. 
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(a) The absence of material and authority in South African law on the subject-
matter of this study makes a comparative study of the experience of other 
legal systems in this regard absolutely necessary. 56 
(b) Computers and the law applicable to them are par excellence a field of law 
that stands to gain from the comparative method. South African consumers 
are trying their best to keep abreast of new technological developments in 
this fast-moving field, and are struggling to cope with corresponding legal 
problems, whereas their overseas counterparts have already appeared in 
court because of the dire consequences of using faulty software. 
(c) As most computer software is received from overseas distributers, 
knowledge of the relevant foreign law is necessary to understand the rights 
and duties of the various parties involved. 
(d) The historical method is inappropriate as computers and their applications 
are a recent development. 
3. Outline of thesis 
Chapter 2 describes the characteristics, structure and purpose of an ES. This 
information is necessary for an understanding of the specific nature of ES's which lies 
at the root of various issues concerning civil liability arising from their use. The three 
basic types of ES's that occur today are described and distinguished, and the persons 
involved in their production and use, as well as the various legal relationships that 
may exist among them, are identified. 
Chapter 3 contains a discussion of the underlying basis of the different types of civil 
56 Van der Merwe vii -viii also chooses the comparative law method mainly because 
of the dearth of material available on computer law in South Africa. 
Chapter 1 Scope and method of study 17 
liability involved when ES's are used. The general principles in terms of which the 
law imposes contractual and delictual liability are outlined with the aim of identifying 
causes of action when damage is incurred through the use of ES's. 
Chapter 4 contains a discussion of various related topics that may be relevant to a 
discussion of ES liability such as the concurrence of claims, choice of law, arbitration 
and alternative dispute resolution methods, the possible influence of a bill of rights 
on the contractual and delictual liabilities that may arise when ES's are used, as well 
as a discussion of some aspects of copyright law with regard to computer programs. 
Chapter 5 consists of a comparative law inquiry into the delictual liabilities arising 
from the use of ES's and comprises three parts. In part I the delictual liability 
principles applicable in the common law countries, namely the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom are discussed, in part II the effect of European 
Union law on ES liability is investigated and in part Ill the application of the delictual 
principles to ES liability are treated with regard to two continental countries, namely 
Germany and the Netherlands. 
Chapter 6 contains an exposition of delictual liability arising from the use of ES's 
according to South African legal principles. In chapter 7 a summary and critical 
evaluation of the previous discussions are given, some conclusions are drawn and 
some recommendations are made. 
·. 
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CHAPTER 2 
EXPERT SYSTEMS 
1. Introduction 
In this chapter the various parties that may possibly be held liable in the event of 
damage suffered through the use of ES's are identified. In order to achieve such 
identification, it is necessary to refer to the characteristics, application and structure 
of ES's. From these elements the specific nature of ES's is determined, which in turn 
indicates the various persons involved in the production and use of ES's as well as 
the different legal relationships which may exist between these persons. It is further 
submitted that the discussion of the above-mentioned elements points to only three 
types of ES's basically being used in the world today. 1 These types are illustrated by 
way of three hypothetical examples which will be used throughout this study to demonstrate 
the legal liabilities that may be incurred through the use of ES's defined as the use of a 
defective ES, the incorrect use of a sound ES, and the non-use of an existing ES.2 
The development of ES's is a component of the study of artificial intelligence (AI) which forms 
a part of computer science.3 Von Wright4 in his inaugural address to the third 
conference on "Logic, Informatics, and Law" states that AI is a branch of "cognitive 
science" which is an interdisciplinary enterprise connecting logic, linguistics, 
neurophysiology and psychology with computer science and technology. The 
1 Namely the Intelligent Advisor, the Self-Help System and the ES Machine: see ch 
1 par 1.1 supra. 
2 See par 9 infra. 
3 Waterman 3; Susskind 8; Franken eta/ 399. See appendix I for a definition of 
basic expert system terminology. 
4 Martino(1) 1. 
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development of computer and information5 technology has had a revolutionary impact 
on "the work of the mind" resulting in the emergence of the current "information 
society"6 as opposed to previous technological discoveries which were concerned 
with "the work of the muscles of men and their domestic animals" and resulted in the 
"industrial revolution". 7 
2. Artificial intelligence 
2.1 General 
AI is a term that provokes a lot of discussion in many disciplines. Philosophers, 
psychologists and scientists have always puzzled over the nature of intelligence8 and 
the idea of creating "artificial intelligence" which can be built into a machine. The 
advent of computers has brought an exciting stimulus to the mystery of "machine 
5 Because information is central to computers, in that the primary function of 
computer technology is to develop faster and better ways to interact and work with 
information, the term "information technology" is frequently used in place of 
"computer technology". This has also occurred with regard to the designation of 
"Computer and information technology law". Cf Geldenhuys 68-74 who gives a 
detailed exposition of the various terms used interchangeably when in fact, 
"Computer technology law" is only one aspect of "Information technology law". 
According to Geldenhuys 70, the reason for the confusing use of terminology may 
be found in the fact that the same legal problems experienced with computers are 
also experienced in other areas of technology and information, and it is therefore 
convenient to treat these problems under the same topic. 
6 The term "information society" was first used by Alvin Toffler in his bestsellers 
Future Schock and The Third Wave. It refers to the post-industrial society in 
which information has become the most valuable commodity in a world which 
increasingly resembles a global village where everybody is in electronic 
communication with each other. 
7 Martino(1) ibid. 
8 Because the term "intelligence" is easier to recognise than to define, it is not 
strange to find as many definitions of AI as there are scientists. 
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intelligence".9 The goal of AI scientists is to design, develop and implement 
computer programs that can perform tasks and solve problems of a type for which 
human intelligence is required, that is programs that can in some sense think. 10 
These programs are then called "intelligent systems" of which ES's are a subset. The 
dividing line between intelligent and non-intelligent systems of course keeps shifting 
as computers and their software become more sophisticated, ensuring that the 
concept of AI remains a moving target. 11 August12 states that the development of 
AI has reached the stage where the type of robots in existence are of such a complex 
and sophisticated nature that their status as objects in American law should be that 
can be programmed to perform some task of manipulation or control, existing tort law 
can sufficiently deal with injuries that result from their use, misuse or abuse since 
they are mere objects 13 for which some human will be responsible, but once the 
9 The invention of the computer is regarded as one of mankind's most advanced 
achievements in that it is the closest representation of artificially reproduced 
human thought. 
Although as a matter of history the concept of non-humans 
exhibiting uniquely human attributes has existed in legend and 
artifact, not until the development of the digital computer in the 
1950's did scientific researchers begin to think seriously about 
artificial intelligence. 
per Nycum and Fang, Artificial intelligence and certain resulting legal issues 
quoted by Friedman and Siegal1988 Rutgers C&TLJ 289 fn 2. 
1 0 The core AI question is the still ongoing debate as to whether it can ever be said 
that a machine can ''think": Waterman 3-5; Susskind 7-11; Rolston 15-21; 
Franken et al400-404. 
11 Scientists expect that future development in the field of AI will lie in the 
development of new hardware architecture rather than in the further development 
of software, in the hope of achieving computers with inherent intelligence as 
opposed to programmed intelligence: Rolston 1; Miller 1984 NZLJ 85. 
12 1988 CLJ 375. 
13 August 1988 CLJ 379 cites the following definition of "robot" according to The 
robot institute of America: 
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robots are considered as entities on their own, the possibility arises of holding them 
independently legally liable for damage caused by them. 14 August expands on the 
interesting notion of developing a "body of robot law"15 applicable to "robot-humans" 
(manufactured equivalents of humans). 16 However, the state-of-the-art in AI does 
not point to the probability of granting independent legal status to AI systems in the 
near future. 17 
A robot is a reprogrammable multifunctional manipulator 
designed to move materials, parts, tools or specialized devices, 
through variable programmed motions for the performance of a 
variety of tasks. 
14 August 1988 CLJ 385 argues that once it is established that robot-humans can 
exist, logic, ethics and open-minded morality dictate that they are given equal 
rights with humans because to discriminate against them on the basis of the 
"softness" or "hardness" of their body parts is just as unreasonable as 
discriminatory treatment on the basis of skin colour. Contra Cole 1990 CLJ 153-
154 who is of the opinion that in the near future, AI will not be granted legal status 
either as an independent or even a semi-independent entity as the technical 
problems in creating truly independent AI (in the sense that it is capable of 
learning, growth, change, consciousness and self-consciousness) are still 
insurmountable. However, once AI has overcome these problems, the possibility 
of according some legal status to such entities is acknowledged: Cole 1990 CLJ 
153fn92. 
15 A Corpus iuris roboticum which describes the status and problems for robots as 
of "mid-MCMLXXXV". 
16 Although the possibility of programming machines to learn and use judgement is 
acknowledged by most writers, the general consensus is that it is impossible to 
construct a genuine emotional brain in an artifact. Robots therefore lack religious 
feelings, conscience and morality which, theoretically, means that they will be 
unable to make value judgements, a situation that can be potentially harmful to 
humans. Robots must therefore be subjugated to regulation, viz the Corpus iuris 
roboticum: August 1988 CLJ 380-382. See also Gelernter Time of 19 May 1997 
57 who notes that the idea of Deep Blue the victorious chess-playing computer, 
having a mind is absurd: "How can an object that wants nothing, fears nothing, 
enjoys nothing, needs nothing and cares about nothing have a mind?" It can win 
at chess but not because it wants to, it plays the game because it is designed for 
that purpose. 
17 Cole 1990 CLJ 153-154. 
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Susskind 18 is of the opinion that the term "artificial intelligence" should be taken to 
connote a prima facie intelligence only, in the sense that those computer systems 
which perform tasks and solve problems that would indicate intelligence if they were 
performed by humans, exhibit artificial intelligence. 19 Rolston20 avoids the 
controversial issues regarding the nature of true intelligence and whether a machine 
can think by defining AI as the "computer-based solution of complex problems 
through the application of processes that are analogous to the human reasoning 
process." Gelernter1 concludes that although the development of a computer such 
as Deep Blue is an amazing technological achievement, signifying an intellectual 
milestone, its chief meaning is that human beings are champion machine builders. 
Activities that humans thought could only be done by minds, can be done by 
machines too if the machine builders are clever enough.22 
In general AI can be defined as the discipline concerned with understanding and 
emulating in machines the processes and mechanisms that underlie human thinking, 
18 At 8. 
19 . A well-known procedure for evaluating the success of an AI system is the Turing 
test in which a human interrogator communicates with the AI system as well as 
another human without being aware of which responses originate from the 
computer and which from the human. This test was developed by A Turing, a well-
known AI scientist: Cf Rolston 20. The AI system passes the test successfully if 
the interrogator cannot differentiate between the human and the computer. 
Rolston supra is of the opinion that an ES can still be of great value even though 
it fails the test. According to him an AI system that would pass a true Turing test 
doesn't yet exist. Contra August 1988 CLJ 385 who quotes various scientists that 
are of the opinion that it should not be impossible to design a machine that can 
think like a human, the real difficulty lies in designing machines that are able to 
display emotions. In conclusion it seems that the question whether a robot is a 
machine or artificially created life can only be answered by taking a decision and 
not making a discovery. 
20 At 15. 
21 Time of 19 May 1997 57. 
22 Gelernter Time of 19 May 1997 57. 
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perception, reasoning, understanding and decision making.23 
2.2 Expert systems 
ES's are an application of AI techniques attempting to capture the basic knowledge 
enabling a human to act as an expe~4 when dealing with a problem.25 This is 
done by simulating the human reasoning process in a computer system (the ES), 
through applying specific knowledge and making inferences. 
Paul Johnson, 26 a scientist who has studied the behaviour of experts, describes an 
expert as follows: 
An expert is a person who, because of training and experience, is able to 
do things the rest of us cannot; experts are not only proficient but smooth 
and efficient in the actions they take. Experts know a great many things 
and have tricks and caveats for applying what they know to problems and 
tasks; they are also good at ploughing through irrelevant information in 
order to get at basic issues, and they are good at recognizing problems 
they face as instances of types with which they are familiar. 
The process of building ES's involves the transferring of domain knowledge, that is 
knowledge about a specified area or domain, from a human expert, called the 
domain expert (DE), to a computer program. This process is known as knowledge 
23 The field of AI actually represents a large body of concepts and techniques 
developed by researchers since the 1960's and includes, inter alia, such 
interesting topics as: natural language processing; speech understanding; game 
playing; and robotics. For purposes of this study, the concept of AI is only 
discussed as a general background toES's. On AI in general, see Susskind 8-11; 
Waterman 3-6; Franken et at 404-410. 
24 The Oxford advanced Ieamer's dictionary describes an expert as a "person with 
special knowledge, skill or training": Hornby eta/ 299. Theoretically an ES could 
even be more skilled than "an expert" as it could embody the knowledge of all the 
experts in a specific area. 
25 Waterman 5; Susskind 9; Franken et a/ 417. 
26 Quoted by Waterman at 5. 
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engineering.27 The expert-system builder is called the knowledge engineer (KE) 
and it is his job to extract the knowledge from the DE and to build it into the ES. An 
ES can, of course, be modelled on the knowledge and experience of more than one 
expert; it is one of the distinct advantages of ES's that they are able to have all the 
experts' opinions available at once. The heart of an ES is the knowledge base 
which has the function of storing expert domain knowledge (usually in the form of 
rules) and from which such knowledge is then retrieved, or from which new 
knowledge is inferred when required. 28 The program containing general knowledge 
and procedures by means of which the most effective use of the domain knowledge 
can be made is contained in the inference engine.29 These are the two basic 
structures of an ES.30 
ES's are knowledge-based systems (KBS's) containing specific knowledge about 
some problem area and thus being expert in that domain. KBS's are systems 
containing knowledge that is used in problem-solving and reasoning and the term is 
generally used as a synonym for ES's although, as Susskind points out, there are 
KBS's that do not simulate experts.31 
27 Waterman 9; Susskind 1 0; Franken et a/ 426. 
28 See par 8.1.2 infra. 
29 See par 8.1.3 infra. 
30 Waterman 18; Susskind 9; Franken et a/418. OnES structure in general, see 
also Tapper 262-263; Reed(1) 71-72; Cole 1990 CLJ 130-146; Konig 100-101. 
31 Susskind 9 strongly objects to the synonymous use of ES's and KBS's because 
KBS's exist that, although also dependent on knowledge, do not require a 
particular human expertise, ega system that recognises speech or images. He 
is of the opinion that only those KBS's containing a "depth and richness of 
knowledge", causing them to perform at the level of an expert in a "highly 
specialised domain", ought to be called ES's. Rolston 13 also mentions the 
"general" application of the term "expert system" to systems that, although they 
are knowledge based, only perform a subset of an expert's task. Because there 
are as yet few existing systems that can completely replace a human expert in a 
complex domain, he accepts this general use of the term. It is submitted that 
Susskind is quite correct in so far as his first argument is concerned, but in my 
view it is unnecessary to place such emphasis on the concept of "expert" and 
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3. Characteristics of expert systems 
AI scientists and researchers require the following basic characteristics to be present 
in a system before it can be defined as an ES:32 
3.1 Expertise 
The ES must achieve the same level of performance as the human expert in the 
particular area of knowledge. 33 This means that the system must be skilful, in other 
words it must be able to apply its knowledge efficiently and effectively in order to 
produce a solution using the same shortcuts humans use in eliminating unnecessary 
calculations. 
3.2 Symbolic reasoning 
Problems are solved by using symbols to represent the problem concepts and then 
applying various strategies to manipulate these concepts. The system must, 
therefore, be able to manipulate symbols rather than perform standard mathematical 
computations. 
3.3 Depth 
An ES must have depth; in other words it must be able to operate effectively in a 
narrow domain containing difficult, challenging problems. In my opinion this 
"expertise". I am quite willing to accept that any KBS that simulates human 
experts in a domain is an ES provided its structure in general conforms to that of 
a basic ES as explained in par 8 infra. 
32 Waterman 25-29; Tapper 262-263; Franken et a/410-417. 
33 When MYCIN, the medical ES described in ch 1 para 1.1 supra is used, it 
achieves higher accuracy than medical. students, interns or practising physicians 
and is on a par with experts in the field: Gill 1986 HTLJ 488. 
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requirement is not a necessity for a system to qualify as an ES; a system solving a 
less challenging problem, for example how to complete an insurance form, may also 
be an ES provided the other requirements are met. 34 
3.4 Self-knowledge 
A true ES has the apparent ability to reason about its own operation because it has 
"knowledge" about its knowledge. This knowledge can be used to check the 
accuracy and consistency of its conclusions and can justify and explain its 
reasoning. 35 This is a very important and useful characteristic of an ES for the 
following reasons: 
• Users have more confidence in the system. 
• The system is easier to debug. 
• Underlying assumptions are explicit (for this reason it is said that ES's are 
transparent). 36 
• Changes in the system are easier to predict and test. 
34 The adjudicating of problems as "difficult" or "challenging" is, in my opinion, of 
much too subjective a nature to qualify as a general characteristic of an ES. 
35 For example, in the case of MYCIN the program is able to show the steps it 
followed to reach a conclusion: see par 4.2 infra. 
36 See par 5.1 infra. 
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4. Expert system applications 
4.1 General 
ES's can be categorized in terms of the basic activities of an ES and according to the 
areas or domains of knowledge in which it solves problems.37 ES's are also 
distinguished by the type of outpue8 they produce and by the manner in which they 
are acquired. 39 Appendix II contains a list of selected ES's, illustrating their 
application areas according to the areas of knowledge in which they solve problems. 
The list shows only some of the ES's found in the most active areas in this field, 
namely chemistry, computer systems, electronics, engineering, geology, medicine, the 
military and the law. 40 Of these areas the medical domain has produced more ES's 
than any other problem area.41 Medical ES's (MES's) are designed for professional 
use42 as well as in-home use,43 and as such they are good examples of the first 
37 Waterman 32-48. 
38 According to the functional distinction in software, ES's with an intellectual output 
provide information and perform tasks to the benefit of a user, and ES's with a 
material output perform tasks that bring about physical and material changes in 
the environment: see par 1 0.1.2 infra. 
39 According to the commercial distinction in software, ES's acquired as a mass-
marketed package is distinguished from bespoke software which is usually 
acquired via a development contract: see par 1 0.1.1 infra. 
40 This list is adapted from the list appearing in Waterman 40-45, figure 5. The other 
domains in which existing ES's are applied are agriculture, information 
management, manufacturing, mathematics, meteorology, physics, process control 
and space control. Cf Waterman 40 et seq. For an extensive bibliography of 
current ES's and their applications, see Hunt and Quinlan. 
41 Cf Waterman 40 et seq; Gill 1986 HTLJ 487-489. 
42 In such a case the ES is designed for use by a professional user: see par 4.2 
infra. 
43 In such a case the ES is designed to be used by a non-professional user: see par 
4.2 infra 
Chapter 2 Expert systems 29 
and second types of ES's identified in this study.44 It is therefore inevitable that 
many of the rules peculiar to the medical profession will be alluded to during the 
discussion of legal liability.45 The application of legal ES's (LES's) also deserves 
special mention. Firstly it involves the domain of law which is familiar to me (and 
most of the readers) and as such it is an example of rechtsinformatica, 46 whereas 
the topic of this study forms part of informaticarecht,47 illustrating the two-way 
relationship between computers and the law. Secondly, like MES's, it may also 
embody the first and second types of ES's identified in this study.48 
4.2 Medical expert systems 
Since their inception, ES's have found a niche in the medical domain.49 An example 
of a medical expert system (MES) is MYCIN, one of the first successful ES's 
developed.50 MYCIN is designed to enhance the doctor's own skill and reasoning 
by way of a consultation process in which the system requires patient history and 
laboratory test results from the attending doctor. As such MYCIN resorts under the 
first type of ES's categorised in this study, namely the Intelligent Assistant. 51 The 
system then produces a probable diagnosis and a possible plan of treatment. The 
44 The Intelligent Assistant and the Self-Help System: see ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
45 Chapters 4 and 5 infra. 
46 Rechtsinformatica refers to lawyers' use of computers: see ch 1 par 1.3 supra. 
47 lnformaticarecht refers to the legal effects of computers in society: see ch 1 par 
1.3 supra. 
48 Ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
49 According to Waterman 40 et seq one of the reasons why ES's burgeon in this 
area may be due to the explosion of information experienced in the medical 
domain. 
50 MYCIN was originally developed as part of the Ph D thesis of EH Shortliffe from 
the Computer Science Department, Stanford Un:versity, USA: Gill1986 HTLJ 487. 
51 See ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
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knowledge base contains close to 500 rules, dealing with blood infections and 
meningitis infections. The reasoning mechanism consists of a chain of rules that 
establishes the presence of an infecting organism from the acquired test data and 
patient history. 52 The program is able to explain its reasoning by answering various 
questions during or after consultation, such as "Why are you asking for this 
information?" and "How was a conclusion reached?" MYCIN states the conclusion 
as a measure of uncertainty based on a continuum from 0.1 to 1.0, where 1.0 is a 
certainty, 0.9 is strong evidence and 0.5 points to suggestive evidence. 53 The 
doctor who uses MYCIN during a consultation has the advantage of the opinion of 
acknowledged experts in bacterial diseases. Although ES's such as MYCIN can be 
useful, it is accepted that they do have limitations and cannot entirely replace 
physicians in the identification and treatment of health problems. The treatment 
prescribed by this type of system is limited by the individual nature of medical cases 
and it must be kept in mind that a system can only apply the principles which were 
incorporated into it by the developers. If a patient's symptoms are unique the ES will 
not be able to answer the user's query. 54 It is also of critical importance that a 
medical ES be constantly updated to keep up with the state of the art in the field of 
medicine. 
52 The following is a sample piece of the knowledge rules embedded in MYCIN: 
IF: 
1) the infection that requires therapy is meningitis, and 
2) the type of the infection is fungal, and 
3) organisms were not seen on the stain of the culture, and 
4) the patient is not a compromised host, and 
5) the patient has been to an area that is endemic for coccidioidomycosis, and 
6) the race of the patient is one of: black asian indian, and 
7) the cryptococcal antigen in the cfs was not positive 
THEN: 
there is suggestive evidence that cryptoccus is not one of the organisms that may be 
causing the infection. 
53 Gill 1986 HTLJ 488. 
54 The one main point of criticism against ES's is the hitherto inability of knowledge 
engineers to include common sense 01 heuristic knowledge in the knowledge 
system: see par 5.2 infra. 
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It is also possible to acquire medical ES's designed for in-home use, in other words 
a system that is used by a lay-person without the aid of a physician. 55 Such 
systems are categorised in this study as a Self-Help System which is used without 
the intervention of a professional user. 56 These systems are able to classify 
common ailments successfully and to serve as a supplement to a regular health care 
program. 57 They usually also contain a warning to the user that a doctor should 
also be consulted. However, it is very possible that the diagnosis and treatment from 
such a match-the-symptom medical program can be regarded as the unauthorised 
practice of medicine.58 
4.3 Legal expert systems 
The domain of law has during the past decade become a popular target for the 
development of ES's.59 Legal expert systems (LES's) are rekindling debate on 
such questions of the theory and philosophy of law as: how does one define a legal 
rule?; how does a lawyer reason?; etc. LES's should be able to simulate the 
reasoning of a legal expert who draws conclusions from norms or who extracts 
general rules from precedents.60 Theoretically all the knowledge of a legal expert 
can become part of a LES, but in reality practical problems are experienced with 
representing knowledge so as to make it understandable for machine processing.61 
55 Gill 1986 HTLJ 488. 
56 See ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
57 Gill 1986 HTLJ 488. 
58 Willick 1986 Rutgers C& TLJ 28. With regard to legal self-help software, it has 
also been noted that the use thereof may constitute the unauthorised practice of 
law: Vincenti 1988 CLJ 186. 
59 Waterman 224; Tapper 262; Susskind 11-33; Tyree 1-15; Schild 13-33; Whitby(2) 
6; Vivant 15-28; Martino(2) 183. 
60 Martino(2) 184. 
61 Ibid. 
32 Chapter 2 Expert systems 
These problems include the use of natural language and the technical language used 
by jurists, legal knowledge representation and rules of derivation to obtain valid 
consequences from a set of norms.62 Legal knowledge representation is one of the 
most difficult tasks in the structuring of an LES because it cannot be formalised in a 
very strict and simple way due to the "vagueness and open-texturedness"63 of legal 
concepts. 64 
4.4 Basic activities of expert systems 
Although ES's have been built to solve many different types of problems, the following 
categories comprising the basic activities of ES's are distinguished:65 
4.4.1 Interpretation 
These ES's infer situation descriptions from sensor data, for example interpreting 
gauge readings in a chemical process plant to infer the status of the process. 
62 Ibid. 
63 - A word is vague when it does not have a clear and definite set of necessary and 
sufficient conditions that apply to it eg a term such as "reasonableness" or "fair''. 
A word is open textured when its definition lends itself to different applications eg 
a general classifying term such as "vehicle". Thus, a user of an ES concerned 
with regulations pertaining to the use of a "vehicle" would be faced with a 
classification problem when dealing with a youngster on a skateboard. Cf 
Susskind 187 et seq. 
64 Susskind 186 is of the opm1on that the problem of vagueness and open-
texturedness can be greatly reduced by using more accurate law-statements and 
law-derivations in the knowledge representation. The doctrine of open texture 
and vagueness was first introduced to legal theory by HLA Hart in Positivism and 
the Separation of Law and Morals (Oxford) 1958 63 and further expounded in The 
Concept of Law (Oxford) 1961 121-132, cited by Susskind at 187. 
65 It must be noted that many ES's perform more than just one of these basic 
activities, for example an ES that diagnoses often also debugs (a term that is 
used to describe the process of removing errors from a computer program) and 
an ES that plans may also design. Cf Waterman 39. 
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4.4.2 Prediction 
These ES's infer the likely consequences of given situations, for example estimating 
the global oil demand from the current geo-political world situation. 
4.4.3 Diagnosis 
These ES's infer causes of system malfunctions from observables, for example 
locating faults in electrical circuits. 
4.4.4 Design 
These ES's develop configurations of objects under certain constraints, for example 
gene-cloning and designing integrated circuit layouts. 
4.4.5 Planning 
These ES's decide on a certain course of action before proceeding to act, for 
example an ES that creates a plan for applying a series of chemical reactions to 
groups of atoms in order to synthesize a complex organic compound. 
4.4.6 Monitoring 
These ES's compare actual system behaviour to expected behaviour, for example 
assisting patients in an intensive care unit (ICU) by analysing data from the ICU 
monitoring equipment. 
4.4. 7 Debugging 
These ES's prescribe remedies for malfunctions, for example selecting the type of 
maintenance needed to correct faulty telephone cables. 
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4.4.8 Repair 
These ES's execute plans to administer prescribed remedies, for example tuning a 
mass spectrometer, an instrument that measures voltage. 
4.4.9 Instruction 
These ES's are used to diagnose, debug and "repair" student behaviour. Instruction 
systems develop a model of the student's knowledge and the way in which that 
knowledge is applied to solve problems. They then analyse the model to diagnose 
any student deficiencies and "debug" or rectify those deficiencies by devising plans 
to correct them. The student behaviour is then "repaired" by executing these plans 
through direct interaction with the student. 
4.4.1 0 Control 
These ES's are used to govern overall system behaviour, for example an ES that 
manages the manufacturing and distribution of computer systems. 
5. · Differences between expert systems and conventional computer 
programs 
5.1 Separation of knowledge base and inference engine 
The main difference between ES's and other conventional programs is the separation 
of the knowledge base in which the knowledge about the problem domain is 
organised from the inference engine which contains general problem-solving 
knowledge. 66 Conventional programs do not possess knowledge bases and 
66 See in general on the differences between ES's and conventional programmes, 
Susskind 4-16; Waterman 24-31. 
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inference engines as they manipulate data67 as opposed to knowledge - they have 
databases encompassing the relevant data and the algorithms needed to work with 
them. In an ES there is a clear separation of general expert knowledge about the 
problem area and information about the current problem (as contained in the 
knowledge base) from the methods used to apply the knowledge to the problem (via 
the inference engine). The result of this partitioning is that the program can easily 
be modified by simply changing or adding rules to the knowledge base, thus making 
it flexible so that the program is able to explain its own behaviour by describing the 
rules it is applying, thereby making it transparent. A conventional program does not 
have this ability because the data and logical procedures are interrelated, making it 
difficult to change the program and impossible to attain transparency. 
An ES also has the ability to infer new knowledge from existing knowledge and is 
potentially able to teach itself. 68 This possibility is derived from the characteristic 
of self-knowledge contained in an ES that enables it to look at the reasoning 
process used in its own operation. 69 The expectation is that this will in future enable 
ES's to reason from first principles, thereby creating the rationale behind their 
reasoning process. Theoretically they should then be able to appraise and change 
their own internal structure. 70 
It is precisely from this partitioning and interaction between the knowledge base and 
the inference engine that most legal difficulties arise in the case of a fault in the ES 
that causes harm. The problem is to determine where the responsibility and legal 
liability should lie, as the fault could have been caused by a defect in either of the 
67 Data is a statement of fact: see par 9.1 infra. 
68 This process is still very much in a conceptual state and the subject of much AI 
research, as the ability to learn points to a heightened form of "machine 
intelligence". Cf Rolston 10 et seq. 
69 This characteristic is displayed in the explanation facility: see par 8.1.5 infra. 
70 Waterman 29. 
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abovementioned components, or as a result of their interaction, making it difficult to 
pinpoint its origin. The inference engine may be incorporated in an ES sheW1 which 
was designed and marketed by one person, while the knowledge base may have 
been produced by a different person, whereas the combined system may have been 
developed and marketed by a software house. 72 The situation becomes even more 
complicated where teams of people are involved, leading to an abundance of 
potential defendants. 
Added to the problem of multiple potential defendants is the further difficulty of 
establishing which of these defendants caused the malfunction, especially in a 
situation where the defendants themselves are more knowledgeable about the origin 
of the malfunction than the plaintiff. Each of the defendants will be able to suggest 
ways in which the other defendants could be responsible for the defective output. 
5.2 Heuristic methods 
The presence of heuristics makes ES's more powerful and flexible than traditional 
71 . An ES shell is a computer program containing an inference engine without any 
knowledge which enables the ES producer to add her own knowledge to build a 
finished ES: see par 8.1.3 infra. 
72 The problem of allocating responsibility is further compounded by the likelihood 
that the shell works correctly when the rules are phrased and ordered in the right 
way, and the knowledge base is also adequate if the knowledge it contains is 
manipulated in the right way but the two are not properly matched. In such a case 
it will be extremely difficult to decide who is responsible for resulting errors: 
Reed(1) 73-74. The difficulty is aptly illustrated by the following example from 
Reed(1) 74: 
A specialist's expertise is collected and expressed - say in 
heuristics - by the knowledge engineer, whereupon the findings 
are presented to a programmer for coding the system. But did 
the specialist agree to the heuristics? And was the translation 
of heuristics to code 100% accurate? How well did the expert 
express his expertise? Is the knowledge engineer, as a non-
expert in the domain, in a position to judge? 
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software. Heuristics are rules of thumb or hunches that limit the search for 
solutions.73 Heuristic rules are approximate and generally consist of rules that have 
been gathered by experts through years of experience. 
Conventional programs use algorithms74 to manipulate data in order to produce 
computer-based solutions. This is called the traditional dataprocessing (DP) area 
which has to do with the manipulation of data in data bases, files, records, etcetera. 
It is a repetitive process definable from A to Z. Conventional systems are therefore 
linear in that they flow from a predetermined input through a process to output and 
they include spreadsheet, financial and word-processing applications. By contrast, 
the procedure followed byES's is not predictable from one step to the next because 
of (1) the fact that ES's manipulate knowledge75 which is a much broader concept 
than data,76 and necessitates unique rules of representation77; and (2) the 
heuristic methods that are applied in order to find the solutions which cause the 
system itself to search each step as it proceeds on the way to its goal. The ES 
uses many more branches and nonlinear approaches to reach its output. 78 ES's are 
"journey-oriented" whereby user input clarifies facts that are matched with heuristic 
knowledge-generated rules, as opposed to conventional systems which are 
"destination-oriented" and whereby user input supplies the data to process an 
answer. 79 Furthermore an algorithm always produces the correct or optimal 
solution whereas a heuristic can only produce an acceptable solution. This 
73 Waterman 22; Rolston 5; Franken et a/ 403. 
7 4 An algorithm is a formal procedure guaranteed to produce correct or optimal 
solutions: Waterman 22. 
75 See par 9.1 infra. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Representation refers to the way in which the knowledge is built into the system: 
see par 8.1.2 infra. 
78 Tuthill 1991 AI Expert 48. 
79 Ibid. 
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becomes clearer if one looks at Waterman's80 illustration of the difference between 
algorithmic and heuristic methods used to prevent the skyjacking of commercial 
airliners (figure 1 ). 
The algorithm presented here is a repetitive process definable from start to finish 
(everything and every person boarding the plane is searched in the same way); and 
will produce an optimal solution (no-one will go on board with a weapon) in 
achieving the goal of preventing skyjackings. The heuristic method cannot be 
predetermined as it would first have to specify certain passengers (those that set off 
the metal detector or match the skyjacker profile) before proceeding to the prescribed 
search. In this way the system has to search itself for the next step. It would, 
however, be highly impractical to use the algorithm because of the time and cost 
involved, not to mention the unpopularity of such a method with the passengers. In 
contrast the heuristic method, although it cannot guarantee that a weapon will not slip 
on board, will produce an acceptable solution that is easier and more practical to 
implement. 
This capability of ES's to deal with real-world problems81 in a way that reflects 
human judgement and intuition is clearly distinct from more traditional computer 
systems, making ES's at once more advantageous and more dangerous to use. 
They are advantageous, because the systems can do so much more on their own; 
dangerous for the very same reason in that they can be relied on too much, causing 
80 At 17. 
81 A real world problem is a complex, practical problem with a useful solution. 
Computer scientists also make use of toy problems in developing programs but 
they have been found unsuitable for ES's because they tend to be unrealistic and 
oversimplified. A toy problem is an artificial problem eg a game or unrealistic 
adaptation of a complex problem: Waterman 27. 
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damage or injury if something goes wrong.82 As mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, the further dilemma then arises as to who will be legally liable if 
something does go wrong because, in contrast to a conventional system, there are 
many more people involved in the production and use of ES's.83 
6. Advantages of expert systems 
The question may be asked why people are developing ES's rather than relying on 
human expertise as in the past. The answer is that there are several distinct 
advantages in using artificial expertise instead of human expertise:84 
• Artificial expertise in the form of ES's is permanent whereas a human 
expert must constantly practise to remain proficient in some problem area. 
• Artificial expertise can easily be transferred or reproduced simply by 
copying a program or file. Education, which is the transferring of 
knowledge from one human to another, is a lengthy, time-consuming and 
expensive process. 
• Artificial expertise is easier to document because it is already represented 
in some or other form in the system. 
82 As probably occurred in the case of the Airbus 320 mentioned in ch 1 par 1.1 
supra, where the pilot relied completely on the "fly-by-wire" system. See also 
Specht et a/ 1991 JJ 256 who point out the risk involved in the overreliance on 
ES's that fail to perform at an appropriate level of expertise in the auditing 
profession. They conclude that the only material increase in the risk of legal 
liability of an auditor user would be if he negligently relies on the ES and "real" 
human expert judgement is ignored because the system is in place. 
83 Tapper 262-264; Reed(1) 71-72; Turley 1988 CLJ 471; Zeide and Liebowitz 
1987 IEEE Expert 21. 
84 Waterman 12-15. 
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• Artificial expertise produces more consistent results as it is not susceptible 
to distractions. A human expert may make different decisions in identical 
situations because of emotional factors. 
• Human expertise is much more expensive than an ES. Although ES's are 
costly to develop they are cheap to operate and copies of the system can 
easily be made. 
7. Disadvantages of expert systems 
The current state of the art in the development of AI shows human expertise to be 
clearly superior to artificial expertise in the following ways: 85 
• Human expertise is more creative and innovative than the smartest 
computer program. 
• Humans are adaptive and can adjust to new situations whereas a program 
needs to learn new concepts or rules. 
• Human experts can make direct use of their sensory experience namely 
visual, auditory, tactile and olfactory. For ES's this sensory data must be 
transformed into symbols before it can be understood by the system and 
at this stage of development some of the information is lost during the 
process. 
• Human experts have a broad focus on all aspects of a problem in relation 
to the central issue; ES's tend to have only a narrow focus on the problem 
itself, ignoring side-issues which are also relevant. 
85 Waterman 14-15. 
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• The biggest disadvantage of ES's compared to human experts is the one 
major drawback of artificial intelligence in general in comparison to human 
intelligence, and that is the absence of commonsense knowledge. 
Commonsense knowledge is a broad spectrum of general knowledge about the world 
and how it works. This is a huge amount of knowledge which is possessed by all 
human experts and non-experts alike; and includes knowing what you don't know as 
well as what you do know. For example, a human who is asked to give the telephone 
number of Father Christmas would know immediately that such a number doesn't 
exist, but an ES would waste valuable time searching through its data and rules to 
find a solution. There is unfortunately no easy way to build this enormous quantity 
of commonsense knowledge involved in everyday problem-solving into a specialist 
system like an ES, but new developments are taking place rapidly and commonsense 
knowledge representation is a top priority. 86 
Because of the abovementioned disadvantages ES's are mostly used in an advisory 
capacity as an aid to an expert or novice user in some problem area. As these 
shortcomings do not reflect a fundamental limitation of AI, but only the current state 
of the art, the status of ES's in future may change dramatically and some human 
professionals may even become extinct!87 
86 Waterman 14. 
87 According to Katsh 28 the novelty of computers and the fast developing realm of 
"cyberspace" (the space one enters when communicating electronically via 
computer networks) is not really the speed and expertise with which tasks are 
performed, but rather the removal of constraints of space and distance, resulting 
in the formation of new relationships between people and information. An example 
is the availability of professional services via the computer instead of from a 
consultation with a doctor or lawyer etc, as is the case when a Self-Help System 
is used: see ch 1 para 1.1 supra. See also Kupfer 1987 Fortune of 12 October 
47 where it is alleged that companies are using ES's to help them do everything 
from "approving loans to hunting enemy submarines". 
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8. Structure of expert systems 
8.1 Architecture 
Although ES architecture varies according to the specific ES application, the following 
general components (as shown in figure 2) are common to all systems.88 
8.1.1 User interface 
The user interface acts as the medium through which the user communicates with the 
system and vice versa. This facility should ideally consist of a natural-language 
processor that accepts and returns information in essentially the same form as a 
human expert. Although natural-language dialogue is not yet completely capable, 
current systems show good results.89 
8.1.2 Knowledge base 
The powerful corpus of knowledge that is built into the ES is the heart of an ES. 
This knowledge is stored in the knowledge base in the form of facts, rules and 
heuristics. It has already been mentioned90 that the process of acquiring and 
representing this knowledge in an ES is called knowledge engineering and that it 
is done by the KE. Apart from the knowledge obtained from the domain expert, the 
system may also contain expertise from other sources such as books, journals, 
etcetera. The extraction of knowledge from the human expert is referred to as 
88 On the architecture of ES's in general, see Layton 2-19; Rolston 6-14; Waterman 
16-23; Franken eta/ 418-422; Susskind 11-16. 
89 The development of natural language processing is very topical among AI 
scientists, and even more so among ES developers as communications should be 
as natural as possible because the system is after all meant to substitute a 
human. 
90 Par 2.2 supra. 
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knowledge acquisition91 and the way in which this knowledge is stored or 
organised is referred to as knowledge representation. 92 The work pertaining to 
the inference procedures, that is the methods of reasoning, which are going to be 
used by the ES during problem-solving, is termed knowledge utilisation. 93 
Knowledge representation is done by adopting various techniques, any of which can 
be used alone or in combination with others. The most widely used methods of 
representation are: 
8.1.2.1 Production rules 
A rule consists of a statement of the form "if something is true, then something else 
is true". These are called IF (set of condition) THEN (set of action) statements, IF 
THEN rules for short. An example of such a rule is the following: 
IF 1 - The patient's infection is primary-bacteraemia 
and 2 - The site is one of the sterile sites 
THEN There is evidence that the category is enterobacteriaceae94 
Rule-based knowledge representation 95 is by far the most popular system as it is 
reasonably easy to code because it is based on formal logic which provides a natural 
way to describe processes in a changing environment. 
91 Susskind 9; Franken et a/ 426. 
92 Susskind 10; Franken et a/430. 
93 Susskind 10. 
94 A rule taken from MYCIN, the medical ES that diagnoses and treats bacterial 
infections, discussed in par 4.2 supra. 
95 Such ES's are also referred to as "rule-based systems": Waterman 20; Franken 
eta/ 434. 
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Layton96 criticises the overuse of rules as this differs from the human thought 
process. 97 
8.1.2.2 Semantic nets 
This method is based on a network structure, graphically depicting relationships 
between elements in a domain. 98 This is done by connecting points (nodes) with 
links (arcs) that describe the relationships between the nodes. Common types of 
arcs that are used for representing these hierarchies are is-a and part-of (see 
figure 3). 
8.1.2.3 Frames 
A frame is a data-structure consisting of a series of slots representing concepts or 
situations. 99 Each slot represents a typical attribute of the concept represented by 
the frame. Figure 4 shows a frame for the concept car. A frame-based system 
consists of various interrelated frames representing the domain. 
96 At18. 
97 Humans arrive at solutions to problems not only by logic, but also by comparing 
analogous situations, applying heuristics, and even from intuition which can be 
very illogical. And to complicate matters even further from a logical point of view, 
these human thought processes tend to be in action simultaneously in a parallel 
mode (this is one of the reasons why researchers are currently investigating the 
possibility of using "neural networks" as they follow a parallel working method: see 
par 8.1.2.5 infra). 
98 Waterman 21; Franken et a/430. 
99 The idea of frames originated from Marvin Minsky in 1975 in a famous paper 
entitled "A framework for the representation of knowledge" published in The 
psychology of computer vision, McGraw-Hill, 1975 as cited by Layton 14 and 
Waterman 73. See also Franken et a/432. 
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8.1.2.4 Case-based reasoning 
This form of representation was first developed in the United States where it is 
particularly suited to the domain of Anglo-American law with their "common law" legal 
system and methods of stare decisis, 100 as it involves the manipulation of 
cases. 101 Case-based reasoning entails the use of frames to represent the facts 
and decisions of cases. New facts are then matched with existing cases to seek 
appropriate findings which can be used in analogical argument. 102 
8.1.2.5 Neural networks 
This is a new method of representation which is based on the way the human brain 
works, imitating "brain logic" which functions in a parallel mode instead of "machine 
logic" which functions sequentially. 103 Neural networks are gaining acceptance 
among computer scientists and are seen as a potential breakthrough in the field of 
AI as they may prove capable of dealing with judgmental questions. 104 Also called 
"connectionism", the idea is to represent knowledge in the same way as networks of 
neurons in the brain. The contention is that each neuron's output is determined by 
the number and intensity of its inputs and that they learn to recognise patterns by 
1 00 The doctrine of case precedent, also followed in SA law: Fellner v Minister of the 
Interior 1954 4 SA 523 (A). 
101 Franken et a/436-438; Rissland and Ashley 214-215. 
102 See Rissland and Ashley 213-230 for a discussion of their research project HYPO, 
which is a precedent-based legal reasoner using the case-based reasoning 
method to perform legal reasoning in the domain of trade secret law. 
103 Reed(1) 236-239. 
104 The Sunday Star of 22 August 1993 reported on a research project at York 
University in northern England involving the development of neural networks in 
designing a computer model to recognise faces. The system is able to link certain 
characteristics of a person's face to a database of habits, twitches, facial 
expressions, movements and profiles associated with individuals: see Staff 
reporter Sunday Star of 22 August 1993. 
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adjusting the outputs of each neuron to other neurons. 105 
8.1.3 Inference engine 
The inference engine contains knowledge of how to use the domain knowledge. It 
must be able to search for the appropriate knowledge and when it is located, to infer 
new knowledge from the existing knowledge in the knowledge base. In other words, 
it is responsible for managing the process of generating new information. The 
engine's search strategy that is used in this process is called the inference paradigm 
and although there are many different paradigms in use, most of them are based on 
two major methods: 
(a) forward chaining, also called "data-directed inference", which is a bottom-
up reasoning process that works forward from known conditions toward the 
desired goal106; and 
(b) backward chaining, also called "goal-directed inference", which is a top-
down reasoning process that works backwards from the desired goals to 
105 An example of a neural network software package is the Neural control and 
optimisation package from NeuraiWare, USA. This is an advanced current state-
of-the-art software suite which uses on-line adaptive neural network based 
techniques for process control problems in industries: Staff reporter of the 
Engineering News of 24 January 1997. Parallel computing has also been the key 
technique behind Deep Blue, the chess-playing IBM computer: Gelernter The 
Times of 19 May 1997. 
1 06 Eg in the case of a rule that states: 
IF 
THEN : 
F and B exist 
Z exists 
when the system's goal is to determine whether or not Z exists, forward chaining 
would mean that the system will start by searching for rules that establish F and 
B and will then infer Z. 
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the requisite conditions. 107 
The choice of an inference paradigm and the way the inference engine is constructed 
depends ultimately on the nature of the problem domain and the type of knowledge 
representation in the ES. 
In the early 1980's computer scientists began putting inference processes in an 
independent system, enabling ES builders to add only their particular domain 
knowledge to construct a finished ES. This led to the birth of ES shells, 108 most 
of which today contain a knowledge representation formalism as well as an inference 
engine. 109 An ES shell is created by removing the domain-specific knowledge of 
an existing ES and leaving the inference mechanism to be applied to a different 
problem domain. 110 This makes it possible for ES builders to construct different 
ES's simply by changing the domain knowledge that is put into the shell. There are 
various ES shells currently available on the market, each wim its own 
characteristics. 111 
8.1.4 Knowledge update facility 
This facility is used to modify the knowledge base of an ES in a domain where the 
107 Using the same example as in the previous fn, this would mean that the system 
starts with what it wants to prove, namely Z, and searches for the rules that 
conclude F and B which then establish Z. The inference chain created here is 
identical to the one created by forward chaining, the only difference lies in the 
method in which the rules are searched: Waterman 67; Franken et a/421. 
108 These shells are also called "skeletal systems": Susskind 155. 
109 Layton 7-8; Susskind 155-157; Franken et a/419. 
110 The best known skeletal system is EMYCIN, meaning Empty MYCIN, which 
resulted from the removal of the infections diagnosis rules from the ES MYC/N: 
Susskind 155. 
111 Eg, EXSYS (short for "expert system"), PC PLUS (derived from "personal 
computer"). 
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knowledge continually expands and changes. 
8.1.5 Explanation facility 
Just like an expert, an ES must be able to explain the reasoning that led to the 
solution of a complex problem. This facility consists of identifying the steps in the 
reasoning process coupled with a justification of each step. Rolston 112 points out 
that the credibility of an ES depends largely on the system's ability to explain its own 
reasoning. 
8.2 Persons involved in the production and use of expert systems 
The persons involved in the production and use of ES's can be divided into two main 
groups, namely the producers and the users (see figure 5). The producers consist 
of the developers, who are the various persons involved in designing and building 
the ES, and the suppliers, who are the persons responsible for the distribution of 
ES's. In some instances ES's are acquired directly from the developers, in which case 
a supplier does not feature. 113 The users consist of professional users who use 
ES's as an aid in the execution of their professional duties, and non-professional 
users who use ES's for instruction in a specific domain. Based on the architecture 
and the nature of ES's, the following persons are involved in the production 114 and 
use of ES's: 115 
112 At 11. 
113 This will usually be the case when the ES is acquired in terms of a development 
contract (bespoke or customised software): see par 1 0.1.1 infra. 
114 Production refers to the development (which includes the designing and the 
manufacture of an ES) and to the distribution (which includes the supply of an ES). 
115 On the various persons involved in the production and use of ES's, see in general 
Waterman 8-11 . 
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8.2.1 Domain expert (DE) 
This is a knowledgeable person with a reputation for solving problems in a certain 
field of knowledge. The DE is responsible for the content of the knowledge that is 
contained in the knowledge base of an ES and is one of the developers of an ES. 
8.2.2 Expert-system-toolbuilder (toolbuilder) 
This is the programmer that builds the expert-system-building tool which refers to the 
programming language and the support environment116 used to build the ES. For 
this purpose an existing ES shell can be used or a complete individually tailored 
system can be constructed. The toolbuilder and the KE are referred to as the 
designers of the ES. The designers and the DE are the developers of the ES. 
8.2.3 Knowledge engineer (KE) 
This is the person, usually with a background in computer science and AI, who knows 
how to build ES's. He interviews the experts, organizes the knowledge, decides on 
it~ form of representation and may even help the toolbuilder to write the programming 
code. As stated in the previous paragraph, the KE is a designer of the ES and also 
one of the developers of the ES. 
8.2.4 Developer 
The developer of an ES, who may be a single person but is more likely to be a juristic 
person, is responsible for the production of the ES. The developer can be compared 
to the manufacturer of a product. 117 It may be that the developers of an ES consist 
116 The support environment consists of various facilities that help the user interact 
with the ES, eg debugging aids, editors and graphic devices. 
117 See ch 3 par 3.3.6 infra. 
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of only the DE and the designers themselves, in which case they undertake the 
production as well as the designing of the system, but more often the developer 
consists of a software house by whom the designers are employed or with whom they 
and the DE are engaged in a contract, or to whom they have sold their system for 
production. 
8.2.5 Supplier 
The supplier supplies the ES to the user. There may be a chain of suppliers involved 
in the distribution of an ES, or it may be that the developer supplies the ES directly 
to the user, in which case there is no separate supplier. 118 
8.2.6 User 
This refers to the person who uses the developed ES. The user is not involved in 
the production of an ES. In this study the term "user" actually refers to the "end-user'' 
who is the person for whom the system has been developed as opposed to any other 
user of the system, for example a programmer who also uses the system for 
updating purposes. 119 A further distinction is made between a professional user, 
referring to a person in an acknowledged profession like a doctor, lawyer, engineer, 
etcetera that uses ES's in the course of the professional service she provides to third 
parties, and a non-professional user who is a lay-person in the domain of the ES 
that she is using, for example a taxpayer who uses an ES for advice on tax 
deductions. This type of user utilises the results of the ES herself, not involving third 
parties. The Intelligent Assistant is designed for use by professional users and the 
118 It must be noted that in many instances of delictual ES liability, the liability of the 
suppliers differ substantially from that of the rest of the producers because they 
(the suppliers) will not ordinarily incur manufacturers' liability as would the 
developers of software: see par 8.2.4 supra. 
119 A user in its widest sense, is any person who uses an ES, such as an end-user, 
a DE, a KE, a toolbuilder or a support staff member. 
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Self-Help System is especially designed for non-professional users. The ES Machine 
can be used by any of the two typs of users. This distinction is important when 
liability is determined because of the different policy issues that come into play in a 
system that is used as a tool during the exercise of professional duties and in a 
system that is available on the mass-market as standard software in the form of a 
packaged product to consumers. 120 An interactive user is a user that has to provide 
information to the ES by way of user input. 
9. Defective expert systems, the incorrect use of expert systems and the 
non-use of expert systems 
In terms of the research question of this study, all parties who could possibly be held 
civilly liable in South African law when the use of ES's causes loss to someone, has 
to be identified. The situations in which the use of ES's could lead to loss being 
suffered is limited in this study to instances where a defective ES is used, or an ES 
is incorrectly used or an existing ES is not used.121 The civil liabilities incurred 
through the use of ES's in each of these situations are discussed with reference to 
the three different types of ES's identified. 122 The following paragraphs describe 
the ways in which faults and errors in the design and structure of ES's, or the 
improper treatment of ES's, may lead to damage. 123 
120 Capper and Susskind 122 point out that the group of users consisting of lay-users 
who are private consumers, will attract increased liability from the ES producers 
in the event of loss suffered, but that the professional users, who are able to 
assess for themselves the suitability of an ES, will attract the least liability from the 
producers. 
121 See ch 1 par 1.4.1 supra. 
122 See ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
123 Par 9.2 and 9.3 infra. 
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9.1 The mechanism of computer systems 
Although a computer is able to perform many complex tasks, it is inherently a 
moronically simple device that can only recognise one of two states such as yes or 
no, or on or off. 124 A computer must be told how to perform any task and this is 
done by having the instruction carried by a computer program called the software 
to the hardware which is the computer itself, referring to the boxes and electronics 
it contains. 125 A hybrid form of computer material containing elements of hardware 
as well as software has also been developed. This is called firmware and consists 
of a semi-conductor chip encoded with a computer program in its memory which is 
permanently embedded in the computer. 126 ES's may occur in the form of software 
or firmware. During the execution of any task the software and hardware are 
constantly interacting with each other. In this respect the technical distinction of 
software into application software and operation system software applies. The 
application software communicates with the computer through its c~eration system 
software in order to have a specific task performed. 127 ES's are a type of 
application software. The user uses the computer system 128 by supplying input 
data and receiving output data. Data refers to a statement of fact which must be 
distinguished from the concept of information, which is the knowledge conveyed to 
124 Binary notation is the term used to describe such a system and uses the symbols 
0 and 1 to depict the two states. It is therefore plain to see how easily errors can 
arise when a state which should be 0 is 1 or vice versa: Kelman and Sizer 9. 
125 Kelman and Sizer 10 illustrate the workings of a computer system by comparing 
it with a multi-layered sandwich where the sandwich is the hardware and the 
layers in between are different types of software. Van der Merwe 3 uses the 
analogy of a gramophone(hardware) and records(software), which should today 
perhaps be replaced with a compact disk player and CO's! 
126 Van der Merwe 3 33: Visser 1984 CILSA 33. 
127 For example, this thesis was written with the aid of Wordperfect, a 
wordprocessing program as tl1e application software, using Windows which rides 
on the back of DOS, as the ope.·ation system software. 
128 This is comprised of the computer (hardware) and the program (software). 
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the mind by the data. 129 Van der Merwe130 is of the opinion that information is 
created by a computer organising otherwise worthless data. Geldenhuys 131 gives 
a comprehensive definition of "information" of which the ability to be perceived by the 
senses forms an essential prerequisite and states that only data which cannot 
comply with that requirement, does not amount to information. According to him, 
information as such cannot qualify as an object of law in the sense that there exists 
a "right to information" in general. 132 There are, however, certain categories of 
information that serve as legal objects in regard to which subjective rights exist, for 
example in the law of copyright, patents, trade marks, privacy, reputation, etc. In 
these categories information does serve as a legal object and it is quite possible that 
new categories of information could be defined and recognised in future because the 
existing subjective rights do not form a numerus clausus. Geldenhuys further points 
out that information itself is not legally protected, only certain deserving individual and 
community interests with regard to information are protected. 133 Such protection 
is found in legal rules which prohibit the infringement of these interests as are found 
in, for example, copyright law in the private interest sphere and the law pertaining to 
129 Kelman and Sizer 22. 
1.30 At ix-x. 
131 At 59. 
132 Geldenhuys 93-97. The reason being that although certain information does 
comply with the following requirements for a legal object, this cannot be said of all 
information: 
(1) the entity must be of value to some or other legal subject and be able to 
satisfy a need; 
(2) it can be lawfully ascribed to one legal subject to the exclusion of others -
this implies that it is not freely available and it can be controlled by 
humans and it is adequately certain, defined and independent for the 
possibility of enjoyment and disposement; 
(3) the entity must be able to fulfil a function of community ordering 
(gemeenskapsordening). 
133 "(R)egtens beskermwaardige indiwiduele en gemeenskaplike belange" : 
Geldenhuys 531-538. 
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state secrets in the public interest sphere. 134 
9.2 Faults and errors in expert systems 
9.2.1 Source of errors 
From the above explanation of the working of a computer system it can be 
appreciated that errors in the output of such a system can arise from many sources: 
the hardware or software may be faulty, or may develop faults when interacting with 
each other or with other components in the network, 135 or the user may have 
supplied incorrect or insufficient data. ES's in particular are more susceptible to faults 
because of their unique program design and function. 136 For purposes of this study 
it must be assumed that with regard to a defective ES, it has already been 
established that the source of any errors or faults lies in the ES itself, as opposed to 
any other software or hardware fault. 
ES's do not necessarily have to be defective to cause an injury, the incorrect use of 
ES's may also cause damage. 137 ES's that are highly user-interactive138 
134 Ibid. 
135 A computer network exists where one or more computers that store and maintain 
data, are able to communicate with other computers as and when required. 
136 The most striking difference between ES software and conventional software is 
found in the separation of the knowledge base from the inference engine and the 
use of heuristics: par 5.1 and par 5.2 supra. ES's are therefore much more 
difficult to design at the conceptual level than conventional software applications, 
as it entails two development strategies, two functional and problem-solving 
methodologies and also two sets of maintenance requirements: Tuthill 1991 A/ 
Expert 48. 
137 An example is scenario (1) sketched in ch 1 para 1.1 supra, where the patient 
suffers damage due to a wrong diagnosis from MYCIN caused by incorrect data 
supplied by the doctor. 
138 A term used to describe a system that relies on user input to match facts with 
information in the knowledge base. The Intelligent Assistant and the Self-Help 
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complicate the issue of liability because of the possibility that a malfunction could 
have originated from wrong input on the part of the user. Injury may also be caused 
through undue reliance placed on the system by the user. 139 These occurrences 
are referred to as the incorrect use of an ES, and for purposes of this study it is 
accepted that the ES thus used, is a sound ES, in other words, that the ES itself is 
not defective. As ES's become more commonplace, it is also conceivable that a 
person may be negligent in not using an existing ES. In other words, the non-use 
of an ES may cause an injury. 
9.2.2 Types of errors: Faulty design/development and improper execution 
Two basic types of errors may occur when ES's are used: those resulting from faulty 
design/development, 140 and those resulting from improper execution. 141 
Design and development errors include errors incurred during the identification or 
determination of the mission statement, knowledge base, target audience, explanation 
subsystem, type and extent of user input, number of results, selection of knowledge-
base source, speed of execution, training distribution or maintenance of the system. 
Execution errors include errors or bugs in the inference engine, program bugs in the 
knowledge base, user input errors and undue user reliance on system outputs. The 
first type of errors include the design and manufacture defects typically found in 
product liability cases, 142 which originate from a defect in the preliminary design of 
the product or from the actual manufacturing of the product. Such defects usually 
System are examples of user-interactive ES's: see par 11 infra. 
139 See Turley 1988 CLJ 4 71. 
140 See table 1 in appendix Ill. 
141 See table 2 in appendix Ill. 
142 The distinction that is drawn in product liability cases between design and 
manufacture defects can also be applied to defects in software: see ch 3 par 
3.3.2.3 infra. 
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result in one or more of the producers 143 being at risk of incurring liability for 
subsequent damage caused. The second type of errors include design and 
manufacture faults in the execution of the ES, such as incorrect linking between the 
knowledge base and the inference engine which causes a fault in the execution of the 
program, 144 as well as errors by the user. These defects point to the users, and in 
some cases the producers, being at risk. 145 Appendix Ill contains a list of the 
various risk areas in which these errors may occur, together with a definition of the 
specific risk area and a description of the consequence of the error (exposure), 
concluding with an indication of the person who risks possible liability. 146 
9.3 Injured parties 
Damage caused by the use of an ES may be sustained either by the user of the ES 
or by another person. The latter may be injured through the use of the ES by the 
user, 147 or through simply being in the vicinity of the operation of the ES, similar to 
the position of the "innocent bystander" in a situation of product liability. 148 The 
injured party who is not the user of the ES, may be in a contractual relationship with 
the user, such as the patient or client of the professional doctor- or attorney- user, or 
may be a third party in relation to the user, such as the dependent of the patient or 
client. In both these cases, the injured party would be a third party in relation to the 
producer of the ES. The injured user may be in a contractual relationship with the 
143 The producers of an ES consist of the various people involved in the production 
of an ES, see par 8.2 supra. 
144 See table 2 in appendix Ill. 
145 Ibid. 
146 Tables I and II are taken from Tuthill 1991 A/ Expert 46-47 and adapted for 
purposes of this thesis to reflect the risk candidates as defined in this discussion. 
147 For example, a professional user making use of the Intelligent Assistant. 
148 For example. a pedestrian who is killed by an aeroplane crash caused oy a 
defective ES Machine contained in the plane's fly-by-wire system: see ch 1 par 1 
supra. 
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producers, either by way of a licensing contract or an acquisition contract. 
10. The identification of possible liable parties when damage is caused by 
the use of expert systems 
In the previous paragraphs the persons involved in the production and the use of 
ES's were identified and the ways in which they could have caused or contributed to 
a defective output from ES's were pointed out. 149 The question whether any of 
these persons may be liable for damage caused to an injured party by such use of 
ES's, will depend on the legal relationships that exist among themselves and the 
relationships existing between them and the injured parties. Another factor which 
influences the identification of possible liable parties, is the distinction in the kinds of 
output effected by software. 150 In a situation where the ES effects a material 
output151 , a direct causal link will usually exist between a defect in the software and 
the resulting damage, but where the ES has an intellectual output152 only, the 
intervention of a human user can cause a break in the chain of causation between 
a defect in the software and possible damage. 153 
149 See par 8.2 and 9.2 supra. 
150 See par 10.1 infra. 
151 An output that brings about a material or physical change in the environment, such 
as is found in an ES Machine: see par 1 0.1.2 infra. 
152 An output consisting of information, in other words an intellectual output which 
does not by itself bring about a material change in the environment. Change in 
the environment will only occur after a human has acted upon the information, for 
example in the case of the lnte!!:gent Assistant: see par 1 0.1.2 infra. 
153 See ch 5 part II pars 9.1.3 and 9.2.2 infra. 
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10.1 Distinctions in the nature of software 
10.1.1 Commercial distinction 
The different ways in which software may be acquired are referred to as the 
commercial distinction in the nature of software. Software is generally acquired in 
two ways, namely as standard or package software, or as custom or bespoke 
software. Standard software is also known as off-the-shelf software because it is 
available in multiple copies over the counters of suppliers. Custom software is 
specifically developed on instruction from a client and usually only available in one 
copy for the client. Standard software is therefore analogous to mass-marketed 
products whereas custom software amounts to the rendering of a service. 154 It is 
also possible to acquire a hybrid form of software in the case of standard package 
software which is adapted to suit the user's requirements, resulting in customised 
software. The contention among Anglo-American writers 155 is that standard 
software should be classified as products which are then purchased or hired, and 
that custom software as well as the hybrid form of customised software amount to the 
rendering of services governed by a service contract. 156 In South African law the 
manner of acquisition does not depend on the nature of the goods or services, but 
on the nature of the transaction or agreement that took place between the relevant 
parties. 157 
154 Reed(1) 67. 
155 Reed(1) 67; Tapper 182; Cole 1990 CLJ 159; Tuthill 1991 AI EXPERT49; 
Turley 1988 CLJ 458; Birnbaum 1988 CLJ 149. 
156 Reed(1) 67 69 argues that the main purpose of a "software development contract" 
is the provision of a service, namely the production of software to the client's 
requirements, whereas the acquiring of mass-produced "package software" on 
physical media amounts to the provision of goods. The importance of the 
classification of software into goods or services in terms of Anglo-American law 
lies in the different theories of liability applicable to goods and services 
respectively: see ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 infra. 
157 See ch 3 par 2.6.2.1 infra. 
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1 0.1.2 Functional distinction 
The different functions of ES's can be explained in terms of the functional 
distinction in the nature of software. Software can either be incorporated into a 
machine (in the broad sense) or in a robot where its function is to instruct the 
machine or robot to move and work, or it can be used to instruct a computer to 
provide information and perform tasks to the benefit of a user. 158 In the first 
instance a material output is effected in that the robot is directed by the software to 
perform tasks that bring about physical and material changes in the environment, for 
example the plane can fly itself, the life-support system can change the patient's 
medicine, etcetera. In the second instance an intellectual output consisting of 
information is given to the user that runs the program on her computer. In the case 
of software used in a machine or robot, the software has the same role as any other 
mechanical device and may therefore be regarded as a component part of the 
machine or robot. In the case of an intellectual output, software has the role of a 
source of information for the human user.159 
Although ES's fall into either of the two categories mentioned above, overseas 
computer literature 160 concerning the problem of legal liabilities refers mainly to 
ES's that generate an intellectual output. The reason for this is found in the fact that 
the output consists of information which, because of its intangible nature, struggles 
to fit into the classic legal concepts such as products, goods or services. 161 The 
giving of advice by way of an ES, in the domain of an acknowledged profession such 
as medicine or law, actually amounts to the rendering of professional services 
158 Triaille 1993 CLSR 222. 
159 Triaille ibid illustrates the distinction by describing the intellectual output software 
as a computer program that tells the user how to prepare an apple pie and the 
material output software when installed in a robot, as a computer program that 
causes the robot actually to make the pie. 
160 South African legal literature has not yet produced any comments on ES liabilities. 
161 Stuurman 128; Tapper 264. 
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through the operation of a computer program, which in the case of packaged software 
is sold as goods and more specifically, as a consumer product. 162 
The problem relating to classifying ES's as goods or services for purposes of 
contractual liability has already been referred to above. 163 With regard to delictual 
liability, the embodiment of professional services in a product leads to a conflict of 
policies in Anglo-American law when legal remedies are considered. 164 The reason 
is that products are governed by strict liability principles whereas services are ruled 
by negligence principles. 165 Tapper166 summarises the problem as follows: 
The nature of expert systems is, in essence, that professional services are 
packaged and sold as consumer products. Given the wholly different legal 
policies which apply to the provision of professional services and of 
consumer products, it is not surprising that difficulty occurs. 
In the codified legal systems of Germany and the Netherlands, product liability is in 
some circumstances regulated by strict liability principles in conformance with the 
directives of European Union law and in other instances by the general law of 
delict.167 Damage caused by the provision of services are also regulated by the 
general law of delict. 
In South African law, product liability has so far not enjoyed the prominence it has 
(and is continuing to have) in American law. 168 However, the possibility of 
162 See ch 5 part I pars A 1.2 and B 1.2 infra; part II par 9.2.3 infra; part Ill pars 
A 1.2 and B 1.2 infra. 
163 See par 1 0.1.1 supra. 
164 See ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 infra. 
165 Tapper 264. 
166 At 264. 
167 See ch 5 part II pars A 5.1 and B 3.1 infra. 
168 See ch 5 part I par B 3.3 infra. 
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regarding software as a product in South African law necessitates fresh attention to 
the principles of Aquilian liability requiring fault, especially when the difficult position 
of the plaintiff of having to prove negligence on the part of the producer, is taken into 
account. 169 The supply of incorrect or defective information is analogous to the 
making of a misrepresentation or misstatement. 170 In the context of ES applications 
such incorrect advice raises the problematic aspect in law of negligent misstatements 
causing pure economic loss. 171 
Another issue that needs to be addressed is that of "professional liability", both in 
regard to the professional user of an ES that gives professional advice, as well as 
with regard to the producers of software, as being members of a profession. 172 The 
latter instance raises the question whether the South African software industry has 
evolved into a fully-fledged profession yet, duly regulated and controlled. 173 In this 
respect the question further arises whether the producers of the ES should be held 
liable according to the standard of skill applicable to the profession in which the ES 
works, or whether they should be held liable to the standard of skill currently 
practised by the software industry or profession. 174 In this regard the impact of 
standardisation and certification needs to be investigated. 175 Closely related to the 
applicable standard of skill applicable, is the increasing awareness of "software 
169 See ch 3 par 3.3.6 infra. 
170 Tapper 250; Reed(1) 72. See ch 3 par 3.3.6 infra. 
171 See ch 3 par 3.3.6 infra. 
172 The question whether a claim based on professional liability can be instituted 
against the producers of software, has been raised by Anglo-American computer 
law writers: see Cole 1990 CLJ 207-211 ; Bott et a/ 236-238. See also ch 5 part I 
pars A 2.7 and 8 2.7 infra. 
173 So far, only Britain formally recognises "software engineering" as a profession: see 
ch 5 part I par A 2. 7 infra. 
17 4 In the USA mention is made of "computer malpractice" in this regard: see ch 5 
part I par A 2.7 infra. 
175 See ch 3 par 3.3.6 infra. 
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safety" and the role of "quality assurance". 176 
10.2 Legal relationships 
In some instances, liability will be based on contract, and in some instances, on 
delict. For example, where damage is caused to the user by a bug in the knowledge 
base which was traced to the incorrect representation method chosen by the KE, 177 
the latter's liability towards the user will depend on the type of contract in existence 
between them and whether such liability has been excluded or not in an exemption 
clause of the contract. In the absence of a contract, liability will depend on the 
existence of a delictual ground of liability. If the KE designed the ES on instruction 
from a developer, the developer may be vicariously liable towards the user and the 
liability of the KE towards the developer will depend on the relationship between 
them. 
In dealing with issues of liability a distinction is made between the two main groups 
of persons involved, namely the producers and the users (see figure 5). The 
producers consist of the software developers and the software suppliers in the chain 
of distribution. The developer consists of the DE, KE and toolbuilders. The users 
consist of professional users and non-professional users according to the function 
of the ES (see figure 6 for a depiction of links indicating the contractual relationships.) 
1 0.2.1 Legal relationships among the producers 
In the ordinary course of events the toolbuilder and the KE will be employed by the 
176 Ibid. 
177 Such an error is categorised as a faulty design/development type of error which 
occurred during knowledge acquisition and representation. See appendix Ill 
table 1. 
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developer178 who may either be a software development company, also called a 
software house179 or an individual. As shown in the previous paragraph, it is also 
possible for the KE and the toolbuilder to provide their services to the developer or 
to each other as independent contractors. The DE will provide the expert knowledge 
in terms of a contract with the developers for ser-Vices rendered. The supplier will be 
in a contractual relationship with the developer of the ES. 
ES's that give professional advice in a particular field of knowledge raise the question 
of the professional liability of the producers. Can the producers of such a system be 
held to a professional standard of negligence when harm is caused by a defective 
system? 
10.2.2 Legal relationships between the producers and injured parties who are 
not users of the expert system 
In the ordinary course of events no contract will exist between the producers and the 
injured parties who are not users of the system. Such injured parties will be in a 
similar position as the "innocent bystander" in situations where damage is caused 
through the use of a defective ES which means that any claim for compensation will 
be based on delictual liability. 180 It must be noted that the supplier of an ES does 
not incur the same liability as the developer of an ES who, in the case of a defective 
ES, is in the same position as the manufacturer of a defective product. 
178 Reed (1) 66; Tapper 137. 
179 A software house is a legal entity whose business it is to develop and market 
software. 
180 See ch 3 par 3.3.6 infra. 
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1 0.2.3 Legal relationships between the users and producers 
The user could either have bought the ES as standard or off-the-shelf181 software 
from a software supplier or could have entered into a software development 
contract with the developer of the software. In the first instance there may be an 
acquisition contract182 between the user and the supplier but not between the user 
and the developer, whereas in the second instance the acquisition contract may exist 
between the user and the developers themselves. In both instances a licensing 
contract may exist between the user and developer. 183 The first type of software 
is also referred to as standard or package software which is available in multiple 
copies froffi..$uppliers and the second type as.bespoke or custom software of which 
there is usually only one copy designed to suit the client's specific needs. 184 
10.2.4 Legal relationships between the user and injured parties 
A contract for the provision of services may exist between the user and the injured 
party. In the case of a professional user, the professional liability of the user may be 
at stake. It may also be that the injured party is not in a contractual relationship with 
th~ user, such as a dependant of the injured party, in which case only a delictual 
action is available. 185 
181 "Off-the-shelf' means that the software is literally available from the shelves of the 
software house or supplier and is therefore comparable to a product. 
182 See ch 3 par 2.6 infra. 
183 See ch 3 par 2.5 infra. 
184 Reed(2) 67 et seq. 
185 The special actions of dependants are not discussed in this study. 
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11. Conclusion 
From the outline of the structure of an ES given above, 186 it can be seen that it may 
be very difficult to determine precisely who is responsible for a design or 
development defect in an ES, since an error may originate from any one or more than 
one of the various parties collectively referred to as the producers of the system. 
With regard to the execution of an ES, it is also possible that the users of the system 
may be responsible for the incorrect use of the system. This difficulty is further 
compounded in a negligence action because of the burden on the plaintiff to prove 
that the defendant's conduct falls short of that of the reasonable person 187 in 
circumstances where the defendant possesses more knowledge about the facts that 
have to be proved, than the plaintiff does. 188 It is no easy task for an injured 
member of the public whose knowledge or access to knowledge of computer 
technology may be very scanty, to litigate against a sophisticated computer software 
company. 
Another complicating factor in the identification of liable parties is the influence of the 
displacing effect of new computer and information technology media on legal 
relationships. 189 Displacement refers to the creation of a new electronic 
environment in which information is accessed, communicated and used. A new 
space called cyberspace, 190 in which physical restrictions of movement and limited 
capabilities are lifted, is entered through new ways of interacting with machines 
186 Par 8.2 supra. 
187 The test for negligence: see Boberg 269; Van der Walt 65; Neethling et a/130 et 
seq. 
188 See ch 3 par 3.3.6 infra. 
189 Katsh 26. 
190 Electronic space. Cf also Katsh 15 et seq in general. 
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endowed with the capability to respond to the user, such as ES's, hypertext191 and 
hypermedia. 192 The result is a change in the way in which information is used, not 
in the content of information. Distances become irrelevant as computer networks 
disperse information in an electronic world. 193 Informational distance refers to how 
inaccessible or accessible a medium makes information. 194 In the domain of 
professions, these informational distances and media settings are specifically relevant 
because a professional, by definition, controls a body of knowledge. When access 
to information is small and informational distances become greater, institutional roles 
become more distinct and professional authority grows. Conversely, professional 
authority declines when informational distances become smaller. 195 Consequently, 
the emergence of sophisticated computer systems such as the ES's embodied in the 
Self-Help System is effecting a dramatic change in the manner in which professional 
services are provided. The availability of such systems to the general public adds to 
the decline of that particular domain's informational distance which inevitably results 
in a blurring of the traditional responsibilities and duties of the information-provider. 
In the context of legal professionals for example, the status of lawyers is not simply 
related to their duties but also to their knowledge, and how distinct the information 
they possess and control is from commonly accessible information. The development 
of new links to legal information will inevitably change the role, authority and domain 
191 Hypertext refers to the representation of text in which keywords contain hyperlinks 
to other texts that expound on the keyword or on the original text and which 
themselves contain links to yet more texts: Katsh 198. It creates the opportunity 
to move through text in different ways by branching out of a text at a particular 
point and following a new direction; in other words, it is a non-linear form of 
acquiring information. Cf Katsh 198 et seq. 
192 Hypermedia is the evolvement of hypertext in that hyperlinks are established 
between text and sound, graphics and video. Cf Katsh 198 et seq. 
193 The "Internet" has revolutionised the accessibility and communication of global 
information. 
194 Katsh 59. 
195 Katsh 61. 
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of lawyers as the distance between law and citizen, and lawyer and layperson 
narrows. An example of such change has already been foreseen by some jurists who 
have raised issues concerning the unauthorised practice of professions through the 
use of computers as decision-aids. 196 
Some of these ES's, such as MES's, carry a great risk of potential injury to the vast 
amount of users when distributed on the mass-market. Another consequence of the 
proliferation of these software systems is the absence of any quality control or 
supervision of the content of the systems. In the case of ES's which furnish expert 
advice in the traditional professional domains such as medicine, law, architecture, 
etcetera, these systems, in contrast to their human counterparts, do not have to 
register with professional councils 197 and consequently the user public receives no 
protection by the organised profession. ES's built into safety-related products such 
as life-support systems also carry a risk of injury to users or third parties. The 
question arises whether the usual common law principles regarding delictual liability 
in South African law sufficiently protects injured parties in these instances. It is 
submitted that regard should be had to the imposition of strict liability principles in 
some instances of ES liability in analogy with the strict product liability principles 
applied in other jurisdictions. 198 
The following examples of hypothetical ES's will be used to discuss the potential 
liabilities involved: 
196 Willick 1986 Rutgers C& TLJ 22. Various legal and ethical aspects are involved 
when tasks which are traditionally considered central to professional practice are 
computerized. For example, most codes of professional ethics require 
practitioners to supervise the work of their subordinates personally, which rule 
serves as a safeguard against unauthorised practices. If computer systems 
capable of monitoring the work of subordinates are developed, this traditional 
safeguard in protecting the public's interest falls away. 
197 An example is the compulsory registration of doctors and other health care 
practitioners with the Medical and Dental Council of South Africa in terms of the 
Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service Professions Act 56 of 1974. 
198 See ch 6 par 7 infra. 
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(a) The Intelligent Assistant: an interactive ES produced for use by 
professional persons as a tool or decision-aid in the practising of their 
professions, for instance a MES to be used by a doctor in diagnosing an 
illness or prescribing a drug, a LES to be used by a lawyer in advising a 
client, drawing up documents or planning a trial or a design ES to be used 
by an engineer or an architect. 
(b) The Self-Help System: an interactive system produced for in-home use by 
lay persons to advise them on matters such as financial investments, 
income tax planning, how to clean your swimming pool and even divorce 
proceedings. 
(c) The ES Machine: a product which contains an ES as a component part, for 
example a fly-by-wire system in an aeroplane, a life-support system, or a 
radiation machine. 
With regard to the commercial distinction 199 in software, the ES's in example (a) will 
normally be acquired as standard software as well as custom software. Those in 
example (b) will be treated as standard software because that is the usual way in 
which such systems will be made available to the public while those in example (c) 
will be acquired in the same manner as any other product (the ES being only a 
component part of the product). 
These chosen examples represent a combination of the types of ES's that are 
currently available and reveal the legal issues that are most likely to occur if and 
when the use of such software leads to litigation. With regard to the functional 
distinction200 in software, the ES's in examples (a) and (b) have intellectual outputs 
and example (c) illustrates a material output.·· The civil liability incurred by the 
199 Par10.1.1supra. 
200 Par10.1.2supra. 
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producers and the users will be discussed in terms of the three types of ES's 
identified above201 and with regard to the defined use of ES's, namely where 
damage is caused because of the use of a defective ES, the incorrect use of an ES 
and the non-use of an ES. 202 
201 Namely, the Intelligent Assistant, the Self-Help System and the ES Machine. 
202 See ch 1 par 1.4.1 supra. 
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CHAPTER 3 
BASIS OF LIABILITY 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Objectives of this chapter 
As stated previously, 1 this thesis has three objectives, namely to: 
(a) identify all the parties that may possibly be held liable in the event of 
damage suffered through the use of an ES; 
(b) determine the contractual and delictual causes of action for the institution 
of claims for damages arising from such use; and 
(c) discuss the various forms of delictual liability arising from the use of an ES. 
The previous chapter was governed by the first objective.2 The people involved in 
the production and use of ES's were identified (see figure 5) and two main groups 
were distinguished: the people who develop and supply ES's or the producers; and 
the people who use the ES's or the users.3 The producers consist of the developers 
and the suppliers, and the users may be professional or non-professional.4 It is 
important to keep in mind the latter distinction between the various parties when ES 
liabilities are discussed, as different legal principles are applicable to the different 
1 Ch 1 par 1.2 supra. 
2 Ch 2 supra. 
3 See ch 2 par 10.2 supra. 
4 See ch 2 par 8.2.6 supra. 
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categories of parties. 5 
In this chapter the second objective6 will be explored by means of a discussion of the 
underlying principles of contractual and delictual liability in our law. Although both 
these grounds of liability constitute forms of unlawful conduct, the aims of the two 
types of liability differ considerably. Contractual liability, in the sense of determining 
the remedies arising from a breach of contract, 7 primarily seeks to remedy breaches 
of an agreement, whereas the law of delict primarily seeks to compensate an injured 
party for loss suffered.8 Contractual liability which refers to the remedies arising from 
breach of contract, depends on the type of contract entered into and is only 
applicable between the contracting parties. 9 Delictual liability depends on the 
infringement of a subjective right or the breach of a legal duty to compensate for loss 
caused. 10 It was further established that three basic types 11 of ES's occur in the 
5 For example, the contractual relationship between the supplier and the user will, 
under normal circumstances, be regulated by the principles of, for example, an 
agreement of purchase and sale whereas it may be that no acquisition contract is 
in existence between the developer and the user: see par 2.6.2 infra. However, 
a legal duty to prevent harm may rest on the developer towards the user, which 
may lead to delictual liability: see par 3.3.2.3 infra. 
6 . The third objective, namely a discussion of the various forms of delictual liability 
arising from the use of ES's, is treated in chs 5 and 6 infra. 
7 Contractual liability can be used in two senses: it may either refer to the obligation 
of fulfilling the terms of the contract, or it may refer to remedies arising from the 
breach of contract: see par 2.1 infra. This study is concerned with contractual 
liability in the latter meaning. 
8 Although it is accepted that a breach of contract can also amount to a delict, in 
that it is an unlawful and culpable act by one contracting party that causes 
damage to another contracting party, it is for historical and practical reasons 
considered as part of the law of contract and should not be treated as essentially 
the same as a delict as there are distinctive rules applying only to the law of 
contract and delict respectively: Neethling et a/ 6; Van der Walt 7; Van der 
Merwe and Olivier 479; Van der Merwe et al 236; Van Aswegen 424 et seq; 
Hasten et a/ 700-701. 
9 See par 2.2 infra. 
10 See par 3.3.2 infra. 
Chapter 3 Basis of liability 77 
world today and that various legal relationships may exist when they are used. 12 
Damage caused by the use of ES's is defined as referring to three situatons, namely 
damage caused by the use of a defective ES, the incorrect use of a sound ES, and 
the non-use of an existing ES. 13 
1.2 Basis of contractual liability 
The contractual relationships between and among the producers and users will be 
determined by the manner in which an ES is acquired, through an acquisition 
contract, and by the existence of a valid and enforceable software licensing 
agreement. 14 From the outset it must be understood that in the case of normal 
software use, two distinct contractual relationships are relevant between the 
producers and users: one contract comes into being when the software is acquired, 
whether it is one of sale, lease or the provision of services between the supplier and 
the user, namely the acquisition contract; and the other contract consists of the 
licensing agreement between the user and the developer of the software, the 
licensing contract (see figure 6). 15 The first contract regulates the rights and 
duties of the contracting parties which arise from the way in which the software is 
acquired, and the second contract regulates the user's use of the software in terms 
of the immaterial property rights of the developers and also creates an opportunity 
11 The Intelligent Assistant, the Self-Help System and the ES Machine: see ch 2 par 
11 supra. 
12 Ch 2 par 10.2 supra. 
13 See ch 1 par 1.4.1 and ch 2 par 9 supra. 
14 The manner in which the ES is acquired and the legal relationships existing among 
and between the parties are factors determining the type of contract entered into 
by the parties: ch 2 par 10 supra. 
15 The possibility of licensing as a form of acquisition is discussed infra: see par 
2.6.2.1 (d). 
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for the latter to limit their liability in case of damage caused. 16 The same situation 
applies to the acquisition and licensing of ES software. 
The contractual relationships among the producers of ES software will be determined 
by the acquisition or distribution agreement between the developer and the 
supplier, 17 and by the terms of employment or the terms of a programming services 
contract that may exist between the various developers such as the DE, the KE and 
the toolbuilders. 18 In cases where a third party is injured through the use of an ES 
by the user, a contractual relationship for the provision of services (which may be of 
a professional nature or not) may exist between the user and the injured party. 
Moreover a licensing contract also exists between the producer and user, whether the 
latter is a professional or not. 
It is possible to exclude liability for loss or damage arising from the use of the ES 
software or from errors or faults in the software by way of an exclusion clause 19 in 
any of the above-mentioned contracts, provided that the clauses are not found to be 
contrary to public policy.20 Exclusion or exemption clauses are terms which exclude 
or limit the contractual and/or delictual liability of a contractant. 21 Where only 
contractual liability is excluded, an injured party may still have a delictual action at her 
16 Apart from the question whether an enforceable licensing agreement has been 
entered into by the parties, the usage of the software is still restricted by the 
copyright protection provisions of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978: Mare 71. 
17 An independent supplier does not exist in cases where the software is acquired 
directly from the developer: see ch 2 par 1 0.2.1 supra. 
18 Tapper 164-170; see also par 2.6.2.2 infra. 
19 Vander Merwe 69; Tapper 199 et seq; Vander Merwe et al214 et seq. 
20 Morrison v Angelo Deep Gold Mines Ltd 1905 TS 775 779; Wells v SA Alumenite 
Co 1927 AD 69 72. 
21 See par 2.4.2 infra. 
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disposal provided the delictual requirements are met. 22 If delictual liability is also 
excluded an injured party may not have any action at her disposal. Notably in the 
case of computer licensing agreements, it is very common for the producers of 
software to minimise their liability in respect of both the type and the extent of loss 
for which they are liable.23 In this way liability for misrepresentation, breach of 
contract or liability imposed by the specific naturalia24 of a contract may be excluded 
or limited, the latter by putting a financial cap on the amount of damages that may 
be claimed by one defendant.25 As exemption clauses are used more often, it is 
becoming clear that they are used to empower contractants in a strong bargaining 
position to exploit co-contractants in a weaker position.26 Because of this, many 
such practices are viewed as unfair in foreign jurisdictions and have been restricted 
by legislation.27 In this regard the incidence of standard form contracts plays a 
significant role in the determination of contractual liabilities. 28 In South African law 
there is no statutory provision applicable to exemption clauses in general but a few 
specific provisions proscribe the inclusion of some terms in certain types of 
contracts.29 However, the South African Law Commission (SALC) is currently 
22 See par 3.3 infra. 
23 · See also Pistorius 1993 SA Mere LJ 17; Eiselen 1995 SA Mere LJ 14; Mare 16-
19. 
24 Naturalia are the terms of a contract which are attached ex lege to each contract 
of a particular class: see par 2.3 infra. 
25 Vander Merwe et a/214. 
26 See par 2.4 infra. 
27 Examples of this type of legislation are found in the English Unfair Contract Terms 
Act (UCTA) and the German Algemeine Geschaftsbedingungen Gesetz of 1976: 
see ch 5 part I and part II. See also Tapper 199; Vander Merwe et a/214-216. 
28 See par 2.4 infra. CfVan der Merwe et a/225; Mare 9; Symon 72. 
29 For example, ss 6(1 )(c) and (d) of the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980 which 
prohibit certain exclusion clauses in a credit agreement, and s 15(1 )(b) and (c) of 
the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 which prohibit certain terms in a contract for 
the purchase of land. 
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researching the possibility of drafting controlling legislation in this regard. 3° For this 
reason, specific reference is made only to Anglo-American Jaw as it pertains to 
exemption clauses, as the United States and England are among the first countries 
in the world to legislate against unconscionable contract terms, and it seems that the 
South African legislator may follow suit.31 No other comparative law discussion with 
regard to contractual liability is undertaken as the main emphasis of this study falls 
on delictual liability issues. 
Another reason for the inclusion of certain aspects of Anglo-American law in the 
discussion of contractual liability is the high incidence of computer contracts in South 
Africa that are subject to Anglo-American law.32 This stems from the fact that many 
software programs currently in use in South Africa are developed in the United States 
of America and Great Britain, and are consequently distributed with a licensing 
agreement containing terms relating to a foreign legal system and also stipulating 
such legal system as the applicable system in case of litigation.33 It is to the 
advantage of contractants to be aware of the invalidity or not of exemption clauses 
in certain jurisdictions. 34 
1.3 Basis of delictual liability 
An injured party may also have a claim based on delict against the person who 
wrongfully caused the harm if delictual requirements are met and a delictual claim is 
30 Project 47 of 1984: see par 2.4.3 infra. 
31 See par 2.4.3 infra. 
32 Van der Merwe 60; Symon 78; Morgan 1991 Elektron 11; Eiselen 1995 SA Mere 
LJ 14. 
33 Ibid. See also appendix IV par (5) which contains a choice of law clause of the 
license agreement of Borland Inc, based in California, regarding packaged custom 
software bought in South Africa that states that the licence statement shall be 
"construed, interpreted, and governed by the laws of the State of California". 
34 See ch 4 par 4.4 infra. 
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allowed. 35 The delictual action may exist on its own or may subsist in addition to 
the contractual claim. The latter will be the case where, apart from breach of 
contract, the conduct complained of also wrongfully and culpably infringes a legally 
protected interest, existing independently of the contract. 36 In such circumstances 
concurrence of claims may occur.37 In the absence of a contract between the 
injured party and the producers of the ES, or in the case of a contract which excludes 
liability, by way of an exemption clause not covering delictual liability, the plaintiff's 
only recourse will lie in a delictual action. In the event that an agreement between 
producers and users contains a valid exclusion of contractual and delictual liability, 
the injured contractant will not be able to institute a claim for damages suffered to the 
extent that it is excluded or limited.38 This situation could lead to a very unjust 
position in the case of a defective ES which is mass produced and distributed as a 
consumer product in the form of standard software. It is submitted that such an ES 
constitutes a commercial product for which the developer incurs manufacturer's 
liability, which liability the developer should not be able to evade through an 
exemption clause.39 The extent to which current product liability principles can 
satisfactorily be applied to the situation of ES liability, is discussed later.40 
In the case of damage caused through the incorrect use or non-use of an ES, a 
derictual action may lie against the user of the ES, based on the latter's legal duty 
towards the injured party, or an infringement of the injured party's subjective right.41 
Where the user is a professional who relies on an ES during the execution of her 
35 Neethling et a/6-7; Van Aswegen 298; Vander Merwe and Olivier 468 et seq. 
36 Ibid. 
37 Van Aswegen 96 et seq. See also ch 4 par 2.2 infra. 
38 See par 2.4.2 infra. 
39 See ch 6 par 5 infra. 
40 See ch 6 infra. 
41 See par 3.3.2 infra. 
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professional duties, the professional liability of the latter is at stake.42 The 
question also arises whether software producers are professionally liable towards the 
user and the injured for the defective computer system they produced,43 and 
consequently if a computer malpractice claim may be instituted against them.44 
In the case of an ES with intellectual output, the user's liability for negligent 
misrepresentation45 may also arise, and because many ES's are likely to cause 
only financial loss, liability for pure economic loss is also discussed.46 Because 
of the nature of ES's, in that they consist of information, the producers may also be 
liable on the grounds of a negligent misrepresentation where incorrect information 
causes damage. The possibility of the non-use of an ES leading to liability on the 
grounds of an omissio, is also investigated.47 
An exposition of the delictual liability arising from the use of ES's constitutes the third 
and last objective of this study, and is discussed more fully in a separate chapter48 
after a comparative law study ln this regard, whereas this chapter only contains a 
brief exposition of the basic principles underlying delictual liability in the realm of 
ES's. 
42 See par 2.7 infra. 
43 See par 3.3.3.3 infra. 
44 See ch 6 par 6 infra. The possibility of a malpractice claim is advanced by 
American commentators on software liability: see ch 5 part I par 8 2.2.3 infra. 
45 See ch 6 par 2 infra. 
46 See ch 6 par 3 infra. 
47 See ch 6 par 4 infra. 
48 Ch 6 infra. 
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2. Contractual liability 
2.1 Introduction 
Contractual liability may refer to either the obligation of fulfilling the terms of a 
contract or to remedies arising from a breach of contract.49 In the first instance the 
contractant is liable to perform in terms of the contract and in the latter she will incur 
liability for breach of contract, which can include liability for damage caused by the 
non- or improper performance of the contract. In the case of a claim for damages 
arising from a defective ES or the incorrect use of such a system, contractual liability 
that stems from an act of breach of contract committed by one of the contracting 
parties is relevant. 50 The cause of action in all instances where breach of contract 
takes place is in fact, a breach of contract. The question whether a breach of 
contract took place depends on the terms of the particular contract. 51 
A computer program is typically acquired subject to a licensing agreement, which 
agreement purports to establish a contract between the developer of the software and 
the user of the software (in this case the ES), regulating intellectual property rights, 
49 Van der Merwe et a/ 238 et seq. 
50 Christie 588. 
51 An area of contention is the question whether or not breach of contract constitutes 
a new cause of action distinct from the conclusion of a contract. In the case of a 
claim for specific performance in terms of a contract, the claim is based on the 
contents of the contract and not on the breach that took place: Joss v Barclays 
Western Bank Ltd 1990 1 SA 573 (T) 581. However, where damages is claimed, 
it cannot be said that the original obligation was to pay damages: Van Aswegen 
313. De Wet and Van Wyk 17 4 are of the opinion that a new cause of action does 
not arise, but that the original obligation undergoes a change in content, 
substituting performance for damages. Van der Merwe et a/ 239 contends that 
breach does constitute a new obligatory fact which amounts to a new cause of 
action. See also Vander Merwe and Olivier 479. This view was supported in 
lmprefed (Pty) Ltd v National Transport Commission 1990 3 SA 324 (T). 
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restricting the use of the software and limiting the product liability of the producers. 52 
In the case of standard software, the licensing agreement usually accompanies the 
software in the form of a shrinkwrap agreement53 and in the case of custom 
software, it is given to the user as a separate contract.54 However, the ES may be 
acquired from the software supplier either by way of a purchase and sale 
agreement, a lease agreement, an agreement for the letting and hiring of work, 
and possibly, by way of licensing which is distinguished from the licensing 
agreement regulating intellectual property rights referred to above.55 Consequently, 
two agreements come into existence; (1) the licensing agreement that exists between 
the developer and the user; and (2) the contract by which the user acquires the 
software from the suppliers. 56 In this regard the commercial distinction in the nature 
of software referred to earlier57 becomes relevant as it usually determines the way 
in which the software is acquired. In the world of computers, extensive use is made 
of standard form contracts which may pertain to both the acquisition contract as welt 
as the licensing agreement. 58 This study is concerned primarily with liability for 
breach between parties in a contractual relationship regarding the acquisition and use 
of ES software. 59 
52· See appendix IV for an example of a typical licensing agreement; see also par 2.5 
infra. 
53 See par 2.4.2 infra. 
54 In the case of custom software, the licensing agreement may form part of the 
software development contract: see par 2.5.1 infra. 
55 See par 2.6.2.1 infra. 
56 See fig 6 for a depiction of links indicating possible contractual relationships. See 
also Reed(2) 46 et seq. 
57 Ch 2 par 2.3 supra. 
58 Tapper 144; Franken et a/60; Mare 9. 
59 Breach of contract resulting from infringements of the immaterial property rights 
of the defendant, contained in the licensing contract, is specifically excluded: see 
ch1 par 1.4 supra. 
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2.2 Requirements for contractual liability 
2.2.1 The existence of a valid contract 
The general principles relating to the law of contract apply to all the various 
contractual relationships sketched above,60 including the relationship created by the 
conclusion of a licensing agreement which, in South African law, is an innominate 
contract unknown to our common law.61 A contract is an agreement entered into 
between parties with the intention of creating an obligation.62 The primary 
requirement for a contract creating obligations is the intention to be legally bound on 
the part of both contracting parties. 63 Further requirements for a valid contract are 
that the parties have the necessary capacity64 to enter into the contract, that the 
agreement is capable of performance65, that the contract is lawful66 and that the 
60 Par 2.1 supra. 
61 See par 2.5 infra. Cf Eiselen 34; Mare 117; Pistorius 1993 SAM ere LJ 2. 
62 Van Rensburg et a/188; De Wet and Van Wyk 9; Christie 2; Van der Merwe eta/ 
7. An agreement is a mutual understanding between two or more persons which 
exists when these parties have come to a conscious accord that they intend to 
create an obligation with a specific content between them: Joubert 21. 
63 Joubert 21; Van Rensburg et a/188; De Wet and VanWyk 13 et seq. Cf Mondorp 
Eiendomsagentskap (Edms) Bpk v Kemp & De Beer 1979 4 SA 74 (A). 
64 Every person is presumed to have contractual capacity: Van Rensburg et a/211. 
For the categories of persons with no or limited capacity to contract, see Van 
Rensburg et a/212. 
65 If performance to which the parties agree is objectively impossible, the contract is 
void: Rood en VanWyk v VanRyn 1913 CPO 311; Wilson v Smith 1956 1 SA 393 
(W); Blou Bu/ Boorkontrakteurs v McLachlan 1991 4 SA 283 (T). 
66 The rule is ex turpi causa non oritur actio: Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 AD 537; Kelly 
v Wright, Kelly v Kok 1948 3 SA 522 (A). A contract is illegal if the conclusion, 
performance or object is prohibited by legislation or is contrary to good morals or 
public policy: Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 1 SA 1 (A); Magna Alloys & 
Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 4 SA 87 4 (A). 
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required formalities (if any)67 are satisfied.68 In the case of joint parties, the nature 
of the contractual relationship depends on the intention of the parties.69 
Persons are generally in agreement if there has been a complete meeting of their 
minds. In other words, the intention of one party must correspond exactly with the 
intention of the other party.70 It may happen that a person's intentions are 
misinterpreted or that a person is deliberately or negligently misled about the other's 
intentions. In this event a party to a contract is only held bound to the contract in 
accordance with the reasonable impression conveyed by her conduct,11 To this 
extent it is said that the approach to contract is objective. 72 The contracting parties 
must have the serious and deliberate intention to bind themselves in law.73 
67 In general there are no prescribed formalities for a binding contract and parties 
can make their intentions known in any form they wish: Goldblatt v Fremantle 
1920 AD 123; Ally v Dinath 1984 2 SA 451 (T}. In some exceptional areas where 
the law does prescribe formalities, such as in the case of the alienation of land, 
compliance therewith is necessary before a valid contract is constituted: s 2(1) of 
the Alienation of Land Act 68 of 1981 . 
68 Joubert 21 et seq; Van Rensburg et a/211 et seq; De Wet and VanWyk 9-24. 
69 · See Van der Merwe et a/ 168; see also par 2.2.2.2 infra. 
70 The intention theory holds that the agreement between parties forms the basis of 
a contract. The parties must not only be of the same mind, they must also know 
that they are: Kunsmis (Edms) Bpk v AE & Cl Bpk 1984 2 SA 261 (W); Joel 
Melamed and Hurwitz v Vomer Investments (Pty) Ltd 1984 3 SA 155 (A). 
71 "The promisor is bound to perform what his language justified the promisee in 
expecting" per Innes JAin Pieters and Co v Salomon 1911 AD 121 at 138. See 
also Van Ryn Wine and Spirit Co v Chandos Bar 1928 TPD 417 423; Hodgson 
Bros v SA Railways 1928 CPO 257 261; National and Overseas Distributors 
Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Potato Board 1958 2 SA 473 (A); Ocean Cargo Line Ltd 
v FR Waring (Pty) Ltd 1963 4 SA 641 (A) 653; Spes Bona Bank Ltd v Portals 
Water Treatment SA (Pty) Ltd 1983 1 SA 978 (A) 984; Sonap Petroleum (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd v Pappadogianis 1992 3 SA 234 (A). 
72 Van Rensburg et a/ 189. 
73 This intention is also referred to as the causa contractus: Conradie v Rossouw 
1919 AD 279. 
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Consensus or conscious agreement is usually reached by offer and acceptance,74 
although contracts can be concluded by other means.75 In the case of software, a 
very popular method to reach agreement is by means of provisions contained in a 
shrink-wrap licence/6 In terms of the general requirements of offer and 
acceptance, an offer will only be regarded as valid if it is definite and complete77 and 
if it contemplates acceptance and resultant obligations.78 For a valid acceptance to 
take place, the acceptance must be unconditional79 and it must be accepted in the 
prescribed manner80 by the offeree81 in response to the offer.82 The last-
mentioned requirement is especially relevant in the case of a shrink-wrap licence 
where the offer is made to the general public and a person has to be aware of the 
offer before it can be accepted. 83 
7 4 Van Rensburg et a/190 et seq; Van der Merwe et a/ 42 et seq; De Wet and Van 
Wyk 31 et seq. The Offer is a statement of intention stipulating the performance 
and terms to which the offeror is prepared to be bound and the acceptance is a 
statement of intention whereby the offeree's assent to the offer is signified. 
75 Estate Breet v Peri-Urban Areas Health Board 1955 3 SA 523 (A). 
76 See par 2.5.2 infra. 
77 · The offer must contain a clear indication of the offeror's intention otherwise it can 
be declared "void for vagueness": Humphreys v Cassell 1923 TPD 280; Mouton 
v Hanekom 1959 3 SA 35 (A); Kantor v Kantor 1962 3 SA 207 (T). 
78 Wasmuth v Jacobs 1987 3 SA 629 (SWA) 633. 
79 Watermeyer v Murray 1911 AD 61; ACC Bio Kafee (Edms) Bpk v Raad van 
Kuratore van Warmbadplase 1957 4 SA 183 (T); Van Jaarsveld v Ackermann 
1975 2 SA 753 (A). 
80 Laws v Rutherford 1924 AD 261; Ebrahim v Khan 1979 2 SA 498 (N); Ficksburg 
Transport (Ems) Bpk v Rautenbach 1988 1 SA 318 (A); Amcoa/ Collieries Ltd 
v Truter 1990 1 SA 1 (A). 
81 Blew v Snoxe/1 1931 TPD 226; Baker v Crowie 1962 2 SA 48 (N); Bird v 
Summerville 1961 3 SA 194 (A). 
82 See Vander Merwe et a/47-51. 
83 See par 2.5.2 infra. 
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2.2.2 Breach of contract 
2.2.2.1 Definition of breach 
A breach of contract is traditionally described as malperformance (wanprestasie). 84 
Malperformance consists in the breach of a promise to perform timeously and 
properly as agreed to in the contract. Breach of contract is not limited to 
malperformance, it is a much wider concept encompassing one contractant's wrongful 
conduct towards the other contractant. It may refer to any act of a contractant which 
infringes the personal rights of the other contractant arising from the contract, or 
which breaches a duty of a more general nature (in that the conduct is unacceptable 
in terms of the no~ms that require a contractant to comply with general contractual 
duties).85 
2.2.2.2 Forms of breach 
Non-compliance with any one term86 of a contract would constitute a breach of 
contract upon which a party can base an action for damages provided loss is 
suffered. The forms of breach may be divided into two main groups, namely 
malperformance and anticipatory breach. Malperformance consists of positive 
malperformance, negative malperformance of the debtor (mora debitoris) as well as 
negative malperformance of the creditor (mora creditoris). Anticipatory breach of 
contract includes forms of breach that anticipate eventual malperformance, namely 
84 On breach of contract, see in general Van der Merwe et a/ 235 et seq; De Wet 
and Van Wyk 157 et seq ; Christie 587 et seq ; Farlam and Hathaway 471 et 
seq; Van Rensburg et a/ 249 et seq. 
85 The wrongfulness of conduct in breach of contract is therefore, similar to 
wrongfulness in delict, determined in terms of rights as well as duties: Van der 
Merwe et a/ 237. 
86 See par 2.3 infra. 
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repudiation and prevention of performance. 87 
Positive malperformance occurs where the contractant does not comply with the 
terms of the contract in that she either renders defective performance or does 
something which she undertook not to do.88 Positive malperformance therefore 
consists of conduct which is not in accordance with the content of the debtor's 
contractual duties. 89 Defective, inadequate or incomplete performance results in a 
breach of the debtor's positive duty.90 This form of breach of contract can occur 
when a defective ES is used, when a sound ES is used incorrectly or when an 
existing ES is not used at all in some circumstances. 91 If a breach of contract has 
occurred, the innocent party may direct the available remedies towards either 
performance or rescission of the contract. 92 
As ES's are constructed by teams of people it is appropriate to state the position of 
co-debtors and co-creditors with regard to liability for performance. In the case of co-
debtors and co-creditors two situations can be distinguished: simple joint debtorship 
or creditorship and solidary co-debtorship or co-creditorship.93 In the case of the 
former each joint debtor and creditor is liable for and entitled to her pro rata-share of 
87 Van Rensburg et a/ 249. 
88 Van Rensburg et a/271-272; De Wet and VanWyk 177-179; Vander Merwe et 
a/250 et seq. 
89 Collen v Rietfontein Engineering Works 1948 1 SA 413 (A); Sishen Hotel (Edms) 
Bpk v Suid-Afrikaanse Yster & StaallndustriiHe Korporasie Bpk 1987 2 SA 932 
(A); Schatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 1976 2 SA 545 (A); SA Sentrale 
Ko-op Graanmaatskappy Bpk v Shifren 1964 4 SA 760 (A); Sweet v Ragerguhara 
1978 1 SA 131 (D). 
90 Ibid. 
91 In some circumstances the non-use of an ES may constitute positive 
malperformance in terms of a party's contractual duty: see par 2.3 infra. 
92 Vander Merwe et a/251-256; De Wet and VanWyk 178. 
93 Van der Merwe et a/ 168 et seq. 
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performance only. In the case of the latter, any one of the co-debtors is liable for the 
full performance and any one of the co-creditors is entitled to the full performance.94 
2.2.2.3 Remedies for breach of contract95 
The remedies for a breach of contract directed at the performance of the contract 
consists of a claim for specific performance by the other party to the contract, or for 
a sum of money in lieu of performance; if it is directed at the rescission of the 
contract, it consists of a claim of cancellation of the contract, or rescission. In 
either case the innocent party is also entitled to claim for damages for any 
foreseeable patrimonial loss suffered as a result of the breach (that is consequential 
loss).96 Non-patrimonal loss such as discomfort, pain and suffering may also be 
caused by a breach of contract. An example of such loss can be found in the case 
of a doctor who, by not applying the necessary skill which she has undertaken to 
apply, negligently prescribes the wrong medicine resulting in unnecessary suffering 
of the patient. Apart from wasted medical costs, the patient also suffers non-
patrimonial loss in the sense of discomfort. Such non-patrimonial loss is not 
recoverable ex contractu in terms of a policy decision of our courts.97 
Where a claim for patrimonial loss does lie, the onus of proof is on the contractant 
claiming the damages.98 The damages should place the plaintiff in the same 
94 This type of liability is also called joint and several liability and can only arise if 
created specifically by the contractants: Tucker v Carruthers 1941 AD 251; Neon 
and Cold Cathode Illuminations (Pty) Ltd v Ephron 1978 1 SA 463 (A). 
95 On remedies for breach of contract, see in general Van der Merwe et a/ 272 et 
seq; Farlam and Hathaway 530 et seq; De Wet and Van Wyk 195 et seq; 
Christie 615 et seq; Van Rensburg et a/ 250 et seq. 
96 Swart v Van der Vyver 1970 1 SA 633 (A) 643C; Van Rensburg et a/ 285; Van 
der Merwe et a/ 305; De Wet and Van Wyk 222. 
97 Administrateur, Natal v Edouard 1990 3 SA 581 (A). 
98 Esso Standard SA (Pty) Ltd v Katz 1981 1 SA 964 (A); Swart v Van der Vyver 
supra 643. 
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financial position in which she would have been had there been no breach, or in the 
position in which she would have been, had the contract been properly performed.99 
Damages are therefore calculated in accordance with the injured party's positive 
interest. 100 The Apportionment of Damages Act 101 was not intended to apply to 
actions based on contract and our courts have confirmed this view. 102 In the event 
of an impending breach of contract a contractant may apply to the court for an 
interdict to prevent the breach. 103 If a contractant is entitled to cancel the 
contract, 104 an election must be made by choosing between upholding or cancelling 
the contract. A contractant is in principle entitled to an order for specific performance 
but the court has a discretion to refuse the order. 105 Orders for specific 
performance in case of obligations arising from contracts for the rendering of services 
are not readily given because of the implications such orders will have for the 
personal freedom of employers and employees. 106 
99 Van Rensburg et a/ 295. 
100 Van der Merwe et a/ 297; De Wet and Van Wyk 222. 
101 Act 34 of 1956. 
102 See Neethling et al 153-154; Barclays Bank v Straw DCO 1965 2 SA 93; OK 
Bazaars (1929) Ltd v Stern & Ekermans 1976 2 SA 521 (C). 
103 Ibid. 
1 04 Cancellation is an extraordinary remedy which is only available in special 
circumstances such as in the case of a material breach or in cases where a right 
to resile was contracted: Van der Merwe et a/287; De Wet and Van Wyk 215. 
105 Haynes v King William's Town Municipality 1951 2 SA 776 (A) 378-379. The 
order will be refused where specific performance is impossible or if the debtor is 
insolvent: Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 1 SA 776 (A) 783. 
106 National Union of Textile Workers v Stag Packings (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 151 (T); 
Vander Merwe et a/276 et seq; De Wet and VanWyk 210; Van Rensburg eta/ 
288. 
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2.3 Terms of a contract 
Whether an act constitutes a breach of contract depends on the terms of the contract. 
Express terms are terms agreed to by the parties in a contract, either expressly by 
words or tacitly by conduct. 107 Implied terms describe the unexpressed provisions 
of a contract which are imported by law (ex lege) without regard to the intention of 
the parties, or they may consist of terms implied by the facts or circumstances of the 
case (ex consensu). The ex lege implied terms of a contract differ according to the 
form of contract entered into. Such terms are in fact one of the naturalia of the 
contract which apply automatically if they are not excluded. For instance, in a contract 
of sale there is an implied guarantee or warranty against latent defects; in a contract 
of lease there is a similar implied undertaking by the lessor in respect of the absence 
of defects; and in the case of a contract for services rendered there is an implied 
term that reasonable care will be taken in providing the service. 108 A term implied 
ex consensu is a term incorporated through the true, but unexpressed intention of the 
parties, also referred to as "tacit terms". 109 Such a term is usually inferred by the 
courts from the surrounding circumstances of the contract, adopting the "innocent 
bystander test" of English law. 110 
Terms are also divided into essential (essentialia), natural (naturalia) and incidental 
(incidentalia) terms. 111 Essentialia are prescribed terms of law that have to form 
107 Christie 147-150; Vander Merwe et a/196-200; Van Rensburg et a/232-235. 
108 See par 2.6.2.2 infra. 
109 Van Rensburg et a/ 234; Van der Merwe et a/ 196. 
110 Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co (Ramsbottom) 118 L T 479 483. See also 
Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 197 4 3 SA 
506 (A) 532 for the implementation of the test stated in the Reigate decision. 
111 Van Rensburg et a/ 231; De Wet and Van Wyk 129; Van der Merwe eta/ 200. 
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part of an agreement if it is to be classified as a specific contract. 112 Naturalia are 
terms which by law form part of a certain type of contract unless excluded by the 
parties, 113 and incidentalia are terms which the parties stipulate themselves without 
being prescribed or implied by law. 114 The naturalia determine the consequences 
of any known type of contract. A contract which does not contain the essentialia of 
a known type of contract, is a contract sui generis, such as the licensing agreement 
offered by the producers of software. 115 Natura/ia may be excluded from a contract 
by agreement but not the essentialia. For example, in a contract of sale the parties 
may agree to the exclusion of one of the naturalia of such a contract, namely the 
implied guarantee against latent defects. 116 
Exemption or exclusion clauses seeking to exclude or limit contractual liability are 
frequently employed in the standard form contracts used by the software industry. 
Such clauses typically contain limited warranty and liability provisions catering for the 
replacement of defective materials and excluding any liability for loss or damage 
arising from the use of the software or from any errors, faults or deficiencies in it, 
whether it was caused by negligence or otherwise. 117 
112 For instance, in the case of a contract of purchase and sale there must be 
agreement on the thing (merx) sold as well as on the selling price (pretium): Van 
der Merwe et a/ 200. 
113 Cf Videtsky v Liberty Life Insurance Association of Africa Ltd 1990 1 SA 386 (VV); 
A Becker & Co (Pty) Ltd v Becker 1981 3 SA 406 (A); Essa v Divaris 1947 1 SA 
753 (A). 
114 Van der Merwe et a/ 202. 
115 See par 2.5.1.2 infra. 
116 Hosten et a/ 720; De Wet and Van Wyk 335. 
117 See appendix IV par (3). 
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2.4 Standard form contracts 
2.4.1 General 
The contracting party who suffers loss through the use of an ES amounting to a 
breach of contract will need to rely on her contract, if one exists, for compensation 
which is usually found in a claim for damages based on a breach of contract. 118 
The normal consequences or remedies of a contract usually provide adequate 
protection. However, normal consequences can be varied by agreement. Where 
equal bargaining power exists between the contracting parties, adequate protection 
against abuses can be ensured by the agreement between the parties. A problem 
arises in the case of private individuals and small businesses who are forced to 
accept the use of standard form contracts with clauses that exclude liability or terms 
of which the contractant has no knowledge. 119 Such contracts are available on a 
"take it or leave it" - basis and actually negate the "freedom to contract" - doctrine. 
A standard form contract120 is a contract in which the rights and duties of the parties 
are defined before contracting takes place and the offer is available on a "take it or 
leave it" - basis. Most software producers make use of standard form contracts in the 
distribution of their software. 121 This is a universal phenomenon and explains why 
buyers in South Africa, for example, are frequently bound to the same contracts as 
buyers in America who are limited to the applicability of, for example, Californian 
118 Van der Merwe et a/ 296 et seq. See also par 2.2.2.3 supra. 
119 Symon 73; Van der Merwe 60-72; Vander Merwe et a/225. Cf Glen Comeragh 
(Pty) Ltd v Colibri (Pty) Ltd 1979 3 SA 21 0 (T); Western Bank Ltd v Sparta 
Construction Co 1975 1 SA 839 f.YV). 
120 Also known as a contrat d'adhesion. 
121 The computer industry is characterised by extensive use of standard form 
contracts: Vander Merwe 60; Symon 73-74; Tapper 144-145. 
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law. 122 The licensing agreement offered by the developer of software always 
contains some exclusion of liability clause. 123 
The desirability of standard form contracts is a contentious issue among lawyers. 124 
On the one hand the doctrine of freedom of contract ensures that courts will not 
lightly interfere with the contractual provisions agreed to between the parties, however 
harsh they may be, and on the other hand, it is acknowledged that unnegotiated 
terms may be abused by contracting parties. The doctrine of freedom of contract is 
based on the premise that both contracting parties hold a position of equal bargaining 
strength and that they are quite free to accept or reject any term of the contract. 
Unfortunately, true equality does not exist in the consumer society of today where the 
supplier has greater strength in respect of economic resources and knowledge which 
is in turn reflected in the designing of oppressive terms for the user. The software 
consumer is forced to accept the presented standard form or must decline to contract. 
If the consumer does contract, she will ironically be bound to the terms she has 
"agreed to", however harsh they may be.125 Protection against unfair terms of 
contract in foreign jurisdictions have mostly been effected by legislation.126 
International parties to a software contract must take note of the ruling legal systems' 
legislative measures on exclusion clauses lest they be invalid. 127 
122 Van der Merwe 60. 
123 See par 2.5.1 infra. 
124 See par 2.4.2.3 infra. 
125 Symon 75. 
126 An example is the UCTA of England: see par 2.6.1.3 infra. 
127 See ch 4 par 4.4.1 infra. With regard to exemption clauses in Anglo-American 
contracts, see par 2.6.1.3 infra. 
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2.4.2 Protection against exemption clauses in ·south African law 
There are two methods used by the South African courts to protect the public from 
the worst abuses of exemption or exception clauses. The first is by setting limits to 
permissible clauses, and the second is by interpreting such clauses narrowly.128 
2.4.2.1 Public policy 
Exemption clauses that are against public policy are not recognised by our law and 
will not be enforced. 129 An exemption clause will be contra bonos mores if it 
necessarily contravenes, or tends to induce contravention of a fundamental principle 
of justice or of statutory law, or if it is against the public interest.130 On this basis 
an exemption from liability for fraud will not be enforced. 131 An exemption clause 
from liability for negligence is permissible and enforceable. 132 It is uncertain 
whether the English doctrine of fundamental breach, in terms whereof it is legally 
impossible to be exempted from the consequences of a fundamental breach 
irrespective of the common intention of the parties, is applicable in our law.133 In 
Government of the Republic of South Africa (Department of Industries) v Fibre 
128 Christie 212; Vander Merwe et a/226. 
129 Morrison v Angelo Deep Gold Mines Ltd 1905 TS 775; Wells v SA Alumenite Co 
1927 AD 69. 
130 Christie 213; Van der Merwe et a/115; De Wet and Van Wyk 48. 
131 Ibid. 
132 Central SAR v Adlington & Co 1906 TS 964; SAR & H v Conradie 1922 AD 137; 
Essa v Divaris 1947 1 SA 753 (A); SAR & H v Lyle Shipping Co Ltd 1958 3 SA 
416 (A). 
133 In Wijtenburg Holdings t/a Flamingo Dry Cleaners v Bobroff 1970 4 SA 197 (T) 
the court accepted this doctrine as part of our law but in Galloon v Modem Burglar 
Alarms (Pty) Ltd 1973 3 SA 64 7 (C) and Micor Shipping (Pty) Ltd v Treger Golf 
and Sports (Pty) Ltd 1977 2 SA 709 (W) this view was rejected. 
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Spinners & Weavers (Pty) Ltd 134 the court doubted the acceptance of this doctrine 
in South African law and held that an exemption clause, like any other term or 
condition of a contract, must be construed in the light of the provisions of a contract 
as a whole. This is called the construction approach and it appears from the dicta 
in Wells v SA Alumenite Co135 that a party can validly be exempted from even an 
intentional fundamental breach of contract provided it is not fraudulent. 
2.4.2.2 Interpretation of exemption clauses 
Exemption clauses are interpreted narrowly so as to confine them within reasonable 
bounds. Those clauses which do not set out the legal grounds for liability from which 
exemption is granted are subject to especially narrow interpretation.136 In such 
cases the nature of the contract will firstly be examined for the purpose of deciding 
what legal grounds of liability would have existed in the absence of an exemption 
clause. The clause will then be interpreted to exempt a party from the ground of 
liability for which she would otherwise have been liable in the least degree of 
blameworthiness. 137 The wording of the clause and the surrounding circumstances 
are also investigated to ascertain whether the clause reveals a common intention of 
the parties to be protected from liability arising during the performance of contractual 
obrigations only, or also from additional risks. 138 
134 1977 2 SA 325 (D) . 
135 1927 AD 69 at 73: Christie 212-221. 
136 Christie 219; Vander Merwe et al214. 
137 Essa v Divaris 1947 1 SA 753 (A). Cf Christie op cit 219 and the authorities 
quoted in fn 42. 
138 Weinberg v Olivier 1943 AD 181 ; Hall-Thermotank Natal (Pty) Ltd v Hardman 
1968 4 SA 818 (D); Ornelas v Andrew's Cafe 1980 1 SA 378 0/V). 
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2.4.2.3 Control of unconscionable contract terms 
The SALC conducted an enquiry into the control of unconscionable contract terms in 
1984.139 The result was a proposed system of judicial and preventive control of 
contractual freedom according to the principle of good faith. 140 The proposals 
concluded that there should be a system enabling the courts by statute to perform 
their specific duty to control misuse of contractual freedom. The basis for such 
control is the requirement of "good faith" in all phases of contractual relationships. 
A general criterion of "good faith" rather than "public policy" is offered because inter 
alia, "good faith" is the internationally and locally acknowledged term by which the 
ethical requirement set by public policy is expressed. It was pointed out that good 
faith represents the collective experience of our legal culture as well as that of 
comparable legal systems. The test for good faith should be applied in terms of a 
wide and general criterion, assisted by open-ended practical guidelines.141 The ·~ 
courts should be empowered by legislation to refuse to enforce unfair contracts or to 
change such contracts before enforcing them. Preventative control can be facilitated 
through empowering an existing body such as the Harmful Business Practices 
Committee to reach enforceable negotiated settlements, to promote self-control and 
to give interim relief. This proposed system was further refined in 1990142 and 
resulted in draft legislation.143 
139 Project 47: Vander Walt (1) 147. 
140 For an overview of the enquiry, see Van der Walt ibid. Cf also Eiselen 1988 De 
Jure 251-264, 1989 Oe Jure 44-54 and 1989 THRHR 516-539; Vander Walt 
1991 THRHR 367-387 and 1993 THRHR 65-82. 
141 The idea is that contractual justice can only be attained alongside individual 
autonomy which includes the optimistic view that individuals will act for their own 
benefit and for the good of the community if left to themselves: Van der Walt 1991 
THRHR 377. 
142 Vander Walt 1993 THRHR 80. 
143 Bill on the Control of Contract Terms, 1991. 
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The proposed legislation has been favourably received by South African 
commentators: according to Van der Walt144, any steps taken to augment 
contractual justice through implementing a system of proper control over the freedom 
of contract is compatible with a declaration of human rights. 145 Van Aswegen 146 
points out that the changed social and economic realities of our post-apartheid era 
have made current contract doctrine, based on party autonomy and the principle of 
consensualism in a free market on an equal footing, virtually obsolete. Some 
transformation of our contract law is, therefore, necessary to ensure substantive 
justice between contracting parties. 147 It is submitted that the sooner the proposed 
measures are instituted, the better. 
2.4.2.4 Conclusion 
In most cases of standard software use, an acquisition contract excluding contractual 
and delictual liability, will only exist between the injured user and the supplier, not 
between the user and the developer. 148 A third party who is injured through the use 
of an ES is not affected by such a contractual term. 149 A licensing agreement may 
have been concluded though, between the injured user and the developer, excluding 
the contractual and delictual delictual liability (specifically, product liability) of the 
developer. The validity of the exemption clause will then have to be determined 
144 1993 THRHR 384. 
145 Most declarations of human rights protect principles of freedom of contract in a 
direct and indirect manner for example the freedom to work, the freedom to form 
and join unions, the right to own property and the freedom to choose a place to 
live. 
146 Van Aswegen 1994 THRHR 448 458. 
147 Ibid. 
148 See ch 2 par 10.2.3 supra. 
149 See ch 2 par 10.2.2 supra. 
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according to the principles already discussed.150 Most standard software packages 
make use of shrink-wrap licenses which, as will be pointed out, only constitute a valid 
contract if they meet with very specific requirements. 151 Where a valid licensing 
agreement has been concluded between the parties, it is possible that any exclusion 
of liability may be invalid, either because it is outlawed by the foreign legal system 
regulating the contract, or because it is held to be contrary to public policy in terms 
of South African law. 152 If the latter does not apply, it may be that the exclusion of 
liability is valid and the injured party has no action for damages. 153 
2.5 Software licensing 
A licensing contract is an agreement between the owner of intellectual property and 
a user in terms whereof the user may use the copyrighted product against payment 
of a licensing fee. 154 It may be concluded through a shrink-wrap agreement or by 
completing a registration card when the software is acquired. The function of a 
licensing agreement is to describe the rights of the copyright holder and to create a 
contractual relationship between the software developer and the user which would 
not usually arise when the software is acquired from a supplier. In this way the 
developers have an opportunity to exclude their delictual or product liability. 155 
According to Tapper156 and Reed, 157 software is generally licensed rather than 
150 Par 2.4.2 supra. 
151 See par 2.5.2 infra. 
152 See par 2.4.2 supra. 
153 See also par 3.3.3.4 infra with regard to the actio de non petendo. 
154 Eiselen 21; Tapper 146; Franken et a/66. 
155 These exclusion clauses usually form part of a standard form contract: see par 2.4 
supra. 
156 At 180. 
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sold outright. 158 The reason for this dates back to the time when software was first 
distributed and the subsistence of intellectual property rights in software was not yet 
acknowledged, with the result that software developers could only protect their 
interests via contractual restrictions on the use of their product. 159 Although it is 
now established law that copyright does subsist in software, 160 a licensing 
agreement may still be required to regulate more precisely the measures of 
protection, the rights of the copyright holder and greater restrictions on the user. 161 
At the same time, the licensing agreement creates a contractual relationship between 
the developer of the software and the customer-user, which would normally be absent 
in cases where the software is acquired from a supplier. In this way developers have 
the opportunity to exclude their possible delictual or product liability. 162 The 
licensing agreement regulating the use of copyright material, should not be confused 
with the acquisition agreement which, according to the circumstances, may constitute 
a contract of sale, or hire of goods, or for the letting and hiring of work, 163 or the 
licensing of software as a manner of acquisition. 164 The licensing contract entered 
157 Reed(2) 46. 
158 On software licensing in general, see Tapper 180-184; Reed(2) 46-49; Vander 
Merwe 61-67; Pistorius 1995 SA Mere LJ 1-19. 
159 Reed(2) ibid. 
160 S 1(1) of the Copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992: see ch 4 par 5.3 infra. In 
terms of European Union (EU) Directive 250 of 1991, member States of the EU 
are required to protect the copyright of computer programs in their national 
legislation as "literary works". 
161 Tapper 180; Reed(2) 46; Mare 102-103. 
162 In the absence of a licensing agreement between the developer and the user, a 
contractual nexus will normally not exist between these two parties, as the 
software is directly acquired from the supplier. Therefore, the developer runs the 
risk of incurring delictual liability in the event of damage caused by a defective 
product: see par 3.3.2.3 infra. 
163 Locatio conductio operis. 
164 See par 2.6.2.1 infra. 
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into will, in most cases, consist of the developer's standard contract in this 
regard. 165 In the case of packaged standard software the terms will be non-
negotiable but in the case of custom software, there is a possibility of negotiating 
about the terms of the contract. Shrink-wrap licensing agreements, a type of 
licensing agreement peculiar to standard mass-packaged software, raise the question 
of enforceability as it is uncertain whether the parties have reached consensus on the 
conclusion of the contract. 166 
2.5.1 The nature of a licensing agreement 
2.5.1.1 Anglo-American law 
In Anglo-American law it is necessary to determine whether such a licence is a sale 
which is to be governed by the law of sale of goods.167 A software licence normally 
only grants the right to use the software on a single computer at a single 
location.168 The other characteristic of such a licence is that it contains a clause 
restricting the user from transferring the software to any third party. 169 The 
argument is then that a licence, which is actually only the conferring of a right170 to 
165 See par 2.4 supra. 
166 See par 2.5.2 infra. 
167 Eg the Sale of Goods Act (SGA) in the UK and the Uniform Commercial Code 
(UCC) in the USA: see par 2.6.1 infra. 
168 In the case where a network or many computers are used special provision can 
be made through the use of a "site licence" which permits the licencee to use the 
software on any number of computers or sites: Reed(2) 48; Van der Merwe 63. 
169 See appendix V for an example of a licence statement appended to an ES 
produced by Capper and Susskind in England: Latent Damage Law- The Expert 
System: Capper and Susskind 1. 
170 Reed(2) 4 7 defines a licence as "permission to do something that would otherwise 
be unlawful." 
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use a copy of the program, is not a sale because full ownership does not pass. 171 
Although the transference of full ownership is an essential element of a contract of 
sale, 172 it is always subject to the law of intellectual property rights, as for example 
in the case of a book or a compact disk (cd), which if sold gets a new owner but the 
copyright of the authors still subsists. 173 In the same way while the purchaser of 
software usually174 becomes the owner of the physical disks upon which the 
software is copied their use is restricted through the granting of a licence. Capper 
and Susskind175 are of the opinion that there is in functional terms 176, no need for 
the legal system to differentiate between the supply of physical goods and the supply 
of copies of software. According to them 177, the "novel concept of software" does 
not alter the fact that the purchaser of software receives something from the supplier 
just as much as a purchaser of, for instance, a car does and that the law (in the 
absence of a contrary agreement between the parties) should then be entitled to 
apply the normal obligations regarding fitness for purpose and quality in the case of 
goods, to software as well. They argue that a car which is developed from a 
standard product line is a form of a copy of the manufacturer's design and, therefore, 
it is no less a copy of an original than distributed software is such a copy. The 
purchaser of the car does not become the owner of the design of that car any more 
than the purchaser of software becomes the "owner" of that software. This amounts 
171 See appendix V par (4) under the heading "Title" especially the last sentence: 
"You do not own any copy of this Software." 
172 Rowland v Divali [1923] 2 KB 500. 
173 Reed(2) 48. 
17 4 It may be that the disks are not purchased but hired in terms of a definite contract 
of lease, whereupon ownership of the disks will not pass: Reed(2) 48. 
175 At 121. 
176 As opposed to legal terms. 
177 At 121. 
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to the same argument as that of Reed178 who points out that the fact that software 
is not sold but licensed does not alter the underlying nature of the contract for the 
supply of the software. 179 Viewed in this way, there are actually two contracts 
between the licensor and the licensee: (a) The contract for the supply of the software 
which will be a contract of sale if ownership of the physical media passes to the 
licensee and a hiring if it does not, and (b) the licence agreement. 180 
In practice, a signed written agreement, setting out the conditions of sale or service 
including the licensing thereof, will be entered into with a software house or other 
software specialist in the case of custom software. In the case of standard software 
a written contract of supply does not usually exist and the licensing terms are 
stipulated in a shrink-wrap license 181 which is a standard contract purporting to 
establish a contract between the software developer and the user. The nature and 
enforceability of this particular type of licensing agreement is discussed 
separately. 182 
2.5.1.2 South African law 
The licensing contract under which software is usually supplied, is unknown to the 
South African common law and has no natura/ia which will determine its scope. 183 
As such it is an innominate contract to which the general principles of contract law 
178 Reed(2) 44. 
179 Eurodynamic Systems pic v General Automation Ltd [1988] QB 5. See also 
Pistorius 1993 SA Mere LJ 12. 
180 Eiselen 31; Mare 104. 
181 See par 2.5.2 infra. 
182 Par 2.5.2.2 infra. 
183 Eiselen 34; Pistorius 1993 SA Mere LJ 10. 
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is applicable. 184 Whether a licensing agreement is concluded or not, the provisions 
of the Copyright Act185 applies in any case to the copyright of software. 186 In 
terms of this Act a legitimate user is entitled to make back-up copies for recovery 
purposes. 187 
2.5.2 Shrink-wrap licensing 
2.5.2.1 Definition 
Shrinkwrap-licensing is a technique used by software developers to constitute a direct 
licensing agreement between themselves and the user in situations where a signed 
licensing agreement is impossible. 188 A typical shrink-wrap licensing agreement 
reads as follows: 189 
READ THIS AGREEMENT BEFORE YOU OPEN THE SEALED 
DISKETTE PACKAGE. BY OPENING THE SEALED PACKAGE OR 
USING THE SOFTWARE YOU ACCEPT THE TERMS OF THIS 
LICENCE AGREEMENT. 
(If you do not accept these terms return the unopened diskette 
package to your dealer with your receipt for a full refund.) 
These types of agreements are normally used in the case of packaged software 
which is mass-marketed and -distributed through various outlets without the 
184 Mare 19; Pistorius 1993 SA Mere LJ 3. 
185 Act 98 of 1978. 
186 S 1 (1) as amended by the Copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992: see ch 4 par 
5.3 infra. 
187 s 11 8(1). 
188 See in general Reed(2) 57-59; Tapper 145; Vander Merwe 65-66. 
189 Van der Merwe 65. See also the provisions of par (1) of appendix V which 
contains a facsimile of the licensing agreement appended to the disks containing 
Latent Damage Law - The Expert System: Capper and Susskind 1. 
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opportunity of negotiations between the parties. 190 Their purpose is to protect the 
copyright enjoyed by software developers, to regulate the use of computer programs 
on an internationally uniform basis, and to deter piracy. 191 The terms of the shrink-
wrap licence agreement are usually visible through clear plastic film wrapped around 
the software package, thus shrink-wrapped, which has to be torn open. Other terms 
used include "tear-me-open", "box-top", and "blister-pack" agreements. 192 It is 
assumed that by opening the seals of the package the customer accepts and 
acknowledges the terms of the contract. 193 The terms for licensing can also be 
contained in the software program itself, appearing on screen after installation of the 
program. In such a case it is suggested that activation of the program itself will 
constitute acceptance by the user of the relevant conditions. 194 
2.5.2.2 Enforceability 
The enforceability of the agreement by the licensor is still uncertain as this is a 
bilateral contract which actually requires mutual communicated acceptance and 
consensus on all terms before the conclusion of the contract. 195 In the United 
States and the United Kingdom the licensing agreement will be validly concluded if 
the customer-user acquired the software with full knowledge of the appended 
licensing terms. 196 If the user was unaware of such terms, no licence agreement 
190 Pistorius 1993 SA Mere LJ 1. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Pistorius 1993 SA Mere LJ 2. 
193 Reed(2) 57; Tapper 143; Vander Merwe 65. See also appendix V par (1) and 
(8). 
194 Mare 12. 
195 Reed(2) 58-59; Tapper 144-146; Stern 51. See also Pistorius 1993 SA Mere LJ 
2, especially the numerous references in fn 46 to articles on this contentious issue 
in Anglo-American law. 
196 Tapper 145. 
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is concluded. In a Canadian case197 the court held that as the shrink-wrap licence 
of a computer program was not visible or known to the purchaser at the time of 
purchasing the program, there was no notice of the conditions of sale which could 
bind him. 198 It is possible that the American courts will construe the licensing 
agreement as a sale because of the specific terms which provide for the use of the 
software for an unlimited period against full payment in advance. 199 In the state of 
Louisiana, specific legislation was enacted to authorise shrink-wrap licences.200 
In South African law the position is as follows: If proper notice of such inclus.ion is 
given before conclusion of the contract, the terms will become part of the contract 
even though one party is unaware of the contents of the terms.201 In this regard 
the practical rules, adopted by our courts202 from English cases203 relating to the 
so-called "ticket cases", are relevant. 204 These are cases in which the supplier 
furnishes the customer with a document (usually printed on the back of a ticket or 
receipt) in the form of a ticket which is not intended to be signed, containing the 
197 North American Systemshops Inc v King 68 ALR 145 (Can QB 1989). 
198 Pistorius SA Mere LJ 4. 
199 Tapper 146. 
200 The Software License Enforcement Act, 1984. However, see the case of Vault 
Corporation v Quaid Software Ltd (1987) 655 F Supp 750 (ED La) in which this 
Act was found to be in conflict with federal copyright law and therefore 
unenforceable. 
201 Mare 24-26; Eiselen 13. 
202 See eg Kings Car Hire (Pty) Ltd v Wakeling 1970 4 SA 640 (N); Bok Clothing 
Manufacturer's (Pty) Ltd v Lady Land (Pty) Ltd 1982 2 SA 565 (C); Slabbert, 
Verster & Malherbe (Noord Vrystaat) (Edms) Bpk v Gellie Slaghuise (Edms) Bpk 
1984 1 SA 491 (0); VanDeventer v Louw 1980 4 SA 105 (0); Micor Shipping 
(Pty) Ltd v Treger Golf & Sports (Pty) Ltd 1977 2 SA 709 (VV). 
203 Parker v South Eastern Railways [1877] QB 768; Richardson Spence & Co v 
Rowntree [1894] AC 217. 
204 See in general Christie 206; Vander Merwe et a/217. 
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terms and conditions according to which the supplier will do business.205 The rules 
are intended to prove that the customer is bound by the contract where the latter 
denies awareness of the terms embodied in the ticket and there is no proof to the 
contrary. According to Pistorius206 a valid and enforceable contract is concluded 
in the case of a shrink-wrap licensing agreement if the requirements of offer and 
acceptance have been complied with. 207 If the user read the licence she is bound 
by the terms and no further enquiry is needed. If there is no proof that she read the 
document, she will only be bound to the contract if it can be proved that the supplier 
did all that was necessary or reasonably possible to draw the attention of the 
reasonable user to the terms of the agreement, or that the document itself is 
conspicuous enough to draw the reasonable user's attention to its terms. 208 The 
danger of shrink-wrap licences lies in the inclusion of unfair terms which the user is 
deemed to have accepted. As South Africa has no specific principles regarding 
shrink-wrap agreements, nor any general statute protecting contractants against 
unfair or harsh contract terms, the courts have to be relied upon for legal 
development in this area. This aspect has already been discussed in regard to 
standard form contracts. 209 
2.6 Software acquisition 
2.6.1 Anglo-American law 
In Anglo-American law the determination of liability, whether grounded in tort or 
205 Pistorius 1993 SA Mere LJ 4. See also the caveat subscriptor cases: Kings Car 
Hire (Pty) Ltd v Wakeling supra. 
206 1993 SA Mere LJ 6. 
207 The question remains whether a meeting of minds has taken place: Pistorius 1993 
SA Mere LJ 5. 
208 Pistorius SA Mere LJ 5. 
209 See par 2.4.2 supra. 
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contract, resulting from personal or economic injury caused by the use of ES's, 
hinges on the crucial question of whether these types of computer programs are 
regarded as products (goods) or services.210 With regard to contractual liability 
arising from a breach of contract, the applicability of legislation regulating the sale of 
goods and services211 is dependent on the classification of ES's as "goods" or 
"services".212 In terms of these statutes a much stricter duty is placed on the 
supplier of goods than upon a supplier of services. 213 
2.6.1.1 Products or services 
(a) The nature of software in general 
Before ES's can be classified into products or services it must be decided what the 
legal nature of software is in general. In this regard the two distinctions drawn 
previously214 in software, one technical and the other commercial, are 
important. 215 In terms of the technical distinction in software, ES's are a subset of 
application software which may, in terms of the commercial distinction, be acquired 
210 See Tapper 181; Reed(2) 43-46 and 66-71; Turley 1988 CLJ 455; Hagendorf 
1990 CLJ 47; Reed 1987 CL&P 12; Zeide and Liebowitz 1987 IEEE Expert 19; 
Davies 1993 CL&P 99; Reed 1988 CL&P 149; Tuthill 1991 A/ Expert 45; Cole 
1990 CLJ 127; Triaille 1993 CLSR 214; Wolpert 1993 DCJ 519; Schmal 1992 
L T 1; Frank Spring 1988 AI Magazine 63 (Part I) and Summer 1988 109 (Part 
II); Gill 1986 HTLJ 483 and Birnbaum 1988 CLJ 135. 
211 The sale of goods and services is regulated in the USA by the UCC adopted in 
every state except Louisiana, and in the UK by the SGA, the Supply of Goods and 
Services Act (SGSA) of 1982 and the Supply of Goods (Implied Terms) Act of 
1973: see par 2.6.1.3 infra. 
212 See Reed(2) 67; Tapper 181; Capper and Susskind 124-128. 
213 The consequence of the particular contract being one of sale of goods or one for 
services is that there are different regimes of implied conditions and warranties 
that apply: see par 2.6.1.2 infra. 
214 See ch 2 par 10.1 supra. 
215 See ch 2 par 10.1 supra. 
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as standard, custom or customised software.216 The latter distinctions refer to the 
commercial distinction in software which consists mainly of standard or package 
software and custom or bespoke software.217 As stated before,218 the former 
is a standard product meeting the requirements of a large number of users and the 
latter is custom made to meet the particular requirements of a specific user. Between 
these two main types of software it is also possible for a hybrid form of software to 
exist; this occurs where a standard package is altered by the software producer to 
fit the user's needs more closely, a process called "customisation".219 
Tapper220 points out that the practice followed by the computer industry in the 
United States before the days of "unbundling" was to supply the hardware complete 
with the necessary operation systems software as a unit available at one 
undistinguishable price. Since the 1970's "unbundling" has taken place whereby the 
programs(software) were separated from the hardware although a sale of hardware -~ 
inclusive of standard software still occurs. 221 In such a case the sale has been held 
to be a sale of goods both in the United Kingdom222 as well as the United 
States.223 
216 Ibid. 
217 See ch 2 par 10.1.1 supra. 
218 Ch 2 par 10.1 supra. 
219 See ch 2 par 10.1.1 supra. 
220 At 147. 
221 Reed(2) 44. 
222 Toby Constructions Products Pty Ltd v Computa Bar (Sales) Pty Ltd [1983] 2 
NSWLR 48; Micron Computer Systems Ltd v Wang (UK) Ltd (1990) unreported 
9 May (QBD). 
223 Triangle Underwriters, Inc v Honeywell, Inc (1978) 457 F Supp 765 (EDNY), 
(1979) 604 F 2d 737 (2d Cir); Dreier Co, Inc v Unitrix Corp (1986) 218 NJ Super 
260, 527 A 2d 875. 
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According to Turley,224 the American courts treat software in the same way as other 
commercial transactions and the same distinction between customised and standard 
goods in general is also applied to software. Therefore, a computer program that is 
mass produced and marketed, in other words standard software, is likely to be 
classified as a product and the transaction defined as a "sale of goods" within the 
meaning of article 2 of the UCC,225 whereas a program that is custom made for a 
specific user is more likely to be classified as the provision of a service which is 
governed by common law.226 It is interesting to note that in a few cases American 
courts have regarded software transactions as a "transaction in goods" irrespective 
of whether the software consist of a standard package or custom made or whether 
it includes the hardware. 227 The same has been held with regard to licensing 
agreements: the UCC has been applied either directly or by way of analogy.228 
English courts have also taken into account the substance of the software contract: 
If it is for the production of something which is to be sold to the consumer, then it is 
a sale of goods, but if it is for the exercising of skill and labour although some 
materials (for example the disks containing the software) are also transferred, it is a 
contract of services.229 Although there are no reported English cases directly 
defining computer programs as "goods", Reed230 believes that the following 
224 1988 CLJ 459. 
225 For purposes of contract law, s 2-105(1) of the UCC defines goods as "all 
things .... which are movable at the time of identification of contract of sale". 
226 Turley 1988 CLJ 459; Tapper 181-182. 
227 Hollingsworth v The Software House Inc (1986) 513 NE 2d 1372 (Oh); Harford 
Mutual Insurance Co v Seibels, Bruce & Co (1984) 579 F Supp 135 (D Md); 
Schroders Inc v Hogan Systems Inc (1987) 4 UCC Rep 2d 1397 (NY). 
228 Samuel Black Co. v Burroughs Corp. (1981) 33 UCC Rep 954 (D Mass). See also 
Tapper 181-182; Turley 1988 CLJ 458. 
229 Robinson v Graves [1935] 1 KB 579; Marcel Furriers Ltd v Tapper [1953] 1 WLR 
49. 
230 At 44. 
Chapter 3 Basis of liability 113 
statement made in Eurodynamics Systems pic v General Automation Ltcf31 is an 
indication that English courts do regard it as such: 
Although the ideas and concepts involved in software remained intellectual 
property, the reality of the transaction is that there has been a transfer of a 
product. 
If title to the physical medium on which the software is supplied passes to the 
purchaser, it is a contract of sale of goods and if not, it is a contract of hire of 
goods.232 In the case of Cox v Rilef33 the defendant was convicted of criminal 
damage of a magnetic card after he had erased the programs on it. The court, by 
rejecting the defendant's argument that he had not damaged the card itself, and 
accepting that the software recorded on it is property for the purposes of the Criminal 
Damage Act 1971, in effect found that the software is not merely information, but 
goods.234 
Another argument in determining the legal nature of software is that a computer 
program is not "goods" because it consists of pure information235 which is intangible 
and therefore not movable, especially in the case where there is no hard copy of the 
information transmitted to the customer and it is simply passed along a telephone 
line.236 In the case where the transaction does involve the transmission of physical 
231 Supra. 
232 Reed(2) 70. 
233 83 Cr App R 54 QBD (1986). 
234 See also the English court of Appeal's decision in St Alban's DC v ICL reported 
in the Times of 14 August in which the court found obiter that computer software 
is generally "goods": see Col bey 1996 Solicitors Journal 1 025. 
235 See ch 2 par 5.1 supra. 
236 Tapper 181; Reed(2) 43. Contra Konig 100-101 who holds the view that the 
transmission method of software makes no difference to the corporeality of 
software as there is always a hard copy of the software in existence at one end. 
However, see ch 5 part I par 8 2.5 infra for a discussion of tortious liability caused 
by the use of information products. 
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objects like disks, tapes, books, etcetera it is then argued that because the value of 
the medium on which the program exists is so insignificant compared to its intellectual 
content, these physical objects cannot determine the nature of the transaction.237 
This would mean that only the physical medium on which software is supplied 
constitutes "goods" and the software recorded on it does not because it is merely 
information. 238 Tapper,239 as well as Reed,240 find these arguments 
unconvincing and also irreconcilable with the treatment of books and works of art. 
A book is undisputedly tangible property which constitutes "goods" in legal terms, 
notwithstanding the fact that its major value lies in the writing, and not in the book. 
Therefore, software embodied in a physical medium is a good or a product.241 
(b) The nature of ES software 
ES's that clearly fall within the ambit of a product or a service will be classified 
accordingly. Difficulty arises, however, when ES's that cloud the distinction between 
a product and a service are analyzed in the above context: products are typically 
manufactured items like soda bottles and motorcars produced by companies who are 
in such line of business. Professional services are functions performed by people like 
doctors, architects, engineers and lawyers who are not ordinarily held to a strict 
237 Capper and Susskind 120 point out that the disks could be seen as merely the 
high technology version of a cardboard box in which the real product is packaged. 
Fortunately English law has already dealt with this argument by attaching the 
liability of the supplier to all goods supplied irrespective of their primary contractual 
purpose: Reed (2) 43. 
238 Reed(2) 70. 
239 At 181. 
240 At 43. 
241 However, see Westerdijk 78 who distinguishes between the tangible medium of 
software, which is a product, and the intangible information, the software itself, 
which is sometimes a product and sometimes not: see part II par 9.1.3 infra. 
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liability standard, but rather to a negligence standard.242 Contractors who supply 
goods or services have in essence a quality or fitness obligation whereas 
professionals only have the obligation to exercise reasonable care and skill in the 
rendering of their services.243 How should a mass produced ES that operates to 
perform such a professional service offered by a human expert be classified? 
Turley244 offers a solution whereby one looks at what the ES provides and classifies 
it accordingly: if the ES provides a product, it is a product and if it provides a 
service, it is a service. In the United States the "predominant feature" test is 
applied to reach a conclusion.245 This means that a contract involving aspects of 
sale and service is classified according to the predominant aspect of the contract.246 
In conclusion it looks as though the courts will have to decide on a case by case 
analysis whether each individual ES is a product (goods) or a service.247 In this 
regard it seems that software contracts in the United States are more readily held to 
be contracts for the sale of goods, irrespective of the commercial nature or the 
tangibility of the software and its medium, than in England where a strict adherence 
to the nature of the transaction and the tangibility of the software determines the 
nature of software contracts.248 
242 Tapper 265. 
243 Capper and Susskind 1 03. 
244 1988 CLJ 458. 
245 RRX Industries, Inc. v Lab-Con, Inc (1985) 772 F 2nd 543 (9th Cir). 
246 Compu-Med Systems, Inc. v Cincom Systems, Inc No 83 Civ 8729 (unpublished 
decision) cited by Turley 1988 CLJ 459. See also ch 5 part I par B 1.2 infra. 
247 Turley 1988 CLJ 477. 
248 Tapper 181 et seq. 
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2.6.1.2 Effect of nature of contract on liability 
According to the doctrine of privity of contract in common law there can only be a 
claim in contract if there is a contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the 
defendant.249 Contractual liability of the producers and users, arising from the use 
of an ES as defined in this study, stems from a breach of contract.250 One of the 
obligations created by entering into the contract is the duty to take reasonable care. 
The producer who fails to exercise the degree of care in producing software that a 
reasonable man with the same expertise in the same position would have done, will 
be in breach of the contract. The same applies to the software user who, in using the 
ES as a tool during the rendering of services to another, fails to take the same care 
as the reasonable user in the same position would have done. 
As was seen above, the commercial distinction between custom and standard 
software, the characteristics of the specific ES in question, and public policy reasons 
may result in different legal classifications of ES's which in turn may lead to different 
legal regimes governing the contracts for their supply.251 In the case of a custom 
made ES, a software development contract will exist between the producers and the 
users which will be classified as the rendering of a service, since the transfer of the 
physical components is subsidiary to the main purpose of the contract, namely the 
design of unique software.252 In the case of a standard ES which is mass produced 
and distributed, a contract for the supply of goods will exist between the producers 
and the user which is classified as a sale or lease of goods. ES's that perform 
professional services, either as an aid to a professional253 or as the direct rendering 
249 Tapper 229. 
250 Ibid. 
251 Par 2.6.1.1 supra. 
252 Reed(2) 67. 
253 For example the Intelligent Assistant identified in ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
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of services254 to a member of the public, can be classified as a product or a service 
depending on the prevailing policy considerations followed by the court.255 
Contracting parties may also expressly stipulate the nature of the transaction in their 
contract. There may also be different contracts in existence between the injured 
parties on the one hand and the producers and users on the other hand.256 The 
main difference between a contract for services and a contract for the supply of 
goods is that in the former it is implied that reasonable skill and care will be used 
(thus a negligence standard) and in the latter that the result will be fit for a particular 
purpose and meet a certain standard of quality (thus a strict liability standard). 257 
Therefore, in the case of breach of contract arising from breach of these warranties, 
the burden of proof resting on the plaintiff will be easier disposed of in the case of a 
software contract consisting of a sale of goods, than in one consisting of the 
rendering of services. 258 
2.6.1.3 Specific acquisition contracts 
(a) Contracts for the sale or lease of goods or services 
The position in the United Kingdom 
In the United Kingdom the SGA confers on the supplier of goods a duty to supply 
goods that comply with their description,259 and are merchantable260 and 
254 For example the Self-Help System identified in ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
255 Reed(2) 69; Tapper 182. 
256 See ch 2 par 10.2 supra. 
257 Tapper 256; Reed(2) 67-68. 
258 See par 2.6.1.3 infra. 
259 S13(1). 
260 s 14(2). 
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reasonably fit for their common or specific purpose261 which is made known to the 
purchaser at the time of sale.262 In a contract of lease the same terms are applied 
through the application of the SGSA.263 These are statutory implied terms of 
contract which may lead to breach of contract if not complied with. These terms are 
also applicable to software.264 Liability for breach of these and other terms can be 
excluded in a contract subject to the legal controls found in the common law and in 
the UCT A. In terms of the common law an exclusion clause is only valid if it is 
contractually binding on the buyer as in the case of a written and signed 
agreement.265 In terms of the UCTA though, it is impossible to exclude these terms 
re the quality, fitness for purpose and description in the event of a consumer sale 
or hire.266 A buyer is a consumer if she does not buy in the course of a business 
but from somebody that does, and the goods are of a type normally supplied for 
private use or consumption.267 In a business transaction, however, these implied 
terms may be excluded if it is reasonable to do so.268 The burden of proof with 
regard to the reasonableness of the clause is on the person relying on it.269 The 
test of reasonableness provides that it must have been fair and reasonable to include 
261 s 14(3). 
262 Reed(2) 67. 
263 Ss 8 and 9. 
264 In the case of Saphena Computing Ltd v Allied Collection Agencies Ltd [1988] QB 
59 it was decided by the recorder that it was an implied term of each contract for 
the supply of software that it would be reasonably fit for any purpose that was 
communicated to the purchaser. 
265 Reed(2) 36. 
266 S 6(2). Reed(2) 55. 
267 s 12. 
268 Ss 6(3) and 7(4). 
269 Phillips Products Ltd v Hyland [1987] 1 WLR 659. 
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the clause at the time of contracting270 while taking into account the factors set out 
in schedule 2 of the Act.271 In this regard it has been held that a limitation of 
liability is more reasonable than a complete exclusion.272 The ability of a party to 
insure against the loss has also been taken into consideration by the English 
courts.273 Because the effect of standard exclusions differs from legal system to 
legal system, it is essential for contracting parties to obtain advice in this regard 
before agreeing to a specific choice of law clause. 274 
There can also be express warranties of quality in a contract; these usually cover the 
extent to which the product conforms with the user requirements specification, and 
guarantee that physical defects in the software medium will be corrected (usually by 
replacing them if they are sent back within a certain time period).275 A warranty 
may also be limited to a specified time after which any defects in the software may 
be covered by a software maintenance agreement. Express provisions that impose 
lesser obligations on a supplier than those imposed under the SGA, and which are 
stated to be in lieu of all other rights, will amount to an exclusion clause subject to 
the provisions of the UCTA.276 In considering the term of merchantable quality, the 
inevitability of programming errors or "bugs" has been taken into account by the 
270 s 11(1). 
271 These include the strength of the parties' bargaining power, knowledge of the 
clause on the part of the buyer, whether it was reasonable to expect the condition 
to be complied with, etc. 
272 George Mitchell (Chesterha/1) Ltd v Finney Lock Seeds Ltd [1983] 2 AC 803. 
273 Ibid. The main reason for finding an exclusion clause unreasonable in this case 
was the fact that the seller could easily insure against loss caused by a defect in 
the product, and that insurance would add less than 1 % to the cost of his 
products. 
27 4 See ch 4 par 4.4.1 infra. 
275 See appendix V par 5. 
276 Reed(2) 71. 
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courts,277 with the result that programs that are reasonably fit for their purpose may 
contain bugs that do not amount to a breach of contract. It is also unlikely that 
standard package software will meet all the requirements of the user as it is not 
designed with any particular user in mind. In the case of bespoke software, however, 
it is more reasonable to expect that the software will comply with the requirements 
of the user. Software licences are mostly in written form and attempt to exclude or 
limit the operation of implied conditions and warranties. 278 
The position in the United States 
The UCC provides two important implied warranties in a contract of sale of goods: the 
warranty of merchantibility279 and the warranty of fitness for a specific purpose. 280 
In terms of the first warranty an obligation is imposed on the merchant of goods to 
provide goods that can pass without objection in the trade and are fit for the purposes 
for which they are to be used.281 In terms of the second warranty the vendor must 
at the time of contracting be aware of the purpose for which the goods are required 
and that the buyer is relying on the skill of the vendor to provide suitable goods. 282 
Turley283 states that this knowledge will always be present in the case of a sale of 
an ES, as the use in the case of a purchase of a MES284 by a doctor for example, 
will be obvious to all. Both these warranties may be excluded in contracts if general 
277 Eurodynamics Systems pic v General Automation Ltd supra; Saphena Computing 
Ltd v Allied Collection Agencies Ltd supra. 
278 See appendix V par {5) for an example of such an exclusion clause. 
279 s 2-314. 
280 s 2-315. 
281 Turley 1988 CLJ 469. 
282 Ibid. 
283 1988 CLJ 468. 
284 See ch 2 par 4.2 supra. 
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language in conspicious writing is used.285 However, courts may refuse to enforce 
any clause of a contract which is found to be unconscionable. 286 
(b) Software development contracts 
In the case of software development contracts the parties usually contract for the 
provision of a service consisting of the production of software to the customer's 
specific requirements. The position in terms of the SGSA in the United Kingdom, and 
the common law principles relating to a contract of service in the United States, are 
basically the same. 287 Apart from any express terms, the SGSA implies into the 
contract a term that the supplier will take reasonable skill and care in providing the 
service, and that any materials supplied must be fit for their purpose and of 
merchantable quality.288 In terms of common law the position is the same. 289 
This means that there is an obligation on the software producers to take reasonable 
care to ensure that the software performs the functions specified by the client, 
together with any other functions necessary for the effective operation of the 
software. 290 Liability for breach of this implied term as well as other terms of a 
standard form contract can only be excluded if the exclusion passes the test of 
reasonableness in terms of section 11 of the UCT A. 291 
285 S 2-316(2) UCC. 
286 s 2-302. 
287 Tapper 198; Reed(2) 67. 
288 s 13. 
289 Tapper 198. 
290 Reed(2) 67. 
291 Ss 2 and 3. Reed(2) 55 further points out that ss 2 and 3 of the UCTA apply to 
software licensing agreements as well, in spite of the provision in s 1 (c) of 
schedule 1 whereby it is stated that ss 2 to 4 do not apply to contracts as far as 
they create or transfer intellectual property rights. Because the provisions only 
applies to ss 2 to 4 and not to ss 6 to 7, exclusions of matters re the quality and 
performance of software are controlled by the UCT A. 
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The conclusion of a contract therefore establishes a duty to take reasonable care 
which will be breached if the producer fails to take as much care in producing the 
software as a reasonable person in the same position with the same expertise would 
have done. The burden of proving breach rests on the plaintiff. This already difficult 
task in an ES is made even more so because of the following factors: 
{a) The experimental nature of the ES can lead to the argument that perfectly 
working software is impossible to produce in the current state of the art 
and, therefore, it is not careless to release slightly defective software. The 
plaintiff would have to show that the defect is such that a reasonable 
producer would not have released it. 
{b) The interaction of the ES with data provided by the user will necessitate the 
difficult task of disentangling the workings of the system from the data in 
order to prove that the ES is defective. If the problem arose from the 
particular combination of the system and data, the plaintiff will have to show 
that a reasonable producer would have foreseen this possibility and taken 
measures to guard against it before she can be held liable. 
2.6.1.4 Other contracts 
{a) Software maintenance contracts 
Software maintenance consists of the correction of errors and the provision of 
enhancements and updates to the software.292 The software maintenance 
agreement is a contract for the provision of services and therefore subjected to the 
implied term that reasonable skill and care will be used in carrying out the 
service.293 As such, an exclusion of this term will have to comply with the 
292 Reed(2) 63; Tapper 161. 
293 S 13 of the SGSA. 
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reasonableness test as set out in the UCTA.294 
Although a software maintenance contract is not, strictly speaking, an acquisition 
contract, it is nevertheless relevant to the determination of a contractual cause of 
action in case of damage caused through the use of an ES, as a fault could have 
been introduced into the ES during the maintenancing of the system. Because all 
software is subject to a continuing process of development, corrective maintenance 
provides an opportunity for producers to correct errors which surface during the 
operation of the program.295 Application software especially must be able to meet 
increased demands and in the case of an ES that provides professional services, it 
is very important that continuous updates are effected. 
(b) Bureau services or outsourcing contracts 
Bureau services entail the situation where an organisation's computer needs are 
catered to by a computer bureau, typically situated outside the customer organisation 
against the payment of a monthly service fee.296 Such agreements consist of a 
contract for the supply of services.297 The traditional type of bureau services 
provides for the service to take place at the bureau itself, but in recent times the 
services are being rendered on the premises of the organisation.298 The services 
may also be rendered through electronic transmission, in which case it is not 
necessary for any of the parties to move around physically.299 
294 Ss 2 and 3. 
295 Tapper 161. 
296 Tapper 171-175. 
297 Tapper 172. 
298 See Staff reporter Business Review Weekly (Australia) of 16 September 1996 72. 
299 Ibid. 
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Nowadays, bureau services are known as outsourcing which is fast becoming the 
most cost-effective way for organisations to meet their information technology (IT) 
needs. The broadest definition of outsourcing is a contract with a third party to 
perform all or some of the company's IT functions. According to an Australian 
financial magazine, outsourcing is fast becoming the most popular and efficient way 
for businesses to have an IT system that works, stays updated and reduces capital 
spending. Another advantage of outsourcing is that it frees a company for 
concentration on its core business. The main IT functions suitable for handing over 
to experts are "help desk" operations and mainframe data centre management. 
However, outsourcing may also go much further to include the contracting of external 
skills to develop and maintain application systems (such as ES's), communications 
systems and computer networking functions. A world-wide trend towards contracting 
out certain services and maintaining a smaller core of permanent staff is currently 
discernible and "outsourcing" is becoming a business in its own right. 
Different outsourcing models exist which depend on the stipulations of the contracting 
agreement. Companies are moving away from the "all or nothing" outsourcing trend 
and are outsourcing only sections of their IT work. Another type of outsourcing 
agreement is found in co-sourcing in which a business-unit team works with the 
outsourcer. Such an agreement is usually achieved a few years after the initial 
outsourcing contract whereupon the outsourcer would then, instead of hourly rates, 
receive special benefits from the company.300 It is also possible for a company to 
acquire the help of an outsourcing service comprising of a mobile computer unit, 
called the Mobile Recovery Centre, in times of a crisis, which is designed immediately 
to replace services disabled by fire, flood or some other disasters. 301 
300 According to IT companies in Australia, outsourcing has steadily withdrawn internal 
IT operations, especially those of non-IT corporations: Staff reporter Business 
Review Weekly of 16 September 1996 7 4. 
301 Staff reporter Business Review Weekly of 16 September 1996 76. 
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2.6.2 South African law 
The specific contracts in terms of which software is acquired have been identified as 
contracts of sale, lease, the provision of services, and licensing.302 The first three 
contracts are nominate contracts in South African Jaw and the last-mentioned, the 
licensing contract, is an innominate contract to which the general requirements for 
contractual liability are applicable.303 After an evaluation of the various types of 
contracts that parties may enter into when computer software is provided, Mare304 
quite correctly concludes that the problem of standard form contracts and clauses 
form an underlying issue to the conclusion of these contracts. 
2.6.2.1 Specific acquisition contracts 
(a) Purchase and sale 
The contract of purchase and sale is an agreement in terms whereof the seller 
undertakes to deliver possession of a thing in return for the purchaser's undertaking 
to pay a sum of money.305 The essentialia are therefore agreement with regard to 
the thing sold and the price. The object of the sale may be corporeal or incorporeal. 
The naturalia include the liability of the seller for latent defects and the implied 
warranty against eviction306 which may be excluded. Such exclusions will be 
effective unless liability for latent defects are excluded completely.307 Because no 
302 Mare 2-3; Eiselen 30-39. The position of the licensing contract as an acquisition 
contract in terms of our law is still unclear: see par 2.5.1.2 supra. 
303 See par 2.2 supra. 
304 At 11. 
305 See in general Hasten 770 et seq; De Wet and VanWyk 313 et seq. 
306 De Wet and Van Wyk 291-294; Mare 62-64. 
307 De Wet and Van Wyk 292. 
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software functions perfectly, these warranties can be problematic in the case of 
software. However, a perfect product is not required, the software should only be as 
functional as could reasonably be expected from such a product.308 In the case of 
software, specifications are usually included as part of the contract with the result that 
any substantial non-compliance therewith may amount to a latent defect. 309 Liability 
for consequential and other damage is almost always excluded by the seller because 
of the high risk of potentially large claims as a result of defective software. Liability 
of the supplier is also mostly limited to the remedying of defects or the replacement 
of defective software or the purchase price. 310 The risk of damage or destruction 
of the software passes to the purchaser once the contract is perfecta.311 
The seller's (software supplier's) main duty ex lege is to deliver the software in 
accordance with the stipulations of the contract. Where the seller has guaranteed the 
absence of defects or the presence of good qualities in the software sold, and 
thereupon delivers defective software or software without the guaranteed qualities, 
a breach of contract (warranty) will have been committed for which direct and 
consequential damages could be claimed in terms of the actio empti. 312 The seller 
will also be liable in terms of the actio empti for defects in the software which was 
knowingly not disclosed.313 Where the seller is also the developer (manufacturer) 
of the software, liability in terms of the actio empti may be incurred for defects in the 
308 Holmdene Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co 1977 3 SA 670 (A) 
683. 
309 Eiselen 33; Mare 63. 
310 Eiselen 33; Mare 65. 
311 De Wet and VanWyk 308-311. 
312 De Wet and VanWyk 339; Mare 64-65; Swift v Cohen 1924 OPD 233; Kock v Du 
Plessis 1923 OPD 113; Cluely v Muller 1924 TPD 720; Bower v Sparks, Young 
and Farmer's Meat Industries 1936 NPD 1; Minister van Landbou-Tegniese 
Dienste v Scholtz 1971 3 SA 188 (A). 
313 In such a case the liability is grounded in misrepresentation rather than breach of 
contract: Cullen v Zuiflema 1951 3 SA 817 (C). 
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software even if a warranty was not given and even if the developer was ignorant of 
the existence of the defects.314 The courts have gone even further and have held 
a seller whose business is to trade in a specific type of product, liable for 
consequential loss caused ·by such a defective product in the absence of any 
knowledge of the defect or a guarantee against such defects, relying on a statement 
of the French writer, Pothier. 315 Although the court in Hackett v G & G Radio and 
Refrigerator Corporation316 doubted whether this rule of Pothier applies in our law, 
it was nevertheless followed in subsequent cases317 until it was decided in 
Kroonstad Westelike Boere-Ko-operatiewe Vereniging Bpk v Botha and Another18 
that the trader who is unaware of the defect is only liable "where he publicly 
professes to have attributes of skill and expert knowledge in relation to the kind of 
goods sold."319 This rule may be applicable to the software supplier who trades 
specifically in software, such as the typical computer shop or software house. 
In the case of delivery of a defective thing without the seller having given any 
warranties or made any representations, the purchaser has the following two aedilian 
actions, based on the implied warranty against latent defects, available: the actio 
redhibitoria and the actio quanti minoris. 320 These actions stem from two actions 
introduced in Roman law by the currules aediles, officials of the praetor, who 
presided over the markets of Rome. 321 The actio redhibitoria may be instituted to 
314 Bower v Sparks, Young and Farmers' Meat Industries Ltd supra; Holmdene 
Brickworks (Pty) Ltd v Roberts Construction Co Ltd supra. 
315 Marais v Commercial General Agency Ltd 1922 TPD 440. 
316 1949 3 SA 664 (A). 
317 Odendaal v Bethlehem Romery Bpk 1954 3 SA 370 (0); Jaffe & Co (Pty) Ltd v 
Bocchi and Another 1961 4 SA 358 (T). 
318 1964 3 SA 561 (A). 
319 Supra 571. Cf De Wet and Van Wyk 341-342 for a criticism of this decision. 
320 Hackett v G&G Radio and Refrigerator Corporation 1949 3 SA 644 (A). 
321 Hosten et al774; De Wet and VanWyk 342. 
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reclaim the purchase price in cases where the defect is substantial, in other words 
it must be unfit for the purpose for which it was bought. The actio quanti minoris may 
be instituted for a reduction in the purchase price where the defect is of a lesser 
nature.322 These actions can be instituted in the alternative provided the plaintiff 
does not rely on inconsistent remedies based on the same set of facts. 323 This ex 
lege liability for latent defects may be excluded by agreement and the sale will then 
be voetstoots. Such an exclusion clause will only be valid concerning the seller's 
liability for defects of which she was unaware, as liability for dolus cannot be 
excluded. 324 
Requirements for the _aedilian actions are:325 
(i) a defect in the thing that renders it completely unfit or less fit for the 
purpose for which it was bought- the test is objective326 and "the purpose 
for which it was bought" can mean its normal use or a special use 
contemplated by the parties; 
(ii) the defect must not be negligible;327 
(iii} the defect must not be apparent upon inspection by an average person328 -
the test is objective;329 
322 SA Oil and Fat Industries Ltd v Park Ryne Whaling Co Ltd 1916 AD 400. 
323 LeRoux v Autovend (Pty) Ltd 1981 4 SA 890 (N). 
324 Vander Merwe v Culhane 1952 3 SA 42 (T). 
325 See De Wet and Van Wyk 343. 
326 Dibley v Furter 1951 4 SA 73 (C) 80. 
327 According to the de minimis non curat lex rule: Dibley v Furter supra 85. 
328 Deutschmann v Graham 1912 EDL 214. 
329 Schwarzer v John Roderick's Motors (Pty) Ltd 1940 OPD 170. 
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(iv) the defect must have existed at the time of the sale;330 and 
(v) the purchaser must not have been aware of the defect - the onus of proof 
is on the purchaser.331 
The aedilian actions are also available against the seller who makes dicta et 
promissa to a buyer upon the faith of which the contract was entered or the price was 
agreed and which later turned out to be unfounded.332 A dictum et promissum is 
a "material statement made by the seller to the buyer during the negotiations bearing 
on the quality of the res vendita and going beyond mere praise and 
commendation. "333 
(b) Lease or rental 
A contract of letting and hiring of things334 (also called a lease) is an agreement 
whereby one party (the lessor) undertakes to grant to the other party (the lessee) the 
temporary use and enjoyment of a thing in return for the latter's undertaking to pay 
rent in money. Where software is rented, the program and manuals must be returned 
to the lessor at the end of the rental period. 335 The essentialia are the agreements 
regarding the thing and the rent together with the ius utendi fruendf36 as the object 
of the lease, and temporary transfer of the thing. The naturalia of the common law 
330 Seboko v So/11949 3 SA 337 (T). 
331 Cullen v Zuidema supra 821. 
332 Phame (Pty) Ltd v Paizes 1973 3 SA 397 (A). De Wet and Van Wyk 346-347. 
333 Ph a me (Pty) Ltd v Paizes supra 417-418. However, see De Wet and Van Wyk's 
criticism at 346-34 7. 
334 Known as the locatio conductio rei in Roman law. See generally De Wet and Van 
Wyk 355-382. 
335 Eiselen 34. 
336 The power to use and enjoy (a thing). 
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lease consist of a guarantee against latent defects and a guarantee that the property 
will be enjoyed undisturbed.337 Any of these obligations may be excluded by the 
contracting parties. 338 
The main duty of the lessor is to deliver the thing let to the lessee in the condition 
agreed upon. 339 The lessor will be liable for breach of contract if there is a defect 
in the thing. 
(c) Provision of services 
A contract for the provision of services is viewed as a contract for letting and hiring 
of work340 in terms of which a piece of work is let out by the lessor to the lessee 
who agrees to do the work for a remuneration.341 Bespoke or custom made 
software as well as customised software342 is developed under this form of contract. 
The lessee does not work under the control of the lessor - she is an independent 
contractor.343 The locatio conductio operis contains an implied warranty that the 
work will be done in a proper manner and that the materials used will be of good 
quality and suitable for the particular purposes. The software will also have to comply 
with the specifications contracted for. In case of a defect, payment may be refused 
until it is rectified, the contract price may be reduced, or a claim for damages may 
be instituted where the contract price has already been paid.344 The common law 
337 Mare 89-90. 
338 Eiselen 34. 
339 De Wet and Van Wyk 358. 
340 Locatio conductio operis. 
341 See generally De Wet and VanWyk 386-390. 
342 See ch 2 par 1 0.1.1 supra. 
343 Fisk v London & Lancashire Insurance Co Ltd 1942 WLD 63 73. 
344 Eiselen 36; BK Tooling v Scope Precision Engineering 1979 1 SA 391 (A). 
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liability for latent defects may also be validly excluded as may be done in a contract 
of purchase and sale.345 
(d) Licensing 
Eiselen346 and Mare347 distinguish between licensing as a means of acquiring 
software, and licensing as a way of regulating the use of copyrighted material.348 
In the first instance a type of acquisition contract is concluded whereby software is 
supplied under a licensing contract, whereas in the second instance, a licensing 
agreement regulating the use of copyrighted material, is concluded.349 These 
contracts are not necessarily between the same parties: the acquisition agreement 
is concluded between the supplier and the user, and the licensing agreement is 
concluded between the developer (copyright holder) of the software and the user.350 
In this paragraph the possibility of regarding licensing as a form of acquisition, 
distinguishable from licensing as an agreement which regulates copyright, is 
discussed. 
The reason why software is more often said to be licensed than sold, stems from the 
practical difficulties in American law with regard to copyright law and a sale.351 The 
position of the licensing contract in South African law is still unclear, it is an 
innominate contract with no applicable natura/ia.352 As stated before, there are 
345 See (a) supra. 
346 At 34. 
347 At 117. 
348 See par 2.5.1 supra with regard to the traditional licensing agreement. 
349 Ibid. 
350 See par 2.5 supra. 
351 See par 2.6.1.3 supra. 
352 See par 2.5.1.2 supra. 
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always at least two agreements in existence when software is used, namely the 
licensing contract and the acquisition contract. 353 To view the "licensing" of 
software also as a manner of acquisition apart from sale, lease or the provision of 
services, is in my opinion, to negate the essence of the transaction taking place when 
software is acquired, which is that the user is put in the posession of a specific 
manifestation of the software as owner, lessor or the recipient of a service which 
includes the acquisition of a product, in exactly the same way as a book or tape or 
any other copyrighted product. Even the fact that software may be directly transferred 
electronically or installed on to the user's computer system, makes no difference to 
the nature of the transaction taking place.354 Depending on the nature of the 
transaction, the latter products are purchased, hired or acquired by way of a locatio 
conductio operis. 355 To state in the case of a book for example, that the purchaser 
of a book is not the owner thereof is absurd.356 The only difference between the 
latter products and software, to my mind, lies in the prescription of the use of the 
copyrighted material: in the case of software such use is much more narrowly defined 
than in the case of books and tapes,357 but the manifestation of the software 
remains the object of a sale or lease or whatever the case may be. Nevertheless, 
until such time as the South African courts have had the opportunity to pronounce 
upon the nature and effect of software licensing agreements, the possibility of 
regarding "licensing" as a form of acquisition sui generis, cannot be excluded. 
353 See par 2.1 supra. 
354 It is already possible to receive books in this manner from the Internet, which 
books are then purchased from the service provider. See also the discussion of 
the English decision in St Albans DC v ICL supra by Colbey 1996 Solicitors 
Journal 1024-1025, where the English court of Appeal specifically found that 
software directly installed on to the user's computer constitutes "goods" which was 
sold for purposes of the UCTA: see par 2.6.1.3 supra. 
355 A contract for the provision of services: see (c) supra. 
356 Eiselen 35; Reed(2) 46. 
357 For example, only one set of backup copies are permitted in the case of software 
whereas in the case of tapes any quantity of copies for private use is allowed. 
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2.6.2.2 Other contracts 
{a) Maintenance and support contracts 
The maintenance agreement is a contract for the provision of services358 in terms 
whereof the service provider has the obligation to check the functioning of the 
software, to install updates of the system and to help with software malfunctions.359 
If the service provider does not perform as agreed to in terms of the contract, the 
same remedies as in the case of the software acquisition contract referred to 
above360 , applies. 
(b) Bureau services or outsourcing contracts 
The computer bureau contract is a contract for the letting and hiring of work361 with 
the same obligations as referred to previously. 362 Outsourcing contracts are also 
contracts for the letting and hiring of work, and may take place on the same basis as 
those discussed under Anglo-American law.363 If the service provider does not 
perform in accordance with the agreement between the parties, the same remedies 
as above364 apply. 
358 Locatio conductio operis. 
359 Eiselen 39. 
360 Par 2.6.2.1 (c). 
361 Locatio conductio operis. 
362 Par 2.6.2.1 (c) supra. 
363 See par 2.6.1.4 (b) supra. 
364 Par 2.6.2.1 (c) supra. 
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2. 7. Professional liability 
Professional liability refers to the liability a person who engages in a profession, trade 
or calling which demands special knowledge and skill. 365 As such the term 
"professional liability" does not constitute a separate and independent cause of 
action, but is used to describe the liability of a certain group of persons whose 
negligence are judged by a higher standard of skill than that of ordinary 
wrongdoers. 366 Professional liability may be grounded in an action based on 
contract as well as delict, 367 and in this paragraph the discussion is limited to 
actions of a contractual nature.368 
In most instances a contract will exist between the professional user and her client 
in terms whereof the former undertakes to render professional services to the latter 
for a specified fee. The contractual nature of the relationship that exists between the 
professional user and her client who may be the possible injured party, is one of 
mandate.369 In terms of the mandate the professional user (mandatary) undertakes 
to provide a professional service with such measure of skill and competence as can 
be reasonably expected from another professional of the same profession to the 
client (mandator).370 The standard of care required is not the highest possible 
365 Midgley(1) 146 and (2) 120-132. See also VanWyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438 444; 
Blyth v Vander Heever 1980 1 SA 191 (A) 221; Randaree v WH Dixon & 
Associates 1983 2 SA 1 (A) 4; S v Kramer 1987 1 SA 893; Pringle v Administrator 
Tvl1990 2 SA 379 (W) 384; Castell v De Greet 1993 3 SA 501 (C). See also ch 
6 par 6.2 infra. 
366 See also Weir 6-3; Pretorius 14; Jackson and Powell 3. 
367 Ibid. 
368 See par 3.3.3.3 infra with regard to professional liability in delict. 
369 Midgley(2) 1; Strauss 3; Claassen and Verschoor 115. 
370 Claassen and Verschoor 116; Midgley(2) 5; De Wet and Van Wyk 386. 
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degree371 of professional skill, and unless it is expressly so guaranteed, 
professionals do not normally warrant that they will achieve the results that their 
clients desire.372 A professional is judged by a higher standard of care than is 
required from an ordinary person because more can reasonably be expected of a 
skilled professional than of an untrained lay-person. 373 The ex lege duties of the 
mandatary as imposed by the contract of mandate are to perform the task, to obey 
instructions, to exercise care and diligence, to advise and impart information, to 
account and to show good faith. 374 If the professional performs her duties in a 
negligent manner, a breach of contract is committed for which the client may claim 
damages. Although exclusion of liability clauses are not invalid, the general rule is 
that professional persons of integrity do not resort to excluding liability.375 The 
possibility of a delictual claim may also arise as professional relationships give rise 
to a legal duty to exercise the necessary care, skill and diligence towards their 
clients. 376 
When the type of ES embodied in the Intelligent Assistane77 is used, it serves as 
a tool or decision-aid for professional users such as lawyers, doctors, engineers, 
etcetera during the provision of their professional services. In the same way an ES 
371 Mitchell v Dixon 1914 AD 519 525; Castell v De Greef supra 509. 
372 Buls v Tsatsarolakis 1976 2 SA 710 (T) 723. See also Strauss 41 and the 
unreported decision to which he refers, namely that of Behrmann and Another v 
Klugman 1988 WLD in which the court found that an unsuccessful vasectomy was 
not accompanied by a guarantee from the doctor as to the permanent success of 
the operation. The court accordingly held that there was not a breach of contract 
by the doctor: Strauss ibid. 
373 Guardian National Insurance Co Ltd v Wyers 1988 1 SA 255 (A) 263. 
37 4 Midgley(2) 73; De Wet and Van Wyk 386-387. 
375 Midgley (2) 87. However, there is no reason why a partial exclusion that defines 
the scope of the professional services, should not be accepted: Midgley (2) 87. 
376 Midgley(1) 1; Strauss 243. See ch 4 par 2 infra with regard to the concurrence of 
claims. 
377 See ch 2 par 11 supra. 
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Machine can be used by professional users in the practice of their professions. 
Where a client of the professional user consequently suffers damage because the 
professional used a defective ES, or used a sound ES incorrectly, or did not use an 
ES at all in circumstances where one should have been used, a breach of contract 
based on positive malperformance may have taken place if such conduct amounts 
to breach of one of the duties defined above. 378 
Professional liability may also arise with regard to the contractual liability incurred by 
the producers of an ES. The DE as an expert in the field of knowledge of the ES, 
and the designers as the toolbuilders and computer programmers of an ES, may be 
held professionally liable for incorrect knowledge or programming supplied, either 
towards the main developer of the system in terms of the employment contracts for 
the provision of services existing between them, 379 or towards the user in terms of 
an existing software development contract. With regard to third parties, the 
professional does not undertake any contractual obligations to a non-cliene80 with 
the result that such a claim will have to be based in delict. 381 
2.8 Conclusion 
Where damage is incurred by the use of ES's, contractual liability may occur between 
parties in contract.382 The contractual liability will depend on the type of contract(s) 
in existence which, in the case of software use, consists of at least two types of 
contracts, namely the licensing contract between the developer and the user, and the 
378 Claassen and Verschoor 117; see also par 2.2.2 supra. 
379 The issue whether the developers of software in general can be regarded as a 
profession and eva luted in terms of a professional standard, is a contentious one: 
see ch 6 par 6 infra. 
380 Wunsh 1988 TSAR 9. 
381 See par 3.3.3.3 infra. 
382 See par 2.1 supra. 
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acquisition contract between the supplier arid the user. 383 Before a contractual 
action can be instituted the requirements for a valid contract must be met in terms of 
the general principles of contract.384 In the case of the use of a defective ES, use 
of an incorrect ES, and the non-use of an ES, breach of contract based on positive 
malperformance may occur if such use constitutes non-compliance with the terms of 
the contract in existence.385 In case of breach of contract, parties will have a claim 
for damages for patrimonial loss suffered, including foreseeable consequential loss, 
whether the contract is upheld or cancelled.386 Contractual liability is frequently 
excluded or limited by exemption clauses.387 In contrast to the position in other 
jurisdictions, notably the United Kingdom and the United States, South African 
contracting parties have virtually no protection against unfair contract clauses. 388 
This situation is especially detrimental to the position of software consumers 
subjected to standard form contracts, and the legislator should remedy the situation 
speedily.389 These exclusions, which may exclude contractual as well as delictual 
liability, may occur in the acquisition contract concluded between the supplier and the 
user or in the licensing agreement concluded between the developer and the 
user.39° For reasons already shown,391 it often transpires that the licensing 
contract is not validly concluded, unlike the acquisition contract which comes into 
383 Ibid. 
384 See par 2.2 supra. 
385 See pars 2.2.2.2 and 2.2.2.3 supra. 
386 See par 2.2.2.3 supra. 
387 See par 2.4.supra. 
388 See par 2.4.2.3 supra. 
389 The SALC has already made extensive proposals in this regard: see par 2.4.2.3 
supra. 
390 See par 2.4 supra. 
391 See par 2.5.2.2 supra. 
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existence when the software is commissioned, purchased, hired or licensed.392 The 
user may therefore be in the position where she does not have a contractual or 
delictual claim against the supplier (because it has been excluded), but she does 
have a delictual action against the developer as no contractual exemption applies 
between the parties (due to the licensing agreement not being validly 
constituted). 393 If the developer is a foreign party, as is frequently the case, the 
plaintiff may be in an invidious position. Where a valid licensing contract does exist, 
the delictual liability of the developer will, more often than not, be excluded which, in 
terms of South African law will probably be enforceable, leaving the injured party with 
no claim at all. 394 However, in the case of Anglo-American law being the applicable 
law of the contract, 395 an exemption clause may be found unconscionable and 
therefore invalid.396 
The following software acquisition contracts have been identified in South African law 
namely, contracts of purchase and sale, lease or rental, the provision of services and 
licensing.397 The various duties in terms of the relevant contractual obligations, and 
the possibility of exemption clauses have been discussed and will not be repeated 
here. 398 Other contracts, such as contracts for maintenance and support, bureau 
services or outsourcing contracts, may also lead to contractual liability in case of an 
ES error causing damage. 399 In the case of an ES used by a professional user in 
the execution of her professional duties, professional liability may be incurred if she 
392 See par 2.6 supra. 
393 See par 2.5.2.2 supra. 
394 See par 2.5.1 supra. 
395 See ch 4 par 4.4.1 supra. 
396 See par 2.6.1.3 supra. 
397 See par 2.6.2.1 supra. 
398 See par 2.6.2.1 supra. 
399 See par 2.6.2.2 supra. 
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does not render a service with the measure of skill and competence that can 
reasonably be expected.400 The same applies to the various producers of an ES 
who may be held liable in terms of the standard of skill of their profession in the 
execution of their contractual duties in producing the ES.401 The producers in the 
employ of the developer must comply with their duties towards the latter according 
to the terms and conditions of their contracts of employment402 and may be liable 
for any non-compliance thereof. 403 The employer will be liable for any contractual 
obligations incurred by employees which fall within the employer's business.404 
Where the producers render their services to a developer in terms of a locatio 
conductio operis, they are independent contractors for whose actions the developer 
will not be liable as an employer. 405 
3. Delictual liability 
3.1 Introduction 
The South African law of delict is founded on Roman and Roman-Dutch law with 
some influence from English law.406 As such it is based on general principles of 
liability as a basic point of departure, upholding the following approach as formulated 
in Perlman v Zoutendyk407 : 
400 See par 2.7 supra. 
401 Ibid. 
402 Such contracts are in the form of a locatio conductio operarum. 
403 See par 2.6.2.2 supra. 
404 Midgley(2) 183; Claassen and Verschoor 127; Strauss 79. 
405 Eiselen 36; Strauss 79. 
406 Midgley (1) 18; Neethlng et a/ 9; Van der Merwe and Olivier 6. 
407 1934 CPO 151 155. 
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Roman-Dutch law approaches a new problem in the continental rather than 
the English way, because in general all damage caused unjustifiably is 
actionable, whether caused intentionally (dolo) or by negligence (culpa). 
When a conflict between the interests of different legal subjects causes loss to one 
of them, it must be ascertained who must bear the loss. In this study the delictual 
liability of the producers and the users, arising from loss caused through the use of 
ES's, are discussed. The basic rule is that the loss lies where it falls408 except 
when the rights of the victim are culpably infringed, in which case the loss is shifted 
to the actor.409 The circumstances in which the latter situation is likely to occur are 
pointed out in this chapter with reference to the general principles involved, while a 
detailed discussion follows later.410 As stated before,411 the use of a defective 
ES, the incorrect use of a sound ES, and the non-use of an existing ES may lead to 
the commission of a delict by the producers and/or the users in respect of any of the 
three types of ES's identified, namely the Intelligent Assistant, the Self-Help System, 
and the ES Machine. 
A delict is defined as the wrongful and culpable act of a person which causes harm 
to another.412 These principles for liability apply to any infringement of an individual 
interest, thereby giving South African law a "generalising approach"413 which is in 
direct contrast to the casuistic approach of Anglo-American tort law.414 According 
408 res perit domino. 
409 Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A) 494. 
41 0 See ch 6 infra. 
411 Cf ch 1 par 1.1 and ch 2 par 11 supra. 
412 Neethling et a/ 4; Van der Walt 1; Van der Merwe and Olivier 1. Boberg at. 1 
defines a delict as the " infringement of another's interests that is wrongful" without 
referring to the requirement of fault. See Neethling et a/ 4 fn 8 for their criticism 
of this definition. 
413 Neethling et a/ 5, especially fn 11. 
414 See ch 5 part I pars A 1.1.1 and B 1.1.1 infra. 
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to the casuistic approach, a set of specific delicts or torts exists, each with its own 
rules that have to be satisfied before a wrongdoer can be held liable under that 
rubric. However, there is a qualification to the generalising approach in our law in 
that only two basic types of delicts are distinguished in accordance with the type of 
loss caused: those that cause patrimonial damage415 and those that cause injury 
to personality.416 The type of loss determines the remedy available for recovering 
the loss caused. 417 Therefore, all delicts that are committed fall under either or 
both of the two basic types. It is on these two types of delict that the two pillars of 
the law of delict, namely the actio legis Aquiliae and the actio iniuriarum, are 
grounded.418 A third action, the Germanic action for pain and suffering which was 
taken up in Roman-Dutch law, also became available. In terms of the Aquilian action, 
damages for the wrongful and intentional or negligent causing of patrimonial 
damage may be claimed; in terms of the iniuria action, satisfaction or sentimental 
damages may be claimed for intentional injury to personality interests, and in terms 
of the Germanic action, non-patrimonial damages for pain and suffering associated 
with physical injury which was negligently caused, may be claimed.419 
Because of its generalising approach, the law of delict is very flexible and can 
accommodate new situations that arise in modern times with relative ease. 420 This 
elasticity of general principles is limited by the generally conservative approach of our 
415 damnum iniuria datum. 
416 iniuria. 
417 See par 3.2 infra. 
418 Neethling et a/ 5-6. 
419 Ibid. 
420 An example is the protection of privacy and the goodwill of a company: 
Neethling et a/ 4. 
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courts to the extension of liability.421 However, they have extended liability to novel 
situations where required by legal or public policy and it seems as if recent decisions 
are adopting new or modified legal principles whereby the foundation is being laid for 
further policy decisions.422 The general criterion of reasonableness, the legal 
convictions of the community or the boni mores, based on public policy has been 
used to justify the extension of delictual liability to novel situations, thereby laying a 
foundation for further policy decisions.423 Examples are the extension of delictual 
liability in cases involving omissions and pure economic loss to forms of conduct or 
types of losses not previously recognised as founding such liability.424 The 
requirement of wrongfulness, determined by the open-ended boni-mores standard, 
thus plays a major in instances where policy considerations have led to the extension 
of delictual liability.425 Open-ended standards refer to legal rules which, by their 
formulation, expressly or by implication incorporate considerations of policy in their 
application. Examples are two of the general requirements for delictual liability, 
namely the currently accepted criteria for the determination of wrongfulness and of 
421 Herschel v Mrupe supra; Union Government v Ocean Accident and Guarantee 
Corp Ltd 1956 1 SA 577 (A) 584; Lillicrap, Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington 
Bros (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 (A) 501. 
422 Midgley(1) 18; Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171. Cf Compass Motor Industries 
(Pty) Ltd v Gal/guard (Pty) Ltd 1990 2 SA 520 0/V); Minister van Polisie v Ewels 
1975 3 SA 590 (A); Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 3 SA 
824 (A); Marais v Richard 1981 1 SA 1157 (A); Pakendorf v De Flamingh 1982 
3 SA 146 (A); Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A); International Shipping Co (Pty) 
Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A); Lillicrap, Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington 
Bros (SA) (Pty) Ltd supra. 
423 Midgley(1) ibid; Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171. 
424 Minister van Polisie v Ewels supra; Compass Motor Industries (Pty) Ltd v 
Gal/guard (Pty) Ltd supra; Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk; 
Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 
1978 4 SA 901 (N); Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) 
(Pty) Ltd supra; Shell and BP SA Petroleum Refineries (Pty) Ltd v Osborne 
Panama SA 1980 3 SA 653 (D); Arthur E Abrahams and Gross v Cohen 1991 2 
SA 301 (C); lndac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 1 SA 783 (A). 
425 Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 182-185. 
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legal causation or remoteness of damage.426 Public policy not only has a leading 
role in determining and limiting liability through the application of the open-ended 
norms utilised in the tests for wrongfulness and causation, it also determines or plays 
a role in determining whether liability should be strict or based on fault,427 whether 
someone has title to sue,428 what form of intention should be required,429 what 
constitutes negligent conduct,430 what constitutes actionable harm,431 who should 
bear the onus of proof in a given action and what is the extent of such onus.432 
The question arises whether delictual liability incurred through the use of ES's can 
likewise be fully accommodated by our existing common law principles without the 
intervention of the legislator. This issue is fully explored later when a detailed 
exposition of the applicable delictual liability is undertaken.433 Here, the general 
requirements for delictual liability are briefly set out in order to show their applicability 
to the situation of ES use. 434 
426 Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 171-195. 
427 Pakendorf v De Flaming supra; PMB Armature Winders v Pietermaritzburg City 
Council1981 2 SA 129 (N) 133-134; Cosmos (Pty) Ltd v Phillipson 1968 (3) SA 
121 (R) 129. 
428 Dhlomo v Natal Newspapers (Pty) Ltd 1989 1 SA 945 (A); Argus Printing and 
Publishing Co Ltd v lnkatha Freedom Party 1992 3 SA 579 (A) 588. 
429 Minister of Justice v Hofmeyr 1993 3 SA 131 (A) 154. 
430 Ngubane v SA Transport Services 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 776. 
431 Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v Warneke 1911 AD 657; 
Eduard v Administrateur Natal 1989 2 SA 368 (D). 
432 Mabaso v Felix 1981 3 SA 865 (A) 871; Neethling v Du Preez, Neethling v The 
Weekly Mail 1994 1 SA 708 (A) 770. 
433 Ch 6 infra. 
434 See par 3.3.6 infra. 
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3.2 Remedies 
There are three actions with which compensation for the commission of delicts are 
recovered: (a) the actio legis Aquilia for the recovery of damages for the wrongful 
and intentional or negligent causing of patrimonial damage; (b) the actio iniuriarum 
to claim satisfaction for the wrongful and intentional injury to personality interests; and 
(c) the action for pain and suffering to claim compensation for certain types of injury 
to the personality arising from the wrongful and negligent impairment of the physical-
mental integrity.435 
Although not improbable,436 it is unlikely that in the type of cases forming the 
subject of this thesis, the damage will be caused through intentional conduct and will 
consist of injury to personality, and for that reason the treatment of delictual liability 
is confined to liability for injury to person and property incurred through negligent 
conduct.437 It follows that instances where the actio iniuriarum, requiring intention, 
would have been applicable are excluded from this discussion. The remedy likely to 
be used most frequently in the context of ES liability, is the Aquilian action for 
compensation of negligently caused patrimonial damage.438 The sui generis action 
for pain and suffering will be applicable to recover non-patrimonial damages for 
negligently caused personal injury. Whereas it can be stated that pure economic loss 
is more readily sustained than personal injury in cases of damage incurred through 
435 Neethling et a/ 5; Van der Walt 2; Van der Merwe en Olivier 15; Boberg 18. 
436 It is possible that instances of producers and users acting intentionally (with dolus) 
will occur but it is submitted that such cases will be exceptional and do not form 
part of legitimate software production. 
437 Fraud as a delict is therefore also not discussed. 
438 For example, a defective MES which is negligently used as an Intelligent Assistant 
by the doctor, is likely to cause personal and property damage to the plaintiff: see 
ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
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the use of conventional software,439 this is not necessarily the case with ES 
software as it is of a nature which frequently entails risk of bodily injury.440 
3.3 Requirements of a delict 
In terms of the definition of a delict there are five requirements or elements that must 
be present before a delict is constituted: (i) an act, (ii) wrongfulness, (iii) fault, (iv) 
causation and (v) damage.441 The development of strict liability (liability without 
fault) in certain instances is an extension of traditional delictual liability which requires 
fault.442 
3.3.1 Conduct 
Conduct is a voluntary human act or omission.443 Only a human being can incur 
delictual liability.444 A juristic person such as a company or a software house may 
439 Conventional software refers to programs that manipulate data instead of 
knowledge as in the case of ES software: see ch 2 par 5 supra. As such, 
conventional software is mostly used for ordinary data-processing and not in 
decision-making applications to be used in potential risk activities. 
440 Two examples are the high incidence of ES applications in the medical domain 
and in safety-related products such as the "fly-by-wire" pilot system where a defect 
in the system which leads to a crash is bound to cause bodily injury: see ch 2 pars 
4 and 9 supra. 
441 Neethling et a/ 4. 
442 Cf Neethling et a/ 341 et seq. See ch 6 par 7 infra. 
443 Neethling et a/21 et seq; Vander Merwe and Olivier 24 et seq; Van der Walt 57; 
Boberg 41; Midgely(1) 47-49; Snyman 57. 
444 August 1988 CLJ 382 argues that robots (which are controlled by software that 
effect a material output, and therefore similar to an ES Machine) should be 
acknowledged as legal entities attracting independent liability: see ch 2 par 2 
supra. See also Cole 1990 CLJ 153 who notes that it is not yet possible to hold 
the ES itself liable for damage caused: see ch 2 par 2.1 supra. 
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commit a delict through the conduct of its human members.445 In such a case the 
act of a human being is attributed to the legal entity.446 The following guideline is 
submitted by Neethling et af47 to establish when the act of a human is attributable 
to a legal entity before it can be held delictually liable: "An act which is performed 
by or at the command of, or with the permission of a director, official or servant of the 
legal corporation in the exercise of his duties or functions in advancing or attempting 
to advance the interests of the legal corporation, is deemed to have been performed 
by such corporation." In the case of damage caused by an ES, liability will either 
settle on the human user of the ES because of the incorrect use of the ES, or on the 
human producer of the ES because of a defect in the ES itself. A human act is 
therefore still present whether the ES is used as an instrument448 to commit a delict, 
or whether the production of the ES constitutes a delict, as in the case of a defective 
ES. 
The conduct must furthermore be voluntary which implies that the actor has the 
mental ability to control muscular movements.449 Conduct is voluntary if the actor 
is capable of making a decision about the conduct and is capable of preventing the 
prohibited act or result if she concentrates on doing so.450 
445 Neethling et a/ 22. 
446 Ibid. 
447 At 22 fn 6. 
448 An object or an animal can be used as an instrument to commit acts: Jooste v 
Minister of Police 1975 1 SA 340 (E); Chetty v Minister of Police 1976 2 SA 450 
(N). 
449 The same principle exists in criminal law: Cf Snyman 52-53. 
450 S v Johnson 1969 1 SA 201 (A) 204; S v Goliath 1972 3 SA 1 (A) 29; S v Trickett 
1973 3 SA 526 (T) 532; S v Chretien 1981 1 SA 1097 (A) 1104. A defence of 
"automatism" can be advanced by the defendant who, due to certain conditions, 
acted mechanically or involuntary: Cf Neethling et a/ 23 et seq; Van der Merwe 
and Olivier 26 et seq. 
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Conduct may consist of a commission (positive conduct) or an omission.451 An 
omisson can be described as a failure to take positive steps to prevent harm to 
another.452 For an omission to take place, the failure to act must not form an 
integral part of positive conduct such as driving, as it would then constitute negligent 
positive conduct.453 Liability for omissions is more restricted than liability for 
commissions.454 In the case of an omissio there must be a legal duty to act 
positively before the conduct can be regarded as unlawful.455 Control over a person 
or thing constitutes positive conduct and inaction or failure to take precautions during 
the activity of controlling may constitute negligent control which may be regarded as 
a commission or as an omission.456 Product liability cases illustrate examples of 
negligent control by the manufacturer of a defective product.457 
Positive conduct may be in the form of physical conduct or in the form of a statement. 
Different policy rules are considered to determine liability when statements instead 
of physical conduct cause damage.458 If such statements are made negligently, 
451 Neethling et a/26; Vander Walt 58; Snyman 55; Boberg 210; Vander Merwe 
and Olivier 31. 
452 Neethling et a/ 27; Van der Walt 58. 
453 Ibid. 
454 Neethling eta/ 27; Van der Walt 58; Boberg 211 states: 
The forces of history and social policy maintain the distinction 
between positive and negative conduct by viewing the latter more 
benevolently than the former: the duty not to cause harm is more 
stringent than the duty to prevent it. 
455 Minister van Polise v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A). See par 3.3.2.3 infra. 
456 Midgley(1) 48; Pretorius 254-255. In this way the act is constituted in the case 
of products liability: see ch 6 par 5 infra. 
457 Neethling et a/ 304 et seq; Boberg 193 et seq. See ch 6 par 5 infra. 
458 Midgley(1) 47; Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 182. 
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liability may arise from negligent misrepresentation.459 
3.3.2 Wrongfulness 
The conduct of the defendant must have been wrongful, it must have caused harm 
in a legally reprehensible or unreasonable manner.460 The determination of 
wrongfulness consists of a twofold investigation: Firstly, it must be determined 
whether the act has in fact caused a harmful result and secondly, it must be 
determined whether this harmful result occurred in an unreasonable manner in 
violation of a legal norm.461 
3.3.2.1 The test for wrongfulness 
Wrongfulness is a conclusion of law which is drawn by the court from the facts before 
it.462 In determining whether conduct is unlawful, the courts consider the conflicting 
interests of the parties, their relations to each other, the circumstances of the case, 
any existing superior rights, and policy considerations.463 Considerations of public 
and legal policy indicate the community's perception of justice, equity, good faith and 
reasonableness, to be taken into account when the court has to render a value 
459 Neethling et a/ 286 et seq; Boberg 58 et seq. See ch 6 par 2 infra. 
460 Conduct is therefore wrongful when it is unreasonable. Cf Neethling et a/29 et 
seq; Van der Merwe and Olivier 49 et seq; Van der Walt 20 et seq; Boberg 30 
et seq; Midgley(1) 49 et seq. 
461 Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 SA 376 (T); 
Neethling et a/ 29. 
462 Mabaso v Felix 1981 3 SA 865 (A) 875; Natal Fresh Produce Growers' 
Association v Agroserve (Pty) Ltd 1990 4 SA 749 (N) 757. 
463 Midgley (1) 50; Natal Fresh Produce Growers Association v Agroserve (Pty) Ltd 
supra 754; Minister of Law and Order v Kadir 1995 1 SA 303 (A) 318. 
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judgement in terms of society's notion of justice.464 
Th~ general criterion of reasonableness,, also referred to as the .legal convictions of 
... 
the community (the boni mores) is the norm or test used to determine whether 
conduct is wrongful.465 This test is an obj~gyy_e_ex_po~tfc:JQt<?P ..fQCe~s. therefore it 
.,....-•·•'"""...,n 
is sometimes said to be viewed by the courts from the perspective of the "reasonable 
bystander".466 In applying the boni mores test, the court has to weigh the 
conflicting interests of the plaintiff and the defendant in the light of all the relevant 
factors mentioned above, in order to decide whether the defendant's conduct was 
reasonable or unreasonable.467 The infringement of a subjective right and the 
violation of a legal duty are specific examples of the legal norms used in the 
application of the boni mores test. 
Although the reasonableness standard can readily be applied to novel situations, the 
courts will only extend the ambit of delictual liability to new situations where "there 
464 Compass Motor Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gal/guard (Pty) Ltd supra 528-529; Trope 
v SA Reserve Bank 1992 3 SA 208 (T) 214; Motor Industry Fund Administrators 
(Pty) Ltd v Janit 1994 3 SA 56 (VV) 61. 
465 Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 1977 4 SA 376 (T) 
387; Minister van Polisie v Ewe/s 1975 3 SA 597 (A); Marais v Richard 1981 1 
SA 1157 (A) 1168; Lillicrap, Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington Bros (SA) (Pty) 
Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 (A) 498; Kadir v Minister of Law and Order 1992 3 SA 737 (C) 
7 41; Borgin v De Villiers 1980 3 SA 556 (A) 577; Ramsay v Minister van Polisie 
1981 4 SA 802 (A) 811; Natal Fresh Produce Growers Association v Agroserve 
(Pty) Ltd supra 753; Macadamia Finance Ltd v De Wet 1991 4 SA 273 (T) 278; 
Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v lnkatha Freedom Party 1992 3 SA 579 (A) 
588; Knop v Johannesburg City Council1995 2 SA 1 (A) 27; Administrateur, Tv/ 
v Vander Merwe 1994 4 SA 347 (A) 361; Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van 
Afrika Bpk 1979 3 SA 824 (A) 833; Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan 
Construction Co Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 (D) 380; Hawker v Life Offices Association 
of South Africa 1987 3 SA 777 (C) 781; Schultz v Butt 1986 3 SA 667 (A) 679; 
Clarke v Hurst 1992 4 SA 630 (D) 651; Lanco Engineering CC v Aris Box 
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1993 4 SA 378 (D) 380. 
466 Borgin v De Villiers supra 577. CfMidgley (1) 50-54; Neethling et al31-39; Boberg 
30-54. 
467 Ibid. 
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are positive policy considerations which favour such an extension".468 However, the 
words of Conradie J in Kadir v Minister of Law and Orde1'69 are also appropriate: 
(B)ut one should remember that we are 1 0 years wiser now and that Courts 
nowadays are a great deal more comfortable with the notion that a decision 
on the wronfulness of the act or omission in a novel duty situation, whether 
in the field of physical damage or economic loss, is custom-made for that 
particular situation. With the aid of the test in Ewels (supra) we can now 
pinpoint very particular features of a particular situation which can be seen 
to be wrongful in one context and in practically no other. 
According to Van Aswegen, 470 the extension of delictual liability to negligent 
misrepresentation471 and conduct causing pure economic loss,472 is based on 
policy considerations. The extension of Aquilian liability to conduct causing pure 
economic loss was developed further in other cases in which the following two factors 
emerged as being decisive: (i) the policy consideration of a fear of overwhelming 
potential liability which is based on the constitutional objection to an unlimited number 
of trials occupying the courts and impairing the administration of justice and moral 
objections to imposing an impossible burden on the wrongdoer,473 and (ii) 
reasonable foreseeability which is actually the subjective foresight or knowledge of 
the wrongdoer that her conduct would cause loss to the plaintiff - knowledge of the 
identity of the plaintiff and of the loss which will be caused justifies the imposition of 
liability.474 In a recent Appellate decision475 the court emphasized the absence 
468 Lillicrap, Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington Bros (SA) (Pty) Ltd supra 504. 
469 Supra 742. 
470 1993 THRHR 171-195. 
471 Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 3 SA 824 (A). 
472 Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A); Compass Motor Industries (Pty) 
Ltd v Gal/guard (Pty) Ltd 1990 2 SA 520 0/'J). 
473 Pretorius 269. 
474 In such a case, the main objection to indeterminate liability is absent as foreseen 
loss to an identified victim can never be indefinite: Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 
184. 
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of limitless liability as a factor indicative of the policy considerations imposing a legal 
duty in the circumstances.476 The court also mentioned the possibility of effective 
loss-spreading through insurance as a policy consideration to be applied for the 
protection of the economic interests of society as a whole. 477 
The principle of foreseeability of harm, which is the cornerstone for the test of 
negligence,478 is one of the factors considered by the court during the application 
of the test for wrongfulness.479 The Constitution,480 in particular the Bill of 
Rights,481 ane; relevant factors to be taken into account when assessing whether or 
not conduct is reasonable.482 This follows from the provisions of the application 
clause483 in which the legislature, the executive and the judiciary484 are bound to 
apply or develop the common Jaw in accordance with the fundamental rights accorded 
to natural and juristic persons in the Constitution.485 The values reflected in the 
Constitution, namely "to transform the South African legal system into one concerned 
with openness, accountability, democratic principles, human rights and reconciliation 
475 lndac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 1 SA 783 (A). 
476 Supra 798. 
477 Insurance as policy factor influencing delictual liability, also plays a role in other 
jurisdictions: see ch 5 infra. 
478 Kruger v Coetzee 1966 2 SA 428 (A) 430. 
4 79 Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd supra 384. 
480 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
481 Chapter 2 of Act 108 of 1996. 
482 Midgley (1) 54. See also par 3.3.2.4 infra. 
483 S 8 of Act 108 of 1996. 
484 s 8(1). 
485 S 8(2) and (3). See also ch 4 par 6.2.2 infra. 
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and reconstruction"486 , should also be reflected in our common law.487 Chapter 
two therefore provides a judicial instrument to develop the law of delict. 
Wrongfulness can be seen as an infringement of a right or the breach of a legal 
duty.488 These two concepts provide the structure for the development of principles 
relating to wrongfulness. 489 
3.3.2.2 Infringement of a right 
In terms of the doctrine of subjective rights, wrongfulness consists of the infringement 
of a subjective right.490 In terms of the dual relationship491 that characterises 
every right, the holder of the right has the power to enjoy the legal object of the right 
without interference from others. There is a duty on others to refrain from infringing 
upon the holder's relation to the legal object as a correlative to the holder's 
capacities.492 According to the different nature of legal objects, five categories of 
rights are classified: real rights, personality rights, personal rights, immaterial property 
rights and personal immaterial property rights.493 Infringements of these rights are 
486 Qozeleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994 3 SA 625 (E) 634; Phato v Attorney-
General, Eastern Cape; Commissioner of the South African Police Services v 
Attorney-General, Eastern Cape 1995 1 SA 799 (E); Gardener v Whittaker 1995 
2 SA 672 (E) 685. 
487 Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC) 692. 
488 Minister van Polisie v Ewe/s 1975 3 SA 590 (A); Halliwell v Johannesburg 
Municipal Counci/1912 AD 659; Silva's Fishing Corporation (Pty) Ltd v Maweza 
1957 2 SA 256 (A); Regal v African Supers/ate (Pty) Ltd 1963 1 SA 102 (A). 
489 See Midgley (1) 56-65; Neethling et a/ 43-65; Boberg 30-57. 
490 Clarke v Hurst supra 651. 
491 The subject-object relationship and the subject-subject relationship. 
492 Midgley (1) 57; Neethling et a/ 43; Van der Merwe and Olivier 54; Van der Walt 
22. 
493 Traditionally only the first four kinds of rights were distinguished: Universiteit van 
Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk supra 382. Neethling 1987 THRHR 
316 identified personal immaterial property rights as the fifth category of 
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prima facie wrongful.494 A justifiable interference with the relationship does not 
constitute an infringement of a right though, and whether an interference is justifiable 
or not is determined according to the reasonableness criterion.495 Wrongfulness in 
the case of an infringement of a subjective right therefore entails two issues, namely 
(a) Interference with an interest that falls within the identified categories of rights; and 
(b) a criterion for determining the justifiability of an interference with the relevant 
subject-object relationship, which is the general boni mores test.496 
3.3.2.3 Breach of a legal duty 
An infringement of a subjective right is not the only criterion for unlawfulness, as 
damage may occur in circumstances where a clearly defined subjective right does not 
exist or in circumstances where, although the infringement of a subjective right is 
identifiable, it is more appropriate to determine whether a legal duty has been -
breached.497 In such cases wrongfulness is determined by asking whether the 
defendant had a legal duty to to prevent the loss.498 In cases of liability for an 
omission or the causing of pure economic loss, the impairment of the legal object is 
not prima facie unlawful, or no recognised legal object can be identified and it must 
be determined in each case whether there is a legal duty to act positively499 or to 
subjective rights. These categories of rights are not restricted in number, new 
categories may be recognised and developed: see Neethling et a/ 46. 
494 Clarke v Hurst supra 651; Neethling et a/47. 
495 Par 3.3.2.4 infra. 
496 Neethling et a/ 29. 
497 For instance, in the case of damage caused by a negligent misrepresentation and 
pure economic loss: Universiteit van Pretoria v Tommie Meyer Films (Edms) Bpk 
supra 387. See also ch 6 par 2 infra. 
498 Neethling et a/ 49 et seq; Midgley 59 et seq. 
499 The failure to act positively to prevent loss does not prima facie constitute an 
infringement of subjective rights: see ch 6 par 4 infra. 
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avoid pure economic Joss.500 
The question whether a legal duty exists and has been breached is determined by 
the same test used in cases of an infringement of a right, namely the objective 
reasonableness criterion or the boni mores test.501 In cases of wrongfulness arising 
from the breach of a legal duty, two issues arise, namely (a) whether there was a 
duty upon the defendant to act reasonably towards the plaintiff; and (b) whether the 
defendant breached that duty. The first issue is a conclusion of law, determined by 
taking all the circumstances into account. 502 The question is whether the plaintiff's 
interest merits judicial protection against the defendant's conduct in the 
circumstances.503 The existence of a legal duty which is sometimes referred to as 
a duty of care,504 must be distinguished from the "duty of care" concept which is 
applied during the determination of the defendant's fault or negligence.505 In the 
latter instance duty of care refers to the question whether the wrongdoer exercised 
the standard of care that the reasonable person would have exercised in order to 
prevent damage (the "negligence-issue") whereas in the former instance relating to 
the existence of a legal duty, the question is whether the conduct was objectively 
reasonable in all the circumstances, including the foreseeability of harm. The "duty-
issue", namely whether a duty of care is owed by the defendant is first established 
and thereafter the negligence-issue is determined, namely whether a breach of the 
duty occurred. The duty of care doctrine is foreign to Roman-Dutch law, it is an 
500 See ch 6 par 3 infra. 
501 Neethling et a/ 50; Boberg 32. 
502 Knop v Johannesburg City Council supra 28. 
503 Administrateur Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk supra 832-833; Bayer SA (Pty) 
Ltd v Frost supra 568; Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd 
1994 4 SA 747 (A) 770; Administrateur, Tv/ v Vander Merwe supra 358. 
504 Eg Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 3 SA 824 (A); 
Compass Motor Industries (Pty) Ltd v Gal/guard (Pty) Ltd 1990 2 SA 520 (W). 
505 Neethling et a/139-140. 
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English doctrine applied with reference to the tort of negligence and should be 
avoided as it causes confusion between the test for wrongfulness and the test for 
negligence. 506 
3.3.2.4 Grounds of justification 
Grounds of justification are defences which exclude the wrongfulness element of a 
delictual action. 507 These grounds are typical circumstances in which prima facie 
unlawful conduct is regarded as lawful in terms of the general criterion of 
reasonableness (the boni mores).508 Although several stereotyped grounds of 
justification have crystallised through the years, 509 there is no numerous clausus 
of justification grounds, and new grounds may develop with regard to novel 
circumstances. 510 In this regard the provisions of the Constitution511 are also 
relevant and a general defence of exercise of a constitutional right is likely to be 
advanced in the future. 512 The provisions of the Bill of Rights513 may also be 
used to test the validity of a ground of justification. Any defence to an infringement 
506 Neethling et a/140; Boberg 279; Van der Merwe and Olivier 129-131. See also ch 
5 part I par A 2.2.1 infra. 
507 Midgley(1) 84. 
508 Neetling et a/66; Van der Walt 40 et seq; Boberg 724 et seq; Van der Merwe and 
Olivier 70 et seq. 
509 These stereotyped grounds are specific grounds with their own rules, limiting the 
scope of their application. 
510 Clarke v Hurst supra 650; Argus Printing and Publishing Co Ltd v lnkatha 
Freedom Party 1992 supra 589. 
511 Act 108 of 1996. 
512 An example is a newspaper's defence of exercising its right to free speech, 
against a defamation claim: Midgley (1) 54 86. See also ch 4 par 6.3 infra with 
regard to the possible infringement of First Amendment rights by imposing strict 
liability on producers of information products in the United States. 
513 Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the RSA Act 108 of 1996. 
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of a fundamental right will have to comply with the criteria set out in the limitations 
clause. 514 The scope of the operation of a defence must also be determined by the 
Constitution. 515 The historic grounds of justification applicable to the two delictual 
actions under discussion, namely the actio legis Aquilia and the Germanic action for 
pain and suffering, are necessity, private defence, statutory authority, public office, 
obedience to orders, provocation, consent to injury (volenti non fit iniuria), abuse of 
right and nuisance.516 The grounds of justification most relevant to ES liability are 
consent and possibly the new general constitutional defence of the exercise of 
a right. Also, a pactum de non petendo517 may exclude liability, although it does 
not as such affect the wrongfulness of an act. 518 
Consent to injury or harm is a ground of justification in terms whereof the actor 
cannot be held liable for the damage caused.519 Boberg520 defines consent in the 
following manner: "Consent freely and lawfully given by a person who has the legal 
capacity to give it justifies the conduct consented to, making lawful the infliction of of 
the ensuing harm."521 This principle is contained in the maxim volenti non fit 
iniuria522 of Roman and Roman-Dutch law,523 which indjcates either consent to 
514 Section 36 of Act 108 of 1996: see also ch 4 par 6.2.2 infra. 
515 S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) 652. 
516 Neethling et al66; Midgley (1) 86. 
517 An agreement not to institute action: Neethling et al97. 
518 See infra. 
519 See Neethling et al90 et seq; Van der Merwe and Olivier 89 et seq; Boberg 724 
et seq; Van der Walt 50 et seq. 
520 At 724. 
521 See also R v Taylor 1927 CPO 16 20; Esterhuizen v Administrator, Transvaal 
1957 3 SA 710 (T) 720. 
522 A willing person is not wronged. 
523 Neethling et al90. 
Chapter 3 Basis of liability 157 
injury or consent to risk of injury. 524 Consent should be given before the 
injurious conduct as approval after the act does not constitute valid consent but may 
amount to a pactum de non petendo.525 The essential requirements for valid 
consent are "knowledge, appreciation and consent."526 It must be shown that the 
risk of injury was known, realized and voluntarily undertaken. The consent must not 
be contra bonos mores. 527 Consent to bodily injury or to the risk of such injury is 
usually contra bonos mores except in for example, cases of participation in lawful 
sport and medical treatment. 528 Informed consent to medical treatment is 
recognised as a ground of justification.529 
A pactum de non petendo is a contractual undertaking not to institute an action, 
wrongfulness is therefore not excluded, only the resultant action.530 The injured 
party loses her remedy because the action was waived. 531 Like contractual 
exemption clauses, such undertakings may be invalid in the same circumstances as 
exemption clauses. 532 
524 Consent to risk of injury must be distinguished from voluntary assumption of 
risk, which can either imply contributory intent (a ground excluding fault) or 
consent to risk of injury (a ground of justification): see par 3.3.3.7 infra. 
525 Infra. Cf Neethling et a/ 91-93 for the characterstics of consent. 
526 Waring and Gil/ow Ltd v Sherborne 1904 TS 340 344; see also Lampert v Hefer 
1955 2 SA 507 (A) 509. 
527 S v Collett 1978 3 SA 206 (RA). 
528 Boshoff v Boshoff 1987 2 SA 694 (0). See Neethling et a/96; Van der Merwe and 
Olivier 100. 
529 Strauss 12-13; Claassen and Verschoor 62. 
530 Neethling eta/ 97; Van der Merwe and Olivier 101; Van der Walt 51. 
531 Jameson's Minors v CSAR 1908 TS 575. 
532 See par 2.4.2 supra. 
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3.3.3 Fault 
3.3.3.1 General 
Fault or blameworthiness is a subjective element and consists of negligence and 
intention.533 For purposes of this study, only the former is taken into 
consideration. 534 The criterion which our law applies to establish when a person has 
acted negligently is the objective standard of the reasonable person, the bonus 
paterfamilias. 535 Neethling et af36 states that the the defendant is negligent if the 
reasonable person in the same position would have acted differently; and according 
to the courts the reasonable person would have acted differently if the unlawful 
causing of damage was reasonably foreseeable and preventable in the 
circumstances. The enquiry into a person's fault can only be done after it has been 
established that the person acted unlawfully.537 Before it can be determined 
whether a defendant's wrongful conduct is blameworthy, it must be ascertained 
whether the defendant has the capacity to be held accountable, in other words 
whether the defendant's mental ability is of such a nature that intent or negligence 
may be imputed to her. 538 A person is accountable if she has the necessary 
mental ability to distinguish between right and wrong, and if she can also act in 
accordance with such appreciation.539 
533 Midgley( 1) 114 et seq; Neethling et a/113 et seq; Van der Merwe and Olivier 11 0 
et seq; Boberg 268 et seq; Van der Walt 60 et seq. 
534 See ch 1 par 1.4 supra. 
535 Neethling et a/122; Van der Walt 65; Boberg 27 4; Van der Merwe and Olivier 126. 
536 At 122. 
537 It makes no sense to blame someone who has acted lawfully: Neethling et a/113. 
538 Neethling et a/114; Vander Walt 60; Vander Merwe and Olivier 112; Boberg 271. 
539 Weber v Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1983 1 SA 381 (A) 389 403 410. 
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3.3.3.2 Test for negligence 
The test for negligence is found in the well-known dictum of Holmes JA in Kruger v 
Coetzee:540 
For the purposes of liability culpa arises if -
(a) a diligens paterfamilias in the position of the defendant-
(i) would foresee the reasonable possibility of his conduct 
injuring another in his person or property and causing him 
patrimonial loss; and 
(ii) would take reasonable steps to guard against such 
occurrence; and 
(b) the defendant failed to take such steps.541 
The reasonable person or the diligens paterfamilias posesses all the qualities which 
the community expects from its members, and is neither exceptionally clever or 
careful; nor dull-witted or reckless. Although every person is required to conform to 
the objective standard of the reasonable person, exceptions are made in the case of 
certain categories of actors, such as children and experts. The situation of experts 
is very relevant to the issue of ES liability542 and warrants further discussion. 543 
The test for negligence consists of two elements, namely reasonable foreseeability 
and reasonable preventability of damage.544 With regard to the nature of the 
foreseeability test, there are two views, namely the abstract approach and the 
540 1966 2 SA 428 (A). 
541 See also Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Swart supra 819; Ngubane v 
SA Transport Services 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 776. 
542 The knowledge base of an ES is compiled by the DE, who is an expert in her field 
of knowledge: see ch 2 par 8.1.2 supra. 
543 See par 3.3.3.3 infra. 
544 Neethling et a/ 130. 
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concrete or relative approach.545 In terms of the abstract approach it is a sufficient 
requirement for negligence that damage in general was reasonably foreseeable, 546 
whereas the concrete approach requires that a person's conduct may only be 
described as negligent in regard to a specific consequence, therefore the occurrence 
of a particular consequence must be reasonably foreseeable. 547 It is not possible 
to formulate exact criteria for the application of the foreseeability test .548 However, 
as a broad guideline it can be stated that the foreseeability of harm depends on the 
magnitude of the risk created by the actor's conduct. 549 With regard to the second 
element of the test for negligence, namely whether the reasonable person would have 
taken precautionary steps to prevent the damage from occurring, such action would 
depend on the nature and extent of the risk in the wrongdoer's conduct, 550 the 
seriousness of the damage, 551 the relative importance and utility of the wrongdoer's 
conduct and the cost and difficulty of taking precautionary measures.552 
3.3.3.3 Professional negligence 
Professional negligence refers to the negligence of an expert. In the case of an expert 
545 Ablort-Morgan v Whyte Bank Farms (Pty) Ltd 1988 3 SA 531 (E). 
546 Botes v Van Deventer 1966 3 SA 182 (A) 191; Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 
(A); Van Der Walt 68. Boberg 276 does not favour the abstract approach as it 
underlies the concept of remoteness of damage which is a factor limiting liability, 
and not a factor by which to determine fault. 
547 Neethling et a/ 131; Boberg 276-277; Ablort-Morgan v Whyte Bank Farms (Pty) 
Ltd 1988 3 SA 531 (E) 536. 
548 Neethling et a/ 132. 
549 Vander Walt 77; Butters v Cape Town Municipality 1993 3 SA 521 (C). 
550 Ngubane v SA Transport Services 1991 1 SA 756 (A) 776; Herschel v Mrupe 
supra 477; VanDer Walt 78 -79. 
551 Lomagundi Sheetmetal and Engineering (Pvt) Ltd v Basson 1973 4 SA 523 (RA); 
Khupa v SA Transport Services 1990 2 SA 629 (W). 
552 Gordon v Da Mata 1969 3 SA 285 (A). 
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or a professional such as a doctor, attorney, builder, pilot, etcetera, the test for 
negligence in regard to the exercise of the expert activity, is the test of the 
reasonable expert. 553 The only difference between this test and the reasonable 
person test referred to above, lies in the added measure of related experience. The 
standard of experience is reasonable because "the general level of skill and diligence 
possessed and exercised at the time by the members of the branch of the profession 
to which the practitioner belongs",554 is taken into account and not the highest 
degree of expertise in the relevant profession.555 In these instances the 
professional liability of defendants is at stake and actions based on "malpractice" are 
instituted against them.556 
In terms of the maxim imperitia culpae adnumeratur, ignorance or lack of skill is 
deemed to be negligent.557 The principle applies when a person undertakes an 
activity for which expert advice is necessary while she knows or should have known 
that she lacks such expert knowledge. 558 A problem which frequently arises with 
regard to professional negligence is the foreseeability of the damage, which is 
essentially applied to limit the liability of the professional, which forms part of the legal 
causation reqirement. 559 
553 Neethling et a/129; Vander Merwe and Olivier 140; Boberg 346; Vander Walt 71. 
554 Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438 444. 
555 A body of case law has developed with regard to negligence in various different 
professions. In the medical and legal professions especially, various typical duties 
have crystallised: Neethling et al129 fn 87. See also Weir 6-3 for an international 
perspective. See also ch 6 par 6 infra in regard to professional liability in SA law. 
556 See ch 6 par 6 infra. 
557 Neethling et al130; Boberg 346-347; Van der Walt 70-71. 
558 Simon's Town Municipality v Dews 1993 1 SA 191 (A); Savage and Lovemore 
Mining (Pty) Ltd v International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd 1987 2 SA 149 (W) 210. 
559 See par 3.3.4.3 infra. 
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3.3.3.4 Particular factual circumstances 
Negligence is determined in the light of all the surrounding circumstances of a 
particular case.560 The regular occurrence of typical factual situations have led to 
a body of findings and rulings regulating such situations, which although not binding, 
enjoys persuasive power. 561 Such typical factors apply in cases involving inherently 
dangerous things, sudden emergencies, contributory negligence, normal practices of 
the community and specific statutory provisions. In this regard the existence of basic 
product safety standards (for example ISO 9000),562 set and validated by 
recognised organisations such as the SABS563 or DIN, 564 play an important role 
in the determination of negligence. Compliance with such standards may be indicative 
of the reasonable conduct of the defendant, excluding negligence in the 
circumstances. 565 
3.3.3.5 Proof of negligence 
The onus is on the plaintiff to prove on a preponderance of probabilities that the 
defendant was negligent. The maxim res ipsa loquitur66 refers to a situation where 
an inference of negligence can be made from the facts. 567 It is usually applied to 
cases where the only known facts with regard to negligence, consist of the 
560 Neethling et a/ 136 et seq; Boberg 355 et seq; Van der Walt 76 et seq. 
561 Boberg 367. For example, negligence in cases involving motor vehicles: see 
Boberg 375-377. 
562 A series of international standards for software systems: see ch 6 par 6 infra. 
563 South African Bureau of Standards: see ch 6 par 6 infra. 
564 Deutsches lnstitut tar Normung: see ch 5 part Ill par A 5.5.2 infra. 
565 See ch 6 pars 3 and 6 infra. 
566 "The facts speak for themselves". 
567 Hoffmann and Zeffert 551; Schmidt 163; Schwikkard et a/ 356. 
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occurrence itself. 568 For example, in Arthur v Bezuidenhout and Mienys9 the 
appellant's lorry suddenly swerved to the wrong side of the road and collided with the 
respondent's vehicle, killing both drivers. As there was no clear explanation of the 
cause of the accident, the court made a finding of res ipsa loquitur, and negligence 
was inferred. An inference of negligence from the nature of the facts is only 
permissible while the cause of the occurrence is unknown. As soon as the cause is 
known, the basis for the use of res ipsa loquitur no longer exists, and the court has 
to decide in the normal manner whether the proven facts indicate negligence or 
not.570 Res ipsa loquitur is not a presumption of fact based on a rule of law, it 
actually refers to a kind of common sense reasoning.571 As such, the maxim does 
not affect the incidence of the burden of proof, neither does it create a prima facie 
case for the plaintiff.572 Where an inference of negligence is drawn an evidential 
burden is put upon the defendant, not to prove that she was not negligent, but merely 
to show facts consistent with an inference that does not involve negligence, or to 
adduce evidence which raises a reasonable doubt. 573 Holmes JA summed up the 
matter as follows in Sardi v Standard and General Insurance Co Ltd:574 
568 Arthur v Bezuidenhout and Mieny 1962 2 SA 566 (A); Sardi v Standard and 
General Insurance Co Ltd 1977 3 SA 776 (A) 778; Osborne Panama SA v Shell 
& BP South African Petroleum Refineries (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 890 (A) Madyosi 
v SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd 1990 3 SA 442 (A); Stacy v Kent 1995 3 SA 344 
(E). 
569 Supra. 
570 Groenewald v Conradie 1965 1 SA 184 (A) 188; Hoffman and Zeffert 553. See 
also Madyosi v SA Eagle Insurance Co Ltd supra 445 where the court found that 
the maxim did not apply where a bus had overturned after a tyre burst. 
571 Hoffmann and Zeffert 552; Schwikkard et al357. 
572 Arthur v Bezuidenhout and Mieny supra 57 4; Sardi v Standard and General 
Insurance Co Ltd supra 780; Pringle v Administrator Transvaal 1990 2 SA 379 
(W). 
573 Arthur v Bezuidenhout and Mieny supra; Hoffman and Zeffert 554; Schwikkard et 
a/357. 
57 4 Supra 780. 
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The person against whom the inference of negligence is sought to be 
drawn, may give or adduce evidence seeking to explain that the occurrence 
was unrelated to any negligence on his part. The court will test the 
explanation by considerations such as probability and credibility .... At the 
end of the case, the court has to decide whether, on all the evidence and 
the probabilities and the inferences , the plaintiff has discharged the onus of 
proof on the pleadings on a preponderance of probability , just as the court 
would do in any other case concerning negligence. 
In Van Wyk v Lewis575 the maxim was explicitly rejected by the court in medical 
negligence cases.576 In Bayer South Africa (Pfy) Ltd v Viljoen577 the Appellate 
Division held that there may be policy reasons to justify the application of the doctrine 
of res ipsa loquitur in cases involving products liability.578 
3.3.3.6 Contributory negligence 
In terms of our common law the fault of the plaintiff excluded a claim for damages 
from a defendant who also had fault. 579 The contributory negligence580 of the 
plaintiff therefore precluded the plaintiff from recovering compensation from a 
negligent defendant. Under influence of English law our courts adopted the so-called 
"last opportunity" rule in terms whereof action could only be instituted against the 
party whose negligence was the decisive cause of the accident. The Apportionment 
of Damages Act581 now regulates the position and allows the court to apportion the 
575 1924 AD 438. 
576 Strauss 271; Claassen and Verschoor 30. 
577 1990 2 SA 647 (A). 
578 See ch 6 par 5.2.3 infra. 
579 The aU-or-nothing-rule: see Neethling et a/146. 
580 Strictly speaking the term contributory negligence is incorrect as it implies a 
wrongful act which is impossible in the case of an act towards oneself: see 
Neethling et a/151. 
581 Act 34 of 1956. 
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damage of each party in accordance with their relative degrees of fault. 582 The Act 
abolishes the ali-or-nothing principle of common law.583 The criterion used by the 
courts to apportion the damages is the reasonable person test for negligence and the 
method of determining who should bear which portion of the damage, entails a 
comparison of the respective degrees of negligence of the parties involved.584 
Section 1(1)(a) of the Act is also applicable to contributory negligence causing an 
increase of the damage suffered.585 This means that a defendant whose 
negligence did not contribute to the event causing the damage but did contribute to 
an increase in the damage, is subject to the apportionment of damage suffered. 586 
The effect of contributory negligence of the deceased or injured party on the 
dependants' action is ruled by the Apportionment of Damages Amendment Act. 587 
In terms of this Act the third party and the deceased in the case of prejudice suffered 
as a result of death of a breadwinner, as well as the third party and the breadwinner 
in the case of prejudice suffered as a result of injury of the breadwinner, are deemed 
to be joint wrongdoers. 588 
The Act does not apply in cases of liability without fault. 589 The negligence of a 
582 S 1 (1 )(a). 
583 s 1 (1 )(b). 
584 South British Insurance Co Ltd v Smit 1962 3 SA 826 (A); Jones v Santam Bpk 
1965 2 SA 542 (A). See also AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd v Nomeka 
1976 3 SA 45 (A) and the critique by Neethling et a/149-151 with regard to the 
conflicting approaches followed by our positive law when apportioning damages. 
585 An example is the ''failure to wear seat belt" cases: Union National South British 
Co Ltd v Vitoria 1982 1 SA 444 (A); General Accident Versekeringsmaatskappy 
SA v Uijs 1993 4 SA 228 (A). Cf Neethling et al 152. 
586 Ibid. 
587 Act 58 of 1971. 
588 S 1 (a)(1 B) of Act 58 of 1971. See Neethling eta/ 261 et seq. 
589 Neethling et a/148; Vander Walt 87. 
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third party cannot serve as a defence to a delictual action.590 The defendant has 
to prove a defence of contributory negligence by the plaintiff, on a balance of 
probabilities. 591 
3.3.3. 7 Contributory intent 
A plaintiff who wilfully exposes herself to risk of injury and whose conduct is 
consciously unreasonable, in that it is not directed towards achieving a lawful goal, 
acts intentionally with regard to the injury she suffers. 592 As in the case of consent 
to risk of injury as a ground of justification, this situation is also referred to as 
voluntary assumption of risk. However, the difference between voluntary assumption 
of risk with regard to contributory fault and voluntary assumption of risk in the sense 
of consent, is that the former is a ground that cancels fault and not a ground of 
justification which cancels wrongfulness. In terms of our common law the plaintiffs 
contributory intent cancels thP defendant's negligence. 593 Therefore, a plaintiff who 
intentionally contributes to her own loss while the defendant was merely negligent, 
forfeits her claim. 594 
590 Neethling et a/ 151. See par 3.5 infra with regard to the position of a defendant 
and a third party who are joint wrongdoers. 
591 Schoeman v Unie en SWA Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1989 4 SA 721 (C). 
592 Neethling et a/ 154 et seq; Van der Merwe and Olivier 167 et seq; Boberg 7 40 et 
seq; Van der Walt 93. 
593 Van der Walt 93; Neethling et a/155. This common law principle is not affected 
by Act 34 of 1956 which, it seems, also does not provide for the defence of 
contributory intent: see Neethling et a/ 148. The intent of the defendant is not 
relevant for purposes of this discussion: see ch 1 par 1.4 supra. 
594 Wapnick v Durban City Garage 1984 2 SA 414 (D) 418. 
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3.3.4 Causation 
3.3.4.1 General 
Causation involves two elements, namely factual causation and legal causation.595 
Factual causation entails the determination whether the conduct of the defendant 
caused the damage suffered by the plaintiff. The question whether such a causal 
nexus exists in a particular case, is a question of fact which depends on the particular 
circumstances. Because a single act may set in motion an endless chain of harmful 
events, it is only fair to limit the liability of a defendant. Legal causation entails the 
determination for which of the harmful consequences actually caused, the wrongdoer 
should be held liable. This distinction between factual and legal causation is 
expressed as follows in Tuck v Commissioner for Inland Revenue: 596 
(l)t is generally recognised that causation in the law of delict gives rise to 
two distinct enquiries. The first, often termed causation in fact or factual 
causation is whether there is a factual link of cause and effect -between 
the act or omission of the party concerned and the harm for which he is 
sought to be held liable; and in this sphere the generally recognised test is 
that of the conditio sine qua non or the but for test. This is essentially a 
factual enquiry. Generally speaking no act or omission can be regarded as 
a cause in fact unless it passes this test. The second enquiry postulates 
that the act or omission is a conditio sine qua non and raises the question 
as to whether the link between the act or omission and the harm is 
sufficiently close or direct for legal liability to ensue; or whether the harm 
is, as it is said, 'too remote'. This enquiry (sometimes called 'causation in 
law' or 'legal causation') is concerned basically with a juridical problem in 
which considerations of legal policy may play a part. 
3.3.4.2 Factual causation 
A defendant cannot be held delictually liable if it is not proven that her conduct in fact 
595 Midgley( 1) 151 ; Neethling et a/ 159 et seq; Van der Walt 95 et seq; Van der 
Merwe and Olivier 196 et seq; Boberg 380 et seq. 
596 1988 SA 819 (A) 832-833 per Corbett JA. 
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caused the damage of the person who suffered harm.597 The test which is used 
to determine factual causation is the conditio sine qua non theory.598 The conditio 
sine qua non test or the "but for" test means that in order to establish whether X was 
the cause of Y, X must be mentally eliminated and if Y then falls away, X is a cause 
of Y. If Y is still there when X is eliminated, X is not a cause of Y. 599 In other 
words, to apply the conditio sine qua non test, one asks whether the plaintiff's harm 
would have occurred but for the defendant's conduct.600 
3.3.4.3 Legal causation 
As stated before,601 it is generally accepted that a wrongdoer cannot be held liable 
without limitation for all the harmful consequences actually caused by her act.602 
Under normal circumstances, the harm caused by the wrongdoer falls so clearly 
within the limits of her liability, that an investigation into legal causation is 
unnecessary.603 Legal causation becomes an issue in cases where there is a 
whole chain of injurious consequences set in motion by the wrongful conduct, and it 
must be determined if the wrongdoer should be held liable for the "remote" or 
597 Siman and Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1984 2 SA 888 (A) 907; 
Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Viljoen 1990 2 SA 64 7 (A). See Neethling et a/160; 
Boberg 380; Van der Walt 95; Van der Merwe and Olivier 196. 
598 Minister van Polisie v Skosana 1977 1 SA 31 (A); S v Daniels 1983 3 SA 275 (A); 
S v Van As 1967 4 SA 594 (A); Siman and Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank 
Ltd supra 914; lntemational Shipping Co v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A). 
599 Neethling et a/161; Vander Merwe and Olivier 197. 
600 Boberg 380. For criticism against this theory, see Neethling et al162-166. 
601 Par 3.3.4.1 supra. 
602 Tuck v Commissioner for Inland Revenue supra 832. 
603 Legal causation is not the only way in which lability in delict is limited. The 
investigation into all the elements of a delict, whereby liability is established, also 
serves to limit liability. Especially the elements of wrongfulness and fault "limits" 
liability: see Neethling et a/171; Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 
supra 833. 
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additional consequences ("ulterior harm").604 The question of legal causation is 
also referred to as the problem of "remoteness of damage" or the problem of 
"imputability of harm". 605 
The courts did not use a single inflexible criterion to determine legal causation, 
neither did they follow a uniform approach.606 Even delictual law writers had 
different opinions in this regard.607 The most popular theories of legal causation 
(the application of which has ample judicial authority)608 are the theory of adequate 
causation, the direct consequences theory, the theory of fault, and the reasonable 
foreseeability criterion. Until 1990 it was accepted that the courts preferred the 
reasonable foreseeability criterion,609 but now that the Appellate Division in S v 
Mokgethf10 has expressed a preference for a flexible approach in regard to legal 
causation, the courts will follow suit.611 In the Mokgethi decision612 it was held 
that there is no single general criterion for legal causation which can be applied to all 
factual situations. Therefore a flexible approach is suggested which entails 
604 CfVan der Merwe and Olivier 201 et seq; Van Oosten 1982 De Jure 239 et seq 
and 1983 De Jure 36 et seq. See also Alston v Marine and Trade Insurance Co 
Ltd 1964 4 SA 112 0/V); Mafesa v Parity Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1968 2 SA 
603 (0). 
605 Neethling et a/ 170. 
606 Vander Walt 98; Boberg 440; Vander Merwe and Olivier 216; Van Oosten 1982 
De Jure 253 and 1983 De Jure 36; Neethling et a/ 171. 
607 Neethling et a/194; Snyman 86; Vander Merwe and Olivier 196; Boberg 447; Van 
Oosten 1983 De Jure 57; Vander Walt 218. 
608 See Neethling et a/172 et seq. 
609 Neethling eta/ 194; Van der Walt 102; Boberg 445 447; Van der Merwe and 
Olivier 216 223-4. 
610 1990 1 SA 32 (A). 
611 The principles adopted in S v Mokgethi supra was confirmed in International 
Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A). See also Bonitas Medical Aid 
Fund v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 2 SA 42 (W) 49. 
612 Supra 36. 
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determining whether a sufficiently close relationship exists between the wrongdoer's 
conduct and its consequences in order that such consequence may be imputed to the 
wrongdoer according to policy considerations based on reasonableness, fairness and 
justice. In determining legal causation within the framework of this flexible approach, 
the existing criteria for legal causation (the legal causation theories) may be 
utilised.613 
3.3.5 Damage 
"Damage" refers to the broad concept of patrimonial as well as non-patrimonial loss 
suffered by the plaintiff (damnum).614 As such it refers to harm suffered in a 
person's patrimony (patrimonial loss: vermoenskade) as well as to harm to a person's 
personality interests (non-patrimonial loss: persoonlikheidsnadeeQ, both losses to be 
compensated for in money.615 Pure economic loss refers to patrimonial loss that 
does not result from injury to the plaintiffs person or property.616 and is 
compensable in terms of the Aquilian action.617 
"Damages" is the monetary compensation awarded to the plaintiff by the court.618 
The object of an award of damages is to place the plaintiff in the position she would 
613 Per Van Heerden JA supra 40-41. 
614 Neethling et al197 et seq; Boberg 475 et seq. 
615 Neethling et a/202; Boberg 475. 
616 See Neethling et a/ 280; Boberg 1 03; Van der Walt 35. 
617 Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 4 SA 
901. See ch 6 par 3 infra. 
618 For a discussion of the "Law of damages" in general, see Visser and Potgieter. 
The latter at 22 define damage as: 
the diminution, as a result of a damage-causing event, in the 
utility or quality of a patrimonial or personality interest in 
satisfying the legally recognised needs of the person involved. 
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have been had the delict not been committed. With regard to patrimonial loss, 
damage is represented by the difference between the hypothetical pecuniary position 
of the injured party if the delict had not occurred and the pecuniary position after the 
commission of the delict,619 consisting of actual losses and expenses (damnum 
emergens), such as medical expenses, as well as the deprivation of future financial 
benefits (lucrum cessans), such as a loss of profits.620 With regard to non-
patrimonial loss in the present context, damage consists of an impairment of 
personality interests such as feelings of pain and suffering, emotional shock and loss 
of the amenities of life. These losses may also already have been sustained or still 
to be sustained in the future. Non-patrimonial loss is determined by comparing the 
quality of the personality interests before and after the delict was committed, and then 
providing a type of imperfect compensation, as the affected interests do not possess 
a natural equivalent in money.621 
3.3.6 Conclusion 
Damage caused by the use of ES's will be compensable in terms of the South African 
law of delict if such use constitutes a wrongful and culpable act that causes 
harm. 622 Damages for patrimonial loss suffered can be claimed under the Aquilian 
action, and the action for pain and suffering can be instituted for non-patrimonial loss 
suffered.623 
619 Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk v Byleveld 1973 2 SA 146 (A). 
620 Boberg 478. 
621 Neethling eta/ 32. 
622 See par 3.1 supra. 
623 See par 3.2 supra. 
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3.3.6.1 The use of a defective expert system 
Liability of the producers 
The basic types of errors which may occur when ES's are used were pointed out in 
chapter 2 and the respective parties who may incur possible liability as a result of 
such errors, were identified.624 The developers of an ES are responsible for defects 
in the system in the same way as the manufacturer of products in a situation of 
manufacturer's or products liability. Manufacturer's liability in South African law is 
grounded on the general principles of delict.625 In this regard the act is constituted 
by the conduct of the developer which conduct consists of the control and 
organisation of the production process.626 In the same way the developer of any 
part of an ES, for example the KE who designed the inference engine or the DE who 
provided the knowledge base may be liable for defective components of the ES. The 
activity of control may take the form of a commission or omission on the part of the 
developer. Where a legal entity such as a software house produces a defective ES 
through the unlawful and negligent conduct of one of its human members, the 
software house may be deemed to have acted if the act was performed at the 
command of the software house.627 In the case of an ES with an intellectual output 
consisting of information,628 such as the Intelligent Assistant and the Self-Help 
System, the act of the developers may consist of a statement instead of physical 
conduct, constituting a negligent misrepresentation.629 The conduct of the DE, who 
624 See ch 2 par 9.2.2 supra. 
625 See ch 6 par 5 infra. 
626 See par 3.3.1 supra. 
627 Ibid. 
628 See ch 2 par 10.1.2 supra. 
629 See par 3.3.1 supra. 
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provides the expert knowledge for the production of the knowledge base,630 may 
consist of a misrepresentation where such knowledge is defective and as a result 
thereof, damage is caused. 
In terms of the test for wrongfulness (the boni mores test), the developers' conduct 
will be unlawful if a subjective right has been infringed or a legal duty has been 
violated by the use of the defective ES. 631 Where personal injury or property 
damage is caused by negligent misrepresentation of the developer, the conduct is 
prima facie unlawful in that the injured party's right to personality has been 
infringed.632 If the misrepresentation made is in the form of an omission, breach 
of a legal duty must be established as the infringement of subjective rights are not 
sufficient to constitute wrongful conduct.633 Where damage in the form of an 
infringement of subjective rights is caused by a defective ES, unlawfulness of the 
manufacturer's conduct must also be found in the breach of a legal duty.634 This 
kind of damage may occur in many ES's applied in safety-critical situations such as 
MES's, fly-by-wire systems, etcetera.635 If pure economic loss is sustained, for 
example in the case of a defective tax advisory Self-Help System, or in the case of 
the professional user who suffers financial damage as a result of using a defective 
Intelligent Assistant which caused personal injury to the user's client, the 
wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct will also have to be found in the breach of 
a legal duty, determined according to the boni mores.636 A ground of justification 
630 See ch 2 par 8.2.1 supra. 
631 See par 3.3.2.1 supra. 
632 See par 3.3.2.2 supra. The unlawfulness of a manufacturer's conduct is rather 
seen as a violation of a legal duty: Neethling et a/ 306. 
633 See par 3.3.2.3 supra. 
634 Ibid. 
635 Such damage may be incurred from the use of any of the three types of ES's 
identified: see ch 2 par 11 supra. 
636 See pars 3.3.2.3 and 3.3.5 supra. 
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may be found in the injured party's consent to injury or to the risk of injury if it is 
proved that such risk was voluntarily and knowingly undertaken before the injury 
occurred.637 Since consent to bodily injury is illegal except in the case of medical 
treatment, such consent will only justify the causing of damage to property or pure 
economic loss.638 Personal injury caused by a defective MES may therefore not 
be compensable if a valid consent to risk of injury was given. 
The producers will only be liable for the damage caused unlawfully if they acted 
negligently.639 According to the test for negligence, the producers will be negligent 
if a reasonable person in their position would have acted differently in foreseeing the 
damage and preventing it from occurring.640 In other words, the reasonable 
foreseeability and preventability of damage in each case have to be determined. The 
producers' negligence will be determined according to the standard of skill exercised 
by other software producers and in this regard product standards and quality 
assurance procedures play a definite role. If the application of such standards and 
assurance procedures are followed by the reasonable software expert and producer, 
non-compliance may indicate negligence.641 A developer will be negligent if she 
produces an ES without the necessary expert knowledge.642 This situation will arise 
when an unqualified or unknowledgeable person acts as the DE in the production of 
. an.ES. In the case of a products liability claim, proof of negligence on the part of the 
software developer may be difficult due to the highly technical production process. 
Our courts have held that an inference of negligence may be made after application 
637 See par 3.3.2.4 supra. 
638 See par 3.3.2.4 supra. 
639 See par 3.3.3.1 supra. 
640 See par 3.3.3.2 supra. 
641 See par 3.3.3.3 supra. 
642 See par 3.3.3.3 supra. 
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of the res ipsa loquitur maxim.643 If the plaintiff was contributorily negligent in 
causing the damage, as would be the case where the user of a defective ES 
negligently used the ES incorrectly, the damage caused by the developer and the 
user will be apportioned in terms of the Apportionment of Damages Act. 644 The 
contributory negligence of the professional user will not serve as a defence in a 
product liability claim of the injured client against the developer.645 However, an 
injured user who intentionally used an ES in an activity causing damage, or, who in 
a state of recklessness exposed herself wilfully to the risk of injury, excludes the 
defendant's negligence.646 In such a case the developer or the user will not be 
delictually liable for the harm suffered by the user or injured party, respectively.647 
In the case of use of a defective ES Machine or Self-Help System it will usually not 
be difficult to prove that the loss suffered was factually and legally caused by the 
defective software.648 More problematical is the situation where damage is caused 
by the use of a defective Intelligent Assistant which entails the intervention of a 
professional user.649 Chances are that some of the damage was caused by the 
negligence of the professional user in using a defective system. In terms of the 
conditio sine qua non theory it is possible that the conduct of both the user and the 
developers caused the damage and they will be held liable as joint wrongdoers. In 
ter·ms of the flexible approach to determine legal causation,650 it is however also 
643 See par 3.3.3.5 supra. 
644 Act 34 of 1956: see par 3.3.3.6. supra. 
645 See par 3.3.3.6 supra. 
646 See par 3.3.3. 7 supra. 
647 This is a situation .of voluntary assumption of risk that excludes fault and not 
unlawfulness: see par 3.3.3.4 supra. 
648 See ch 2 par 11 supra. 
649 See ch 2 par 11 supra. 
650 S v Mokgethi supra: see par 3.3.4.3 supra. 
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possible to regard the user's intervention as a novus actus, breaking the chain of 
causation between the developer and the damage caused, and holding only the user 
liable. However, each case will have to be decided on its own merits and the 
outcome will differ according to the circumstances. 
The injured party will be able to claim damages for any type of loss suffered as a 
result of the use of the defective ES.651 
Since the supplier is not involved in the production of the software, there is no act of 
manufacturing upon which the supplier may incur manufacturer's liability, neither has 
a misrepresentation been made by the supplier.652 However, it has been held that 
where a defective product that caused damage was supplied, the supplier may incur 
delictual liability if there was a duty on the supplier to inspect the product and she 
failed to do so.653 
Liability of the users 
The user of a defective ES will be liable towards an injured party for damage caused 
if a subjective right has been infringed or if a legal duty has been breached in using 
such a system654 and if the user was negligent in using such a defective ES. 655 
Where a professional relationship exists between the user and the injured party, such 
as is the case when an Intelligent Assistant is used, the professional negligence of 
651 See par 3.3.5 supra. 
652 See ch 6 par 5 infra. 
653 See A Gibb and Son (Pty) Ltd v Taylor and Mitchell Timber Supply Co (Pty) Ltd 
1975 2 SA 457 0N). See also ch 6 par 5.2.2.1 infra. 
654 See par 3.3.2.1 supra. 
655 See par 3.3.3.1 supra. 
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the user is at stake.656 
3.3.6.2 The incorrect use of an expert system 
A person who is injured by the incorrect use of an ES, will have a claim against the 
user of the ES if the requirements for a delict, as stated above, are met. The incorrect 
use of an ES incurs the same liabilities with regard· to the user as the use of a 
defective ES. 657 
3.3.6.3 The non-use of an expert system 
The failure to use an ES may either constitute a commission or omission.658 It will 
be a commission in the case of a user who has control of an ES, fails to use the 
system in a situation where a reasonable person would have used the ES. An 
example would be the pilot who bils to switch to the fly-by-wire ES under her control 
in circumstances where she herself becomes unable to pilot the aircraft. Such failure 
actually constitutes negligent positive conduct.659 On the other hand, a person who 
knows of a MES that would be of assistance in a particular emergency situation and 
fails to use such a system, will have committed an omission if there was a duty on 
the person to act positively to prevent harm.660 Such a person will only be liable 
for damage caused by the failure to use an ES if a legal duty rested on this person 
to use the ES to prevent harm from occurring, and the person failed to comply with 
this duty.661 In the example of the MES a doctor who fails to use such a system 
656 See par 3.3.3.3 supra. 
657 See par 3.3.6.1 supra. 
658 See par 3.3.1 supra. 
659 Ibid. 
660 Ibid. 
661 See par 3.3.2.3 supra. 
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with regard to a patient, will have committed an omission.662 The question whether 
a duty to use an ES exists, is determined according to the legal convictions of the 
community, in other words the boni mores test is applied.663 
3.4 Strict liability · 
Although our law of delict is firmly based on the fault theory,664 the ever-increasing 
mechanisation and expanding technological development which have occurred since 
the last century are showing this theory to be increasingly inadequate in the light of 
the growing risk of harm to individuals who are exposed to potentially dangerous 
situations arising from for example the advent of electricity, nuclear power, motor 
vehicles and aeroplanes. The inherent danger of damage may sometimes be out of 
all proportion to the degree of negligence that caused it, and it may often be 
impossible for the victim to prove fault on the part of those who control the dangerous 
object. For this reason there has been a movement all over the world towards the 
expansion of the field of delictual liability without fault,665 also called risk or strict 
liability. 666 . 
3.4.1 The basis for liability without fault 
The justification for liability without fault is found in various factors from which the 
following two theories have emerged: (1) the interest or profit theory which is 
662 It is of course also possible to view the same conduct by the doctor as 
professional negligence: see par 3.3.3.3 infra. 
663 See par 3.3.2.3 supra. 
664 Neethling et a/ 341. 
665 The statement that such liability cannot be delictual because delictual liability is 
always based on fault, is criticised by Hosten et a/ 844 fn 20. Cf Van der Walt 
1968 CILSA 64; Neethling et a/ 343; Van der Merwe and Olivier 486. 
666 Neethling et a/ 341-361; Hosten et a/ 843-848. See also ch 5 infra with regard 
to the position in the foreign legal systems discussed. 
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unacceptable because it depends on the profitability of the perpetrator's activity;667 
and (2) the risk or danger theory whereby the increased potential for harm as a result 
of the person's activities justifies holding her liable even in the absence of fault. The 
latter theory depends on the legal convictions of society,668 as implemented through 
legislation and cases. Although it is criticised669 because of the difficulty to 
ascertain whether the increase of potential harm in specific circumstances is 
considerable enough to warrant strict liability, Neethling et af70 finds this theory 
more acceptable than the profit theory as almost all human activities can be 
interpreted as being in one's own interest. According to them, this theory provides 
a satisfactory substantiation for most strict liability instances recognised in our 
law.671 Strict liability for damage caused by the use of an ES can be justified under 
the risk theory if the legal convictions of the community so indicate. Instances of 
strict liability have the following general characteristics in common: 
(a) Fault is not required for liability in claims for compensation; 
(b) Vis maior and fault on the part of the injured person are recognised 
defences; 
(cr Activities that can create extraordinary increases in the risk of harm to 
the community are usually involved; 
(d) In instances of strict liability imposed by legislation, the extent of the liability 
imposed is limited by fixing maximum amounts of compensation. 
667 According to this theory a person who acts to the advantage of her own economic 
interest is responsible for the harm caused by her actions: Neethling et a/ 342. 
668 Van der Walt 1968 CILSA 55. 
669 Van der Merwe and Olivier 564. 
670 At 342. 
671 Ibid. See par 3.4.2 infra for the instances of strict liability found in our law. 
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(e) Compensation is restricted in most cases to damage to life, limb and 
property. 
3.4.2 Forms of liability without fault in South African law 
In South African law instances of strict liability arise from common law, the courts ·and 
the legislature.672 Examples of common law instances are found in the various 
Roman law actions for damage caused by animals673 and damage caused by 
objects thrown from buildings. Examples of common law instances derived from 
English law are actions for damage caused by nuisance and actions based on 
vicarious liability in the form of an employer-employee relationship.674 Instances of 
strict liability developed by the courts are found in actions for damages based on the 
wrongful deprivation of liberty,675 the wrongful attachment of property676 and the 
liability of the press for defamation.677 It will also be seen during the comparative 
law investigation that products liability is regarded as a form of strict liability in some 
circumstances by certain foreign jurisdictions.678 In these cases existing rules are 
altered to accommodate novel factual situations in circumstances where there is a 
glaring disjunction between law and social reality.679 An example is the recognition 
672 Neethling et a/ 343 et seq. 
673 The actio de pauperie, the actio de pastu and the actio de feris. Cf Neethling et 
a/343 et seq. 
67 4 The basis of liability for damage caused by nuisance is controversial. See 
Neethling et a/ 350; Van der Merwe and Olivier 500 et seq. 
675 Donono v Minister of Prisons 1973 4 SA 259 (C) 262; Minister of Justice v 
Hofmeyr 1993 3 SA 131 (A) 154. 
676 Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk v Geregsbode, Middelburg 1966 3 SA 391 (T) 393. 
677 The owner, publisher, printer and editor are liable for defamation in the absence 
of intention or negligence: Pakendorfv De Flamingh 1982 3 SA 146 (A) 156-158. 
678 Ch 5 infra. 
679 Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 186. 
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of strict liability of the press for defamation.680 Strict liability via legislation occur in 
the provisions of various acts, namely the Transport Services Act,681 the Aviation 
Act,682 the Nuclear Energy Act,683 and the Electricity Act.684 Where damage is 
caused by the use of ES's applied in circumstances which fall under any of the 
abovementioned statutory provisions, strict liability may be incurred towards the 
injured party.685 
680 SAUK v O'Malley 1977 3 SA 394 (A); Pakendotf v De F/amingh 1982 3 SA 146 
(A). 
681 S 2(1) of Act 9 of 1989. 
682 S 11 (2) of Act 74 of 1962. 
683 S 41(1) of Act 92 of 1982. 
684 S 19 of Act 54 of 1986. 
685 See ch 6 par 8 infra for a full discussion. 
'• 
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CHAPTER4 
RELATED TOPICS 
1. Introduction 
This chapter contains a brief discussion of specific topics related to the subject matter 
of the study, that are either not dealt with in detail in this thesis, but are identified as 
topics requiring further attention, or strictly speaking, do not form part of a discussion 
of civil liabilities incurred through the use of ES's, but which nevertheless may arise 
in that connection under certain circumstances. 1 These topics include the 
concurrence of actions,2 arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR),3 the issue of conflicts of law arising between international parties,4 copyright 
law pertaining to computer programs,5 and some aspects of constitutional law,6 
particularly the possible influence which the Bill of Rights contained in the 
Constitution7 might have on civil liabilities. It must be stressed that an in-depth 
exposition of these aspects falls outside the ambit of this study and that they are 
discussed for only two reasons, namely: 
1 For example, such circumstances may arise in case of damage caused by an ES 
acquired under a licensing agreement concluded by the user with, a foreign 
producer. In a subsequent trial, the court may have to determine whether it has 
jurisdiction to hear the matter and where the license agreement provides for a 
choice-of-law clause, the principles relating to conflicts of law becomes 
important: see par 4.1 infra. 
2 Par 2 infra. 
3 Par 3 infra. 
4 Par 4 infra. 
5 Par 5 infra. 
6 Par 6 infra. 
7 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
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(a) to present a complete picture to the reader who is seeking general 
assistance in the determination of civil liability arising from the use of ES's; 
and 
(b) to furnish motivation for the argument that certainES liability resulting from 
a defective ES should be resolved in terms of strict product liability 
principles adopted through legislation.8 
Concurrence of claims is very relevant to the issue of ES liability because of the likely 
incidence of various actions existing simultaneously when harm is caused through the 
use of ES's and for this reason, the basic principles of actual concurrence are pointed 
out. Because of the highly technical nature of ES's, it may be advisable for parties 
involved in a dispute arising from the use of ES's to turn to other conflict-resolving 
measures, such as arbitration, when a solution is sought. Consequently, the 
advantages and disadvantages of ADR mechanisms are pointed out. The discussion 
of copyright law is included for the purpose of drawing an analogy between the 
manner in which the legislator determines the holder of copyright in a computer-
generated work, and the determination through general principles of who the possible 
liable parties are in a civil action arising from the use of ES's. Computer contracts 
often contain "choice of law" clauses designating a foreign legal system as the law 
in terms of which disputes arising from such contracts have to be resolved. In some 
instances, a jurisdiction clause in terms whereof the jurisdiction of a particular forum 
is agreed upon, is also included and therefore the implications of such clauses are 
highlighted. The necessity of a discussion of the possible effect or influence of the 
Constitution on civil liabilities arises from the crucial question involving the so-called 
horizontal application of a bill of rights: to what extent, if any, does the South African 
Bill of Rights contained in the Constitution apply to private law relationships 
(horizontal operation), or does it only find application in the public law relationship that 
8 The submission is that the producers of software, including the producers of ES's, 
should be strictly liable for damage to person and private property caused as a 
result of defects in the software: see ch 7 infra. 
Chapter 4 Related topics 185 
exists between the individual and the State (vertical operation).9 If the Bill of Rights 
has horizontal application, contractual and delictual liability will have to be determined 
with due regard to the possible infringements of the parties' fundamental rights 
protected in the Bill. 10 It would appear though, that the vertical-horizontal debate will 
shortly be of academic interest as the final Constitution specifically provides for 
application by the judiciary11 of fundamental rights provisions to "all law", hence also 
to the rules of private law. 12 However, the exact scope of horizontal application will 
still have to be determined. 13 
2. Concurrence of claims 
2.1 Introduction 
It is a well-known principle in law that one and the same act may lead to different civil 
actions or claims for which different remedies are available. 14 These remedies may 
9 In DuPlessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) the 
court held that the bill of rights contained in Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution 
of the Republic of South Africa Act 1 08 of 1996 does not have a general direct 
horizontal application but it may have an indirect influence on the development of 
the common law as it governs relationships between individuals. However, it 
seems as if the final Constitution does make provision for the direct horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights: Chapter 2 of Act 108 of 1996: see par 6.2.2 infra. 
10 In the USA, strict liability in the form of products liability that is applied to 
information products, is viewed by some critics as constituting a first amendment 
infringement: see par 6.3 infra. 
11 S 8(1) of Act 108 of 1996: see par 6.2 infra. 
12 S 8(3) of Act 108 of 1996. 
13 See par 6.2 infra. 
14 The principle is also referred to as "concurrence of remedies" and" concurrent 
liability". Boberg 1-2; Neethling et a/ 262 et seq ; Van der Walt 7; Van der 
Merwe and Olivier 464 et seq; Hasten 1960 THRHR 251. Van Aswegen 3 prefers 
the wording "claims" (Afr: eise) to that of "actions", inter alia, because of the 
latter's procedural meaning which is inconsistent with the substantive content of 
this subject. 
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be similar (for example delictual actions only) or dissimilar (for example delictual and 
contractual actions) and, depending on their purpose, they could all be instituted 
simultaneously. 15 This is the case where, for example, the different delictual actions 
concur for different types of loss and therefore the actions do not compete with each 
other. Van Aswegen 16 refers to this type of concurrence as "concurrence in the 
wide sense". It is also possible for one act to give rise to a claim which can be based 
on alternative causes of action such as a choice between a contractual and a 
delictual action. In such a case there is also a concurrence of claims but the law 
forbids or limits their simultaneous application. 17 Van Aswegen 18 defines this 
phenomenon as "concurrence in the narrow sense" and points out that this type of 
concurrence causes problems when a choice between claims must be made. It is 
also possible for parties to a contract to restrict their contractual and/or delictual 
liability through an exclusion or limitation clause. 19 The exact nature of the 
restriction on liability is a question of interpretation which, in turn, will have an effect 
on the type of remedies at the prejudiced person's disposal. 20 Dt.1ing the 
Concurrence of civil claims actually forms part of the all-embracing general 
concept of concurrence which, in its widest meaning, denotes the application of 
numerous legal rules and principles to the same factual situation: Van Aswegen 5. 
A single act can therefore result in delictual, contractual and criminal liability. As 
this study is limited to civil liability issues only, concurrence of criminal actions is 
not discussed. 
15 Neethling et a/ 262; Van der Merwe and Olivier 464 et seq. 
16 At 9. 
17 Van Aswegen 9 calls this "sameloop in die eng sin" as opposed to the former 
types of concurrence which is "sameloop in die wye sin". Contra Hosten 1960 
THRHR 251 who opines that "concurrence" only exists in cases where different 
remedies can be exercised simultaneously; the problem of concurrence ("die ware 
'sameloop'probleem") consists rather of a choice of actions. 
18 At 10. 
19 Essa v Divaris 1947 1 SA 753 (A); Government of the RSA v Fibre Spinners and 
Weavers (Pty) Ltd 1978 2 SA 794 (A). 
20 The clause may, eg, only exclude the remedies for breach of contract, leaving the 
prejudiced party with the delictual action: Neethling et a/255; Van Aswegen 349 
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determination of ES liabilities, concurrence of claims in the wide as well as in the 
narrow sense is likely to occur, necessitating a brief discussion of the various ways 
in which concurrence takes place when the use of ES's cause damage. 
2.2 Concurrence and the use of expert systems 
The question arises as to when the use of an ES would lead to concurrent civil 
liability. The various situations of concurrence that may arise when ES liability is 
determined are illustrated in terms of the first type of hypothetical ES identified, 
namely the Intelligent Assistant, 21 as this type of system has the potential to portray 
all possible legal relationships that may lead to the concurrence of claims:22 Say 
for instance the patient of a doctor who uses a MES to assist her in the prescription 
of the appropriate medicine, suffers a bodily injury causing patrimonial loss, such as 
medical expenses, as well as non-patrimonial loss such as pain and suffering, after 
taking a drug incorrectly prescribed by the doctor because of an error in the 
knowledge base of the MES. The MES in question was developed by a software 
house who used the services of one of their own employees as the KE, and that of 
an independent contractor, namely a medical specialist who is a drug therapy expert, 
as the DE. The defective MES is one of a batch MES's distributed as packaged 
sta.ndard software to a local computer shop, from where it was bought by the doctor. 
Under these circumstances, the doctor is a professional u~er of the MES, the patient 
is the injured party who is not a user of the MES, and (the producers of the MES 
consist of the software house as the developer under whose name the MES is 
distributed, and the computer shop as the supplier of the MES.23 The designers of 
et seq. 
21 See ch 2 par 11 supra. 
22 The relationships that occur in the remaining two types of ES's are included in the 
relationships created by the Intelligent Assistant, making it unnecessary to discuss 
the resulting concurrences under a separate heading. 
23 See fig 1. 
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the MES, namely the KE as the software author and the DE who is responsible for 
the content of the knowledge base, also form part of the producers of the MES.24 
2.2.1 Claims against the producers 
2.2.1.1 Developers 
The patient and the doctor may have a delictual claim against the software house 
based on manufacturer's liability (product liability).25 The patient's claim will consist 
of the Aquilian action for patrimonial damage suffered and the action for pain and 
suffering for non-patimonial damage suffered as a result of the personal injury caused 
by the defective MES. The doctor, who will only have suffered financial loss in the 
circumstances, will have the Aquilian action at her disposal. The doctor (a 
professional user)26 may also have a claim based on breach of contract against the 
software house, depending on the type of acquisition contract in existence between 
the parties. 27 It is very likely that the doctor and the software house would have 
entered into a licensing agreemenf8 which would probably contain an exclusion 
clause excluding or limiting the liability of the developer for any or some loss 
sustained as a result of the use of the MES, including damage suffered in terms of 
a delictual action.29 In these circumstances the professional liability of the developer 
may also be at stake which could have an impact on the determination of the validity 
24 See ch 2 par 8.2 supra. 
25 See ch 3 par 3.3.6 supra. 
26 See ch 2 par 8.2.6 supra. 
27 See ch 3 par 2.6.2 supra. 
28 See ch 3 par 2.5.1.2 supra. 
29 See ch 3 par 2.4.2.4 supra. 
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of an exclusion clause. 30 The delictual and contractual claims of the doctor would 
be in strict concurrence for which a solution would have to be determined in terms of 
the principles referred to later. 31 The doctor will have to choose one of the actions 
or institute the actions in the alternative. The reason why the plaintiff has to choose 
a claim or institute them in the alternative, is because the claims, which exist between 
the same parties and are based on the same act, also have the same purpose 
(compensation for the patrimonial loss suffered) and would result in the plaintiff being 
compensated twice for the same loss. It is this incidence of concurrence that is 
referred to as the "problem of concurrence". 32 
The doctor may also have a delictual action against the DE based on the latter's 
professional liability as a medical expert, which may consist of a misrepresentation 
or omission, although such liability for pure economic loss, which is the type of loss 
suffered by the doctor, is contentious and requires a thorough investigation of the 
elements of wrongfulness, negligence and causation in this regard.33 Because the 
DE (the party responsible for the defect in the knowledge base), is an independent 
contractor, the doctor will not have an action based on vicarious liability against the 
software house as would have been the case if the defect was caused by the KE who 
is in the employ of the software house. The patient also has a delictual action against 
the DE based on the latter's professional liability, which action is clearly established 
in the light of the personal injury suffered by her due to the possible 
misrepresentation or omission committed in the circumstances. 34 
Where different claims for damages for the same loss exist against different 
30 It is generally regarded as unethical for professionals to exclude their liability: see 
ch 3 par 2.7 and 3.3.3.3 supra. 
31 Par 2.3 infra. 
32 Par 2.3 infra. 
33 Neethling 1996 THRHR 197 et seq: see ch 6 par 6.2 infra. 
34 See ch 6 par 6.2 infra. 
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defendants, concurrence does not occur because a recovery of compensation from 
one defendant immediately extinguishes the other claims since the plaintiff no longer 
suffers a loss, an indispensable requirement for the claim. 35 Where different 
plaintiffs have a claim against the same defendant for the same loss, the principle of 
ne bis in idem will prevent compensation from being recovered twice. 36 
2.2.1.2 Supplier 
The doctor has a claim for breach of contract for patrimonial loss suffered37 against 
the supplier of the MES, based on the acquisition contract in existence between 
them.38 As there is no contract in existence between the patient and the supplier 
of the MES, a contractual action cannot be instituted by the patient. The supplier 
does not have a delictual duty with regard to products supplied, and therefore no 
delictual actions can be instituted. 
2.2.2 Claims against the users 
The patient would have a claim against the doctor for damages for patrimonialloss39 
suffered because of a breach of contract based on the mandate that exists between 
35 Van Aswegen 1994 THRHR 153. If the claims were instituted against the 
defendants jointly and severally, compensation for the loss will only be awarded 
once. 
36 Van Aswegen 476-477; Van Aswegen 1994 THRHR 152. 
37 As it is unlikely that the doctor will suffer non-patrimonial loss when the patient 
suffers a bodily injury due to an incorrect ES used by the doctor, the possibility of 
a concurrent action for pain and suffering by the doctor against the producer or 
supplier, is ignored. 
38 See ch 3 par 2.6.2 supra. 
39 Only patrimonial loss can be recovered in contract: Administrator, Natal v Eduard 
1990 (3) SA 581 (A). The court held in the latter case that there is not sufficient 
reason of policy or convenience to extend liability for breach of contract so that 
non-patrimonial loss might be claimed for ex contractu. 
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doctor and patient, 40 as well as a claim for negligent malpractice based on the 
doctor's delictual duty towards the patient.41 The delictual action may consist of the 
Aquilian action for patrimonial damage and the action for pain and suffering as a 
result of the infringement of the patient's physical-mental integrity. 42 Both these 
claims are based on the professional liability of the doctor. 43 Of these claims, the 
patient's two delictual actions, namely the actio legis Aquiliae and the action for pain 
and suffering will concur and the patient will be able to institute both actions 
simultaneously in order to claim damages for the patrimonial loss suffered under the 
Aquilian action and compensation under the action for pain and suffering.44 The 
patient's contractual action against the doctor concurs with the two delictual actions 
mentioned if, as in these circumstances, the conduct wrongfully and culpably infringes 
upon a legally recognised interest that exists independently of the breach of 
contract.45 The claims for patrimonial damage caused must, however, be instituted 
in the alternative or one of the actions must be elected to proceed with.46 However, 
the delictual action for pain and suffering may be instituted in addition to the 
contractual action as it serves a completely different purpose, namely that of 
40 Ch 3 pars 2.2.2 and 2.7 supra. See also Strauss 243; Claassen and Verschoor 
117. 
41 Ch 3 pars 3.3.3.3 and 3.3.6 supra. See also Strauss 244; Claassen and Verschoor 
118. 
42 Although the Aquilian action and the action for pain and suffering may also be 
instituted for patrimonial damage intentionally caused and injury to personality 
caused through the wrongful and intentional impairment of bodily or physical-
mental integrity, such a possibility is not discussed as this study is only concerned 
with negligent actions: see ch 1 par 1.4.2 supra. For the same reason a claim 
based on the actio iniuriarum, which requires intention, is excluded from 
discussion. 
43 See ch 3 pars 2.7 and 3.3.3.3 supra. 
44 Neethling et a/250-251. 
45 See par 2.3 infra. 
46 See par 2.4 infra. See also Neethling et a/253; Vander Merwe and Olivier 478 
et seq 24. 
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compensation of non-patrimonial loss suffered. 47 The Appellate Division has held 
that compensation for pain and suffering experienced as a result of breach of contract 
cannot be claimed with the contractual action, such loss must be claimed for by way 
of a delictual action.48 
2.3 The problem of concurrence 
The problem of concurrence as a legal phenomenon actually only refers to that 
incidence of concurrent remedies or claims for the same act with the same purpose 
between the same parties, in other words, concurrence in the strict or narrow sense, 
or "true concurrence".49 Concurrence in its strict sense gives rise to a two phase-
test, implying two distinct enquiries.5° Firstly, it has to be determined whether 
different claims do in fact exist on the facts of each special set of circumstances. 
This means that the requirements for each different claim must be met, for example 
in the case of concurrence of contractual and delictual liability, the conduct 
complained of must comply with the independent requirements for delictual liability 
in addition to constituting a breach of contract.51 Secondly, after it has been 
established that concurrence of claims exist, the relationship between the concurrent 
claims need to be examined in order to decide whether the plaintiff may institute all 
concurrent claims, freely choose between the claims or be restricted to one of the 
47 Neethling et al252; Vander Merwe and Olivier 476. With regard to the content 
and seperate existence of the action for pain and suffering distinct from the actio 
legis Aquiliae, see Union Government (Minister of Railways and Harbours) v 
Warneke 1911 AD 657 665; Evins v Shield Insurance Co Ltd 1980 2 SA 814 (A) 
838; Guardian National Insurance Co v Van Gool1992 4 SA 61 (A) 65. 
48 Administrator, Natal v Eduard supra 596. 
49 Hosten 1960 THRHR 251. 
50 Van Aswegen 96-103; Midgley 1990 SALJ626-629; Farlam and Hathaway 10-
12. 
51 This is called the "independent-delict" test: Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v 
Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 (A). See also Van Aswegen 
1994 THRHR 150. 
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claims. In other words, an appropriate solution must be found for the concurrence. 
As stated before, in the event of concurrence in the wide sense where the different 
claims do not compete with each other, there is no restriction on a plaintiff to institute 
all claims. 52 The existence of different claims arising from the same facts against 
or at the instance of different parties does not amount to concurrence. 53 However, 
in the case of narrow or strict concurrence, this second enquiry becomes crucial as 
it determines which of the competing claims should be recognised. The choice of a 
solution is a policy issue to be decided by policy considerations. 54 
The most common example of true concurrence is found in the simultaneous 
application of claims for damages for patrimonial loss for breach of contract and ex 
lege Aquilia such as found in the circumstances of the ES liabilities identified 
above. 55 The possibility of concurrent contractual and delictual claims arising from 
the same conduct has been considered in our case law.56 The courts have held that 
the existence of concurrent contractual liability does not prevent an action in delict, 
provided that the independent requirements of delictual liability are also met. 57 This 
will be the case where, even in the absence of a valid contract, the circumstances 
amounting to a breach of contract indicate delictually wrongful conduct, for example 
an infringement of a recognised subjective right (such as the right to person and 
52 Van Aswegen 1994 THRHR 150. 
53 Van Aswegen 11; Midgley 1993 THRHR 308; Van Aswegen 1994 THRHR 150. 
54 Van Aswegen 98 381; Midgley 1990 SALJ 626-629; Boberg 1; Neethling eta/ 
7; Vander Merwe and Olivier 468; Vander Walt 7; Farlam and Hathaway 10-13. 
55 The contractual and delictual claims for patrimonal loss suffered in strict 
concurrence by for example, the claims of the doctor referred to in pars 2.2.2.1 
and 2.2.2.2 supra. 
56 Van Wyk v Lewis 1924 AD 438; Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington 
Brothers (SA)' (Pty) Ltd supra; Correira v Berwind 1986 4 SA 60 (ZH); Otto v 
Santam Versekeringsmaatskappy Bpk 1992 3 SA 615 (0); Tsimatakopoulos v 
Hemingway, Isaacs & Coetzee CC 1993 4 SA 428 (C). 
57 Lillicrap, Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd supra 496 
499. 
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property) or the existence of a legal duty to prevent harm outside duties created 
solely by contract. Van Aswegen58 proposes a test in this regard whereby the legal 
validity of the contract, but not the existing factual situation or the relationship 
between the parties is eliminated during the determination of delictual unlawfulness. 
Neethling et af9 gives the example of a surgeon who performs an operation 
negligently thereby causing patrimonial damage. In such a case, apart from the 
breach of contract, the patient's personality interest in physical-mental integrity is also 
infringed with the result that the patient has an Aquilian action as well as a 
contractual action with which to claim damages. 
The injured party will usually then have a choice between suing in contract or in 
delict. In cases of patrimonial loss for damage for physical injury to person or 
property, a plaintiff will have no difficulty to institute either of the actions referred to 
above, 60 but in instances involving pure economic loss, 61 which is the kind of 
damage that is frequently likely to be sustained during the use of ES's in business,62 
58 · At 300 et seq. 
59 At 253-254. 
60 Namely a delictual or a contractual action, where appropriate. 
61 "Pure economic loss" , also· called "financial loss", refers to patrimonial loss not 
resulting from damage to the property or person of the plaintiff: Neethling et a/ 
280; Boberg 104. See also ch 3 par 3.3.5 supra and ch 6 par 3 infra. Examples 
of such loss in case law are found in Combrinck Chiropraktiese Kliniek (Edms) 
Bpk v Datsun Motor Vehicle Distributors (Pty) Ltd 1972 4 SA 185 (T); Greenfield 
Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 4 SA 901 (N); 
Arthur E Abrahams and Gross v Cohen 1991 2 SA 301 (C); Shell and BP SA 
Petroleum Refineries (Pty) Ltd v Osborne Panarama SA 1980 3 SA 653 (D); 
Franschhoekse Wynkelders (Ko-op) Bpk v SAR & H 1981 3 SA 36 (C); Kadir v 
Minister of Law and Order 1992 3 SA 737 (C). 
62 Eg a tax advisory system or a financial investment system which may be either in 
the form of an Intelligent Assisstent or a Self-Help System as defined in ch 1 par 
1.1 supra. 
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the courts are less clear in their treatment of the scope of Aquilian liability. 53 The 
reason for this is the fact that the wrongfulness-requirement in the case of an act 
causing pure economic loss, lies in the breach of a legal duty rather than in the 
infringement of a subjective right. 64 The reasonableness criterion65 according to 
which a legal duty not to cause economic loss is determined, entails the exercising 
of a value judgement of all the relevant facts in terms of considerations of policy.66 
One of these relevant factors is the fear that compensation of pure economic loss 
would lead to an "overwhelming potential liability" 67 of a socially calamitous 
nature.68 Although delictual liability for pure economic loss is now firmly recognised 
in our law,69 it seems that the courts will not readily construe an interest that exists 
independently from a contract in cases of concurrence. 70 
2.4 Solutions to the problem of concurrence 
There are three acknowledged solutions to the problem of concurrence, namely 
alternativity, exclusivity and cumulation. The solution put forward by the theory of 
63 Neethling et a/253-255; Vander Walt 35-36; Boberg 103-149. See also Van 
Warmelo 1985 TSAR 227; Hutchinson and Visser 1985 SALJ 587; Wunsch 1988 
(1) TSAR 1; Midgley 1990 SALJ621. 
64 See ch 3 par 3.3.2.1 supra. 
65 The boni mores: see ch 3 par 3.3.2.1 infra. 
66 See ch 6 par 3.2 infra. 
67 Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 4 SA 
901 (N) 916-917. 
68 See ch 6 par 3.2 infra. 
69 Neethling et a/ 11-12; Boberg 103. See also Coronation Brick (Pfy) Ltd v 
Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 (D); Administrateur, Natal v 
Trust Bank van Afrika 1979 3 SA 824 (A). 
70 Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd supra 499; 
see par 2.4 infra. 
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alternativity is regarded as the appropriate solution in our law. 71 The theory of 
alternativity means that the injured party may choose freely between the concurring 
claims ex contractu or ex lege Aquilia and may institute them in the alternative. 72 
The only proviso to the existence of the actio legis Aquiliae together with the 
contractual action, is that the conduct must not only constitute a breach of contract 
but also wrongfully and culpably infringe a legally recognised interest. In other words, 
the conduct complained of must constitute a delict that exists independently of a 
contract. 
The following factors influence the choice between an action ex contractu and ex lege 
Aquilia by an injured party: 73 
(a) The calculation of damages differs between the two actions with regard to 
the extent 74 of the damages as well as the time75 of their estimation. 
(b) The requirements of legal capacity to incur delictual liability differ from 
71 Van der Merwe and Olivier 468; Neethling et a/265. Van Aswegen 484 accepts 
this solution, provided that successive alternativity for the sake of full 
compensation is allowed and that the agreed terms of contract take precedence, 
because it guarantees the freedom of parties to contract. She is also of the 
opinion that the possibility of concurrence should be acknowledged in cases of 
breach of contract causing pure economic loss. 
72 Neethling et a/ 253; Van der Walt 7. 
73 Van Aswegen 452-453; Neethling et a/ 253-255. 
7 4 In the law of delict liability is limited through the regulation of legal causation, 
adopting a flexible approach based on policy: S v Mokgethi 1990 1 SA 32 (A); 
International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A). See ch 3 par 
3.3.4.3 supra. Contractual liability may be limited through the application of the 
,criterion of actual foresight or reasonable foreseeability or possibly the 
convention principle: Van Aswegen 328-330; Neethling et a/ 254. 
75 In the law of delict damages are recoverable as determined at the date of the 
commission of the delict, whereas the law of contract measures damages at the 
time of the conclusion of the contract: Van Aswegen 30-332; Neethling et a/254. 
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those in regard to contractual liability.76 
(c) The liability of joint wrongdoers is different to that of joint parties to a 
contract. 77 
(d) The ambit of vicarious liability in delicts is much wider than in cases of 
breach of contract. 78 
(e) An injured party can relieve a wrongdoer of delictual liability by unilaterally 
waiving her rights for example by consent, but the unilateral waiving of a 
contractual claim cannot relieve a contracting party of her liability since a 
personal right can only be extinguished by agreement. 79 
(f) Exclusionary or limiting clauses in a contract may only apply to contractual 
liability, leaving the wrongdoer still delictually liable.80 
(g) Contributory negligence is only a defence against a delictual claim, with the 
result that it may be advantageous for a contributorily negligent plaintiff to 
76 For example, a minor cannot be sued for breach of contract but can be sued as 
a delictual wrongdoer: Neethling et a/ 254. 
77 Joint wrongdoers are jointly and severally liable for the full damage caused 
whereas a joint contracting party is normally only liable for a pro rata share of the 
performance: Van Aswegen 338-341; Neethling et a/ 257-258. See also ch 3 
pars 2.2.2.3 and 3.5.2 supra. 
78 Employers are vicariously liable for the delicts of their employers committed within 
the scope of their employment whereas they can only be liable for their 
employees' breach of contract if the latter acted as agents or mandataries within 
the execution of their employers' contractual obligations: Van Aswegen 341-343; 
Neethling et a/ 254. See ch 3 pars 2.2.1 and 3.5.2 supra. 
79 Van Aswegen 343-348; Neethling et a/ 255. 
80 Unless the exclusion clause pertains specifically to delictual actions: Neethling et 
al 254; Van Aswegen 358. See also ch 3 pars 2.4.2 and 3.3.3.4 supra. 
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institute a contractual action. 81 
(h) The onus of proof in a delictual action is on the plaintiff to prove the 
negligence of the defendant, whereas in a contractual claim for breach of 
contract the onus is on the defendant to prove that she was not 
negligent. 52 
(i) The jurisdiction of courts may differ according to whether the action is 
based on delict or on contract. 83 
0) The rules of private international law prescribe the application of the lex loci 
contractu84 to an action ex contractu and the lex loci delicti commisst-a5 
to an action ex delicto, which locations may of course differ. 
2.5 Concurrence in cases involving pure economic loss 
It appears from the Li//icrap-decision86 that, in cases of pure economic loss, the 
courts, unlike cases where a breach of contract also leads to damage to property or 
an injury to personality, will not readily hold that an interest exists independently of 
81 The Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956 applies only to delictual claims and 
not to contractual actions: Barc/ays Bank DCO v Straw 1965 2 SA 93 (0). See 
also ch 3 par 3.3.3.6 supra. 
82 Van Aswegen 372-373; Neethling et a/ 255. See also ch 3 pars 2.2.2.1 and 
3.3.3.5 supra. 
83 Van Aswegen 373-378. 
84 The law of the place where the contract was entered into: see par 4.4.1 infra. 
85 The law of the place where the delict was committed: see par 4.4.2 infra. 
86 Supra. 
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a contract. 87 This means that in the case of, for instance, negligent provision of 
professional services in terms of an agreement (with attorneys, auditors, engineers, 
etcetera), injured parties would probably only have the contractual action at their 
disposal where there is no infringement of the respondent's property or personality 
rights.88 Thus it seems that our positive law accepts a solution of exclusivity in 
cases of pure economic loss.89 The decision was criticised by several 
commentators,90 mainly because of the court's inability to distinguish clearly 
between the two stages of the enquiry into finding a proper solution for 
concurrence. 91 The majority judgement wrongly used the policy decision whereby 
a solution is determined (the second phase of the test) to determine whether the 
element of wrongfulness is present (the first phase of the test}.92 The effect is that 
conduct generally recognised as leading to delictual liability in the absence of a 
contract between the parties, was not regarded as delictually wrongful in a situation 
87 Hutchison and Visser 1985 SALJ 587; Midgley 1990 SALJ 621. See also ch 6 par 
3 infra. 
88 Ibid. See also Van Aswegen 1994 THRHR 147- 153 where she points out that 
the Lillicrap decision supra, does not bar the co-existence of contractual and 
delictual liability in all cases where the parties are in a direct contractual 
relationship, but rather that the breach of contractual duties to perform professional 
work does not per se constitute a delict and thus ground Aquilian liability in 
addition to liability for breach of contract. This does not exclude the possibility of 
of such co-existence where the requirements for an independent delict are fulfilled: 
Tsimatakopoulos v Hemingway, Isaacs & Coetzee CC supra. 
89 Midgley 29 suggests that our law should follow the alternative system in all cases, 
irrespective of the type of relationship between the parties or the kind of loss 
sustained. He criticises the Li//icrap-decision for finding against concurrent liability 
in cases of pure economic loss where a professional contractual relationship exists 
as he feels the question should simply be: is there a delict or is there not? 
According to him the criteria for limiting delictual liability, for example the policy 
factors considered in the wrongfulness element, are restrictive enough without 
having to tamper with fundamental principles. 
90 Midgley 1994 THRHR629; Hutchison and Visser 1985 SALJ587; Boberg 15-16; 
Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 192-193; Van Aswegen 294-297. 
91 Par 2.3 supra. 
92 Midgley (2) 29; Van Aswegen 294. 
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of concurrence.93 
The facts of the Appellate Division decision in Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v 
Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pfy) (Ltdt4 were as follows: 
Pilkington Brothers, a glass-manufacturing company, contracted with Lillicrap, 
Wassenaar and Partners, a firm of consulting engineers, to conduct soil investigations 
whereby the suitability of a site for the erection of a glass plant was to be determined. 
After the plant had been constructed on the recommendations of the engineers, it 
transpired that the site was, after all, unsuitable for its purpose, and Pilkington 
Brothers instituted a claim for damages against Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners.95 
The claim, arising from the allegation that the engineers did not perform their duties 
with the required professional skill and care, was based in delict as the contractual 
action had already prescribed. Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners excepted to the 
action on the ground that no cause of action arose in delict, which exception was 
dismissed in part by the court a quo.96 On appeal, the question whether all 
breaches of contract are species of delict was not specifically decided,97 but the 
court held that the same facts could, in principle, give rise to causes of action in delict 
as well as in contract, 98 provided that the elements of a delict are present and the 
cla-im in delict is founded independently from the contract. 99 The court 
93 Van Aswegen 1994 THRHR 152. 
94 1985 1 SA 475 (A). 
95 See also Hutchinson and Visser 1985 SALJ587-59; Midgley 1990 SALJ621-632 
for a discussion of this decision. 
96 Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners 1983 2 SA 
157 0N). 
97 4951-496C. 
98 496H-I. 
99 500H-I 
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distinguished100 the present case from Van Wyk v Lewis, 101 in that the facts of the 
latter involved an infringement of rights of property or person which are prima facie 
wrongful, 102 whereas it is common cause that the facts of the present case involve 
a claim for pecuniary loss based on the principles of the extended Aquilian 
action. 103 In such cases, where there is an absence of clearly wrongful actions, the 
element of wrongfulness has to be decided by the court through applying the test of 
reasonableness which involves policy considerations. 104 The majority of the court 
found that policy considerations did not require conferring the actio legis Aquiliae 
for the negligent performance of professional services, which was rendered in terms 
of a contract, in circumstances where there was no need to do so: 105 
In considering whether an extension of Aquilian liability is justified in the 
present case, the first question that arises is whether there is a need 
therefor. In my view, the answer must be in the negative, at any rate in so 
far as liability is said to have arisen while there was a contractual nexus 
between the parties. While the contract persisted, each party had adequate 
and satisfactory remedies if the other were to have committed a breach. 
Indeed the very relief claimed by the respondent could have been granted 
in an action based on breach of contract. 
The Appeal Court approached the extension of Aquilian liability in a more 
100 496F-I: The majority of the court, per Grosskopf AJA, rejected the trial court's 
finding that the present case involved damage to property. 
101 1924 AD 438. 
102 In the Van Wyk case a swab was post-operatively sewn up in a patient, causing 
personal injury. 
103 In this respect the court referred to its own decision in Administrateur Natal v Trust 
Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 3 SA 824 (A), where it was held that Aquilian liability 
could in principle arise from negligent misstatements causing pure financial loss. 
104 499. 
105 Ibid. 
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conservative manner than the court a quo106 , finding that the negligent breach of 
a contract for the rendering of professional services which results only in economic 
loss (as opposed to physical harm), is not a delict, that causing pure economic loss 
is not prima facie wrongful and that there must be valid policy reasons before Aquilian 
liability will be extended to cover this type of circumstance. 107 As policy 
considerations do not require that delictual liability be imposed for the negligent 
breach of a contract of professional employment, the appeal succeeded and the 
exception was upheld. Smuts AJA dissented, holding the view that the engineers 
were liable in delict for the negligent performance of a duty contractually undertaken 
by it in its professional capacity or for negligent misstatements made in the course 
of performing its contractual obligation. 108 
2.6 Conclusion 
The implication for ES's is that, in the case of a possible concurrence of actions "in 
the narrow sense" as defined above, 109 an enquiry will first be made into the type 
of damage that has been sustained as a result of the use of the particular ES. If it 
is in the form of physical injury to a person or property, there will be concurrence, and 
the claimant will have a choice between an action based on contract or on delict, or 
even to institute both claims cumulatively as long as only the actual damages 
1 06 The court a quo adopted the more liberal approach of English law as put forward 
by Lord Wilberforce in Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728, 
where an extension of a duty to take care takes place whenever there is such a 
sufficient relationship of proximity between the parties that it can be said that the 
wrongdoer should reasonably have foreseen that carelessness on her part may 
be likely to cause damage. The Appeal court is in any case of the opinion that 
policy reasons which may be valid in one legal system, are not necessarily valid 
in another system: 525C-D. See ch 5 part I infra. 
107 Boberg 16. See also Wunsh 1988 TSAR 2-3; Van Aswegen 1993 THRHR 187. 
108 5061. The decision attracted much criticism: See Midgley 1990 SALJ 623 and the 
commentators cited in fn 26; Hutchinson and Visser 1985 SALJ 587; Boberg 15. 
109 In other words, where there is a claim for damages based on a breach of contract 
as well as a claim for damages ex lege Aquilia, see par 2.1 supra. 
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sustained are recovered. 110 The choice of an action will depend on the factual 
circumstances and the factors referred to above. 111 
However, if the damage consists of pure economic loss, the courts will be reluctant 
to find that a legally recognised interest exists apart from the contract and therefore 
that a delict has been committed, leaving the claimant with a contractual action 
only. 112 In terms of the Lillicrap -decision113 the indications are that a party 
sustaining pure economic loss through the use of an ES, where such party has a 
contractual as well as a delictual action arising from the use of the ES, will only have 
a contractual action at her disposal. 114 This will be the position in cases where 
economic loss is caused to the plaintiff through the use of the Intelligent Assistent 
and the ES Machine, 115 by a professional user in the execution of professional 
services rendered to the plaintiff.116 In the case of the Self-Help System,117 
concurrence of claims based on the lack of professional skill and care in a situation 
of services rendered, will normally not occur as there is no intervening user with 
whom such a contract has been concluded. An acquisition contract will exist in the 
case of all three types of ES's and where concurrence with delictual actions occurs, 
the plaintiffs will have to elect their actions in terms of the principles set out 
above. 118 
110 Par 2.3 supra. 
111 Par 2.4 supra. 
112 Par 2.5 supra. 
113 Supra 499-500. 
114 Par 2.5 supra. See also Neethling et a/ 253; Wunsh 1988 TSAR 1. 
115 See ch 1 par 1 .1 supra. 
116 Par 2.2.1 supra. 
117 Ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
118 Par 2.4 supra. 
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3. Arbitration and other forms of alternative dispute resolution 
3.1 Introduction 
Many computer contracts contain an arbitration clause. 119 This is a way for 
contracting parties to remove decisions based on matters involving high technology 
from the ordinary courts to a more knowledgeable forum of their own choice. 
Tapper120 points out that some of the most important disputes affecting the 
computing industry are decided by arbitration. Arbitration is the referral of a dispute 
between parties for final determination in a quasi-judicial manner by a person other 
than a court of competent jurisdiction. 121 Although arbitration is one of the oldest 
methods of settling disputes, 122 it also forms part of the mechanisms of the current 
trend towards "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR) that is gaining impetus locally 
and abroad. 123 
3.2 Alternative dispute resolution 
ADR consists of a variety of methods being developed to resolve disputes outside the 
framework of formal court adjudication because of a growing dissatisfaction with the 
litigation process. 124 This development has been brought about by the world-wide 
119 Van der Merwe 70-71; Tapper 224-226. 
120 226. See also Eiselen 1995 SA Mere LJ 13. 
121 Smith Arbitration 269; see also par 3.3.2 infra. 
122 Reference to arbitration is found in the Bible as well as in Roman law from the 
Twelve Tables to the Code of Justinian: Butler and Finsen 4 and also the 
authorities cited in fn 27. 
123 Butler and Finsen 8. On ADR in general, see DeVos 1992 TSAR 381 and 1993 
TSAR 155; Van Kerken 1993 ILJ 17. For a comprehensive exposition of the 
theory and principles of ADR, see the unpublished doctoral thesis of Faris JA An 
analysis of the theory and principles of alternative dispute resolution UNISA 1995. 
124 De Vos 1993 TSAR 155; 
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ideal of providing effective access to justice for all people. 125 
3.2.1 The access-to-justice movement 
The access-to-justice movement embodies "a radical transformation in legal 
scholarship and legal reform in a growing number of countries". 126 In this approach 
the principal elements are the people, the institutions and the processes, representing 
the elements from which the law evolves. 
"Access to justice" is defined as a concept that comprises two basic objectives of a 
legal system, namely (1) that the system must be accessible to all, and (2) that it 
must lead to results that are individually and socially just. 127 The 20th century 
culture of human rights has given an added impetus to the idea of effective access 
to justice since the possession of rights is meaningless without mechanisms for their 
effective enforcement. In this sense effective access to justice is the most basic 
human right of all.128 
Cappelletti129 considers the access-to-justice movement to be the central element 
of a political philosophy based on effective equality, in the sense of equal 
opportunities. This movement is connected with two other major trends of our time, 
namely the constitutional trend and the transnational trend. The constitutional 
trend is seen in the positivisation of natural law as embodied in the bills of rights of 
modern constitutions which, in addition to the traditional political and civil rights, 
125 Ibid. See Cappelletti 1992 SALJ 22-39 for an international perspective on "access 
to justice". 
126 The access-to-justice movement can be seen as the social dimension of law and 
justice in the modern world: Cappelletti 1992 SALJ 22. 
127 De Vos 1993 TSAR 155. 
128 DeVos 1993 TSAR 157. 
129 1992 SALJ 27. 
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include the social rights, that is human rights of the second generation of which 
access-to-justice forms the core. 130 The transnational trend is brought about by the 
inevitable phenomenon of transfrontier migration of people, the proliferation of 
multinational organisations, mass media and international crime. 131 This 
phenomenon can be seen in the common markets of the European Union (EU), the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), various human rights treaties, 132 
the Berne Convention, etcetera, culminating in a new ius commune gentium with a 
transnational dimension of law and justice. A vital part of this growing body of 
community law includes consumer protection as can be seen firstly, in the EU 
Directive on liability for defective products 133 which has pre-eminence over the 
national law of member states, 134 and, secondly, in the various national consumer 
protection laws of different countries. 135 Consumer protection forms part of a 
general policy of access-to-justice in that it simplifies the law and strives for more 
accessible, less expensive methods to solve disputes, and provides for compensation 
on a no-fault basis where loss is suffered, in other words through making more use 
of strict liability principles. The ultimate objective of an access-to-justice policy is the 
approximation of law to society which, according to Cappelletti, is a fundamental 
criterion of democracy. 136 
The access-to-justice philosophy favours a consumers' perspective, referring to the 
consumers of law and justice in general, that is civil society, over that of the law 
130 Cappelletti 1993 SALJ 36. 
131 In other words, the "global village" occurence: Cappelletti 1992 SALJ 37. 
132 Examples are the European and American Conventions on Human Rights. 
133 Directive 85/374: see ch 5 part II infra. 
134 See ch 5 part II par infra. 
135 Examples are the Consumer Protection Act in the UK, the Produkthaftungsgesetz 
in Germany, s 402a of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the USA. 
136 Cappelletti 1992 SALJ 39. 
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producers and their products, which are the law-makers and their laws, judgements, 
etcetera. This philosophy reflects the "social rule-of-law state" philosophy which is 
a response to both oppressive capitalism and Gulag socialism. 137 Cappelletti138 
explains it as follows: 
In the first system - oppressive capitalism - a largely uncontrolled power (economic 
power, but also, indirectly at least, political and legal) is concentrated in the hands of 
powerful private producers, monopolistic or oligopolistic; in the second - Gulag 
socialism - the concentration of both political and economic as well as legal power 
in the governmental organs is even greater, indeed it is institutionalised. In both types 
of degeneration the consumer is isolated and powerless: the supply side is glorified, 
whereas the demand side is humiliated and neglected. 
The international trend to strive for effective access to justice has also spread to 
South Africa, evidence of which is found in work of commissions of enquiry and 
ensuing statutes such as the Hoexter Commission of Enquiry into the Structure and 
Functioning of the Courts. 139 Their recommendations led to the introduction of the 
small claims court, 140 which ensures easier and less costly access to judicial 
resolution. Since 1993, South Africa has joined the world-wide constitutional trend 
through enacting a Constitution with a Bill of Rights 141 and has rejoined the 
international community in participation on the world common markets. 
137 Cappelletti 1992 SALJ 38. 
138 Ibid. 
139 RP78/1983. 
140 This Commisssion had a leading influence on the administration of justice in 
general and civil procedural law in particular: De Vos 1993 TSAR 158. 
141 Chapter 2 of Act 108 of 1996. 
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3.2.2 ADR mechanisms 
It is clear that in the context explained above ADR mechanisms such as arbitration, 
are not only advantageous but should actively be pursued as a method aimed at 
providing more accessible justice. Ways in which the access-to-justice approach can 
be facilititated include the following: 
(a) Reforming general litigation procedures. 
(b) Using alternative methods to decide legal claims. 
(c) Establishing special institutions for certain types of claims of social 
importance for example small claims tribunals and special tribunals for 
consumer complaints. 
(d) Using new methods of providing legal services, for example the services of 
paralegals. 
(e) Simplifying the law, for example through introducing a "no-fault" divorce and 
a "no-fault" accident compensation system. 142 
In South Africa, "access to justice" is also a central notion in the vision of the role 
and function of a justice system appropriate to the new democratic constitutional 
order. 143 Access to justice includes access to the courts and access to lawyers, 
142 In the same manner the streamlining of software product liability in the form of 
strict liability could be pursued by adhering to the principle of "no-fault" liability of 
the producer of defective software, in particular an ES, either via the application 
of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine or via legislation: see ch 6 par 5 infra. See also 
ch 5 part II with regard to EU legislation on liability for defective products. 
143 S 9 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 proclaims 
everyone to be equal before the law, entitled to equal protection and benefit of the 
law. 
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and also implies the creation and/or existence of mechanisms and procedures to 
regulate the relationships in society at the same time allowing maximum freedom to 
individuals so as to reduce disputes and competing claims to a minimum.144 In the 
event of software liability disputes, the mechanisms and procedures of ADR methods 
may lead to a less strict application of the normal rules of evidence and an 
agreement to a more open approach in this regard. 145 
3.3 Arbitration 
The law of arbitration is found in the Arbitration Act146 as well as in the common law 
which was not repealed by the Act. 147 Arbitration agreements have to be in writing 
to fall under the Act, 148 whether they are consensual or compulsory in terms of 
certain statutes. 149 Oral submissions to arbitration or submissions which are invalid 
according to the Act but comply with common law principles, are governed by the 
common law of arbitration. 150 
144 The movement consists of inter alia, streamlining litigation processes to save time 
and money eg the "small claims court" ito Act 61 of 1984, and introducing 
alternative mechanisms to settle claims eg arbitration, mediation, mini-trials and 
short process courts ito Act 1 03 of 1991: De Vos 1992 TSAR 381 and 1993 TSAR 
155; Butler and Finsen 8-24. 
145 Eiselen 1995 SA Mere LJ 13. 
146 Act 42 of 1965. 
14 7 S 42 of the Act only repeals provincial legislation on arbitration, not the common 
law: Nkuke v Kindi 1912 CPO 529 531. 
148 51 of Act 42 of 1965. 
149 The Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 provides for the establishment of a 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration whereby the Commission 
is obliged to attempt to resolve any dispute referred to it in terms of this Act, 
through conciliation: Ch VII s 112 of the Act. 
150 See Butler and Finsen 4-7; Smith Arbitration 267. 
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3.3.1 The arbitration agreement 
Under common law no written agreement is required, but for a valid submission in 
terms of the Act, an arbitration agreement is defined as "a written agreement 
providing for the reference to arbitration of any existing dispute or any future dispute 
relating to a matter specified in the agreement whether an arbitrator is named or 
not".151 It is a self-contained contract, collateral or ancillary to the main agreement 
in which it may be contained, and remains in esse even when the main agreement 
is terminated, 152 unless the reason for its termination lies in some matter outside 
the terms of the contract itself.153 In this event reliance cannot be placed upon an 
arbitration clause as its validity is derived from that of the contract in which it is 
incorporated; if the contract is invalid the arbitrator has no jurisdiction to 
proceed. 154 Any dispute which relates to the terms of the contract itself, such as 
the nonperformance of an obligation, is arbitrable. 155 The acquirement or use of 
a defective ES under a contract containing an arbitration clause would, therefore, set 
the arbitration clause in motion. By the same token, a dispute concerning the 
operation of an exclusion clause would have to be referred to arbitration. 
All matrimonial matters, matters re status, cr~minal matters and matters that are 
illegal, immoral and contra bonos mores are excluded from arbitration in terms of 
both the Act and common law. 156 Any party with contractual capacity may enter 
151 s 1. 
152 SA Transport Services v Wilson 1990 3 SA 333 0JV) 340 341. 
153 Scriven Bros v Rhodesia Hides and Produce Co Ltd 1943 AD 393 401; Gardens 
Hotel (Pty) Ltd v Somadellnvestments(Pty) Ltd 1981 3 SA 911 (W). 
154 This applies even when the parties to the contract declare the clause excisable or 
elect to say that the clause itself is severable from the contract: Wayland v 
Everite Group Ltd 1993 3 SA 946 0/V). 
155 Van Heerden v Sentrale Kunsmis Korporasie Bpk 1973 1 SA 17 (A) 27. 
156 S 2. See also Smith Arbitration 270; Butler and Finsen 55. 
Chapter 4 Related topics 211 
into a binding arbitration agreement. 157 Companies may also agree to arbitration 
proceedings between themselves and any other person or company. 158 Arbitration 
clauses are frequently incorporated in building contracts, deeds of lease, deeds of 
partnership, insurance policies, deeds of sale and software licensing agreements. 159 
The clauses may pertain only to certain disputes or to all disputes concerning the 
contract. 160 The choice of a particular arbitrator will be respected in most legal 
systems, irrespective of the locality of the arbitrator. 161 
A party may not cancel or terminate the agreement to refer to arbitration without 
good cause or the consent of all the parties, both in terms of common law 162 and 
the Arbitration Act. 163 However, if good cause is shown, the courts may set aside 
the arbitration agreement or order that a dispute not be referred to arbitration, or that 
it ceases to have any effect. 164 This onus is not easily discharged and there should 
be compelling reasons for the court to set the arbitration agreement aside as the 
party trying to avoid arbitration is seeking to escape her contractual obligations, 
thereby depriving the other party of the advantages of arbitration.165 Factors taken 
into account by the courts in exercising their discretion with regard to good cause 
shown include circumstances where all the parties to the dispute are not parties to 
the arbitration agreement with the result that arbitration may result in a multiplicity of 
157 Stein v Otto 1917 WLD 2; Meny·Gibert v Crawley 1938 CPD 491; Turkstra v 
Massyn 1958 1 SA 623 (T). 
158 S 72(1) of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
159 Smith Arbitration 27 4. 
160 Ibid. 
161 Eiselen 1995 SA Mere LJ 14. 
162 Melvin v Building Committee of St Cyprian's Society (1989) 9 EDC 1. 
163 S 3(1) of Act 42 of 1965. 
164 S 3(2}(a). 
165 S 3(2)(b). See also Butler and Finsen 64-67. 
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proceedings leading to conflicting decisions and increased costs, 166 and where the 
dispute gives rise to difficult points of law which could more properly be decided by 
a court of law, 167 and where a reasonable fear of bias on the part of the arbitrator , 
can be shown. 168 An arbitration clause can never oust the court's jurisdiction. 169 
3.3.2 The arbitration award 
The finality of the award is a cardinal principle of arbitration proceedings which is 
firmly established in our law. 170 The effect thereof is that there is no right of appeal 
against an outcome of arbitration to a court of law. 171 The award may be made an 
order of court172 which can be enforced in the same way as any judgement or order 
of court. 173 However, a court may, on certain grounds, set aside an arbitration 
award.174 An arbitration clause that purports to deprive the court of its power to set 
166 Yorigami Maritime Construction Co Ltd v Nissho-Jwai Co Ltd 1977 4 SA 682 (C) 
693. 
167 Universiteit van Stellenbosch v JA Louw (Edms) Bpk 1983 4 SA 321 (A) 344. 
168 For example because the arbitrator will be called upon to make findings regarding 
the integrity of a member of her own profession: Sera v De Wet 1974 2 SA 645 
(T) 654; or the arbitrator has an interest in the dispute: Universiteit van 
Stellenbosch v JA Louw (Edms) Bpk 1982 3 SA 9 (C) (in casu this factor was 
rejected on the facts). 
169 Schierhout v Minister of Justice 1925 AD 417; Van Kerken 1993 ILJ 24 17. 
170 S 28. See also Dutch Reformed Church v Town Council of Cape Town (1989) SC 
14; Dickenson and Brown v Fisher's Executors 1915 AD 166; RPM Konstruksie 
(Edms) Bpk v Robinson 1979 3 SA 632 (C); Blaas v Athanassrou 1991 1 SA 723 
~· / 
171 The matter is res iudicata: Austen v Joubert 1910 TPD 1095; Schoeman v Van 
Rensburg 1942 TPD 175. 
172 S 31(1). Cf De Villiers v Stadsraad van Pretoria 1967 4 SA 533 (T). 
173 S31(3). 
174 In terms of s 33(1) of the Arbitration Act. 
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aside or enforce an award, is illegal on the grounds of public policy. 175 A party who 
is dissatisfied with an arbitration award has two remedies, namely remittal and setting 
aside of the award. 176 Remittal entails the referring back of the dispute to the same 
arbitrator to have some defect in the award remedied whereas in the case of a setting 
aside, the award is set aside and submitted to a new arbitration tribunal. 177 
Remittal can only take place on good cause shown, for example in cases of 
procedural irregularity or where additional evidence has been discovered after the 
publication of the award. 178 The Arbitration Act179 provides the following grounds 
for setting aside an award: 
(a) in the case of misconduct by a member of the arbitration tribunal; 
(b) where a gross irregularity has been committed in the proceedings of the 
arbitration tribunal; 
(c) where the arbitration tribunal has exceeded its powers; and 
(d) if the award has been improperly obtained. 
Ground (c) is also available under the common law. 180 The courts have held that 
175 An agreement to deprive the courts of their normal jurisdiction is contrary to the 
public interest and therefore void: Schierhout v Minister of Justice supra. See 
also Christie 421-422; Joubert 137. 
176 In terms of ss 32 and 33 of the Arbitration Act. 
177 Butler and Finsen 285. 
178 Dutch Reformed Church v Town Council of Cape Town (1898) 15 SC 14 23. 
179 s 33(1). 
180 Dickenson & Brown v Fisher's Executors 1915 AD 166 175. 
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the grounds for setting aside the award are limited to these statutory grounds.181 
3.3.3 Advantages of arbitration 
The biggest advantage of arbitration is the finality of the arbitrators' award 182 in 
contrast to the right of appeal that a dissatisfied party has in a civil court. Arbitration 
is also chosen to avoid the heavier expenses of formal litigation as well as. court 
delays and the publicity of trials. 183 It is also very practical for parties to a contract 
to agree that a dispute will be determined by an independent arbitrator appointed by 
them. 184 The parties themselves may decide who will be selected or how the 
arbitrator will be selected, which procedures will be adopted, how the evidence will 
be obtained and implemented, if experts will be used and whether lawyers will be 
permitted to appear. 185 It has been held by the court that counsel should be 
appointed to conduct the arbitration in a case involving not only technical issues, but 
also questions of law.186 
In cases of disputes arising from international contracts, arbitration is much more 
desirable than litigation in a foreign court where the proceedings are conducted in a 
foreign language by foreign lawyers who probably have the exclusive right of 
audience in a foreign court. In terms of an international arbitration agreement, 
disputes can be resolved in a neutral locality by a tribunal whose members are 
181 Dickenson & Brown v Fisher's Executors supra 174-175. See also Butler and 
Finsen 291. 
182 s 28. 
183 On the advantages of arbitration, see in general Dutch Reformed Church v Town 
Council of Cape Town supra. 
184 There are no rules regarding the appointment of arbitrators but certain guidelines 
can be derived from the case law. See Smith 278 et seq for an overview of the 
more salient principles. 
185 Smith Arbitration 269; Christie 421-422. 
186 Krugersdorp Municipality v Griffin Engineering Co Ltd 1924 WLD 288 289. 
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selected by agreement according to agreed procedures in a language also regulated 
by agreement. 187 Arbitration can also be conducted under the supervision of one 
of the many international arbitral institutions that exist in centres throughout the world, 
such as London, New York and Amsterdam. 188 These institutions provide 
arbitrators as well as the necessary administrative back-up to facilitate the resolution 
of disputes. 189 In the case of a dispute between international parties, arbitration is 
preferable to litigation because of the absence of an international court to deal with 
such disputes, resulting in the claimant being obliged to have recourse to the 
unfamiliar courts of the defendant's home country or place of business. 190 It must 
be kept in mind, however, that, although arbitrators have knowledge of the industry, 
they are frequently not skilled in dispute resolution or in judicial determination which 
can in turn lead to arbitrations becoming very protracted and expensive because of 
the arbitrators' inability to dispose of procedural matters before getting to the real 
issues. This problem is worsened by the absence of legal representation which is so -
frequently sought by arbitrators. 191 Disputes may end up in court anyway as the 
dissatisfied party has redress to the courts upon a showing of good cause.192 The 
arbitration clause only delays and does not exclude the interposition of the court 
provided, as stated before, a party can show good cause for the arbitration 
agreement to be negated.193 
187 Aaron 1990 SALJ 633. 
188 Aaron 1990 SALJ 636. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Unless the jurisdiction of a particular court has been agreed to: Butler and Finsen 
297. 
191 Knight and Fitzsimons 19. 
192 See par 3.3.1 supra. 
193 Davies v South British Insurance Co (1885) SC 416. See also Van Kerken 1993 
ILJ 17; Butler and Finsen 297-298. 
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3.4 Mediation 
Arbitration must be distinguished from mediation, a process in which an impartial and 
neutral person, acceptable to all parties, assists them in reaching a voluntary 
settlement with regard to their dispute. 194 A mediator cannot, however, impose a 
binding settlement or finding on the parties, 195 therefore I do not consider it to be 
a practical procedure to be followed in the case of disputes arising from ES liability. 
3.5 Referees 
Arbitrators should also be distinguished from referees. Referees are appointed by 
the supreme court in any civil proceedings provided the appointment is made with the 
consent of the parties. 196 A referee does not resolve a dispute, but assists the 
court in investigating facts on which the court's decision will be based. 197 The 
function of the referee is to conduct an inquiry for example, into matters of a scientific 
or technical nature which cannot conveniently be done in the court, and to draft a 
report which may or may not be adopted as a finding of the court. In conducting this 
inquiry the referee has the power to call witnesses and to compel the production of 
evidence. 198 In a civil action pertaining to ES liability, the court may with the 
consent of the parties, appoint a referee to advise it on technical matters such as the 
architecture of an ES. 
194 Smith Arbitration 271. 
195 Ibid. 
196 S19 bis of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959. 
197 Smith Arbitration 271-272. 
198 Ibid. 
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3.6 Enforcement of foreign arbitration awards 
In the case of disputes that arise between parties from different countries, there are 
various Arbitration Codes relating to international bodies which provide arbitrators and 
facilities for conducting arbitrations. 199 Most countries have statutes regulating 
arbitration that provide for the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards which must 
be taken into account when arbitration is considered in any country. 200 In South 
Africa foreign arbitral awards can be enforced in the High Court in terms of The 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Act.201 
3. 7 Conclusion 
ADR mechanisms such as arbitration can be especially useful in cases concerning 
the computer industry as the judiciary often lack knowledge of the high technology 
involved and its products.202 In the case of ES technology it may be advantageous 
to make use of an arbitrator that is skilled in the field of AI and its applications. The 
fact that many software contractors adopt arbitration or mediation clauses proclaim 
199 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) adopted 
the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules in 1976 and devised the UNCITRAL Model Law 
on International Commercial Arbitration in 1985 which has been adopted by 
various countries eg Australia, Canada and Hong Kong: Butler and Finsen 298-
299; Knight and Fitzsimons 18. 
200 The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(The New York Convention) is the most important international treaty relating to 
international commercial arbitration. See Aaron 1990 SALJ 633. By the end of 
1990 more than eighty countries had acceded to the Convention. South Africa 
acceded in 1977 and consequently enacted Act 40 of 1977: Butler and Finsen 
311. 
201 40 of 1977 s 3. On international arbitration in general, see Butler and Finsen 296-
316. 
202 This is not meant as a reflection on the court's legal competency, but only means 
that the cost and uncertainty of litigation can be reduced if the matter is heard 
before a tribunal knowledgeable about computers. The court would probably 
appoint a knowledgeable assessor to assist in such a case. 
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the obvious advantages of alternative dispute resolution methods as well as the need 
for access-to-justice experienced by software producers and consumers. However, 
the adoption of ADR clauses such as arbitration alone, does not render sufficient 
access to justice. 203 It is my submission that the acces-to-justice ideal would be 
even further enhanced by the adoption of strict liability principles to determine certain 
delictual liabilities arising from the use of software.204 
4. Conflict of laws 
4.1 Introduction 
Because of the fact that the computer industry often involves parties from different 
countries, the role of private international law in the determination of legal liability 
cannot be ignored. With regard to contractual liability, computer contracts with 
"choice of law" clauses indicating a foreign legal system,205 may complicate actions 
for damages. Not only are there practical difficulties in litigating against foreign 
software companies based in other countries, the application of foreign regimes of 
civil liability also has to be contended with.206 The same difficulties may be 
experienced in regard to delictual liability, when the law of the place where the delict 
was committed, has to be determined.207 For example, where the damage incurred 
by the user of software in South Africa was caused through a fault of the KE in the 
employ of the ES producer situated in California, the question arises which country's 
203 See the disadvantages of arbitration referred to above in par 3.3.2 supra. 
204 See ch 7 par 7.1 infra. 
205 See appendix IV par (5) and appendix V par (7). See also Van der Merwe 70. 
206 According to Eiselen 1995 SA Mere LJ 13, most jurisdictions are fairly liberal in 
permitting parties to determine the legal system that will govern their contracts. 
Parties should therefore make good use of a "choice of law" clause to avoid legal 
systems unfavourable to the type of contract entered into. 
207 See par 4.4.2 infra. 
Chapter 4 Related topics 219 
law would be the law of the place where the delict was committed - South Africa or 
California?208 Furthermore, it is of little use when a judgement of one country is not 
recognised and cannot be enforced in the country of the person against whom it has 
been made, especially in the case of such an international industry as the computer 
industry. In this regard the rules and principles relating to the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgements are relevant. Various multilateral and bilateral 
treaties are in existence between nations that concern the recognition of foreign 
arbitration awards, judgements, processes of courts and intellectual property.209 
Forsyth210 points out that the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments is 
a difficult and uncertain area of private international law, involving the unique concept 
of international jurisdiction or competence. 211 Since even a cursory discussion of 
this topic would involve a lengthy digression into private international law-issues, such 
a discussion is not advanced.212 
208 For a discussion of the /ex loci delicti commissi, see par 4.4.2 infra. 
209 For example the Berne Convention concerning the recognition of intellectual 
property rights and the Convention on International Contracts for the Sale of 
Goods: see Edwards 390. 
210 At 333. 
211 The term "international jurisdiction or competence" means neither that the foreign 
court would have had jurisdiction in terms of the SA jurisdictional rules, nor that 
the foreign court had jurisdiction in terms of its own jurisdictional rules; it is rather 
a term of art unique to the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments and 
its meaning cannot be ascertained by reference to the rules of other branches of 
the law: Forsyth 336. 
212 See Forsyth 333-383; Edwards 387-401. See also the Enforcement of Foreign 
Civil Judgements Act 32 of 1988 which provides a relatively simple procedure 
whereby foreign money judgements may be enforced in South Africa, as well as 
the Protection of Businesses Act 99 of 1978, which, inter alia, also prohibits the 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgement for multiple or punitive 
damages in the Republic (s 1 (A) read with s 1 (3). The objective is clearly to 
protect SA defendants from foreign antitrust judgements and excessive amounts 
of damages. The provisions of both these statutes are relevant in the case of 
actions for damages based on ES liability, since such actions would entail money 
judgments as well as the risk of punitive damages in the case of successful 
product liability claims in for instance, the USA: see ch 5 part I par 1.1 infra. 
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The doctrine of conflict of laws entails the resolution of conflicts that arise in private 
law relationships which involve a relevant foreign element. Conflict of law spans 
three distinctive areas,213 namely: 
(a) the jurisdiction of the forum, which refers to the competency of the forum 
to hear and determine a case; 
(b) the selection (by using conflict rules) of the appropriate rules of a system 
of law which the forum should apply to resolve the dispute as well as the 
extent to which the chosen lex causae214 should be applied; and 
(c) the recognition and enforcement of judgements rendered by foreign courts 
or foreign arbitrations awards. 
An in-depth discussion of the rules and principles relating to private international law 
or the "conflict of laws"215 in cases of ES liability falls outside the scope of this 
study, therefore only certain aspects pertinent to the situation involving ES liability will 
be referred to. 
4.2 Jurisdiction 
The choice of a specific legal system does not mean that the courts of that system 
will have jurisdiction over the dispute as questions of jurisdiction are determined by 
213 Edwards 298. 
214 The /ex causae refers to the system of law chosen to be applied in resolving the 
issue. 
215 Knight and Fitzsimons 19. "Private International law" is that part of national law 
that deals with the application of foreign legal principles in a national court. Also 
known as "conflict of laws", it is actually not a part of international law but resides 
under national law. See also Edwards 297 who defines the "conflict of laws" as 
"that branch of a country's national law which is applied when an issue involves 
cognisance of a foreign country's legal system". 
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the national legal system of the forum itself (the lex fon). 216 In fact, the lex fori 
governs all issues pertaining to procedure.217 A South African court will only 
assume jurisdiction of a dispute involving foreign parties if some link exists between 
the territory within which the court operates and one of the parties or the facts from 
which the dispute arose. 218 These links are called "jurisdictional connecting 
factors". 219 These rationes jurisdictionis may consist of domicile, residence, 
commission of a delict, creation of a contract, breach of a contract, submission or the 
situation of property. 
The basis for jurisdiction in our law is the doctrine of effectiveness- that is the power 
of the court to give an effective judgement.220 Therefore, a court will not adjudicate 
a matter if the person or property of a peregrine defendant is not arrested or 
attached?21 The plaintiff, as dominus litis may of course always select the forum 
of the defendant's domicile or residence to institute an action.222 In general, the 
plaintiff will institute action in the forum of the area where the defendant resides. 223 
The significance of the forum is that the lex causae is determined according to the 
conflict rules of the lex fori. 224 Apart from territorial jurisdiction and submission, the 
216 Forsyth 17. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Forsyth 142. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Steytler v Fitzgerald 1911 AD 295; Forsyth 142. 
221 This is known as arrest or attachment ad confirmandam jurisdictionem: Forsyth 
175-186; Edwards 329. 
222 Forsyth 176. 
223 This is the actor sequitur forum rei rule: Sciacero & Co v CSAR 1910 TS 119. 
See also Forsyth 143. 
224 Forsyth 17-18. 
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court's jurisdiction will depend on the nature of the action,225 the nature of the relief 
claimed, or on both.226 With regard to ES liability, the nature of the action will either 
be contractual or delictual and the nature of the relief will be that of a claim sounding 
in money (a claim for damages for loss suffered by the use of an ES). 
In terms of common law, the court in whose area the contract was concluded or 
where performance was to have occurred, or where breach of contract occurred, 
would be vested with jurisdiction in cases of claims sounding in money ex contractu, 
such as claims arising from harm caused by the use of ES's.227 In the case of an 
action ex delicto the court in whose area the delict was committed is vested with 
jurisdiction.228 Jurisdiction may also be acquired through submission to a court's 
jurisdiction provided there is an existing ground for jurisdiction present, for example 
that the delict occurred within the area of the court. 229 In terms of the doctrine of 
prorogation, submission may confer jurisdiction on a court which would otherwise not 
have been vested with jurisdiction.230 The court must, however, have jurisdiction 
over the subject-matter of the suit. 231 South African courts will not assume 
jurisdiction on the ground of submission only in certain types of cases such as 
divorce proceedings, 232 title to foreign land, 233 and in cases where both parties 
are peregrines and the cause of action arose outside the court's area of 
225 Steytler v Fitzgerald 1911 AD 295. 
226 Estate Agents Board v Lek 1979 3 SA 1048 (A); Hugo v Wessels 1987 3 SA 837 
(A). See also Edwards 328; Forsyth 146. 
227 Brooks 347. 
228 Ibid. 
229 Brooks 348. 
230 Forsyth 173. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Brecher v Brecher 1947 3 SA 225 (SWA) 228. 
233 Eifon v Eilon 1965 1 SA 703 (A). 
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jurisdiction. 234 Litigants are therefore not free to establish jurisdiction by 
themselves, the court will first have to decide whether it is prepared to accept the 
parties' submission to its jurisdiction or whether it should not exercise jurisdiction 
because the submission was to a foreign tribunal.235 South African courts have a 
discretion whether to stay or hear the matter and parties cannot exclude the courts' 
jurisdiction through private agreements concluded prior to the cause of action.236 
According to Forsyth,237 the circumstances in which our courts would refuse to treat 
submission as a sufficient connecting factor, is uncertain. 
4.3 Choice of law 
Once jurisdiction is established the court must decide what law should be applied in 
the ensuing litigation. This is the second area of conflict of laws referred to 
earlier38 and is known as "choice of law". This involves the determination of the-
appropriate lex causae (applicable legal system) to govern the legal issue at hand. 
The /ex causae may, of course, be a foreign legal system. 
234 Towers v Paisley 1963 1 SA 92 (E); Greater Services (Pty) Ltd v Du Toit 1975 
1 SA 260 (C). 
235 Forsyth 174. See also appendix V par (7) for an example of a submission to 
jurisdiction clause: " This agreement shall be governed and construed in 
accordance with English Law and be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in 
England." 
236 Yorigami Maritime Construction Co Ltd v Nissho-lwai Co Ltd 1977 4 SA 682 (C) 
692; Butler v Banimar Shipping Co SA 1978 4 SA 753 (SE). 
237 At174. 
238 Par 6.1 supra. 
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4.3.1 Contract 
In the case of an international contract the lex causae consists of "the proper law of 
the contract" which must be ascertained or confirmed by the forum. 239 The proper 
law of a contract is the law of the country which the parties have agreed, or intended, 
or are presumed to have intended, to govern it. 240 The following paragraphs 
contain examples of clauses regulating the applicable legal system: 
This licence statement shall be construed, interpreted, and governed by the 
laws of the State of California. 241 
This agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with 
English Law and be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts in England.242 
According to the principle of party autonomy, contractors have the right to choose 
their own law. However, the judicial limits of party autonomy have not yet been 
decided in our law and there are differing opinions as to whether "absolute" party 
autonomy exists. 243 On the one hand considerations of freedom of contract, the 
protection of justified expectations and policy interests of certainty need to be 
advanced, but on the other hand the evasion of mandatory rules and the enforcement 
of contracts that are contra bonos mores in terms of the forum's legal system, justify 
restrictions on party autonomy. 
It is accepted though, that theoretically at least, the autonomously chosen law can be 
239 Edwards 359 as well as cases cited in fn 1. 
240 " .. the intention of the parties to contract is the true criterion to determine by what 
law its interpretation and effects are to be governed": per De Villiers JA in 
Standard Bank v Efroiken and Newman 1924 AD 171 185. See also Guggenheim 
v Rosenbaum (2) 1961 4 SA 21 (W); Berman v Winrow 1943 TPD 213. 
241 See appendix IV par (5). 
242 See appendix V par (7). 
243 Edwards 361; Forsyth 266-270. 
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limited by common law, statute or international convention prevailing in the relevant 
country. In this regard the decision of Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Co 
Ltcf44 is authority in English common law jurisdictions for the contention that parties 
are free to choose as their applicable law a legal system which has no factual 
connection with their contract as long as the choice is bona fide, legal and not 
contrary to public policy. This means that the proper law must not have been chosen 
to evade a mandatory provision of the law245 with which the contract has its closest 
and most real connection. 246 Consumers and employees in unequal bargaining 
positions need to be protected from unfair "choice of law" clauses. These clauses 
generally form part of standard form contracts which are drawn up unilaterally by the 
stronger party with the result that party autonomy does not really exist. As shown 
earlier, computer contracts are almost always standard form contracts247 and users 
of software are forced to agree to unnegotiated terms. 
European countries have restricted the application of the party autonomy principle 
through concluding the Convention of Rome on Contractual Obligations. 248 This 
Convention has its impact on South African law through the influence of English law 
on our private international law and the fact that the Convention has worldwide 
application. 249 It is therefore quite possible for a South African ES user to be 
subjected to the Rome Convention when she is involved in litigation in one of the 
contracting member states of the EU. The purpose of the Convention is to establish 
uniform choice of law rules for contractual obligations throughout the EU. 250 Apart 
244 [1939] AC 277, [1939] 1 AllER 573. 
245 Ius cogens. 
246 United Nations v Atlantic Seaways Corporation (1979) 2 FC 541. 
247 See ch 3 par 2.4.1 supra. 
248 (1980) OJ L266. 
249 Edwards 364. 
250 Edwards 364 fn 15; Cheshire and North 460. 
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from encouraging the unification process in civil and commercial matters, the 
Convention will inhibit "forum shopping"251 and increase legal certainty.252 The 
Convention has come into force in all the member States except Spain and Portugal, 
and it is expected that any country which may join the EU in the future will accede 
to the Convention. 253 
Article 3(1) of the Convention sets out the basic principle, namely that "a contract 
shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties". However, party autonomy is 
restricted in the following way: 
(a) derogation from a country's mandatory rules is prohibited;254 
(b) mandatory rules are applied to protect consumers and workers from 
prejudice through a choice of law;255 
(c) application of mandatory rules of the forum (for example rules against 
cartels and unfair competition) shall not be prevented by the lex causae 
that would have been applicable; 256 and 
251 This refers to the deliberate choice of a suitable forum in order to attract the 
application of a system of law favourable to the plaintiffs claim. 
252 Cheshire and North 460. 
253 Ibid. 
254 Art 3(3). 
255 Arts 5(2) and (6). 
256 Art 7(2) states: 
Nothing in this Convention shall restrict the application of the 
rules of the law of the forum in a situation where they are 
mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the 
contract 
This provision ensures the preservation of protectionist domestic rules such as the 
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(d) the court has a discretion to apply mandatory rules of a third country, which 
are neither those of the forum nor those of the lex causae, with which the 
cause of action has a close connection.257 
The Convention applies worldwide regardless of any connection in the contract or of 
a party to a EU contracting state. 258 The dispute need only be tried in a contracting 
state to the Convention for it to take effect. The Convention does not prohibit 
contracting states from joining other international conventions that cover the same 
ground, such as the Hague Convention of 1985 on the law applicable to contracts for 
the international sale of goods. 259 
In the absence of a choice of law by the parties, a governing law is assigned to the 
contract. 260 In such cases the proper law of the contract is the law with which the 
contract is most closely connected, which may, for example, be the lex loci contractus 
or the lex loci solutionis. 261 
4.3.2 Delict 
The question of whether a delict was committed is determined by the lex loci delicti 
UCTA in England. In terms of s 27(2) of the UCTA contracting parties most 
closely connected with this country are prevented from contracting out of the 
controls of the UCTA by a choice of law of a country outside the United Kingdom. 
The choice of law is not struck down in such a case; the foreign law must still be 
applied to the contract, but subject to the provisions of the UCT A. 
257 Art 7(1 ). 
258 Art 2. See Cheshire and North 475. 
259 Art 21 . See Cheshire and North 521 . 
260 Forsyth 271. 
261 Ibid. 
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commissi. 262 Delictual actions involving foreign elements where the delict was 
committed within the territorial sovereignty of the Republic is governed by the lex 
fori. 263 In the case of a delict comitted outside the borders of the Republic there is 
no certainty in our law concerning the conflict rule to be applied in the selection of the 
lex causae to resolve the dispute.264 The choice of law in delict may consist either 
of the lex fori, the lex loci delicti commissi or the lex propria delicti. 265 
The theory that tort liability is governed by the lex fori may lead to "forum 
shopping". 266 In a claim involving product liability, for example, it is more 
advantageous to institute action in the USA because juries award higher amounts of 
damages and there is also the possibility of punitive damages. 267 The main 
argument in favour of the application of the lex fori is the similarity of delictual liability 
to criminal liability for which it is universally accepted that foreign law is inapplicable 
and that it must be ruled by the public policy of the forum. Today it is realised that 
criminal law and delictual law ~~we completely different objectives. 
The lex loci delicti is currently applied in Europe and is grounded in the principle of 
territorial sovereignty according to which legal consequences can only be attributed 
by the law of the place where the events have occurred. 268 Another difficulty arises 
262 The lex loci delicti commissi refers to the law of the place where the delict was 
committed: Edwards 375. 
263 This refers to the law of the forum: Edwards ibid. 
264 Morris 276 points out that the choice of law with regard to the law of torts was a 
neglected topic for centuries, but the recent pressures of the technological 
revolution as applied to the manufacture and distribution of products, as well as 
the current means of transportation and communication, have awakened a new-
found interest. 
265 The proper law of the delict: Edwards 375. 
266 See par 4.4.1 supra. 
267 See ch 5 part I par 8 1.1.1 infra. 
268 Edwards 375. 
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in cases where the defendant's acts take place in one country and the ensuing harm 
is inflicted in another. In the context of ES's this is a very real problem due to the 
quantity of foreign-produced software available on domestic markets. If one also 
keeps in mind that there may be a multitude of parties involved in the production of 
an ES, 269 it is conceivable that even the relevant act could possibly have taken 
place in more than one country. It is, for example, possible that the DE compiled the 
knowledge base in the United Kingdom to be built into an ES which was developed 
in the United States and sold to a user in South Africa. When harm is consequently 
suffered, it must first be established where the defect occurred and then decided 
where the act took place. 
The lex propria delicti entails that the rights and liabilities of parties regarding an 
issue in tort will be determined by the law of the country which has the most 
significant relationship to the events. 270 The factors taken into account include the 
place where the injury occurred, the domicile and place of business of the defendant 
and the place where the relationship is centred.271 A further problem is to 
determine where the locus delicti is when the defendant's act takes place in one 
country and the resulting harm is inflicted in another place. In the case of an ES, 
such a situation may easily occur where the ES is produced in a foreign country but 
used in another country with harmful consequences. Morris272 points out that this 
problem occurs frequently across the state borders of America. The Second 
Restatement of Torts simply lists the place where the injury occurred and the place 
where the conduct causing the injury occurred as some of the factors which should 
be taken into account in determining the law of the state which has the most 
269 See ch 2 par 8.2 supra. 
270 Edwards 375. 
271 Edwards 376. 
272 At 294. 
230 Chapter 4 Related topics 
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. According to Morris, 273 
the only consistency in this area of conflict of laws is that not all torts are governed 
by the same rule. He proposes that the sequence of events be looked at to establish 
where, in substance, the cause of action arose. 274 For example, the torts of libel 
and slander are committed where the defamatory statements are published and not 
where they are posted or uttered.275 It has also been held in a case of fraudulent 
misrepresentation that the substantial wrongdoing is committed where the statement 
is made. 276 In the case of a defective ES with an intellectual output, 277 which is 
analogous to the making of a misstatement, it may also be held that the place where 
the defective output is used, constitutes the proper law of the delict. The English and 
Scottish Law Commissions recommended in 1990 that the lex loci delicti should be 
applied in English law of conflicts, and not the lex fori except in cases where public 
policy reasons need to be invoked by the forum. 278 In cases of personal injury and 
damage to property, the law of the country where the person or property was at the 
time of injury, is the applicable law, otherwise the applicable law would be that of the 
country where the most significant sequence of events occurred.279 
In South Africa, the general consensus is that the question of choice of law in delict 
is res nova, and the courts may adopt any of the above rules to establish a governing 
system when the need arises.280 
273 Ibid. 
27 4 Morris 295. See also Castree v ER Squibb Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 1248; Multinational 
Gas Co v Multinational Gas Services Ltd [1983] Ch 258. 
275 Gorton v Australian Broadcasting Commission [1973] 22 FLR 181. 
276 Cordova Land Co Ltd v Victor Brothers Inc [1966] 1 WLR 793. 
277 See ch 2 par 1 0.1.2 supra. 
278 Morris 296-297. 
279 Morris 297. 
280 Forsyth 287. 
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4.4 Conclusion 
Choice of law has an important role in the determination of ES liability. In the 
international world of high technology applications it may be judicious to be aware of 
the legal rules which determine the governing systems in the event of civil liabilities 
incurred. As will be seen in the comparative law discussion, 281 other delictual 
liability regimes apply strict liability principles to actions arising from product liability, 
which may include software products. 282 The advantages to the plaintiff of a strict 
liability regime is apparent and the latter must be aware of the implications when 
choosing a governing legal system. 283 It may also be that unfair contract terms are 
outlawed by the relevant foreign legal system, much to the user's favour. 284 Parties 
in contract and delict should therefore also take heed of the content of the foreign 
liability regimes before making a choice of law. 
5. Copyright law with regard to computer programs 
5.1 Copyright and expert systems 
In dealing with ES liability it may be helpful to refer to the principles of copyright law 
with regard to computer programs. 285 Copyright law in South Africa is created by 
281 Ch 5 infra. 
282 Ibid. 
283 A choice of law clause pertaining to delictual actions is often contained in software 
licensing contracts: see ch 3 par 2.5 infra. 
284 For example, the prohibition of certain exclusion clauses by the UCTA of the UK: 
see ch 3 par 2.4.2 infra. 
285 See in general on the copyright in computer programs, Visser 1984 CILSA 33; 
Van der Merwe 16 et seq; Morgan 1991 Elektron 9; Dean 1992 DR 755; 
Copeling 8. "' 
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statute only and is governed by the Copyright Act. 286 Of particular interest to ES's, 
is the manner in which the legislator determines the holder of copyright in a work 
such as a computer program, which was created by teams of people as opposed to 
that of work done by individual creators. 287 Because the identification of all possible 
liable parties in case of harm caused by the use of a defective ES may also be 
complicated by the fact that teams of people, rather than easily identifiable 
individuals, are involved in the production of an ES, 288 the question arises whether 
it might be meaningful to apply a solution analogous to that in the provisions of the 
Copyright Act, to the problem of determining all possible liable parties when defective 
ES's are used. 289 
5.2 Ownership of copyright in a computer program 
The Act does not contain a comprehensive definition of the term "copyright", 290 but 
it may be described in general terms as "that right which vests in a qualified author 
of an original work recognised by the Act (or a person having acquired rights from or 
through him) and which enables him to prevent unauthorised copying of that 
work."291 Ownership of copyright vests in the "author" or in the person acquiring 
rights from the autho~92 unless one of four exceptions to this rule applies.293 Of 
286 Act 98 of 1978. S 1 (1) of the Act states that no copyright or right in the nature of 
copyright may subsist otherwise than in terms of the Act or some other enactment 
in that behalf. 
287 s 1(1). 
288 The specific nature of an ES ensures at least two parties involved: one for the 
knowledge base and one for the inference engine: see ch 2 par 5.1 supra. 
289 See par 5.3 infra. 
290 S 1 (1) states that "copyright" means "copyright under the Act". 
291 Copeling 4. 
292 51(1). 
293 S 21 (1 )(a)-( d). 
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these exceptions only the following two are applicable to computer programs: 294 
(a) where a work is made under the control of the state or an international 
organisation;295 or 
(b) where a work is made in the course of the author's employment by another 
person under a contract of service or apprenticeship. 296 
Under the first exception the copyright in the work vests in the particular state 
department or international organisation, and under the second exception it vests in 
the employer of the person who creates the work. 297 The parties concerned may 
agree to exclude the operation of all the exceptions mentioned, 298 but not the one 
relating to the state and the international organisations.299 
The legal object of copyright in computer programs is the skill and labour employed 
by the author to create the original computer program.300 As such, it is an 
intangible object which must be distinguished from the tangible, physical product, for 
example the compact disk (CD) or hard disk of the computer which is only the 
294 The remaining two exceptions are only applicable to literary or artistic works, and 
persons who are commissioned to take photographs, paint drawings, etc: s 
21(1)(b) and (c) of Act 98 of 1978. 
295 s 21(1)(b). 
296 s 21(1)(d). 
297 Copeling 10. In the case of delictual liability, the developer as employer would 
also be held liable for harm caused by the delicts of employees, through the 
principles of vicarious liability: see ch 3 par 3.4.2.1 supra. 
298 (a) and (b) supra. 
299 S 21 (1 )(a). 
300 Copeling 61. 
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embodiment of the author's skill and labour.301 These two kinds of property, the 
copyright and the physical medium, exist separately from each other and can be 
transferred independently.302 Therefore, a person who becomes owner of the 
medium, for example a CD containing an ES, does not in consequence of the 
purchase of the CD become the owner of the copyright.303 
5.3 The meaning of "author" with regard to a computer program 
The term "author" is defined in the Act according to the specific category of work 
involved and may have a natural or a special meaning.304 The Act was specifically 
amended305 to protect computer programs sui generis which were previously only 
protected as a species of the genus "literary works". 306 The author of a computer 
program307 is the person who exercises control over the making of the 
301 The distinction between these two objects, ie the incorporeal res con~il)ting of the 
intellectual property right in the software program, and the corporeal res consisting 
of the physical embodiment of the software, is mainly responsible for the 
sometimes incomprehensible classification in Anglo-American law of software into 
products or services: see ch 3 par 2.6 supra. 
302 See Reed's cogent argument that two contractual agreements always exist when 
software is used, namely (i) the agreement in terms whereof the software is 
acquired (the acquisition contract), and (ii) the agreement regulating intellectual 
property rights (usually the licensing agreement): ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra. 
303 See also ch 3 par 2.5.1.2 supra with regard to the nature of software licensing. 
304 S 1(1) of Act 98 of 1978. 
305 S 1(1) amended by the Copyright Amendment Act 125 of 1992. 
306 Northern Office Micro Computers (Pty) Limited and others v Rosenstein 1981 4 
SA 123 (C); Vander Merwe 17. See in general on the Amendment Act 125 of 
1992 and its significance for computer programs, Dean 1992 DR 755. 
307 A computer program is defined in the Act as: 
a set of instructions that is fixed or stored in any manner and 
which, when used directly or indirP ..... tly 1n a computer, directs his 
operation to bring about a result. 
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program.308 This definition is similar to the definition of the author of a 
cinematograph film or of a sound recording who is the person by whom the 
arrangements for the making of the work were made. 309 In terms of this definition 
it is possible for an author to not be the actual creator of a work, but to be the person 
who is responsible for the creation of a copyright work. The historical assumption 
that a copyright work is made by an author who is intimately involved with and 
responsible for its creation is therefore no longer applicable. Because of the many 
and varied people involved in the creation of computer programs, authorship of these 
programs is ascribed to the persons responsible for the making of "arrangements of 
the work" or "exercising control over the making of the program". Dean310 points 
out that in the case of mass-produced computer software, the author would then be 
the company or other juristic person which has developed and published the 
software, 311 and not the individuals312 involved in the making of a program. In this 
respect there is a complete deviation from the natural perception313 of authorship 
in literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works in that the making of arrangements is 
more important than actual creativity. The reason for this deviation is the fact that 
teams of people are usually involved in the creation of sound recordings, 
cinematograph films and computer programs which could lead to a heavy evidential 
burden in proving a title to copyright if all the individuals involved were considered 
authors in terms of the Act. In the case of computer software the practical implication 
of the Act is simply that the company or other juristic person which has 
308 Ibid. 
309 S 1(1) of Act 98 of 1978. 
310 1992 DR 756. 
311 Such a person or entity would be the developer in terms of the identified producers 
of ES's: see ch 2 par 8.2.4 supra. 
312 In the case of an ES, such individuals would, for example, refer to the DE or the 
KE: see ch 2 par 8.2 supra. 
313 Generally the word "author" refers to the maker or creator of the work. 
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developed314 the software is the author. The effect of this provision is to ease the 
evidential burden in proving the subsistence of and title to copyright which, in turn, 
will have the effect of greater enforceability and effectiveness of copyright in computer 
software in South Africa. 315 
5.4 Conclusion 
The question arises whether this practical solution may also be applied to hold the 
developer of an ES ( who, in most cases is also the author of the ES in terms of the 
Act), 316 liable as the person or entity that exercises control over the making of the 
system. Such an application will ease the difficult burden of the plaintiff in identifying 
and proving the negligent conduct of the culprit(s) from among the many possible 
liable parties in the case of a defective ES.317 However, such liability of the 
developer will be identical to the liability of a manufacturer of a defective product,318 
in terms of which the developer of the software may in any case be held delictually 
liable. 319 Therefore it does not seem as if anything is to be gained by developing 
a rule in analogy with that of the Copyright Act. 
6. Effect of the Bill of Rights on civil liabilities 
6.1 Introduction 
Although the full effect of a Bill of Rights on private law - relationships is still 
314 The developer of the ES: see the diagram in fig 5 supra. 
315 Dean 1992 DR 756. 
316 S 1(1) of Act 98 of 1978. 
317 See ch 2 par 8.2 supra. 
318 See ch 3 par 3.3.6 supra. 
319 See ch 6 par 5 infra. 
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uncertain, commentators are in agreement on its influence in various areas of private 
law.320 Of particular importance to the issue of ES liability is the possible horizontal 
operation of the Bill of Rights321 and its effect on the relevant contractual and 
delictual actions arising from the use of ES's. With regard to contractual liability such 
application could mean that whenever a right to performance in terms of a valid 
contract limits fundamental rights, it cannot be enforced by a civil claim. 322 
Ultimately, the individual right to freedom of contract may be subverted by the direct 
horizontal application of fundamental rights. 323 With regard to delictual liability, 
horizontal application could have the effect that the protection of fundamental rights 
takes precedence above the other subjective rights protected by the law of delict but 
not entrenched in the Bill of Rights.324 
A pertinent issue in regard to ES liability is the possible infringement of the right to 
freedom of speech and expression, by the enforcement of a strict products liability 
regime in the case of information products such as books, manuscripts and software 
programs.325 In the USA, the question has arisen whether strict liability may be 
imposed on publishers and authors for injuries resulting from false information 
contained in their publications. 326 The courts have been unwilling to find for such 
320 Midgley(1) 19. See also Vander Vyver 1994 THRHR 378-395; Van Aswegen 
1994 THRHR 448-460 as well as 1995 SAJHR 50-69; Visser and Potgieter 1994 
THRHR493-498; Van derWalt 1994(2) Codicillus 4-18; Leon 1996 OR461-464; 
Du Plessis 1996 Stell LR 3-23. 
321 Chapter 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996. 
322 Van Aswegen 1995 SAJHR 54. 
323 Van Aswegen 1995 SAJHR 69; Leon 1996 DR 463. 
324 Van Aswegen 1995 SAJHR 59-65. 
325 See ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra for a discussion of "information products". 
326 Such liability has already been found in the case of aeronautical charts: Aetna 
Casualty and Surety Co v Jeppesen & Co (1981) 642 F 2d 339 (9th Cir); 
Sa/oomey v Jeppesen & Co (1983) 707 F 2d 671 (2d): see ch 5 part I par 8 3.3 
infra. 
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liability because of the danger of suppressing the right to free speech if publishers are 
threatened with liability for inaccurate or dangerous information. 327 
Another effect will be found in the formulation of legal rules which are determined by 
policy considerations. A Bill of Rights, which reflects the fundamental legal values 
accepted in a society, actually represents a crystallised form of public policy which 
can be applied in the determination of open-ended standards such as the tests used 
in three of the general requirements for delictual liability in South African law, namely 
the test for wrongfulness, the test for legal causation or remoteness and the test for 
negligence. 328 
Constitutionally entrenched rights are traditionally only protected against improper 
state interference; in other words enforcement takes place on a vertical level in 
public law between citizen and the state and not on a horizontal level in private law 
between citizen and citizen.329 However, a measure of horizontality is recognised 
worldwide. 330 Van Aswegen331 comments upon the reason why the horizontal 
application of a bill of rights has been recognised and accepted in most jurisdictions 
where basic human rights are recognised, namely the current international trend 
towards a more communitarian, interventionist welfare-state model. Coupled with the 
327 Lamkin 1994 ELJ 765; Whittaker 1989 LQR 135: see par 6.3.1 infra. 
328 Van Aswegen 1995 SAJHR 60 points out that the objective reasonableness in the 
light of the boni mores or legal convictions of the community used in the first test, 
the flexible criterion of a sufficiently close connection in the light of 
reasonableness, fairness and justice between conduct and harm in the second 
test, and the elements of policy present in the determination of reasonable conduct 
in the test for negligence, are text-book examples of open-ended standards 
utilising policy considerations: see also ch 3 pars 3.3.2.1 3.3.3.2 and 3.3.4.3 
supra. 
329 S 7(1) of the Interim Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993 
referred to the enforcement of fundamental rights entrenched in chapter 3 of the 
1993 Act against the legislative and executive organs of state only. 
330 Van Aswegen 1995 SAJHR 51. 
331 1995 SAJHR 51. 
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development of a doctrine of human rights, the relations between individuals are 
gradually expanding into the traditional field of public law.332 This trend is also 
borne out by the access-to-justice movement discussed earlier. 333 Van der 
Wale34 points out that the possibility of allowing for "horizontal seepage" of 
entrenched rights into the relations between citizens was already mentioned during 
negotiations preceding the drafting of the Constitution. 335 This means that the 
constitutional guarantee of such rights may to a certain extent also be enforced in 
private law relationships between private citizens. 336 
The relevance for ES liability lies in the extent to which the fundamental rights may 
influence the determination and content of such liability. In the event that any civil 
liability legislation is adopted,337 indirect horizontal application of the Bill of Rights 
can take place as the state's legislation will have to comply with the provisions of the 
332 Ibid. 
333 See par 3.2.1 supra. 
334 1994 (2) Codicil/us 4-18. 
335 Cachalia et a/ 20 remarks upon the "quietly introduced compromise" between the 
proponents of the more traditional approach in which the Constitution is primarily 
a fundamental law that restricts government, and the proponents of a more 
extensive approach to the Constitution in which the exercise of private power is 
seen as the greater threat to the exercise of fundamental rights and therefore the 
application of such rights need to be effected between private citizens. The 
compromise was reached through providing for the application of the Bill of Rights 
to common law and customary law: sees 7(2); ss 33(2) and (3) and s 35(3) of Act 
200 of 1993. 
336 A bill of rights is traditionally seen as a constitutional instrument protecting the 
basic rights of citizens against infringement by the state and its powerful organs. 
As such, constitutional principles are only applicable to state action. The 
possibility of the application of the provisions of a bill of rights to legal relationships 
between private parties or individuals in the private -law sphere (referred to as 
Drittwirkung in German jurisprudence) has elicited a lot of debate among writers: 
Cf Rautenbach 75 et seq; Cachalia et a/ 20; Van der Vyver 1994 THRHR 378 
389; Van Aswegen 1994 THRHR 448 450 and 1995 SAJHR 50 52 et seq. 
337 Such as the strict liability legislation for defective software contemplated in ch 7 
infra. 
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Constitution. 338 With regard to common law principles. indirect horizontal 
application took place in the Interim Constitution via the provisions of sections 7(2), 
33{2) and (3) and 35(3). The final Constitution339 provides for direct horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights subject to certain prerequisites. 340 
6.2 Horizontal application 
6.2.1 The interim Constitution341 
The 1993 Constitution made provision for an indirect horizontal effect through firstly, 
the provisions of section 7(2) which stated that the provisions of Chapter 3 "shall 
apply to all law in force and to all administrative decisions taken and acts performed 
during the period of operation of this Constitution". Because of the use of the words 
"all law in force", section 7(2) could be interpreted to imply that the provisions of 
Chapter 3 must be applied to existing principles of private law as well.342 Secondly, 
section 33(2) stipulated that all rules of common law and customary law is subjected 
to the fundamental rights and can only be limited in accordance with the requirements 
of section 33(1 ). 343 Thirdly, section 33(3) recognized common law and customary 
338 Van Aswegen 1995 SAJHR 53 
339 Act 108 of 1996. 
340 S 8 of Act 108 of 1996: see par 6.2.2 infra. 
341 Act 200 of 1993. 
342 Van der Walt 1994 (2) Codicil/us 7; Cachalia eta/ 20. 
343 S 33(1) and (2) of Act 200 of 1993 reads: 
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law rights other than the ones contained in Chapter 3 insofar as they are not 
inconsistent with Chapter 3. 344 Lastly, section 35(3) stipulated that a court should 
have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects345 of Chapter 3 when interpreting, 
applying or developing common law and customary law. 346 The effect of the 
(1) The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by 
law of general application, provided that such limitation -
(a) shall be permissible only to the extent that it is -
(i) reasonable; and 
(ii) justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on freedom and equality; and 
(b) shall not negate the essential content of the right in 
question, and provided further that any limitation to 
(aa) a right entrenched in section 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14(1), 21, 25 or 30(1)(d) or {e) or (2); 
or 
(bb) a right entrenched in section 15, 16, 17, 18, 
23 or 24, in so far as such right relates to 
free and fair political activity, shall, in 
addition to being reasonable as required in 
pargraph {a){i), also be necessary. 
(2) Save as provided for in subsection (1) or any other 
provision of this Constitution, no law, whether a rule of the 
common law, customary law or legislation, shall limit any 
right entrenched in this Chapter. 
344 S 33(3) reads: 
The entrenchment of the rights in terms of this chapter shall not 
be construed as denying the existence of any other rights or 
freedoms recognised or conferred by common law, customary 
law or legislation to the extent that they are not inconsistent 
with this Chapter. 
345 Van der Walt 1994 (2) Codicil/us 7 fn 9 points out that the word "objects" in s 
35(3) probably should have been "objectives" if regard is had to the Afrikaans text 
which stipulates "oogmerke". 
346 S 35(3) reads: 
In the interpretation of any law and the application and 
development of the common law and customary law, a court 
shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of this 
chapter 
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provision in section 35(3) was that the Bill of Rights had only mediated or indirect 
application in relations between private individuals.347 The fact that section 7(1) 
specifically excluded the judiciary from the application of the Bill of Rights 
substantiated the intention of indirect horizontal effect of the drafters of the 1993 
Constitution. The principle of mediated application, called mittelbare Drittwirkung by 
German constitutional lawyers, enabled courts to take the entrenched rights and 
freedoms of Chapter 3 into account when applying principles of common law on a 
horizontal level, thereby developing the common law in accordance with the spirit and 
principles of the Bill of Rights over a period of time. 
In DuPlessis and Others v De Klerk and Others348 the Constitutional court at last 
had the opportunity to deliberate upon the vertical or horizontal operation of the 
fundamental rights provisions, ending the uncertainty created by conflicting decisions 
of the High Court on this issue.349 The majority of the court per Kentridge AJ found 
that: 
... Chapter 3 does not have a general direct horizontal application but that 
it may and should have an influence on the development of the common 
law as it governs relations between individuals. I insert the qualification 
"general" because it may be open to a litigant in another case to argue 
that some particular provision of Chapter 3 must by necessary implication 
have direct horizontal application.350 
In casu the court found that section 15 ( 1) of Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution, 
347 Leon 1996 DR 461. 
348 1996 5 BCLR 658 (CC). 
349 In Mandela v Falati 1994 4 BCLR 1 01\f); Mota/a and Another v University of Natal 
1995 3 BCLR 37 4 {D) the court found that horizontal application of the Bill of 
Rights exists whereas in Potgieter en 'n Ander v Kilian 1995 1 BCLR 1498 (N) and 
the decision of the court a quo in this case, De Klerk v Du Plessis 1994 6 BCLR 
124 (T), it was held that the provisions of Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution only 
have vertical operation and therefore do not have application to any other 
relationship than that between persons and legislative or executive organs of 
State. 
350 692H. 
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the "freedom of speech" clause, is not a provision that warrants direct horizontal 
application. However, as "the values it embodies can and must be taken into account 
in the development of the common law of defamation",351 indirect horizontal 
application will take place. 352 In other words, the court found that although 
constitutional rights under Chapter 3 could only be invoked against an organ of State 
and not by one private litigant against another, a litigant may contend that a statute 
or act relied on by the other party is invalid because it is inconsistent with the 
provisions of Chapter 3. 353 Kriegler J (with whom Didcott J concurred) dissented 
from the majority view and concluded that Chapter 3 was capable of direct horizontal 
application. 354 
6.2.2 The final Constitution355 
In the final Constitution356 provision is specifically made for the horizontal 
351 6938. 
352 The court based its finding on the provisions of s 7(2) which provides that "this 
chapter shall apply to all law in force .... ", the reference to all law clearly including 
the common law. 
S 7(1) provides only for the legislative and executive organs of State to be bound 
by the provisions of Chapter 3. If it had been the intention of the drafters to bind 
more people, it could easily have been done through enacting a similar provision 
to that in article 5 of the Namibian Constitution which expressly binds all organs 
of State, including the judiciary and where applicable, all natural and legal 
persons. The use of the words "persons other than those bound in terms of 
section 7(1 )" in section 33(4), and the provision of section 35(3) that "in the 
interpretation of any law and the application and development of the common law 
a court shall have due regard to the spirit, purport and objects of this chapter" also 
indicated that a general horizontal application was not intended. 
353 691 C-G. 
354 724 8-0. 
355 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 1 08 of 1996. 
356 Act 108 of 1996. 
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application of the Bill of Rights. 357 Section 8, the application clause of 
Chapter 2358 states: 
(1) The Bill of Rights applies to all law and binds the legislature, the 
executive, the judiciary, and all organs of state. 
(2) A provision of the Bill of Rights binds natural and juristic persons 
if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking into account the 
nature of the right and of any duty imposed by the right. 
(3) In applying the provisions of the Bill of Rights to natural and 
juristic persons in terms of subsection (2), a court -
(a) in order to give effect to a right in the Bill, must apply, or 
where necessary develop, the common law to the extent 
that legislation does not give effect to that right; and 
(b) may develop rules of the common law to limit the right, 
provided that the limitation is in accordance with section 
36(1 ). 
(4) Juristic persons are entitled to the rights in the Bill of Rights to· 
the extent required by the nature of the rights and of the juristic 
persons. 
The judiciary is clearly bound by the provisions of section 8359 and direct horizontal 
application of the Bill of Rights is possible from the provisions of subsection (2) in that 
it "binds natural and juristic persons if, and to the extent that, it is applicable, taking 
into account the nature of the right and of any duty imposed by the right". 
Furthermore, a court has direct instructions to develop the common law (which 
includes private law) so that effect can be given to fundamental rights.360 
357 Leon 1996 DR 461; Du Plessis 1996 STELL LR 9. Leon supra 464 criticises the 
implications of s 8 and its consequences for South Africa: Apart from the fact that 
South Africa is about to become the only constitutional country in the world with 
a fully horizontal constitution, "such horizontal application of the Bill of Rights 
would open a legal Pandora's box, the results of which are frightening in their 
implications for business, let alone the South African economy." 
358 Act 1 08 of 1996. 
359 Subsection (1 ). 
360 S 8(3)(a). 
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Section 8361 also states that the Bill of Rights applies to "all law" which of course 
includes private law.362 According to Du Plessis,363 the horizontal application of 
the Bill of Rights brings our Bill of Rights in line with the worldwide growing sentiment 
in favour of such extended protection: 
This sentiment roots in a recognition of the fact that the state is not the only 
powerful social institution whose actions can have a far-reaching impact on 
the lives of "less powerful" people. Individuals sometimes need potent 
protection of against other equally or even more powerful institutions (and 
individuals).364 
The above sentiment is also noted by Van Aswegen365 who states that the strict 
separation between public and private law has gradually eroded during this century 
towards a more communitarian, interventionist welfare-state model in which the 
recognition and protection of human rights have expanded to relations between 
private individuals, and that the horizontal application of a bill of rights to private law 
has been accepted in most constitutional countries where basic rights are protected 
in a bill of rights. 366 She, however, favours indirect horizontal application to meet 
the requirements of extended interpretation.367 
The interpretation clause contained in section 39 has retained the value statement 
ofthe transitional Bi11:368 
361 Subs (1). 
362 DuPlessis 1996 STELL LR 10. 
363 1996 STELL LR 9. 
364 Du Plessis 1996 STELL LR 9. 
365 1995 SAJHR 51. 
366 These observations are also substantiated by the access-to-justice movement 
which strives at its base, for effective access to human rights: see par 3.2.1 supra. 
367 Van Aswegen 1995 SAJHR 52. 
368 S 35 of Act 200 of 1993. 
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When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum -
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and 
freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law. 
(2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the 
common law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum 
must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. 
(3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of any other rights 
or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, 
customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are 
consistent with the Bill. 
According to Ou Plessis, 369 the provisions of section 39(3) seem superfluous in the 
light of the stronger horizontal operation in terms of section 8 which makes the Bill 
applicable to "all Jaw" in any case. In light of the retention of section 39(3), he 
suggests that the reference to all law in section 8 probably has to be restricted to law 
regulating relationships to which the Bill applies while law other than that refers to the 
legislation as well as the common and customary law referred to in section 39(3). 370 
Although the matter will, ultimately, be decided by the Constitutional court, it seems 
that the Bill of Rights has direct horizontal application and its provisions may therefore 
be enforced in private Jaw relationships. 371 However, it is trite that no right can be 
absolute.372 Excplicit provision is made in the Bill of Rights for the limitation of 
fundamental rights and freedoms. 
369 1996 STELL LR 11. 
370 Ibid. 
371 Based on the provisions of ss 8 and 39, as well as the comments of the writers Du 
Plessis and Van Aswegen, noted above. 
372 Cachalia et a/ 106. 
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Any limitation of a fundamental right has to be in accordance with section 36(1) and 
subsection (2) prohibits the limitation of a fundamental right by law except as 
provided for in subsection (1). Section 36(1) states: 
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law 
of general application to the extent that the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom, taking into 
account all relevant factors including -
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
Section 36 (1) is very similar to the previous limitation clause of thP. Interim 
Constitution, namely section 33, except for the omission in the new section of the 
additional requirement that the limitation of certain rights in relation to political 
activities had to be "necessary".373 However, the limiation has to be reasonable 
and justifiable which, according to Du Plessis, 374 can be understood to import 
necessity. 
The way in which the limitation of rights is permitted in our Constitution has been 
drawn from the Canadian Charter of Rights which involves a two stage process as 
set out in the case of R v Oakes. 375 During the first stage it must be determined 
whether an infringement of a fundamental right did in fact take place. 376 If an 
373 S 33(1 )(b)(bb): see par 6.2.1 supra. 
37 4 1996 STELL LR 12. 
375 1986 26 DLR 4th 200. 
376 Cachalia et al 1 06; Oevenish 1995 TSAR 448. 
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infringement did take place, the second stage becomes active and involves an inquiry 
whether the underlying policy of the conduct that caused the infringement is 
reasonable and democratically justifiable in a free and open democracy and whether 
an acceptable method for its implementation has been used.377 In this regard the 
burden of proof is on the plaintiff. 378 During the judicious weighing up of the 
competing jurisprudential and other relevant issues, the principle of proportionality is 
used. 379 Proportionality is established by applying three criteria: 380 
(a) The limitation must be rationally connected to the objective of the 
underlying policy being promoted - the causation test; 
(b) the limitation should be so crafted that it infringes upon the fundamental 
right as little as possible- the threshold test; 
(c) the detrimental effects of the limitation must be in proportion with the extent 
to which the objective is promoted - the balancing test. 
The application of the above criteria set out in the Oakes decision381 negates strict 
adherence to rigid and inflexible standards. Law is a social science necessitating 
social and constitutional issues to be determined in light of the fundamental moral 
and ethical values grounded in the Constitution.382 
377 Devenish 1995 TSAR 448; Woolman 1994 SAJHR 63; Cachalia et a/107. 
378 Devenish 1995 TSAR 448. 
379 R v Oakes supra. 
380 See Devernish 1995 TSAR 448. 
381 Supra. 
382 Devenish 1995 TSAR 448. 
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6.3 Freedom of speech 
The question arises whether product liability on a no-fault or strict liability basis, 
infringes upon the right of free speech and expression. 
6.3.1 United States 
The possibility of such an infringement is discussed by American commentators with 
regard to publisher's liability in American law. 383 If liability without proof of fault 
were to be imposed on the publishers and authors of books, free discussion of 
activities which could cause physical injury would be stifled, thereby infringing upon 
authors' and publishers' right to free speech and expression of freedom of the 
press. 384 The Supreme Court of New York realised this possibility in a case 
involving claims for damages based on the contention of the plaintiff that a textbook 
describing experiments was an inherently defective product subjected to strict 
liability.385 The plaintiff in this case was injured while doing an experiment 
described in the defendant publisher's textbook. The court, in rejecting the plaintiff's 
claim,386 stated the following in regard to the possible infringement of First 
Amendment rights: 
383 Lamkin 1994 ELJ 731-770; Whittaker 1989 LOR 125-139. See ch 5 part I par 6 
supra. 
384 Whittaker 1989 LQR 134. 
385 Walter v Bauer (1981) Sup 439 NYS 2d 821 App Div, (1982) 451 NYS 2d 533. 
386 Another reason for the rejection of the plaintiff's claim was the court's finding that 
the book in question could not be regarded as a defective product because the 
plaintiff was not injured by the use of the product for which it was designed, 
namely to be read: (1981) Sup 439 NYS 2d 823. See also ch 5 part I par 8 3.3 
infra. 
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More importantly perhaps, the danger of plaintiffs proposed theory is the 
chilling effect it would have on the First Amendment to the Constitution-
Freedoms of Speech and Press. Would any author wish to be exposed to 
liability for writing on a topic which might result in physical injury? e.g. How 
to cut trees; How to keep bees?387 
In the First Amendmene88 to the United States Constitution the right of citizens to 
free speech is protected against the federal government. 389 The right to freedom 
of expression is regarded as the most important fundamental right in the United 
States. 39° First Amendment rights can only be violated by the government and it 
is therefore impossible to violate speech freedoms between private individuals. 391 
There is no prohibition on private acts and a private party can control or censor 
expressions since that is regarded as editorial discretion.392 If a tort is committed 
though, constitutional rights are relevant since the imposition of civil penalties is a 
function of court which is a branch of government. However, a plaintiff will have to 
387 (1981) Sup 439 NYS 2d 821 822-823. See also the following decisions in which 
it was held that First Amendment concerns outweighed the plaintiffs claim: Olivia 
N. v National Broadcasting Co (1977) 141 Cal Rptr 511 (Ct App), (1978) 435 US 
1000; Cibenko v Worth Publishers Inc (1981) 510 F Supp 761 (DNJ); Walt Disney 
Prods Inc v Shannon (1981) 276 SE 2d 580 (Ga). 
388 The First Amendment states: 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the 
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peacebly to assemble, and to petition the Government for a 
redress of grievances. 
389 Cavazos and Morin 7 4. 
390 "Freedom of thought and speech is the matrix, the indispensable condition, of 
nearly every other form of freedom." per Cardozo J in Palko v State of 
Connecticut (1937) 302 US 319, 326-327 as quoted by Van Schalkwyk J in 
Mandela v Falati 1994 4 BCLR 1 (W) 7F. See also Devenish 1995 TSAR 445; 
Carpenter 1995 Codicil/us 28. 
391 Cavazos and Morin 75. 
392 Ibid. 
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show that the speech involved unprotected material as there are different categories 
of speech, some of which do not warrant full First Amendment protection, such as 
commercial speech393 and some of which are not entitled to any First Amendment 
protection at all, such as child pornography.394 In the case of protected speech, the 
"clear and present danger" or "compelling state interest" test is used to determine 
whether First Amendment rights should be upheld.395 According to these tests, 
speech which advocates illegal or violent action is not constitutionally protected if it 
is directed to incite or produce imminent lawless action and it is likely to incite or 
produce such action. 396 
Because of the analogy between ES's and informative books and manuals, especially 
"how to" books, 397 the question arises whether the imposition of strict liability for 
damage caused by the use of a defective ES would constitute a First Amendment 
infringement. However, according to Lamkin,398 the information contained and 
assembled in an ES is comparable to that of the report found to be inaccurate in the 
case of South Carolina State Ports Authority v Booz-AIIen & Hamilton, lnc.399 In 
this case the plaintiff had commissioned the defendant to invesigate the merits of 
various ports in the USA and to base its findings in a report. It subsequently 
transpired that the report was incorrect and the plaintiff instituted a claim for damages 
against the defendant based on the alleged negligent preparation of the report which 
393 Lamkin 1994 ELJ 765. Commercial speech is defined as speech of any form that 
advertises a product or service for profit or for business purposes: Devenish 1995 
TSAR456. 
394 Cavazos and Morin 75; Devenish 1995 TSAR 447. 
395 Brandenburg v Ohio (1969) 395 US 444. 
396 Ibid. 
397 Lamkin 1994 ELJ 757; see also ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra. 
398 1994 ELJ 765. See also ch 5 part I par 8 par 3.3 supra. 
399 (1987) 676 F Supp 346 (DOC). See also ch 5 part I par supra. 
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caused the plaintiff economic injury. 400 The defendant's argument that the First 
Amendment protected it from liability was rejected by the court because the report 
contained "objective factual data" which is not constitutionally protected.401 In the 
same way, Lamkin402 argues, does the special nature of an ES render First 
Amendment concerns unwarranted.403 The data compiled in the knowledge base 
of an ES consists of objectively verifiable facts, drawn from the corpus of the relevant 
field of knowledge to the ES. 404 Such data is even more objective than that 
compiled by the defendants in the South Carolina decision.405 
6.3.2 South Africa 
Both in terms of the interim406 as well as the final Constitution,407 freedom of 
speech and expression is entrenched in the Bill of Rights. It is, however, not an 
absolute right and can be limited408 in terms of the limitations clause.409 The 
extent of the protection depends on the context in which it is exercised and in this 
regard the previous limitation provision410 clearly distinguished between two 
categories of speech: political speech which was given a higher priority and non-
400 Supra 346-347. 
401 Supra 349. 
402 1994 ELJ 766. 
403 See also ch 5 part I par B 3.3 infra. 
404 See ch 2 par 8.1.2 supra. 
405 Supra. 
406 S 15 of Act 200 of 1993. 
407 S 16 of Act 108 of 1996. 
408 Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1994 BCLR 1 (NmH). 
409 Ss 33 (1) and (2) of the interim Constitution and ss 36 (1) and (2) of the final 
Constitution: see par 6.2.2 supra. 
410 S 33 (1)(b)(bb) of Act 200 of 1993: see par 6.2.2 supra. 
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political speech relating to artistic and scientific endeavour. 411 The new limitations 
clause does not draw the same distinction between the political and non-political 
context of fundamental rights; all rights may only be limited to the extent that it is 
reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom and taking into account all the relevant factors stipulated in 
paragraphs (a) to (e) of section 36(1) of Act 108 of 1996.412 
In coming to a decision, competing interests will have to be balanced. 413 Because 
there are no hierarchy of values, rights of free expr~ssion will have to be weighed 
against many other claims such as the right to equality,414 dignity,415 privacy,416 
fair trial,417 economic activity,418 and property419• 
It is my submission that the enactment of strict liability principles for ES software 
products as proposed, 420 will not constitute an infringement of the producers' right 
to freedom of speech and expression, as the latter is simply not applicable to the 
objective ·factual information contained in an ES. Furthermore, if it should be found 
by a court that such products do contain constitutionally protected information, it is 
411 Cachalia et a/ 50; Devenish 1995 TSAR 44 7. 
412 See par 6.2.2 supra. 
413 Woolman 1994 SAJHR 76; Marcus 1990 SAJHR 140. 
414 S 9 of Act 108 of 1996. 
415 s 10. 
416 s 14. 
417 835(3). 
418 s 22. 
419 s 25. 
420 See ch 7 infra. 
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my submission that in applying the second leg of the limitation test referred to 
above,421 strict liability legislation constitutes a reasonable and necessary 
infringement based on the overriding interest of consumer protectionism in this 
regard.422 Consumers in South Africa are very vulnerable to exploitation because 
of illiteracy, ignorance and other socio-economic factors. 423 
6.4 Class actions 
6.4.1 Introduction 
Class actions and public interest actions enable individuals and organizations to 
institute actions in the public interest or on behalf of others who, for various reasons, 
are not able to enforce their rights themselves. 424 The South African law 
commission (SALC) made an enquiry into the recognition of a class action in South 
African law, and concluded that legislation should be promulgated to provide for the 
institution of class actions.425 Although the commission distinguishes between a 
class action and a public interest action, only the class action is relevant for purposes 
of this study.426 A class action is brought by a representative on behalf of a class 
421 Par 6.2.2 . 
422 See also the world-wide access-to-justice movement which supports the notion of 
strict liability measures as a method of achieving its objectives: par 3.2.1 supra. 
423 See also Devenish 1995 TSAR 456. 
424 The main reasons being that unsophisticated people do not have the 
understanding or the legal and economic assistance to enforce their rights and 
sophisticated people do not enforce their claims because such claims do not 
warrant the high legal costs: SALC Project 57 at 2. 
425 SALC Project 88 at 35. Such an action would also conform to the worldwide 
"access to justice " movement: SALC Project 88 at 1. See also ch 4 par 3.2.1 
infra. 
426 A public interest action differs from a class action in that the public interest litigant 
does not represent any particular individual but acts in the interest of the public at 
large or a segment thereof. 
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or persons with a common interest in the action. Such an action can be very relevant 
in the case of harm caused to consumers by a defective ES which was mass 
produced and distributed to the public.427 
The predecessor of the modern class action, the representative action, originated in 
English law from where it was received into other Anglo-American legal systems.428 
It became highly developed in the law of the United States but never became part of 
South African law.429 The actiones popu/ares of Roman law became obsolete in 
Roman Dutch law430 but was revived in the interim Constitution of South Africa431 
which formally introduced class actions into South African law.432 The final 
Constitution433 provides as follows: 
Anyone listed in this section has the right to approach a competent court, 
alleging that a right in the Bill of Rights has been infringed or threatened, 
and the court may grant appropriate relief, including a declaration of rights. 
The persons who may approach a court are -
(a) anyone acting in their own interest; 
(b) anyone acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in 
their own name; 
(c) anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or a 
class of persons; 
(d) anyone acting in the public interest; and 
(e) an association acting in the interest of its members. 
427 See par 3.7.2 infra. 
428 SALC Project 88 at 6. 
429 Ibid. 
430 Bagnall v Colonial Government 24 SC 470; Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 
TS 372. The only one of the actiones populares still surviving in our law is the 
actio de libero homine exhibendo: Wood and others v Ondangwa Tribal Authority 
1975 2 SA 294 (A). 
431 Act 200 of 1993. 
432 s 7(4). 
433 Act 108 of 1996 s38. 
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The effect of this provision is that class and public interest actions to enforce 
fundamental rights are introduced into South African law. However, to achieve 
access to justice for all South Africans, such actions also need to be introduced into 
other areas of the law by way of legislation.434 A precedent for the creation of a 
statutory right of action already exists in private law, namely that of the shareholder's 
derivative action. 435 
In terms of the traditional South African law of standing, a litigant has locus standi in 
an action only when he/she possesses a personal, sufficient and direct interest in the 
subject matter of the action.436 In November 1995 the SALC published a working 
paper inviting comment on the recognition of a class action in South African law. 437 
It was recommended that an Act of Parliament be drafted to provide for class and 
public interest actions.438 A class action must be brought or defended by a 
representative on behalf of a class of persons with a common interest in the action. 
It is not necessary for the representative to have a claim or defence that is typical of 
all the claims or defences of all class members.439 Judgement of the court in 
respect of a class action shall be binding (res judicata) on all members of the class. 
434 SALC Project 88 at 30. 
435 S 266 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 enables a minority shareholder to institute 
action on behalf of the company against directors or officers of the company 
whose wrongful conduct or breach of trust has caused the company to suffer 
damages. 
436 Nasionale Party Suidwes-Afrika v Konstitusione/e Raad 1987 3 SA 544 (SWA); 
Standard Genera/Ins Co v Gutman NO 1981 2 SA 426 (C); Christian League of 
Southern Africa v Ra//1981 2 SA 821 (0); South African Optometric Association 
v Frames Distributors (Pty) Ltd t/a Frames Unlimited 1985 3 SA 100 (0); 
Ahmadiyya Anjuman lshaati-lslam Lahore (SA) v Muslim Judicial Council (Cape) 
and others 1983 4 SA 855 (C). 
437 Project 88. 
438 The Public Interest Actions and Class Actions Act: SALC Project 88 at 41. 
439 The concept of an "ideological plaintiff' therefore applies to all types of class 
actions: see SALC Project 88 at 4. Such a plaintiff is often an organisation formed 
to promote certain interests, for example a consumer society. 
.. 
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6.4.2 Application to expert systems 
According to the SALC, an example of a class action would be a monetary claim in 
delict against the manufacturer of a defective product. 440 It is therefore quite 
possible that claims for damages based on multiple copies of a defective ES which 
was widely distributed to the public, may be instituted against the producers of the 
ES if a fundamental right, such as the right to personal integrity or freedom of speech 
has been infringed.441 
440 SALC Project 88 at 5 and 35. 
441 See par 6.4.1 supra. 
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CHAPTER 5 
A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY: DELICTUAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM 
THE USE OF EXPERT SYSTEMS 
INTRODUCTION 
A comparative law study can be undertaken for various reasons. 1 One of the main 
reasons is to gather knowledge of the manner in which a particular problem is solved 
by the rules of other legal systems in order to find a solution in one's own national 
system for the same problem. The incidence of computer use has burgeoned 
phenomenally during the past few years and together with the infinite possibilities of 
cyberspace in every home and office, the information age is sweeping away 
traditional methods and ways of getting things done. ES applications are changing 
the customary manner in which services, including sophisticated professional 
services, are rendered. In essence, ES's embody expert or professional advice or 
techniques in the form of a consumer-product which is available on the mass-market, 
freely and unchecked. The potential for harm is great, especially since many ES 
applications are used in safety-related products and in domains with high risk of injury 
such as medical services and air traffic-control.2 Civil liability incurred through harm 
caused by the use of ES's has already been noted and commented on extensively 
in Anglo-American computer- and information technology law.3 Apart from the fact 
that the South African legal system does not yet recognise "computer- and 
information technology law" as a substantive discipline in our law, the issue of ES 
liability has not surfaced in any South African court proceedings or legal writing thus 
1 Van Zyl 17; Zweigert and Kotz ( 1) 17. 
2 See ch 2 par 4 supra. 
3 See ch 1 par 1.3 supra and pars A 2 and B 2 infra. 
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far. As stated earlier, 4 the delictual liability that may be incurred warrant particular 
attention and form the focus of the comparative law study offered in this thesis.5 
The applied method of comparative law advises on the most appropriate way in which 
a specific problem can be solved under ruling social and economic circumstances.6 
During this investigation of other systems the relation between law and sociology of 
law must, however, be kept in mind. The latter identifies the various factors other 
than law which control human behaviour. In this respect, American law relating to 
product liability is a good example of the solution of a problem through the adoption 
of legal principles developed as a result of socio-legal factors such as the jury system 
and its power to grant punitive damages, remuneration of lawyers on a contingency 
basis, and America's notorious litigious society with a "quest for deep pockets".7 The 
result was the development of strict liability principles for the compensation of harm 
caused by defective products. It is no wonder that such a vast amount of American 
legal literature exists on the sub!~ct of software liability in general and flowing 
therefrom, ES liability.8 
The fear that the adoption of a strict products liability regime by Europe would result 
in a comparable high incidence of products liability claims as occurring in the United 
4 See ch 1 par 1.4 supra. A comparative study of contractual liabilities was limited to 
the Anglo-American treatment of exemption clauses and the distinction between 
licensing and acquisition contracts: ch 3 par 2 supra. 
5 Parts I, II and Ill infra. 
6 Zweigert and Kotz (1) 11-12. 
7 Thus, a true picture of the American law regarding strict liability of the manufacturer 
cannot be given only through listing the elements of a successful claim at law. It 
must also be said that the claim will be decided in a trial by jury, and the roles the 
judge, lawyers, and jury play in such proceedings need to be shown, as well as their 
influence on the substantive law, by noting, for example, that in such a claim the 
plaintiff's attorney normally stipulates for a fee of 30-50 percent of the damages 
awarded and that the jury takes account of this fact when fixing the damages: 
Zweigert and Kotz (1) 5. 
8 See part I par A 1.2 infra. 
' 
• 
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States, are unfounded when regard is had to the same external conditions discussed 
above.9 It must be remembered that products liability actions in the United States 
also serve as a substitute for a less developed network of social insurance systems 
than is found in for example, Germany and the Netherlands. Unlike many European 
countries such as the latter, injuries from defective products which entail huge 
medical costs, loss of future income and even permanent disabilities, frequently 
remain without redress in the United States. 10 In contrast, the German and Dutch 
systems of health and accident insurance more than adequately cover this type of 
damage, obviating the need for legal proceedings. 11 Another factor is the financial 
risk which, in Germany, is considerable in relation to the United States, due to the 
possibility in a German court of having a cost order granted against the unsuccessful 
plaintiff for all litigation fees incurred, whereas in the United States, parties carry their 
own costs. 12 
For purposes of private law the most important western "legal families" are the Anglo-
American, the Germanic and the Romanistic law families. 13 The latter two systems 
are designated as Continental systems and from them the German legal system was 
chosen because it is the leading system of that family in the area under discussion 
and the Dutch system for its similarity to the South African law of delict. Both of them 
are systems in which the development of computer law is quite advanced. From the 
Anglo-American systems the law of the United Kingdom and the United States will be 
scrutinized. 
9 Zekoll 1989 AJCL 817 et seq. 
10 Zekoll 1989 ACJL 817. 
11 Even the social insurance carriers, acting on assigned claims, are reluctant to litigate 
because of the high cost involved: Zekoll 1989 AJCL 817. 
12 Ibid. Compare in this regard the SA situation in which plaintiffs are seriously 
hampered by the high cost of litigation without the benefit of compulsory social 
insurance schemes. 
13 Zweigert and Kotz 66. 
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Any discussion involving product liability would be incomplete without the treatment 
of European Union law because of the influence of the Directive on the Liability for 
Defective Products on EU member states. In light of the fact that England, Germany 
and the Netherlands are members of the European Union, the influence is obvious. 
In order to come to a sensible conclusion in respect of the presumed treatment of ES 
tortious liabilities in any of the legal systems under discussion, it is necessary to view 
the principles of their tort law in general before applying them to situations where 
damage is caused through the use of ES's as defined in this study. Therefore, each 
of the foreign systems treated contain a discussion of the applicable delictual liability 
regime whereafter it is applied to the situation of ES liability as defined in the problem 
statement. Finally, a summary is made of the comparative study as a whole, from 
which cert_ain conclusions and recommendations of use to the South African treatment 
of ES delictual liability can be drawn. 
It must be emphasized that, because no pertinent decision which specifically 
concerns the issue of delictual liability incurred through the use of ES's have been 
noted so far in any of the foreign jurisdictions treated, the eventual conclusions and 
applications remain presumed and conditional on the understanding and interpretation 
of the foreign principles involved. 
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PART I COMMON LAW COUNTRIES 
A. United Kingdom 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Tortious liability 
1.1.1 General 
English law consists of written and unwritten law of which legislation and judicial 
precedent (case law) respectively form the principal sources. 14 Pafflament is 
sovereign with unlimited legislative powers that have to b~ applied by the courts. 15 
Since joining the European Union (EU), th~ United KingdonLbas"become subject to 
--, 
European Treaties and EU legislation.16 Case law is regarded as precedent and 
1 -·- -. --~ ·-·~ " ..... 
c_Oljft§'ddecisions are binding upon each other_ a_cconJjngJQ -~ hierarchical_struetur~ 7 
in terms of which the, tt~use of Lords is the highest couq _in. the land and the onJt_ 
court permitted to depart from a prior ruling of its own "when it appears right to do __ _ 
so". 18 The decisions ~!_!he House of Lords are absolutely binding upon ~ILQ1her 
14 James 6. 
15 Ibid. 
16 European Communities Act of 1972: James 15; Steiner 22. See also part II infra. 
17 The reliance upon precedence is the hallmark and strength of a common law 
system: James 16. 
18 The House of Lords used to treat its own decisions as binding upon itself until the 
Lord Chancellor announced otherwise in 1966: see James 18 et seq. The decision 
of Caparo Industries pic v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 1 605; [1990] 1 All ER 568 
regarding the effect of negligent misrepresentation in cases of pure economic loss 
illustrates this power of the House of Lords to overrule its own previous decision: 
see par 2.5 infra. 
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courts whether these decisions appear to be correct or not. 19 
The law of torts is founded in common law and has been expanded by< tba cour:ts 
acc?r9Jng_<tclthe...ne.eds of sooiety/0 , This expansion will continue to occur limited 
only by the practical consideration that all injuries complained of cannot be regarded 
as legal wrongs. 21 A tort is a civil wrong entitling an injured party to claim damages 
for loss sustained. 22 Torts consist of the infliction of legally recognised injuries which 
have become subject to specific legal definitions and which are actionable only within 
the limitations of special rules applicable to each of them.23 However, Fleming24 
points out that the body of English liability rules establishing specific injuries within 
which a plaintiffs claim must fall in order to found a cause of action, is not so rigid 
that a plain<tiff is denied an action merely because the special circumstances do not 
comply with the rules of any existing tort; new torts can be created when policy 
dictates the need to recognise a new cause of action. 25 The English tort system as 
a system of compensation has not escaped criticism,26 mainly because it is too 
expensive, and unfairly discriminates between victims of the same injury, as 
compensation hinges on the culpability of the defendant. By 1978, the British 
19 James 17. 
20 Delictual liability is known as "tortious liability" in Anglo-American law. "Tort" 
derives from tortus which means "twisted" or "crooked" and is used in English as 
a synonym for "wrong": Fleming (2) 1. 
21 A tort does not consist simply of the infliction of an injury, but of the infliction of a 
legally recognised injury: James 369. 
22 James 366; Fleming (2) 1. 
23 James 369. 
24 (2) 5. 
25 The tort of negligence has expounded to accommodate new causes of action, for 
example the admission of liability for negligent misrepresentation and pure 
economic loss: Hedley Byrne v Hefler [1964] AC 465< See also James 380. 
26 Fleming(2) 14. See also the criticism on the American tort system: par B 1.1 < 1 
infra. 
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Pearson Commission had recommended that social insur~nce benefits be increased f)J f;,c:i 
to reduce the incentive for tort clairn~-27 The steadily increasing ground of~slrlc;t: . ! J J 
"'.liability shows a trend towards applying an ~.C!()r-omic Qffi~ienc:~J?.Qii~r in tort .•. I' • ..-f), C'~ 
whereby the costs of compensation are internalised rather than the traditional 
corrective justice policy whereby an obligation is placed on the wrongdoer.28 
1.1.2 Forms of liability 
Torts can be divided into three categories according to the three grounds upon which 
liability may be based:29 
(a) intentional interference with the plaintiffs interests; 
(b) negligence; and 
(c) strict liability. 
The firstcategory of torts is no_t relevant to this study. 30 The category ~~!~ge~~_! ~}rf~;- ... : 
constitutes by far the largest part of tort law -and devilopsm()S! rapidly as ne~;.·g.~!ies ·,.},, .;, e~ 
ofcare" ara.created. 31 .~§trict liability is applied to abnormally dangerOLIS activities, . 
... ~- "' ... . - ~-..-, '""~-
introduced by legislation in spheres such as aviation, work and road accidents, and 
·~- ··- •··- . 
products liability. 32 
27 Fleming(2) 14. This phenomenon is also occurring in other countries, eg Germany, 
the Netherlands: Zweigert and Kotz 342 et seq. See also part Ill par A 1.1.1 and 
B 1.1.1 infra. 
28 Fleming (2) 329; Zweigert and Kotz(2) 37 4 et seq. 
29 Fleming (2) 15. 
30 See ch 1 par 1.4 supra. 
31 Tapper 245; James 380; Fleming (2) 102. 
32 Fleming(2) 327 et seq. 
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1.1.3 Joint tortfeasors 
In terms of the common law a distinction is made between joint and several 
tortfeasors. 33 The former denotes the position where more than one wrongdoer have 
a common enterprise in causing the same damage, and the latter where the same 
damage is caused but without any common design.34 Joint tortfeasors are 
collectively responsible for the tort committed, in other words they are jointly and 
severally liable for the damage they caused, 35 whereas several tortfeasors are only 
individually liable for the damage each of them caused. 36 Contribution is possible 
between joint and several tortfeasors. 37 
1.2 Software liability 
As software liability issues based on tort have not yet been the subject of a specific 
decision by the courts, computer law writers draw analogies from cases in which 
issues of liability of a similar nature to that of the liability of software users and 
producers, have been decided.38 Computer law writers concur that the most likely 
causes of action in the case of software liability incurred by producers and users will 
be based on negligence,39 in that a duty of care may have been breached, and 
33 Fleming{2) 255. 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid. 
37 See the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act of 1978. 
38 Reed 1987 CL&P 12 and 1988 CL&P 149; Tapper 245 et seq; Singleton 1994 
CL&P 170; Davies 1993 CL&P 99. 
39 The treatment of liability arising from intentional conduct is, in any event, excluded 
from the scope of this study: ch 1 par 1.4 supra. 
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strict liability in the form of product liability and vicarious liability.40 The latter 
form of liability is specifically pertinent to the situation of a software developer who 
' 
employs producers to design and develop software.41 Liability based on negligence 
and products liability hinge upon the question whether software is a product or a 
service. 42 In English law, the latter question depends on whether software consists 
of "goods" within the meaning of a "product" as defined in common law43 and the 
CPA. 44 In this respect the tangibility of the product, the nature of the commercial 
transaction that took place and the substance of the contract, are determinant 
factors. 45 In the case of software being a product, strict liability principles may 
apply, whereas if the software is regarded as a service, negligence liability principles 
will be appropriate.46 
Another argument specifically applicable to possible tortious liability, contends that 
products consisting of information, which cause harm through the use of the 
information, should not be subjected to products liability, as the harm is caused by 
the use of the information in the text, and not by the text (and therefore the product) 
itself. For example, where injury is suffered as a result of contact with poisonous ink, 
it is not the use of the information in the text in the book that causes the harm. but 
40 See Tapper 245 and 255; Reed 1988 CL&P 149; Bott et a/232; Reed 1978 CL&P 
12; 1993 CL&P 99; Singleton 1994 CL&P 167. 
41 See par 3.1 infra. 
42 Ibid. 
43 In terms of the common law, manufacturer's liability was progressively applied to 
many commodities, including natural and manufactured products which are not 
reasonably safe to life, health or property: Fleming(2) 483. 
44 Sec 2(1 ). 
45 See ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra. 
46 See ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra and the authorities cited there in fn 210. 
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the printed text itself. 47 It is accordingly suggested that the software and its physical 
medium (where it is so supplied) should be considered together as a unit, and 
regarded as physical property.48 Where software is provided without a physical 
medium, for example in the case of electronically transferred software, it is not 
regarded as a product but rather as "pure information" which does not fall within the 
meaning of a product and should be regarded as a service. 49 However, this view 
is not accepted .by the majority of English computer law commentators, 50 and 
' 
neither, so it seems, by the courts. 51 
In conclusion it can be stated that software in general and ES's in particular, will be 
regarded as products if they are sold on a physical medium in the form of standard 
or package software. Custom software and software installed directly in the user's 
computer system will more likely be regarded as a service. 
2. Negligence 
2.1 Introduction 
The tort of negligence lies in the breach of a legal duty to take care not to injure the 
47 Eg the poisonous ink in the monk's manuscript of The name of the rose, a novel 
by Umberto Eco published in London 1980. 
48 Triaille 1993 CLSR 219. 
49 Reed(2) 43. This view concurs with the view of European law commentators who 
distinguish between software as a product and instructive information, which is not 
a product: see ch 5 part II par 9.1.3 infra. 
50 Cf Tapper 181; Reed(2) 43; Capper and Susskind 120. See also ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 
supra. 
51 St Alban's DC v ICL (unreported): Cnlbey 1996 SJ 1025. See also Cox v Riley 
(1986) 83 Cr App R 54: Eurodynamic Systems pte v General Automation Ltd 
unreported 6 September 1988 (QBO). See ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra. 
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plaintiff. 52 The three requirements that have to be satisfied before negligence is 
established are:53 
(a) The defendant must owe a duty of care to the plaintiff; 
(b) the defendant must be in breach of that duty; and 
(c) the plaintiff must have suffered damages as a consequence of the breach. 
Included in the third requirement (c), is also the requirement of causation as the 
damages must have been caused by the breach the duty.54 
2.2 Requirements 
2.2.1 Duty of care 
It is commonly accepted that the test for the existence of a duty to take care lies in 
the seminal case of Donoghue v Stevenson55 as propounded by Lord Atkin in his 
famous speech creating the "neighbour test:"56 
You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can 
reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in 
law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be persons who are so close 
and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in 
contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts 
or omissions which are called in question. 
52 Fleming (2) 1 03; James 380. 
53 Ibid. 
54 See also the requirements for a delict in terms of SA law: ch 3 par 3 supra. 
55 [1932] AC 562. 
56 Supra 580. 
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According to this test, liability for negligence is based on harm occurring in 
circumstances where there is such a close and direct relationship between the parties 
that the harm ought reasonably to have been foreseen. 57 Even though these two 
factors of foresight and proximity may have been established, a claim may still be 
denied on the ground of policy considerations. 58 In the case of physical and 
property damage the existence of a nexus between the careless defendant and the 
injured plaintiff is found in the very fact that such an injury has occurred. 59 In 
contrast to damage consisting of physical injury or damage to property, pure 
economic loss60 does not easily lead the courts to recognise a sufficiently 
proximate relationship to give rise to such a duty to take care.61 
2.2.1.1 Duty of care of the producers of software 
The producers of software, therefore, have a clear duty to take care to design and 
produce software that will not physically injure the user or another person,62 or 
57 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1 004; Hill v Chief Constable [1988] 
1 AllER 238; [1989] AC 53. On the duty of care, see in general James 380-385; 
Fleming (2) 135-185. 
58 Ronde/ v Worsley [1969] 1 AC 191; Hill v Chief Constable supra. 
59 Lord Bingham explains it as follows in the Caparo decision supra 808: "It is 
enough that the plaintiff chances to be (out of the whole world) the person with 
whom the defendant collided or who purchased the offending ginger beer." 
60 "Pure economic loss" refers to financial loss not linked to the physical harm of the 
plaintiff or the plaintiffs property: Fleming (2) 173; Neethling et a/ 280 et seq; 
Midgley(1) 30. 
61 From earliest times personal security and tangible property have been protected 
whereas economic loss has only relatively lately been regarded as an interest 
worthy of protection: Fleming (2) 173. See also par 2.5 infra. 
62 Even where physical harm results from reliance by a third party on negligent 
information, the courts have had no difficulty in imposing liability: Clay v Crump 
[1964]1 QB 533; Driver v Willet [1969]1 AllER 665; Watson v Buckley [1940] 
1 All ER 17 4. See also par 2.5 infra. 
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damage the user's or another person's property. 63 In this respect a claim based on 
negligence with regard to damage caused by software (including ES's) may be 
instituted.64 However, liability becomes more problematic when pure economic 
loss is caused, a situation which is much more likely to occur when ES's which have 
an intellectual output, such as a tax advisory system, are used.65 .As-tbere ar:e no·-~ 
""'---·-·· 
~stablished duties of care with reggrcL to the use of ES's yet, an anaiQgy can be 
----· ·---~---.- ··--- ~-~ . - ·-~·-----~--~'~"'"''-'"' --~-~ 
~;- :~::~~~:e::~:=~rn=i~~:.:::~~~~"-~~:-~~=~,~~~~:::~~-
>· K ~- r.esults producecLh)L~sQftVJ_gre .. are-~HtG-.s.tatements .ofJacLwb.icb...may be 
~-\.-..J a_st~~L!J.POD-b.y-the 1;t$efS.67 It may therefore be ~med that the courts will have 
' f..;J.,~ i\) r~gard to considerations found in negligent misstatement cases when the extent of 
{' J_: •• ,k 
. ....--'- ~~ the duty of care owed by the software producers to the user is determined.68 ~'(Y.v 
El 
2.2.1.2 Duty of care of the users of software 
f1 '\) t-· 
Cl""t ~0'~-f.. 
12f'\ ff In the same way the ~~r of software has a duty to take care that the use __ of the_ 
software does not harm another pers.o.o.69 If the plaintiffs loss is caused by the 
~ negligent operation or use of the computer system, the system will be regarded as 
merely the means by which the function is performed, and the question will be 
whether sufficient care was taken by the human in performing the function. 70 
63 Reed (2) 75. The fact that the injury may be caused by acts or words, as in the 
case of misstatements, makes no difference: Fleming (2) 175. 
64 Reed (2) ibid. 
65 Reed (2) 76;Tapper250. 
66 Ibid. 
67 See ch 2 par 1 0.1.2 supra. 
68 Reed (2) 78; Tapper 264. See par 2.5 infra. 
69 Reed(2) 76. 
---~-------~--····'-·-~-------
70 Reed (2) 81. 
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According to Reed, 71 the courts will more easily find a duty to take care irt§Beratina 
aJ~Qmputer-system than.i~~!J.iSuch a system because of the smallclas~~of 
Rlaintiffs.that~xists in the firstinstanc:.§. A ne_gligently operated .ES may cause los§ 
to a fe\1\f_~Hents, but a negligently designed ES may cause loss. to all the use£S. 72 
If the user of the system knew or ought to have known that the ES was defective in 
design or operation, she would be negligent in relying on such a system. Where a 
computer system is under the defendant's control, incorrect results may suggest that 
the defendant acted negligently.73 A defendant will also be negligent if it is shown 
that, although the output is accurate, there is insufficient justification to rely on the 
computer system alone. In this regard problems will often arise when professionals 
give advice which is solely based on information from computer systems. 74 If it 
j( { ,.-ftranspires that such advice is incorrect, the professional will definitely be liable in 
v-r\ 1 ~~~~negligence.75 Regarding the duties of care of the users of ES's, reference can be 
~"' ,, t"} made to instances involving the introduction and ~Jica1i()p~fn!vt_t~~t!D~.U in_ 
~~ ~( ;r-~MtiOIL.oftasks. 76 ~n the decision of The Ll.ad_~-::-GweQclg[flri:...1 the master of 
t~~ ~":"~~~ a ship laden with cargo sailed at full speed in the face of dense fog. Although the 
>L~ ,"~ ~hip was fitted with radar, which at that time represented new technology, the master 
~ ~ <" ~ ~only looked at it occasionally and for most of the time it was set at the wrong range. 
syc.'r'. tl.:\~ The court found that the new technological aid. was used negJig~ntl~ and refused t() 
1r~· Ji·~ e;o/ \ · li_mitthe owners' ~~~~i~!_!yj_n terms of the Mere_~~!!~ §hipping.Ac.~ .2! !~?1 . .beca••se .. they 
~-~~· 
~ 
71 Ibid. 
72 Reed (2) 82. 
73 Reed (2) 83 states that these circumstances may be such a strong indication that 
the work was done negligently, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should come 
into operation: see par 2.3 infra. 
74 See par 2.7 infra with regard to professional liability in the context of ES liabilities. 
75 Reed (2) 85. 
76 Tapper 246 et seq. 
77 [1965] p 294 . 
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had neglected their duty to instruct and train their workers in its use. 78 
~-·-------·. . -
2.2.2 Breach of duty 
Once the existence of a duty of care has been established, the question arises as to 
whether that duty has been breached. 79 A duty of care is breached when the 
defendant has failed to take reasonable care in avoiding injury to the plaintiff. 
Reasonable care varies according to the nature of the risk involved and can 
therefore only be determined in the light of all the facts and circumstances of the 
case. 80 The standard of care is measured by the reasonable person placed in the 
same circumstances as the defendant. 81 The foreseeability of the risk of harm as 
well as the question whether the defendant conformed to common practice in the 
circumstances, play a definite role in determining whether a breach of duty 
occurred.82 Safety codes are viewed as persuasive evidence of expert opinion as 
to minimum safety requirements with the result that non-compliance constitutes 
evidence of negligence. 53 In this respect the use of product standards such as the 
ISO 9000 series,84 can play an important role in the determination of product 
safety.85 Consequently, certification by a recognised authority that a product, such 
as software, was produced according to a defined quality control system such as the 
78 Supra 296. 
79 On breach of duty, see in general James 385-387; Fleming (2) 105-134. 
80 Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Miller SS Co Pty Ltd (The Wagon Mound (No 2)) 
[1967] AC 617. 
81 The same test is used as in SA delict law: see ch 3 par 3.3.3.2 supra. 
82 Fleming(2) 119 et seq; Hodges eta/ 234-235. 
l 
83 Fteming(2) 121. See also par 2. 7 infra with regard to the effect of safety standards 
on professional liability. 
84 See ch 6 par 5.2.2.2 infra for a more detailed discussion of the ISO series 
standards. 
85 Hodges et a/ 397 et seq. 
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ISO series, is an indication that reasonable care has been taken by the producer to 
avoid injury to the users. 86 
Non-compliance with binding statutory standards is regarded as negligence per se 
as in such a case the appropriate standard of conduct is prescribed by law. 87 
According to Fleming, 88 the effect of the doctrine of statutory negligence is the 
promotion of strict liability because of the "absolute duty to comply" with the stated 
standards. 89 
After a duty of care has been established by the production and use of an ES, it must 
be ascertained whether a breach of that duty has occurred in the event of damage 
caused by the use of ES's. 
2.2.3 Damage 
Actual damage is a necessary element of the tort of negligence and no cause of 
action accrues until such damage has occurred.90 The qualification of damage is 
determined by policy rules mostly defined by the various "duties of care" established 
from time to time. It includes physical and mental injury, property damage and pure 
economic loss in some instances. 91 Special and general damages are awarded to 
86 Hodges et a/405. On the role of product standards and quality assurance systems 
in the foreign systems investigated, see par B 2.2.2.3 infra, part II par 9.2.1 infra, 
part Ill pars A 5.5.2 and B 3.3.3 infra. 
87 This is also referred to as statutory negligence: David v Britannic Merthyr Coal Co 
[1909] 2 KB 146 164. See Fleming (2) 124. 
88 At 133. 
89 Cf Fleming(2) 130-134. 
90 James 388; Fleming(2) 191. 
91 Ibid. With regard to the duty to a duty of care in the case of causing pure 
economic loss. see Fleming(2) 177 et seq. See also par 2.5 infra. 
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compensate loss sustained.92 An indemnity principle is followed with exemplary or 
punitive damages rarely, if at all, awarded. 93 Special damages refer to pecuniary 
loss capable of precise quantification such as medical and other expenses as well as 
loss of earnings up to date of trial. 94 General damages refer to non-pecuniary loss 
of the past and future, such as pain and suffering, loss of amenities, etcetera as well 
as loss of future earnings. 95 Financial limits or fixed ceilings (caps) or thresholds 
for damages do not exist in English tort law.96 Liability for death and personal injury 
cannot be excluded or limited by contract,97 but any other loss or damage may be 
excluded or limited to the extent that it is reasonable. 98 
2.2.4 Causation 
The damage must have been caused by the breach of duty.99 Causation deals with 
two inquiries namely that of factual causation or cause-in-fact and legal or proximate 
causation. The first inquiry daals with the question of whether the defendant's 
culpable conduct was causally relevant to the injury sustained for which the well-
92 Fleming(2) 228. 
93 Ibid. Punitive damages are only awarded against defendants who have acted in 
a particularly wanton and deliberate manner: see Fleming(2) 242. 
94 Fleming(2) 229-238. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Such limitations have been instituted in Australia: Fleming(2) 239-240. Even under 
the strict products liability regime in terms of the CPA, the UK has not imposed a 
maximum limit of liability as it is entitled to <llo according to the discretion allowed 
by the EU Directive on product liability in Art 7(e): see par 3.2 infra. 
97 S2(1)UCTA. 
98 S 2(2) UCTA. See also ch 3 par 2.6.1 supra. 
99 On causation in general, see James 387-388; Fleming (2) 192-224. 
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known "but for" or conditio sine qua non-test is used. 100 The second inquiry 
involves the question as to what extent the defendant should be legally responsible· 
for the consequences of her actions and thus entails a policy decision. With regard 
to damage caused by the use of an ES it may be impossible to attribute the fault 
entirely to one party. In the case of a defective system the knowledge could have 
been supplied defectively by the DE, it could have been incorrectly represented by 
the KE and the knowledge base could have been improperly matched with the 
inference engine by the toolbuilder. In such a situation it will be necessary to 
ascertain the relative contributions of all parties for the purpose of causation as well 
as apportionment of the damage. 101 
2.3 Burden of proof 
The plaintiff carries the burden of proof in respect of all elements or facts in issue in 
a tortious actiqo:.~a prima facie case of negligence must be established against the 
'·· ~., 
defendant.102 However, in situations where the cause of injury lies exclusively 
within the defendant's control, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (the thing speaks for 
itself) is invoked. 103 In these situations the facts are such that it is difficult for the 
plaintiff to prove negligence but the facts indicate so strongly against the defendant 
that the court may find in the plaintiff's favour unless the defendant can furnish some 
explanation to rebut the presumption of negligence. If such an explanation is given 
by the defendant, the plaintiff has to prove negligence. 104 In the context of product 
100 Fleming (2) 194; see also the similar position in SA law: Neethling et a/159; ch 
3 par 3.3.4.1 supra. 
101 Tapper 264; Fleming (2) 200-202. 
102 James 388; Fleming(2) 314. 
1 03 Eg in cases involving product liability where the manufacturer has complete control 
of the production process: Fleming(2) 314. 
104 Byrne v Boadle [1836] 2 H&C 722; 159 ER 299. In this way the maxim is building 
a bridge between negligence and strict liability: Fleming(2) 325. 
Chapter 5 Comparative law Part I 277 
liability this doctrine is highly applicable and has resulted in quasi - strict liability. 105 
According to procedural law, the maxim raises only a permissive presumption, in 
other words a presumption of fact which does not shift the "burden of going forward 
with the evidence"106 as does a presumption of law. 107 A presumption of fact 
merely demonstrates the general principle of inferring a fact in issue from 
circumstantial evidence. 108 In practice though, the maxim was treated as a 
presumption of law which established a prima facie case for the plaintiff, resulting in 
a shift of the evidentiary burden raising a presumption of negligence. 109 This 
presumption can only be rebutted by proving that the occurrence was not due to any 
negligence on the part of the defendant or that all reasonable care was taken, 
resulting in an onerous burden of rebuttal on the part of the defendant. 110 In this 
way res ipsa loquitur becomes a device for effecting an outcome similar to strict 
liability. 111 
105 See par 2.8 infra. 
1 06 The term used in Anglo-American law to denote the concept of the "evidentiary 
burden" (weerleggingslas) in SA law of evidence: Schmidt 24. 
f07 Fleming(2) 325. 
108 Fleming(2) 323. 
109 The doctrine had its origin in the ''wood barrel" case, Byrne v Boadle 2 H & C 722 
159 Eng Rep 299 (Exch 1863), in which a pedestrian was injured by a barrel of 
flour that mysteriously hurtled down upon him from above. The plaintiff could not 
prove that the barrel fell due to the lack of care of the defendant, the flour 
company located in the building above the street where the injured plaintiff was 
passing: see Friedman and Siegel 1988 Rutgers C& TLJ 290. The court decided 
that the traditional guidelines of negligence law should bend in order to promote 
justice and did not require that the plaintiff prove the identity of the person actually 
responsible. The mere fact that the accident occurred established a prima facie 
case of negligence since ordinarily the event could not have occurred unless the 
defendant was negligent, in other words, the accident spoke for itself (res ipsa 
loquitur): Byrne v Boadle supra 725. 
110 Ibid. 
111 Ibid. See also par 2.8 infra. 
278 Chapter 5 Comparative law Part 1 
2.4 Defences 
The defences of contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk may be 
raised against a claim arising from the use of ES's. 112 The first defence refers to 
the plaintiff's failure to meet the standard of care applicable for her own protection 
and which is a legally contributing cause of her own injury. 113 In such a case the 
plaintiff's claim may be reduced by a "just and equitable" amount of the damages 
recoverable where the damage suffered was part of the plaintiff's own fault. 114 
Where a defence of voluntary assumption of risk is advanced, the plaintiff, by 
agreeing to assume the risk herself, absolves the defendant from all responsibility 
from it. 115 The former's affected right is thus waived. A person who consents to 
the risk of injury does not have an action in tort against the person who causes the 
injury: the principle of volenti non fit iniuria applies in English law. 116 Consent may 
not be given to run a risk of illegal harm, for example to bodily harm.117 Mere 
knowledge of a risk does not imply consent. 118 The plaintiff must have a full 
comprehension and clear appreciation of the risk involved. 119 
In the context of ES liability, the question arises as to whether the plaintiff consents 
112 See ch 3 par 3.3.6 supra. 
113 Fleming(2) 268. 
114 S 1 (1) of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act of 1945: see Fleming(2) 
269 et seq. 
115 Fleming(2) 291 et seq. 
116 James 369; Fleming (2) 79 291. The principle also applies in SA law: Neethling 
eta/ 91; see also ch 3 par 3.3.3.4 supra. 
117 James 370. 
118 Smith v Baker [1891] AC 325. See also Fleming(2) 296 et seq. 
119 Fleming(2) 100. 
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to the risk of injury where the ES contains a warning of the risk involved in its use. 
2.5 Negligent misrepresentaion 
The possibility of holding the developers of defective ES's liable in terms of a 
misstatement was raised because of the similarity between a computer system giving 
expert advice and a human doing the same. 120 After the decision in Donoghue v 
Stevenson, 121 the policy of the House of Lords was gradually to extend negligence 
into areas where previously no remedies existed such as in the case of 
misstatements causing pure economic loss. 122 This development can be traced 
through the watershed cases of Hedley Byrne v Heller, 123 Home Office v Dorset 
Yacht Co Ltd 24 and Anns v Merton London Borough Council. 125 
In terms of the decision in Hedley Byrne 126 the existence of a duty to take care 
when information is supplied, is limited to parties in a special relationship with the 
maker of the statement and in circumstances where the latter knows or should have 
known that the parties would rely on the statement. 127 This special relationship is 
found in a "sphere in which a person is so placed that others could reasonably rely 
120 Tapper 251; Reed(2) 77. 
121 Supra. 
122 Hedley Byrne v Heller supra. In Donoghue v Stevenson supra, Lord Atkin 
introduced into English law the modern approach of defining a single general 
principle which may be applied in all circumstances to determine the existence of 
a duty of care. See also the comprehensive discussion of this aspect of English 
law in Pretorius 61 et seq. 
123 Supra. 
124 [1970] AC 1004. 
125 [1978] AC 728. 
126 Supra. 
127 Ibid. 
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on his judgement or his skill or on his ability to make careful inquiry, .... "128 It can 
also be found where the parties are in a contractual relationship or in a relationship 
of proximity that is equivalent to a contract or where it is clear that the defendant 
professes to dispose of professional knowledge and ski11. 129 The decision makes 
it clear that the mere fact that it was foreseeable that some person in the defendant's 
position might rely on the statement is not sufficient to establish a duty of care. 130 
The importance of the decision is that for the first time, it was accepted by the House 
of Lords that a duty of care rests on a person not to cause harm through the making 
of a negligent misrepresentation and this duty is not limited to parties in contract. A 
defendant may also be liable for a negligent misrepresentation made to a third party 
outside a contractual relationship or a relationship of trust. The fact that pure 
economic loss is suffered is not per se a reason for denying such a claim. 131 
It seems, therefore, that according to the Hedley Byrne decision132, producers and 
users of ES's will be liable fc r economic loss caused where a special relationship 
exists between them and the injured party, and if it is shown that they knew or should 
have known of the reliance of the injured party on the information provided by the ES. 
In the Anns decision 133 Lord Wilberforce formulated the well-known two-stage-test 
to establish a duty of care in tort: 134 
128 Supra 502. 
129 Supra 529-530. 
130 Fleming (2) 174. 
131 Hedley Byrne v Heller supra 517 529. Cf James 384; Fleming (2) 174. 
132 Supra. 
133 Supra. 
134 7518-7528. 
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First one has to ask whether, as between the alleged wrongdoer and the 
person who has suffered damage there is a sufficient relationship of 
proximity or neighbourhood such that, in the reasonable contemplation of 
the former, carelessness on his part may be likely to cause damage to the 
latter, in which case a prima facie duty of care arises. Secondly, if the first 
question be answered affirmatively, it is necessary to consider whether 
there are any considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit 
the scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed or the 
damages to which breach of it may give rise ..... 135. 
281 
The court must first establish whether a duty of care exists, and secondly it must be 
determined what the scope of the duty is. The first question is answered by applying 
the foreseeability test, which includes the requirement of a "special" or "proximate" 
relationship and the second by looking at policy factors which could exclude or limit 
the scope of the duty. The latter has been further described as taking into account 
"whether it is just and reasonable" to impose such liability. 136 
Because of the fear of opening the floodgates to claims of indeterminate loss, 137 the 
courts have not been anxious to follow the decision in Anns138 and Junior 
Books139 , and have found various reasons to distinguish them from facts in later 
cases. 140 A single general principle whereby a duty of care can be determined in 
135 The test was subsequently confirmed and applied in Junior Books Ltd v Veitchi 
Co Ltd [1983] AC 520; Candlewood Navigation Corporation Ltd v Mitsui OSK 
Lines Ltd [1986] AC 1. See also Governors of the Peabody Donation Fund v Sir 
Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd [1983] 1 AC 201 206; Leigh and Sillavan Ltd v 
A/iakmon Shipping Co Ltd [1986} 2 WLR 902; [1986] AC 785. 
136 Governors of Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson and Co Ltd supra. 
137 This fear was first voiced by Cardozo J in Ultramares Corp v Touche (1931) 255 
NY 170; 174 NE 441 444: see par 8 2.5.2 infra. 
138 Supra. 
139 Supra. 
140 Muirhead v Industrial Tank Specialities [1986] QB 507; Simaan General 
Contracting Co v Pilkington Glass Ltd (No 2) (1988] QB 758; Murphy v 
Brentwood District Council [1990] 3 WLR 414. 
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every practical situation has proved to be unattainable. 141 What has emerged 
though, is that, in addition to the foreseeability of damage, a relationship of proximity 
or neighbourhood should exist between the parties and it should be considered fair, 
just and reasonable to impose a duty of a certain scope on a particular party for the 
benefit of the other party. 142 In Mutual Life Citizens Assurance Co Ltd v Evatt143 
the court held that a duty of care is confined to statements made or advice given in 
the exercise of a profession involving the giving of such advice. 144 
The approach followed in the Anns decision 145 was eventually reversed by the 
~--·-·--·---
House of Lords in the decision ofCaparo Tnd;;stries pic v Dickman. 146 In this case 
it was recognised that, particularly in problematic cases such as those involving the 
recovery of pure economic loss upon the furnishing of information, the courts will 
require something additional to the standard test based on reasonable foreseeability 
of harm, when determining the existence of a duty of care. 147 Although the court 
recognised the importance of the underlying general principles common to the whole 
field of negligence, it was of the opinion that the law had moved in the direction of 
attaching greater significance to the more traditional categorisation of distinct and 
recognisable situations to guide the existence and scope of the various duties of care 
141 Peabody Donation Fund v Sir Lindsay Parkinson & Co Ltd [1985] AC 210; Yuen 
Kun yeu v Attorney-General of Hong Kong [1988] AC 175; Rowling v Takaro 
Properties Ltd [1988] AC 473; Hill v Chief Constable supra; Smith v Eric S Bush 
(a firm) and Harris v Wyre Forest DC [1989] 2 All ER 514; [1989] 2 WLR 790. 
142 Caparo Industries pic v Dickman supra. 
143 [1971] 1 AllER 150; [1971] AC 793. 
144 See also the dissenting judgement of Lord Denning in Candler v Crane, Christmas 
& Co [1951] 2 KB 164 (CA); [1951] 1 AllER 426 433-435 where he requires the 
advice to be given "by one whose profession it is to give advice on which others 
rely". 
145 Supra. 
146 Supra. 
147 Rodger 1995 PN 114. 
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imposed. 148 The court noted with approval the following words of Brennan J in the 
High Court of Australia in Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman:149 
It is preferable in my view, that the law should develop novel categories of 
negligence incrementally and by analogy with established categories, rather 
than by a massive extension of a prima facie duty of care restrained only by 
indefinable "considerations which ought to negative, or to reduce or limit the 
scope of the duty or the class of person to whom it is owed. 
It was held in Caparo150 that the auditors of a company do not owe a duty of care 
to potential investors or to individual shareholders who buy further shares as no 
relationship of proximity between the auditor and a member of public can be deduced, 
because to do so would give rise to the unlimited liability of auditors. The court 
criticised earlier attempts to include within the meaning of proximity, any class of 
persons, unknown to the auditor, who may possibly use the financial statements in 
making investment decisions. 151 Their lordships emphasized that knowledge by 
the auditor of the intended use of the information by the plaintiff is a prerequisite for 
liability .152 This knowledge on the part of the respondents need not be actual 
knowledge but such knowledge as would be attributed to a reasonable person placed 
in the respondents' position. 153 The two-stage test of Anns154 is abandoned for 
a three-stage approach whereby it must be assessed if: -f1 
(a) there is reasonable foreseeability; 
148 At 57 4 per Lord Bridge. 
149 (1985) 60 ALR 1 43-44. 
150 Supra. 
151 Supra 581. 
152 Supra 589. 
153 Ibid. 
154 Supra. 
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(b) proximity; and 
(c) whether it would be just, fair and reasonable to impose liability. 
Underlying this three-stage approach, should be an incremental or traditional 
categorisation approach which means that liability will only be imposed as just, fair 
and reasonable if it can be placed within a previous category of cases in which the 
courts have found a duty of care. 155 The court did not attempt to resolve the 
question of whether the advice relied on should be restricted to advice given in the 
course of business or of a profession since the certifying of accounts, which was the 
particular task executed in this situation, was something done in the course of the 
ordinary business of auditors. 156 
Liability for pure economic loss arising from the use of ES's will probably only be 
imposed on producers of systems containing professional or busine~s advice which 
have been designed and produced with the knowledge that a specific class of users 
will rely on such advice. 157 All other cases involving pure economic loss will have 
to be decided in terms of contractual obligations. 158 Application software such as 
an ES is specifically acquired by users to be relied on for a purpose, and provided 
it is used for its intended purpose, the producers will owe a duty of care to the users 
in terms of the decision in Caparo159. According to Reed160 such a duty of care 
155 See also Rodger 1995 PN 114. 
156 Supra 588. 
157 Examples are the users of the Self-Help System and also the professional users 
of the Intelligent Assistant: see ch 2 par 11 supra. 
158 Reed (2) 77. 
159 Another reason why it was held that the company's auditors owed no duty of care 
to the shareholders in respect of their accounts. was because the accounts were 
not produced to be relied on whc;, making investments: supra 588. 
160 Reed(2) 77. 
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will depend on a further proviso, namely that the software is acquired in the form of 
a development contract, in other words custom software, 161 and not as standard 
software162 which was directly acquired over the counter. The reason for this is that 
standard software, available on the mass-market, is not confined to a limited class 
of users as would be the case with custom software specifically contracted for. 163 
In respect of the liability of authors and publishers towards their readers for negligent 
misrepresentations published in books, no English cases conferring liability upon 
authors and publishers of such books exist. 164 The idea of holding persons liable 
for negligent misrepresentation merely because of the publication thereof is 
considered abominable in English law. 165 A cause of action based on "publisher's 
liability" against the producer of a defective ES, similar to that available in the United 
States, 166 is therefore not possible. 
2.6 Omissions 
The question whether the failure to use a computer system might amount to a breach 
of duty, depends on the particular circumstances of a case. There must be a 
sufficient causal connection between the breach of duty and the loss incurred.167 
The question is whether the reasonable person in the position of the defendant would 
have used the computer system and, in so doing, avoided the loss. In deciding this 
161 See ch 2 par 1 0.1.1 supra. 
162 Ibid. 
163 Ibid. 
164 Tapper 266; Fleming (2) 642. 
165 Candler v Crane Christmas & Co supra; Tapper 266. Contra the position in the 
United States with regard to the "chart and map" cases: par B 2.5.3 infra. 
166 See par B 2.5 infra. 
167 James 387. 
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question, the state of the art in the particular field of application must be taken into 
account. 168 If for example, an ES exists which could be but is not used by a 
professional in the execution of her professional duties and harm is caused through 
this non-use, the professional will be negligent in not having used it. 169 As soon as 
the state of the art has advanced to the stage where a problem is recognised and 
solutions to it have been produced, it will be negligent not to adopt the solutions even 
if it is not customary to use them in that specific area. 170 In General Cleaning 
Contractors Ltd v Christmas171 a window cleaner instituted an action for damages 
against his employer after he was injured when the lower sash of a window fell. The 
court found that the employer was indeed negligent by not installing measures to 
prevent such an incidence. In answer to the argument of the defence that it was not 
usual for the trade to take such precautions, Lord Reid said: " ...... even if it were 
proved that it is the general practice to neglect this danger, I would hold that it ought 
not to be neglected and that precautions should be taken .... " 
Reed172 argues that the General Cleaning decision 173 lends scope to a court to 
hold that a failure to use also includes a failure to invent or modify a computer system 
in order that harm may be prevented, especially when the invention or modification 
is simple to effect. In deciding whether a reasonable man would have made such an 
invention or modification the seriousness of the potential loss, the likelihood of its 
occurrence and the expense need to be balanced. The cases that have established 
this principle all concern a precaution that could have been taken which would have 
168 Reed(2) 86. 
169 See also par 2.7 infra. 
170 For the position in American law, see par B 2.2.1.1 infra with regard to the 
discussion of the USA decision in The T.J. Hooper (1932) 60 F 2d 737. 
171 [1953] AC 180. 
172 (2) 86. 
173 Supra. 
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prevented the loss with certainty. 174 It remains to be seen whether a failure to use 
an ES which caused loss that would otherwise have been prevented, would be held 
to constitute negligent conduct by the courts. 175 
Tapper 176 infers from the General Cleaning decision 177 that the courts will insist 
on the proper maintenance and operation of new technology when it is installed. The 
stage has already been reached where in some areas, like air traffic control, it would 
be negligent not to use computer technology. 178 Another example is found in the 
legal field where LEXIS, the computerised legal information retrieval system, has 
been described as an essential tool in a modern law firm. 179 Some firms even 
require that such a system be consulted before work is finalised, partly to avoid a 
malpractice suit. 180 
2. 7 Professional liability 
2. 7.1 General 
Software engineering is regarded as 
Professional liability is governed firstly by the contractual relationship that exists 
174 Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1951] AC 367; Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850. 
175 Reed (2) 86. 
176 At 249. 
177 Supra. 
178 Tapper ibid. This is an example of a situation where the non-use of an ES may 
cause damage: see ch 2 par 11 supra. 
179 See the American decision of United Nuclear Corp v Cannon 564 F Supp 581 
591. 
180 Tapper 249. 
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between the professional and the client. 181 However, professionals may also be 
held .liable under the general tort of negligence if there is a duty to take care. 182 
This duty may also exist towards parties with whom there is no contractual 
nexus. 183 
There are no general principles which could be applied for the whole range of 
professional expertise; each profession has over the years accumulated its own 
specialised body of case law. Because the development takes place on a case-by-
case basis, it is difficult to extract general principles applicable to a relatively new 
profession such as software engineering. 184 The standard of care expected by a 
professional is that of the ordinarily competent member of that profession. 185 
Rowland and Rowland divide professions into two loosely defined categories: 
(a) Those in which the practitioners cannot guarantee the results of their 
181 See ch 3 par 2.7 supra and also ch 6 par 6.2 infra. 
182 Rowland and Rowland 238. 
183 In the area of safety-critical systems such as MES's, the following two policy 
reasons act both for and against the principle of professional liability per Rowland 
and Rowland 239: 
(a) Where the potential for damage is so great that it will 
be unjust to hold the designer liable; and 
{b) Where it is reasonable to apportionate the liability due 
to the particular type of expertise involved. 
184 Rowland and Rowland 240. 
185 In Bolam v Friem Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 586 McNair 
J put it thus: 
The test is the standard of the ordinary skilled man exercising 
and professing that special skill; it is well established law that it is 
sufficient if he exercises the ordinarf skill of an ordinary 
competent man exercising that particular art. 
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labour, for example doctors and lawyers; and 
(b) those in which the practitioners can be said to impliedly warrant to produce 
a particular result, such as architects and engineers. 
In cases pertaining to category (b) the professional has a particular knowledge of the 
end result required and this leads to a higher standard of care required by the 
courts. 186 Software engineering falls into this second category of professions as 
they usually have knowledge of the end result required. 
Rowland and Rowland 187 point out that the major growth in the use of computer 
software in safety critical applications is causing the software industry as well as the 
relevant regulatory authorities, a lot of concern. The reason for this is that, because 
it is impossible to test software exhaustively, a fault may remain undetected for years 
before surfacing. One of the methods established to accomplish safe software is to 
formulate standards for the specification, design and implementation of safety related 
software and systems. 188 As stated before, 189 safety standards formulate the 
legal standard of care in such circumstances. In order to determine whether the 
producers of defective software have been negligent, it is necessary to define the 
standard of competence expected of software engineers and identify the methods of 
assessing such competence. Guidance on the responsibilities and possible legal 
liability of software engineers is found in the "Professional Brief on Safety-Related 
186 Greaves and Co v Baynham Meikle [1974] 1 WLR 1261. 
187 Rowland and Rowland 237. 
188 The formulation of standards is done under the auspices of the International 
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC): Rowland and Rowland 238. In the RSA, the 
South African Bureau of Standards (SABS) fulfils this function: see ch 6 par 6.2 
infra. 
189 Par 2.2.2 supra. 
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Systems" of the Institution of Electrical Engineers (lEE) which includes a Code of 
Practice for engineers and managers working on safety-related systems. Liability 
revolves around the "competence" of the persons involved and it is pointed out that 
because appropriate education and training is insufficient, relevant experience is 
becoming more important. 
An action based on professional negligence against the producers of an ES will 
attempt to show that the producers failed to take due care in the construction of the 
ES, and that this lack of care resulted in failure leading to an injury. 190 In order to 
assess whether a duty to take care exists and if there was a failure resulting in harm, 
regard is had to the guidelines developed by law to measure the behaviour of 
professionals are regarded. In defending a claim of negligence, the producers will 
have to prove that they took all reasonable care to avoid such an eventuality. This 
can be done by showing that al relevant standards and codes of practice have been 
adhered to. 191 If, on the other hand, the relevant standards and or codes have not 
been adhered to, the onus will be on the producers to explain why not and to show 
that what was done, in effect achieved an equivalent or higher standard. 192 The 
current problem with this approach is that mandatory universally-accepted and well-
defined software standards and codes of practice do not yet exist. 193 
190 Bott et al 236-237. 
191 Bevan Investments v Blackha/1 and Struthers (1973] 2 NZLR 45 49: 
A design which departs substantially from relevant engineering 
codes is prima facie a faulty design unless it can be 
demonstrated that it conforms to accepted engineering practice 
by rational analysis. 
192 Bott et a/ 237. 
193 In the absence of mandatory software standards, responsible software suppliers 
such as the Legal Software Suppliers Association apply self-regulation by 
scrutining and testing members' software before it is distributed: Irving '1996 SJ 
926. 
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2. 7.3 Software engineers 
Software engineers commissioned to design safety-related systems will be aware of 
the need of assurance that the system will not fail in so far as it is possible to achieve 
such a result. Procurers have a duty to contract a competent consultant which implies 
that they must satisfy themselves that the contractor is suitable. Problems arise 
where the product is of a specialised nature and contractors present themselves as 
being competent. It is reasonable to expect a higher level of skill and responsibility 
from an engineer who professes specialist expertise in a particular area. 194 
Rowland and Rowland195 argue that notwithstanding this responsibility of the client 
to engage a competent engineer, the standard of care required of the latter includes 
an appreciation of her own limitations as to knowledge, experience, facilities, 
resources, etcetera as well as the preparedness to declare such limitations.196 
There may, therefore, be a duty on the producers to advise clients to seek expert 
advice in the case of requirements that are above the expertise of the software 
contractor. Although the client is entitled to expect the exercise of a reasonably 
professional judgement, there is also the further problem of economic constraints 
resulting in the lowest tender being accepted even though it may prejudice the safety 
level of the product. If the client is unwilling to pay for a design of sufficient integrity 
there is a duty on the software contractor to warn the client that this is the case. 
Software integrity is primarily achieved through quality assurance during 
specification, design and implementation. Rowland and Rowland states that there are 
no established and set standards which can be used by software engineers 
developing safety-critical software. 197 However, it is submitted that the authors 
194 Rowland and Rowland 250. 
195 At 243. 
196 Such conduct is recommended by the lEE's "Professional Brief': Rowland and 
Rowland 243. 
197 At 246. See also Batt et a/ 224-225. 
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must either be unaware of ISO 9000, 198 or their research material is dated. Rowland 
and Rowland 199 notes that the implication for novel or pioneering designs is that 
research and development will be stifled and inhibited when such designs are found 
to constitute negligent behaviour without further ado. 200 
In conclusion it can be stated that software engineers are required to guarantee the 
adequate safety of software systems. The software contractor must therefore 
undertake a risk analysis of the application area and select the necessary techniques 
to achieve the integrity level of the finished product. 201 While the client may in 
some circumstances undertake the risk analysis, the responsibility falls ultimately on 
the contractor who has a duty to advise the client. Budgetary constraints are no 
defence as it is the contractor's duty to advise of an inadequate budget rather than 
to provide an inadequately safe product. Software engineering is a fast moving 
discipline with software continually being used in hitherto unknown applications and 
although there are no agreed standards, a body of knowledge representing 
"established best practice" is growing fast. 202 
2.8 Product liability 
In terms of the common law consumers could only sue manufacturers for injuries 
caused by a product if a direct contractual relationship existed between them (privity 
of contract). 203 After the seminal decision of Donoghue v Stevenson, 204 it was 
198 An international quality assurance system used during the production of software: 
see ch 6 par 6.2 infra. 
199 At 245. 
200 The protection of consumers, however, must enjoy priority. 
201 Rowland and Rowland 244 et seq. 
202 Ibid. 
203 Winterbottom v Wright (1842) 10 M&W 109, 152 ER 402. Cf Fleming (2) 480 et 
seq; Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 79-81. 
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accepted in English law that an activity which foreseeably exposes others to danger 
if proper care is not observed, creates a duty to take reasonable care to safeguard 
such others from incurring physical harm, notwithstanding the absence of a 
contractual nexus.205 Lord Atkin put it thus: 206 
.... a manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he 
intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left him, 
and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or 
putting up of the products will result in injury to the consumer's life or property, 
owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care. 
Responsibility was applied to any commodity, natural or processed which was not 
reasonably safe to life, health or property.207 Products causing only economic loss 
are excluded as they are viewed as belonging to the province of warranty, not 
tort. 208 Another reason for excluding protection of economic loss lies in the whole 
purpose of products liability, which is the promotion of safety in products with its 
primary concern in physical injury.209 Damages for pain and suffering are 
recoverable and contributory negligence of the plaintiff may lead to a reduction of the 
amount of damages awarded. 210 
Defects in products may stem from negligence in the manufacturing, designing or 
marketing process, all of which have to be proved by the plaintiff.211 However, the 
204 Supra. 
205 Fleming(2) 483; Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 80. 
206 Donoghue v Stevenson supra 599. 
207 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. On product liability in general, see Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 77 -85; Hodges 
et at 229-249. 
209 Lambert v Lewis [1982] AC 225 278. Cf Fleming(2) 495 et seq. 
210 Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 81. See also pars 2.2.3 and 2.4 supra. 
211 Fleming(2) 485; Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 80; Hodges eta/ 233. 
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courts came to the rescue of the plaintiff by applying the procedural device res ipsa 
loquitur to the manufacturing process once the plaintiff and other forces have been 
eliminated as likely causes of the injury. 212 The maxim raises an inference of 
negligence on the part of the manufacturer, whereupon the onus of proof is shifted 
to the defendant in order to disprove negligence. 213 Because of the difficulty of the 
defendants to exculpate themselves in these situations, 214 the operation of the 
maxim comes close to effecting strict liability.215 However, even aided by the res 
ipsa loquitur maxim, some form of negligence still has to be proved, which does not 
protect customers from defects that cannot be reasonably discovered, or from 
problems of causation in for example, the case of mass disasters resulting from 
harmful products.216 Once it was realised that the negligence regime was 
insufficient to protect consumer interests, coupled with the adoption of strict liability 
principles for product injuries, originating in the USA, by the EU Directive of 1985,217 
it was inevitable that strict liability measures would be instituted, and for that purpose 
the British Consumer Protection Act of 1985 (CPA) was promulgated.218 
r /' 
Strict liability "' 
The forms of strict liability pertinent to ES liabilities are vicarious liability and products 
212 Eg Grant v Australian Knitting Mills [1936] AC 85; Martin v Thorn Industries [1978] 
WAR 1 0; MacLachlan v Frank's Rental (1979) 10 CCL T 306. See par 2.3 infra. 
213 Grant v Australian Knitting Mills supra; Fleming(2) 486. 
214 See par 2.3 supra. 
215 Shandloff v City Diary [1936] 4 DLR 712 719. Fairness to the consumer and 
accident deterrence was combined to place responsibility for defective products 
on the manufacturer: Fleming(2) 496. 
216 Fleming(2) 487. 
217 85/373: see part II par 8 infra. 
218 See par 3.2 infra. 
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liability.219 It must be noted that as in other legal systems, civil liability arising from 
aviation is subjected to strict liability in terms of specific legislation.220 
3.1 Vicarious liability 
Masters are held vicariously liable for torts committed by their servants in the course 
of their employment. 221 A servant is any person who works for another subject to 
the control of that other person regarding the manner in which the work shall be 
done;222 employees are therefore the servants of their employers. Skilled or self-
employed workers are independent contractors who are not under the control of the 
person hiring them to do the work and can therefore not be regarded as servants. 
In general a person will thus only be liable for the torts committed by their employees 
and not the torts committed by independent contractors. However, the trend of 
professionals to enter salaried employment in modern business is causing increasing 
difficulty in applying the control test. 223 For this reason the control test has been 
adjusted to enquiring rather whether ultimate authority in the person's work resides 
in the employer so that she was subject to the latter's orders and directions.224 A 
more useful alternative is the "organisation" or "enterprise control" test in terms 
whereof it is determined whether the would-be servant is part of the employer's 
219 See Fleming(2) 327-333 for an outline of the various other forms of strict liability 
in English tort law. 
220 S 76(2) of the Civil Aviation Act of 1982. Fleming(2) 331. This is especially 
pertinent to the example of the ES Machine which consists of a fly-by-wire piloting 
system: see ch 1 par 1.1 supra. Cf the Aviation Act 7 4 of 1962 in SA: Ch 6 par 7. 2 
infra. 
221 James 374; Fleming(2) 367 et seq. 
222 The control test: see Fleming(2) 370. 
223 Fleming(2) 370. 
224 Zuijs v Wirth Bros (1955) 93 CLR 561. 
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organisation or not. 225 An example of the working of the organisation test is found 
in the situation of hospitals which are held vicariously liable for the negligence of their 
professional staff as long as they are subordinated to the hospital organisation.226 
Where a hospital offers complete medical treatment, it assumes a personal duty 
towards the patient which includes independent consultants. 227 
The defendant will, however, be liable for the torts of independent contractors whom 
she has instructed in the following instances because there the conduct of defendant 
amounts to negligence per se:228 
(a) Where the contract of work to be done is likely to involve the commission 
of a tort· 229 
' 
(b) where an exceptionally high duty of care is imposed upon a person by 
law;230 and 
225 MacDonald v Glasgow Hospital 1954 SC 453; Fleming(2) 372. 
226 In earlier years hospitals were only responsible to patients for the performance of 
its administrative staff but not for the negligence of doctors and nurses in matters 
of skill and competence: Fleming(2) 373. See also the SA position: ch 3 par 
3.4.2.1 supra. 
227 Fleming (2) 373 notes a growing tendency of finding duties of reasonable care in 
vicarious relationships, resulting in the master's personal liability. See also par 3.1 
infra, part Ill pars A 4 and B 4 infra with regard to similar aspects of vicarious 
liability in the foreign systems investigated. 
228 In such circumstances the mandator and independent contractor are jointly liable: 
James 377. 
229 An example is the demolition of a building in a densely populated area, causing 
dust and noise affecting people at work. 
230 An example is the doing of dangerous things (except driving) near a highway. 
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(c) in cases of strict liability such as liability in terms of the Rule in Ry/ands v 
Fletcher31 and product liability in terms of the CPA. 
The question of whether the servant has acted within the scope of the defendant's 
employment is one of fact which will depend upon the circumstances of each 
case. 232 An important question is whether a deviation or departure from duty has 
occurred and if it has, whether the servant has acted within the course of 
employment. 233 The employer is always personally liable for acts authorised or 
ratified by herself. 234 
3.2 Products liability in terms of the Consumer Protection Act (CPA)235 
The CPA was passed in 1987 in pursuance of the EU Directive on Product 
Liability. 236 In contrast to the other EU member states' implementing 
legislation,237 the CPA bears little resemblance to the provisions of the EU 
Directive,238 as the British draftsmen pertinently exercised greater linguistic 
231 (1868) LR 3 HL 330. The doctrine known as the rule in Ry/ands v Fletcher 
imposes strict liability on a person who brings on her own land something likely to 
do mischief if it escapes and it consequently does escape and causes harm. See 
in general, James 402-404; Fleming (2) 334 et seq. 
232 James 376; Fleming(2) 377. In this regard policy decisions play an extensive role. 
233 Fleming(2) 377. 
234 In such a case the employer has acted herself, albeit through an instrument (the 
servant): Fleming(2) 369. 
235 Consumer Protection Act of 1987. 
236 85/374: see part II par 8 infra. On the provisions of the CPA in general, see 
Reed(2) 73-75, Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 77-79, Fleming(2) 496-450. 
237 See part Ill pars A 5.6 and 8 3.3 infra. 
238 See part II par 8 infra. 
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.. 
independence. 239 
3.2.1 Strict liability 
In essence, the CPA provides for the liability of producers or suppliers of products in 
the course of a business for the suffering of personal injury or property damage 
caused wholly or partly by a defect in the product, irrespective of any fault on the part 
of such producer or supplier. 240 Such liability cannot be excluded in regard to the 
injured parties or their dependants in any contractual provision. 241 
3.2.2 Product 
A product is defined as "any goods or electricity and includes a product which is 
comprised in another product whether by virtue of being a component part or raw 
material or otherwise".242 "Goods" are defined in section 45 CPA "any natural or 
artificial substance" which suggests that goods must be tangible. 243 
3.2.3 Defect 
A product is defective if it does not provide the level of safety that persons generally 
are entitled to expect, taking all the circumstances into account, including the 
presentation of the product, instructions or warnings, the use to which it could 
reasonably be expected to be put, and the time when the product was put into 
239 Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 77. 
240 s 2. 
241 s 7. 
242 s 1 (2). 
243 It seems, therefore, that the CPA will only apply to software marketed in a tangible 
form: Reed 1988 CL&P 149. 
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circulation. 244 This establishes the "consumer expectation" test for defectiveness 
according to which a defect in a product is defined In terms of the safety which the 
user thereof is entitled to expect.245 In determining the safety which persons are 
entitled to expect from a product, all circumstances are taken into account, especially 
those conditions mentioned in section 3 of the CPA. 246 Although there is no case 
law yet which would illustrate the application of these considerations in practice, 
Hodges et a/ state that safety is a variable and relative concept and that absolute 
safety is unobtainable. The fact that the safety of a product supplied after that time 
is greater than the safety of the product in question, does not per se indicate a 
defective product. 247 
3.2.4 Producer 
The plaintiff can institute a claim against the producer or anyone who holds herself 
out to be the producer, or the importer of the product into the EU or against the 
supplier.248 The producer is the manufacturer of the product.249 The supplier will 
only be liable if she refuses to furnish the name of the producer or importer upon 
request within a reasonable time. 250 
244 s 3. 
245 See part II par 8.3.4 infra. 
246 Supra. 
247 Ibid. 
248 s 2(2). 
249 s 1(2). 
250 s 2(3). 
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3.2.5 Damage 
Liability is limited to death or personal injury251 or damage to property ordinarily 
intended for private use or consumption252 and does not cover damage to the 
product itself or to any product containing the defective product, neither does it cover 
pure economic loss. 253 The damage must exceed 275 pounds sterling254 but no 
maximum limit upon the total liability of a defendant for damage caused by identical 
products with the same defect, is imposed. 255 In pursuance of the EU Directive no 
compensation for pain and suffering is provided for: such claims must be instituted 
in terms of traditional liability principles. 256 
3.2.6 Causation 
The damage must be caused by a defect in the product.257 
3.2. 7 Defences 
The CPA258 contains all the defences provided for in the EU Directive.259 These 
251 s 5(1 ). 
252 S 5(1) and (3). 
253 s 5(2). 
254 s 5(4). 
255 In terms of the EU Directive, member states are permitted to provide for a 
maximum liability for one defendant arising from identical products: see part II par 
8.3.5.infra. 
256 See part Ill par 8.3.5 infra. 
257 s 2(1 ). 
258 s 4. 
259 Art 7 EU Directive 85/374: see part II par 8.3.8 infra for a detailed discussion of 
the provided defences. 
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consist of: 
(1) the legal-compliance-defence, in that the defect is due to the compliance 
of the product with mandatory regulations issued by public authorities (eg 
health or safety regulations); 260 
(2) the non-distribution-defence, in that the product was not put into circulation 
by the producer (eg the product was stolen); 261 
(3) the non-commercial-defence, in that the product was not made or supplied 
in the course of business or it was done without a profit motive;262 
(4) the later-defect-defence, in that the defect did not exist at the time when the 
product was put into circulation;263 
(5) the development risk defence, in that the state of scientific and technical 
knowledge within the industry concerned at the time the product was put 
into circulation was not such that a producer of the same products might be 
expected to have discovered the defect;264 and 
(6) the sub-supplier's-defence, which exonerates the producer of a component 
part of liability if the defect is due to the design of the product in which the 
component part is fitted or to the instructions given by the manufacturer of 
260 S 4(1 )(a). 
261 s 4(1)(b). 
262 S 4(1 )(c). 
263 s 4(1 )(d). 
264 S 4(1 )(e). 
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the final product. 265 
The enactment of the development risk defence is optional, member states may 
choose whether they want to permit such a defence or not. 266 The motivation for 
this defence lies in the recognition that certain innovative products may contain 
unknown hazards about which accurate warnings cannot be given.267 The risk of 
using these products is therefore put on the consumer because the products are 
useful and motivation should be encouraged. The essence of the defence is that the 
state of knowledge was such that the defect was not discoverable when the product 
was supplied, in other words an objective test is applied. 268 The wording of section 
4(1)(e) of the CPA269 is not the same as that of article 7(e) of the EU Directive.270 
Unlike the EU Directive, the CPA relies on a negligence standard and permits the 
defence if a fictitious producer of that kind of product would not have known of the 
defect.271 The EU Commission has concluded that the CPA wording is inconsistent 
with the Directive, and that it violates EU law and should be rectified.272 From the 
wording of the EU Directive it can be seen that the subjective state of the knowledge 
of the producer or supplier is irrelevant to this defence, what is relevant is the 
objective state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time and whether the 
265 s 4(1 }(f). 
266 Art 15 (1 )(b) EU Directive: see part II par 8.3.8 infra. 
267 Hodges et a/247. 
268 Art 7(e) EU Directive reads: 
(The producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he proves): 
that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the 
product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the defect 
to be discovered. 
269 See defence (5) supra. 
270 Supra. See also part II par 8.3.8 infra. 
271 S 4(1 )(c) CPA. 
272 Hodges eta/ 247; Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 78. 
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defect could have been detected, not whether the reasonable producer would have 
discovered the defect. 273 In contrast, it is concluded from the wording of section 4 
of the CPA that the defence will be allowed even in a case in which the available 
knowledge pointed to the existence of the defect, as long as the producer was 
reasonable in not having the knowledge. 274 The effect of this defence is therefore 
to permit the producer to disprove negligence which is a very different matter from 
the strict liability that the CPA apparently introduces.275 
3.2.8 Summary 
The CPA introduces an additional regime of product liability, namely strict liability as 
opposed to the traditional fault-based liability for defective products. The essential 
principle is that the manufacturer, called the producer in the act, and certain others 
involved in the distribution of the product may be liable for death, personal injury or 
specified property damage resulting from a defective product even though on their 
part, there was no negligence towards nor breach of contract with the claimant. The 
potential plaintiff does not have to prove negligence but only has to establish that the 
product was defective, that the damage has occurred, and that there was a causal 
link between the defect and the damage. With regard to the relevant optional choices 
allowed by the EU Directive, the CPA does not award compensation for property 
damage less than 275 pounds and no potential limit is imposed on damages for 
personal injury caused by the same defect of similar products. A defect is defined 
in terms of the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances 
into account. Apart from the defences provided for in the EU Directive, the CPA also 
includes the development risk defence which implements a different test for the 
273 See part II par 8.3.8 infra. See also part Ill pars A 5.6.7 and B 3.3.7 infra with 
regard to the wording of the same defence in the German and Dutch statutes, 
respectively. 
274 Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 78: Reed 1988 CL&P 150. 
27 5 Ibid. Cf Martinek 1995 TSAR 641: Zekoll 1989 AJCL 811: Dielman 1990 Hastings 
I&CLR 429. 
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producer's liability than the one prescribed by the Directive. 276 
The CPA will apply to computer software (and also to ES's) if software falls within the 
ambit of a "product". 277 From the wide definition of a product under the Act it 
seems that software may fall within the ambit of the Act provided it has a tangible 
quality associated with "goods" and it was acquired in the same way as goods, in 
other words by way of a sale or lease and not as part of a service. 278 
4. Conclusion 
Actions for software liability in English law may be based on the tort of negligence, 
vicarious liability and the strict product liability provisions contained in the CPA. 
4.1 The use of a defective expert system 
4.1.1 Liability of the producers 
In circumstances where the ES is regarded as an integral part of of the provision of 
a service, damage caused by the use of a defective ES may render the producers of 
such an ES liable in terms of an action based on the tort of negligence in terms of 
which the plaintiff carries the burden of proof with regard to all the requirements, 
namely a duty of care, breach of such duty and the causing of damage.279 Where 
damage consists of injury to person and property the producers have a clear duty to 
prevent harm.280 Where pure economic loss is suffered, such loss is only 
276 See par 3.2.7 supra. 
277 See par 3.2.2 supra. 
278 See ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra. 
279 See par 2.1 supra. 
280 See par 2.2.1 supra. 
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compensable by tortious liability if sufficient policy reasons exist for the imposition of 
such liability.281 In this instance an analogy to negligent misrepresentation cases 
is made in terms of which the English courts require the existence of a special 
relationship between the parties as well as knowledge on the part of the defendant 
that a class of persons will rely on the information, before economic loss will be 
compensated. 282 This means that users and their clients who suffer pure economic 
loss through the use of a defective Intelligent Assistant will only have a claim against 
the developers based on negligence if the ES was custom made for the user, thereby 
establishing a special relationship, and if the developers had knowledge of the class 
of persons (the clients of the users) who will rely on it. 
I 
As software engineering is regarded as a profession in England, the producers will 
also be liable on the basis of computer malpractice.283 In this regard the application 
of product safety standards and quality assurance codes of practice are indicative of 
the relevant standard of skill in the software engineering profession. 
Where the ES is regarded as a product, strict liability principles in terms of the 
Consumer Protection Act will apply. 284 
4.1.2 Liability of the users 
In the same way the users have a duty to take care and will be liable in negligence 
when a defective ES is used.285 In the case of a professional user the standard of 
care is that of the members of the relevant profession of the user and if a duty to take 
281 See par 2.2.3 supra. 
282 See par 2.5 supra. 
283 See par 2.7 supra. 
284 See par 3.2 supra 
285 See par 2.2.1 supra 
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care is breached by the professional in using a defective system, the latter may be 
liable as a joint tortfeasor with the developer of the ES. 286 
4.2 The incorrect use of a sound expert system 
The users of an incorrect ES will be liable towards an injured party if a duty of care 
was breached in the causing of damage. 287 In the case of a professional user, the 
same principles apply as mentioned above. 
4.3 The non-use of an expert system 
The user who fails to use an ES will be liable in negligence if there was a duty on her 
to use the ES. 288 In the case of a professional user, once again the same 
principles as mentioned above, apply. 
' \ 
B. United States of America 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Tortious liability 
1.1.1 General 
In American law, as in English law, there is not a general law of tort, only a law of 
torts which means that there is a body of civil wrongs for which the court will provide 
286 See par 1.1.3 supra. 
287 See par 2.2.2 supra. 
288 See par 2.6 supra. 
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a remedy in the form of an action for damages.289 Li~~iHty is based on socia!ly 
unreasonable congyct .and the various.:-torts consist gf ~~~osed by 
law:zgo 
The determination of the issue of duty and whether it includes the particular 
risk imposed on the victim ultimately rests upon broad policies which 
underlie the law. These policies may be characterised generally as morality, 
the economic good of the group, practical administration of the law, justice 
as between the parties and other considerations relative to the environment 
out of which the case arose. They are found in all decisions whether based 
on former decisions of court or on a fresh consideration of the factors found 
in the current environment. 
For this reason the lawof tort~-~annot be regarded as static and there ar~_~g_li'!l!~~ 
!o development as new causes of a~tion are continuously being_~gnised.291 The 
purpose and function of the law of torts is to assign and compensate Jor injuries 
sustained by one person as the result of the conduct of another.292 The same 
distinction is made between general and special damages as in English law,293 and 
V ,, • -• •-v~----·- ·~···~ "-~---
although it is acknowledged that£Pm.P.ensayon is the primary function of tort law, 
PI..IQmv~ or e'-'empl~_ry damages are also awarded to the plaintiff in some 
circumstances for the purpose of punishing the defendant and deterring others from 
289 Prosser and Keeton 2. 
290 Per the court in Suter v San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co (1979) 81 NJ 150 
173; 406 A 2d 140 151. 
291 Prosser and Keeton 5. 
292 Although the law of torts in the USA consists of state law of which the details may 
vary from state to state, the principles, derived from English common law, are the 
same in all jurisdictions. Most of tort law is judge-made law as state legislatures 
are ineffective due to the lobbying of powerful opposing groups representing the 
insurance industry on the defence side and the American Trial Lawyers 
Association (ATLA) on the plaintiff's side. Tort law is a highly politicized and 
lucrative business due to the peculiarly American civil trial by jury with the right to 
award punitive damages and a specialist plaintiff's bar where plaintiffs' attorneys 
are entitled to a share in the award if successful: see Fleming (1) 181. 
293 See par A 1.1.1 supra. 
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following the defendant's example. 294 The policy of punitive damages is a 
controversial subject, even more so since the 1970's during which time a trend of 
awarding punitive damages against so-called "deep pocket defendants" was 
established. 295 
1.1.2 Categories of torts 
The fundamental basis of tort liability rests upon three different grot.~hds, namely (1) 
intent of the defendant to interfere with the plaintiff's rights, (2) negligence and (3) 
-~"'-;._,-:--,~~- ~ ,,., ., . ' . •'0•,.-. 
s)fict liability.296 These are the three basic categories into which all the different 
/ 
/\ , ~ 'torts can be classified. For purposes of this ~~Y: __ o~l~. grounds. (2} ~~-~ {~t!:~: 
()) ~ relevant. 297 Providers of services have traditionally been held to a negligence 
\(' t/ 
1 
)._~ ftanda,;;··based on reasonable practice whereas sellers and .manufacturers of_ 
~ \ , ,1 COJllmercial pl'oducts fac~ strict liability for injuries to consumers caused by defects 
' ~ ---\ , ~ in their wares. 298 The reason for the specific choice of a liability standard is based 
' -
on public policy which views product sellers as economically more able to spread a 
loss over a large number of users.299 
1.1.3 Joint tortfeasors 
In the case of multiple wrongdoers joinder of action is permitted in American law 
"""~"-"' ·"-···- .... ~ . ~ - ,.. ·~ 
whether the parties acted in concert (conspiracy) or whether they contributed to the 
294 See Prosser and Keeton 15 et seq. 
295 Ibid. 
296 Prosser and Keeton 31. 
297 Delictual liability arising from the use of ES's is discussed only with regard to 
negligent conduct: see ch 1 par 1.4 supra. 
298 Frank 1988 AIM 110. 
299 Ibid. 
~ .. , ..... , 
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whole or part of the damage caused. 300 The strict common law principle was 
altered by the adoption of various Civil Codes of Procedure in a majority of 
states. 301 The plaintiff may claim compensation against any or all of the defendants 
jointly and severally and the defendants have a right to contribution among each 
other which allows for the apportionment of damages. 302 Contribution must be 
distinguished from indemnity which refers to an order requiring a party to reimburse 
in full another party who has discharged a common liability, for example in the case 
of vicarious liability or liability for the torts of an independent contractor.303 In the 
case of ES liability incurred by more than one party, actions can be instituted against 
them jointly and severally with a right of contribution among them. 
1.2 Software liability 
The courts base their decisions on w_heth~r an ~bje~~ _is a product or a service on 
policy reasons and will pronounce on the nature of ES's by having regard to 
··-. ..,,_,_., .. ,- ... 
analogous case law involving products and services similar to ES software. 304 The 
~ . J 
policies considered include the importance of development of new ES's; the specific 
gain that society would get from the ES; the harm to the plaintiff and the ability of the 
software industry to regulate itself as to competency and skills. 305 The following 
factors may have an influence on the classification of software: 
300 Prosser and Keeton 322 et seq. 
301 Prosser and Keeton 325. 
302 Prosser and Keeton 336-338 345-355. 
303 See par 3.2 infra. 
304 Turley 1988 CLJ 458 et seq. See also ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra. 
305 Turley 1988 CLJ 458. 
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(a) Distribution of software 
As mentioned before, 306 mass produced and marketed software is viewed as 
products whereas the one-off custom-made ES for a specific user is viewed as a 
service. Where products are mass-produced, the following policy goals of products 
liability need to be served: the manufacturer should be liable for defective goods 
because it is able to prevent them from occurring in the first place, customers rely on 
manufacturers to provide safe products, the manufacturer is better able to spread the 
cost of insuring against injuries through increased prices and the consumer would be 
severely burdened by the need to trace a defect to its source. 307 The importance 
of these underlying policies in the law of strict liability was confirmed in the case of 
La Rossa v Scientific Design Co. 308 In this case the court had to consider the 
question of whether the supplier of radioactive pellets could be held strictly liable for 
the death of one of the workers which was caused by exposure to radioactive dust 
while loading them. The court noted that the rendering of "professional services form 
a marked contrast to consumer products cases"309 and concluded that because the 
plaintiff rendered a highly specialised service which had no impact on the public at 
large, the policies behind strict liability were not at issue, and Scientific Design was 
therefore not strictly liable for the defendant's death.310 
(b) Information product 
In the event that software such as an ES is classified as an information generator 
rather than traditional goods does not mean ipso facto that the ES cannot be labelled 
306 Ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra. 
307 Lamkin 1994 ELJ 744. 
308 (1968) 402 F 2d 937 (3d Cir). 
309 At 942-943. 
310 Ibid. 
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a product to which strict liability principles apply. 311 In Aetna Casualty & Security 
v Jeppeson & Co312 the court concluded that an aeronautical chart, designed and 
distributed for pilots making instrument approaches to various airports. is a product 
for purposes of applying principles of strict liability. In casu a defect in the chart 
allegedly caused the aircraft to crash. However, the court held that the pilot was 
negligent in relying on the defective chart. 313 In a series of cases314 involving 
aeronautical charts315 the courts had the opportunity to discuss the nexus between 
mass production and strict liability policies and came to the conclusion that the 
furtherance of policy goals is the penultimate consideration in determining whether 
something is a product for the purposes of strict liability.316 
Turley317 states that it is improbable that an ES developer would be held strictly 
liable in cases where physical injury was caused by the output of an ES which 
requires significant human intervention and review by a professional user.318 He 
illustrates the situation by referring to an engineer who uses an ES to design a plan 
for a bridge. The ES requires the user-engineer to furnish various kinds of input 
during different stages of the program. Two weeks after the bridge is built, it 
collapses as a result of defective plans designed by the user-engineer. In these 
circumstances the ES cannot be regarded as a product for strict liability purposes 
because the product, the design plans, is a combined product constituted by the 
311 Turley 1988 CLJ 460. 
312 (1981) 642 F 2d 339 (9th Cir). 
313 ld 343. 
314 Sa/oomey v Jeppesen & Co (1983) 707 F2d 671 (2d Cir); Fluor Corp v Jeppesen 
& Co (1985) 216 Cal Rptr 68 (Ct App). 
315 Charts used to assist pilots in landing aircraft. 
316 Fluor Corp v Jeppesen & Co supra 71-72. 
317 1988 CLJ 460. 
318 Eg the Intelligent Assistant. 
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efforts of both the ES and the user. The ES actually functions as a service to the 
engineer. 319 Even if such a system is widely distributed and mass produced, the 
interaction with a professional user fits in more easily with the provision of a 
service. 320 Towards a third party who was injured by the collapse of the bridge, the 
use of the ES by the user-engineer (the professional user) would rather be viewed 
as the provision of a service for which an action based on professional negligence 
may be instituted against the user.321 Conversely, an ES that requires no 
interaction with a user, thereby replacing the professional completell22 , is more 
similar to a product than a service because a product (information) is provided which 
is expected to be relied upon without verification or human input. 323 Mass 
produced ES's which cause injuries without user interaction would probably be 
classified as a product for strict liability purposes. 324 As many ES's will not take this 
form, the courts will have to decide upon the nature of each individual ES, taking into 
account the actual content and orientation of the system to a specific area.325 
(c) Software development in conjunction with the user 
Where software is developed with the help of the user, the developer provides 
319 The ES used in this illustration is the type of ES embodied in the Intelligent 
Assistant: see ch 3 par 11 supra. 
320 Turley 1988 CLJ 462. 
321 The ES is used as a tool or decision-aid in the execution of the professional 
user's duties - the type of ES identified as the Intelligent Assistant: see ch 3 par 
11 supra. 
322 Such a system is embodied in the type of ES identified as the Self-Help System: 
see ch 3 par 11 supra. 
323 Turley 1988 CLJ 463. See also Westerdijk 81-95 who distinguishes between 
software that supports decision making, which is not a product, and software that 
directs decision making, which is a product in his view: see part II par 9.1.3 infra 
and part Ill par B 1.2 infra. 
324 Ibid. 
325 Ibid. 
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programming services or a service that is individually tailored to perform a specific 
task. 326 In such circumstances the ES, as a one-of-a-kind product, is viewed as a 
service for which strict liability is not appropriate. 327 
(d) Type of defect or error 
Manufacturing defects occur when the product is not manufactured according to 
design and a design defect occurs in the actual underlying conception of the 
product_328 Strict liability is applied to manufacturing defects while design defects 
are evaluated under a negligence standard. 329 The reason for this is that in the 
case of a manufacturing defect where the product has deviated from its 
specifications, it is relatively easy to determine if the appropriate standards were met 
from the specifications available, but in the case of a design defect the plaintiff will 
have to show that a non-defective design was reasonably available to the 
manufacturer.330 The requirement of reasonableness in these cases points to an 
introduction of an element of negligence. 
The design phase is difficult to distinguish from the production phase where the 
product is a computer program because the development of such a program is an 
ongoing process during which errors will often not be revealed until the system is in 
operation. Even then it may not be possible to determine during which phase the 
error occurred. This problem becomes critical when the software relates to medicine, 
for example in the case of an MES that regulates a life-supporting system used on 
326 Custom-made software: see ch 2 par 10.1 supra. 
327 Ibid. 
328 Lamkin 1994 ELJ 7 42. 
329 Ibid. 
330 A task that will require expert testimony: Lamkin 1994 ELJ 743. 
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a patient in hospital. 331 Because the field of medicine lacks predictability and 
guaranteed results, the detection of errors in medical software can be a very difficult 
task as the error may only become apparent under real life circumstances. 332 
From the problems outlined above it seems that the manufacturing/design defect 
distinction is of limited practical value in the case of computer software. Lamkin is of 
the opinion that this lack of a useful distinction implies important policy reasons 
against applying strict liability to MES's. ES's that cause direct injury due to 
programming errors are comparable to products containing production defects to 
which strict liability might apply.333 
In conclusion, the courts will have to look at each ES in its particular surroundings 
and determine its nature on a case-by-case basis. Apart from the obvious 
distinctions between the characteristics of a product and a service, the following 
factors complicate the classification of an ES: 
(a) one-of-a-kind applications; 
(b) human intervention as part of the expert system's deductive process; 
(c) an application area where no user would blindly rely on the output of the 
system; 
(d) experimental programs where the user is aware of the infancy of the testing 
process; 
(e) where the user has contracted a programmer to develop an expert system 
331 For example, an ES Machine: see ch 1 par 1.4.1 supra. 
332 Lamkin 1994 ELJ 7 43. 
333 Turley 1988 CLJ 463. 
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and compensation is for the programmer's services rather than the value 
of the expert system program. 
American courts have not yet addressed physical and economical injury caused by 
the use of ES software in the context of tort liability334 , but commentators335 agree 
that, as in the case of software in general, the issue of whether the theory of 
negligence or strict liability applies to the producers of ES's depends on the question 
of whether the relevant ES's are products or services. 336 In the case of a defective 
ES, strict liability principles may apply to the producers if the ES is a product and 
negligence principles may apply if it is classified as a service.337 In terms of the 
policies underlying strict liability the analogy of mass marketed ES's to a product is 
obvious because of similar characteristics between software programs distributed to 
more than one user and a product distributed to more than one consumer: the users 
rely on the safe structure and design of the ES, and the manufacturer (developer) and 
designer can spread the risk of losses through pricing and insurance. Furthermore, 
the injured party's ability to trace defects and establish negligence is rendered almost 
impossible by the complex nature and programming techniques of an ES. ES's that 
are mass produced and distributed, in other words standard software, may be 
regarded as products, whereas a custom made ES developed specifically for one 
particular user may be equated to the provision of a service.338 Difficulty arises, 
however, when an ES that is neither a product nor a service, has to be analyzed. A 
typical example of such a system would be the type of system embodied in the 
334 Tapper 264; Turley 1988 CLJ 457. 
335 Cf Tapper 262 et seq; Frank 1988 AIM 1 09; Birnbaum 1988 CLJ 135; Tuthill 
1991 AI Expert 51; Cole 1990 CLJ 167 185; Schmal1992 LT 1; Levy and Bell 
1990 HTLJ 1; Wolpert 1993 DCJ 519; Gi111986 HTLJ 483. 
336 Turley 1988 CLJ 461. 
337 However, see Cole 1990 CLJ 185 et seq for a discussion of strict liability principles 
applicable to services. 
338 Turley 1988 CLJ 458. 
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Intelligent Assistane39 which, although it may consist of standard software that is 
mass produced and distributed, effectively performs a professional service usually 
offered by a human expert. 340 In this respect a very distinctive cause of action may 
also lie against the producers of ES's, namely that of publisher's liability which is 
based on misrepresentation leading to either strict liability or liability based on 
negligence.341 Where an ES is incorrectly used or not used, the producers may be 
liable on the grounds of negligence in some instances.342 
2. Negligence 
2.1 Introduction 
The basic ~!~ments of a cause of acti.onJn newi~~nce are: 
(a) A legal duty on the defendant to conform to a certain standard of conduct 
towards the plaintiff; 
(b) a failure by the defendant to conform to the standard required resulting in 
a breach of that duty; 
(c) a causal connection between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the 
plaintiffs resulting injury;) and 
339 See ch 2 par 11 supra. 
340 See the arguments advanced by Anglo-American commentators in ch 3 par 
2.6.1.1 supra. 
341 See par 2.5 infra. 
342 Cole 1990 CLJ 218 et seq. 
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(d) actual loss or damage suffered by the plaintiff. 343 
2.2 Requirements 
2.2.( 
"") 
Duty of care 
"" 
' 
2.2.1.1 General 
The question of whether a duty of care exists between the defendant and the plaintiff 
is one of law. 344 In the absence of precedent the determinant is the foreseeability 
of harm but legal policy is conclusive. Factors of importance are the connection 
between the injury and the defendant's conduct, the moral blame applicable to the 
defendant's conduct, prevention of future harm and the prevalence and availability of 
insurance. 345 Ba_sed. an these policy considerations, American courts have 
---~--~---~---
determined that a duty of c~(e rests on the manufacturer of ggod.s..Jowards tt"ie 
-~Q£lf:mmer.346 ~Jn MacPherson v Buick Motor Co, 347 Cardozo J held the 
manufacturer of an automobile with a defective wheel liable in tort for negligence.348 
Manufacturers or sellers could from then on be held negligent for (1) creating or 
failing to discover a flaw; (2) failing to warn or adequately to warn consumers about 
inherent risks of products relating to their reasonably foreseeable use; (3) distributing 
a defectively designed product. In cases involving physical injury, there is no difficulty 
343 Prosser and Keeton 164; Fleming(1) 183. The English tort of negligence has the 
same requirements: see par A 2.2 supra. See also ch 3 par 3.3 supra with regard 
to the requirements of a delict in SA law. 
344 Ibid. 
345 Fleming (1) 183. 
346 Prosser and Keeton 682; Fleming(2) 482. 
347 (1916) 217 NY 382, 111 NE 1050. 
348 This decision opened the doors to plaintiffs who are not in privity of contract with 
the defendants. 
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in finding a duty of care, but in situations where the injury consists of pure economic 
loss, the scope of liability is much more restricted for fear of an incalculable and 
uninsurable burden on enterprise.349 In these situations the foreseeability of harm 
is usually not enough to constitute liability.350 
2.2.1.2 Omissions 
--....__,_ 
The question whether a duty to use an existing ES in a particular situation exists, 
depends on the policy factors taken into account. 351 This relates to the possible 
liability of the user for omissions in case of the non-use of an ES. The question of 
whether a failure to use a computer system constitutes a breach of duty can be 
answered with reference to the case of The T J Hooper. 352 In this case the 
plaintiffs barges were lost in a storm at sea while they were being towed by the 
defendant's tugs which were not fitted with radios. If the tugs had been outfitted with 
radios they would have received a storm warning and taken shelter, therebv avoiding 
the loss of the barges. Although it was not common practice to fit tugs with radios, 
the court found that the defendant was negligent in not having them on board, 
especially in view of the fact that the technology was easily available, relatively 
cheap, and its advantage was clear. In United States v Fire Insurance Co353 the 
Coast Guard's actions in calculating the site of a navigation beacon manually rather 
than with the aid of an available computer system, which was known to be more 
accurate, were held to be potentially negligent. The defendant in Chandler v United 
States354 was held to be negligent in a similar fashion for not effecting a computer 
349 Fleming (1) 184. 
350 Many ES applications run only the risk of financial loss: see ch 2 par 9.2 supra. 
351 Par 1.2 supra. 
352 (1932) 60 F 2d 737 _ 
353 (1986) 806 F 2d 1529. 
354 (1988) 687 F Supp 1515. 
Chapter 5 Comparative law Part I 
search to ascertain whether certain arrears in taxes had already been paid. 
( =) 
., .. ,._ ~-
2.2.2 Breach of duty 
2.2.2.1 General 
319 
The duty of the defendant is defined in terms of the standard of care to which the 
defendant should be held. This standard is found in the conduct of the reasonable 
person in similar circumstances: the standard is therefore objective.355 Of particular 
importance in applying the law of negligence to injuries caused by the use of a 
defective ES, the incorrect use or the failure to use an ES, is the standard of care 
required by the producers and users involved in the development and use of such 
systems. The professional defendant is held to a higher standard of care based on 
the knowledge, skill and even superior intelligence of such a person in relation to that 
of the ordinary person. 356 Breach of this standard of care results in professional 
malpractice.357 
A problem experienced with ES's is the difficulty of establishing an appropriate 
standard of reasonable care for ES developers. Currently, producers and users are 
held to the reasonable standard of care of the average person responsible for the 
same functions in the industry. In this respect the possibility of adopting a fixed 
standard through the defining of software programming standards as well as the 
355 Vaughan v Menlove (1837) 3 Bing NC 468; 132 Eng Rep 490; Fancher v 
Southwest Missouri Truck Center Inc, (1981) Mo App 618 SW 2d 271; Prosser 
and Keeton 173; Fleming(1) 185. The English law of torts also uses the objective 
standard of care applied by the reasonable person: see par A 2.2.2 supra. 
356 Prooth v Walsh (1980) 105 Mise 2d 653; 432 NYS 2d 668 (Sup); La Vine v Clear 
Creek Skiing Corp (1977) 557 F 2d 730 (1Oth Cir). 
357 Prosser and Keeton 188. 
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recognition of the software industry as a profession is relevant. 358 Such standards 
would have the effect of attracting litigation as it would be easier to recover damages 
against developers held to a higher standard of care. 359 
2.2.2.2 Professional malpractice 
Professionals are held to a higher standard of care namely that of the reasonable 
practitioner of the profession. 360 A deviation from this standard might result in a 
professional malpractice claim. 361 Most of the cases dealing with malpractice 
actions in the United States have been with regard to doctors and medical specialists, 
but other professions are subject to the same principles. 362 In the context of ES's 
the possibility of a malpractice cause of action may arise firstly, against the 
professional user who used or misused or failed to use the ES and secondly, against 
the producers of a defective ES. 363 
The cases pertaining to medical malpractice are especially relevant in the context of 
ES's since so many of them are in fact medical systems.364 By undertaking to 
render medical services the doctor is understood to have the knowledge, skill and 
care ordinarily possessed and employed by members of the profession in good 
358 See par A 2.7.2 supra, part Ill pars A 5.6.3 and B 3.3.3 infra as well as ch 6 par 
5.2.2.2 infra. 
359 Turley 1988 CLJ 474. 
360 Prosser and Keeton 185. 
361 Cfthe position in English law: see par A 2.7 supra. 
362 Sullivan v Henry (1982) 160 Ga App 791; 287 SE 2d 652; Davis v Tirrell (1981) 
110 Mise 2d 889 443 NYS 2d 136. 
363 A "computer malpractice" claim: see par 2.2.2.3 infra. 
364 See ch 2 par 4.2 supra. 
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standing.365 Through the development of various rules, 366 this standard has 
evolved into one of "good medical practice" which means what is "customary and 
usual in the profession". 367 It is not expected of the professional doctor to cure the 
patient unless expressly so contracted. 368 One of the rules requires a physician to 
exercise reasonable care in ascertaining the functional facts upon which her 
diagnosis is based. 369 This entails the responsibility to ensure that the relevant 
facts are reliable. Where an ES provides the physician with information upon which 
professional decisions are based, a similar duty rests on the physician to ensure that 
the ES is reliable. 370 This duty can be fulfilled by having the system tested and 
certified according to recognised quality assurance systems, for example the ISO 
9000 series test. 371 Not only would a professional's failure to ensure that a 
software system is reliable demonstrate a lack of care resulting in negligence, it 
would also be negligent for a professional to accept from a tested system an output 
containing a mistake that should have been obvious to someone in the 
profession. 372 
365 Prosser and Keeton 187; Sullivan v Henry (1982) 160 Ga App 791; 287 SE 2d 
652; McPherson v Ellis (1982) 305 NC 266; 287 SE 2d 892. 
366 An example is the rule that a doctor must have the minimum requirements of skill 
and knowledge of a medical subject, regardless of personal views on that subject. 
This rule acknowledges that there are different schools of medical thought and 
alternative methods of treatment which entitle the doctor to be judged according 
to her choice of approach provided it is recognised within the profession: Joy v 
Chau (1978) 177 lnd App 29; 377 NE 2d 670. 
367 Prosser and Keeton 189. 
368 Prosser and Keeton 186. Cf Salis v United States (1981) MD Pa 522 F Supp 989. 
369 Prosser and Keeton 190; Willick 1986 Rutgers C& TLJ 15; Gemignani 1987 
Rutgers C& TLJ 319. 
370 Willick 1986 Rutgers C& TLJ 15; Gemignani 1987 Rutgers C& TLJ 320. 
371 Ibid. On ISO 9000, See ch 6 par 6.2 infra. 
372 Gemignani 1987 Rutgers C& TLJ 321. 
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Another rule is the "similar localities" rule in terms whereof regard is had to the type 
of community the doctor practises in when the applicable standard of professional 
care is determined. 373 In terms of this rule, it is accepted that a country doctor, for 
example, does not have the same facilities, equipment or experience available as 
does the practitioner in the larger cities. This rule could be applied in the same way 
when determining the general professional standard regarding the use of an ES by 
a practitioner. 374 The problem could be manifested in two ways: (1) in the case of 
a claim for harm suffered based on the non-use of an ES; and (2) in the case of a 
claim for harm suffered because the ES used was outdated or not the most 
appropriate one. In terms of the similar localities rule, it can then be asked whether 
it is established practice for that particular professional in that locality to use such an 
ES or not. Conversely, courts may reject locality defences if information becomes 
nationally accessible via on-line computer services and mass-marketed ES's.375 
Professionals may be held to a national standard of information retrieval regardless 
of the locale in which they practice. 376 
2.2.2.3 Computer malpractice 
The question arises as to whether a cause of action based on computer malpractice 
can be instituted against the producers of an ES. To date the American courts have 
been reluctant to create such a cause of action: In Triangle v Underwriters, Inc v 
Honeywell, lnc377 the court dismissed claims of the plaintiff which, although not 
explicitly cited as computer malpractice, were nevertheless characterised by the 
plaintiff as such. The claims consisted of a "failure to supervise and correct 
373 Gambill v Stroud (1976) 258 Ark 766; 531 S W2d 945; McPherson v Ellis supra. 
37 4 Willick 1986 Rutgers C& TLJ 4-11; Gemignani 1987 Rutgers C& TLJ 325-332. 
375 Gemignani 1987 Rutgers C& TLJ 11. 
376 Ibid. 
377 (1979) 604 F 2d 737 (2d Cir). 
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deficiencies in the system" and the "wrongful withdrawal of support personnel". 378 
In Chatlos Systems, Inc v National Cash Register Corp379 the court rejected an 
explicit claim of computer malpractice: 
The novel concept of a new tort called "computer malpractice" is premised 
upon a theory of elevated responsibility on the part of those who render 
computer sales and service. Plaintiff equates the sale and servicing of 
computer systems with established theories of professional malpractice.', 
Simply because an activity is technically complex and important to the 
business community does not mean that greater potential liability must 
attach. In the absence of sound precedential authority, the Court declines the 
invitation to create a new tort. 
Such a claim was also rejected in the more recent case of Hospital Computer 
Systems, Inc. v Staten Hospital. 38° Current obstacles that militate against the 
acknowledgement of a claim for computer malpractice are the absence of a standard 
by which the profession can be measured, the rapid development of the programming 
field causing any standard to become obsolete in a matter of years and the difficulty 
in identifying which profession's standards to consult given the diverse group of 
people involved in the creation of ES's. 381 
Turley382 notes that the failure of the courts to allow a computer malpractice claim 
results in the developers of ES's, possessing superior intellectual capacity, escaping 
liability.383 This could have the negative effect of producers innovating and 
378 Triangle v Underwriters, Inc v Honeywell, Inc supra 7 41. 
379 (1979) 479 F Supp 738 (DNJ) 740. 
380 788 F Supp 1351 (DNJ 1992). 
381 Cole 1990 CLJ 207 concludes that a malpractice claim is simply premature 
because of the lack of minimal underlying basic standards. 
382 1988 CLJ 474-475. 
383 See also Cole 1990 CLJ 208. 
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distributing ES's without concern for liability based on a defined standard of care. 384 
If the developers are held to a higher standard of care the industry could possibly 
attempt to define programming standards and computer malpractice insurance would 
be available. A computer malpractice claim should be allowed against the developers 
of ES's in terms of which it must be proved that a higher degree of care than that of 
an average reasonable person was breached. The industry should also regulate itself 
by requiring ES developers to receive credentials showing their competence to 
embark on certain projects. If the computer industry is unable to regulate itself, 
licensing requirements for the development of ES's should be imposed by 
government. 385 
r·o--:' .. 
\ -' . -, 
2.2.3 Causation/ 
The defendant's conduct must be a "cause in fact" of the injury and the burden of 
proof rests on the plaintiff on a balance of probabilities. 386 The negligence must 
also be the proximate cause of the injury which is determined by the foreseeability 
test. In this respect it is sufficient if the harm in general is foreseen. 
The problem of causation in respect of a defective ES, in that the plaintiff is hard put 
to prove precisely who caused the defect, can be alleviated by the res ipsa loquitur 
doctrine in terms whereof the burden of proof is shifted upon the defendant as soon 
as a defect in the ES has been proved. 387 
384 Turley 1988 CLJ 475. 
385 Turley 1988 CLJ 477; Cole 1990 CLJ 208. 
386 Fleming (1) 185. 
387 Turley 1988 CLJ 4 71; Prosser and Keeton 143. 
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The defendant's breach of duty must have caused the plaintiff damage.388 Damage 
' consists of pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss. 389 The former, consisting of medical 
costs, physical damage to property, pure economic loss and loss of earnings is 
compensated with special damages and the latter, consisting of damages for pain and 
suffering, with general damages. There are no tariffs for the awards and juries have 
unlimited discretion in this regard. Coupled with the system of contingency fees due 
to lawyers, awards for damages have become astronomical in the United States. 
Fleming 390 notes that juries are often vindictive towards corporate defendants and 
that "caps" placed on awards for medical malpractice by some jurisdictions, have 
been struck down for violating state constitutions. Punitive or exemplary damages 
are also awarded more frequently against doctors and hospitals for medical 
malpractice and against manufacturers for defective products. 391 Recovery of 
personal and property damage is always compensable but pure economic loss is 
contentious and needs exceptional reasons for succeeding.392 
2.3· Burden of proof 
The burden of proof of the defendant's negligence lies upon the plaintiff who must 
convince the jury on a preponderance of the evidence. 393 This burden may be 
aided by presumptions and in the case of circumstantial evidence, the doctrine of res 
388 Fleming (1) 186. 
389 Ibid. 
390 Fleming(1) 187. 
391 Fleming(1) 187. 
392 Tapper 255. 
• 
393 Prosser and Keeton 239. 
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ipsa loquitur evolved. 394 The doctrine has been held to have two effects, in the first 
instance it is only regarded as a form of circumstantial evidence in that the jury may 
draw an inference of negligence395 from the circumstances, 396 and secondly, it is 
held to have the effect of shifting the burden of going forward with the evidence397 
from the plaintiff to the defendant. 398 Some courts have even held that the doctrine 
shifts the ultimate burden of proof to the defendant, requiring the defendant to adduce 
evidence of greater weight than the plaintiff. 399 However, the latter decisions have 
not been followed outside the states of Louisiana and Mississippi; the major trend in 
the states is to view res ipsa loquitur as raising only a permissible inference.400 
Before the codification of products liability the doctrine was extensively used by the 
courts to relieve the burden of proof of negligence of the plaintiff.401 The onerous 
duty of the defendant to rebut this inference of negligence in fact lead to liability 
without fault.402 
394 Prosser and Keeton 243. 
395 A permissive inference: see par A 2.3 supra. 
396 Strick v Stutsman (1982) Mo App 633 SW 2d 148; Lanza v Poretti (1982) ED Pa 
537 F Supp 777. 
397 The evidentiary burden in SA law: see ch 3 par 3.3.3.5 supra. See also par A 2.3 
supra for the position in English law. 
398 Hyder v Weilbaecher 1981 54 NC App 287 283 SE 2d 426; Newing v Cheatham 
(1975) 15 Cal 3d 351; 124 Cal Rptr 193 540 P 2d 33; Prosser and Keeton 258. 
399 Toussant v Guice (1982) La App 414 So 2d 850; Coca-Cola Bottling Co 1960 239 
Miss 759 125 So 2d 537. 
4oo Prosser and Keeton 259. 
401 Prosser and Keeton 681; De Jager 354 et seq. 
402 The reason why the res ipsa doctrine caused such an onerous duty in practice is 
because the jury, who has to decide o,., the factual question of the existence of 
negligence, almost always found for the injured plaintiff: Prosser and Keeton 257; 
De Jager 354. 
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2.4 Defences 
Two defences may be advanced against a negligence action, a defence of 
contributory negligence may reduce the plaintiff's claim for damages403 and a 
defence of voluntary assumption of risk may defeat an action against the producers 
and users of ES's where harm was caused by the use of a defective system as well 
as by the incorrect use of a system. 
2.5 Publisher's liability 
2.5.1 Definition 
The analogy between ES's and informative publications points to the possibility of 
another cause of action against the producers, namely that of publisher's liability, 
which is pased on misrepresentation. According to Lamkin,404 there is an obvious 
similarity between ES's and informative books and manuals, especially "how to" 
books which are acquired for the information they contain. An action in tort would lie 
against publishers for injuries caused by false information in their publications. Such 
liability has already been found by American courts in cases relating to aeronautical 
charts.405 
2.5.2 Negligent misrepresentation 
Negligent misrepresentation as a form of misconduct has frequently been accepted 
by the courts as a cause of action for personal injuries and property damage.406 
403 Li v Yellow Cab (1975) 13 Cal 3d 804; 532 P 2d 1226. 
404 1994 ELJ 757. 
405 See par 2.5.3 supra. 
406 Prosser and Keeton 745. 
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A problem arises though in cases where only economic loss is sustained because of 
such a misrepresentation. The courts became alarmed at the possibility of 
indeterminate unlimited liability407 and developed a restrictive rule in the form of a 
limitation of the group of persons to whom the defendant is liable. In the landmark 
case Ultra mares Corp. v Touche408 Cardozo CJ held that "one is liable for negligent 
misrepresentation only to those with whom one is in privity or to third parties actually 
known to be beneficiaries of the representations .... "409 In the light of this limitation 
it is unlikely that publishers will be liable to their readers for injuries caused by 
inaccurate information contained in publications as they are generally not in privity 
with the publisher nor are they actually known to them.410 
Liability may lie under section 552 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts: 
Information Negligently Supplied for the Guidance of Others 
(1) One who, in th& course of his business, profession or 
employment, or in any other transaction in which he has a 
pecuniary interest, supplies false information for the guidance of 
others in their business transactions, is subject to liability for 
pecuniary loss caused to them by their justifiable reliance upon 
the information, if he fails to exercise reasonable care or 
competence in obtaining or communicating the information. 
407 The following dictum of Cardozo CJ in Ultra mares Corp. v Touche (1931) 255 NY 
170; 17 4 NE 441 gave birth to this fear: 
408 Supra. 
If liability for negligence exists, a thoughtless slip or blunder, the 
failure to detect a theft or forgery beneath the cover of deceptive 
entries, may expose accountants to a liability in an indeterminate 
amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class. The 
hazards of a business conducted on these terms are so extreme 
that as to enkindle doubt whether a flaw may not exist in the 
implication of a duty that exposes to these consequences. 
409 174 NE 448. 
410 Lamkin 1994 ELJ 758. 
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(2) Except as stated in Subsection (3), the liability stated in 
Subsection (1) is limited to loss suffered 
(a) by the person or one of a limited group of persons for 
whose benefit and guidance he intends to supply the 
information or knows that the recipient intends to supply 
it; and 
(b) through reliance upon it in a transaction that he intends 
the information to influence or knows that the recipient so 
intends or in a similar transaction. 
329 
Liability in terms of section 552 is limited to an identifiable person or at least a small 
group of people for whose benefit or guidance the representation is intended.411 
Although there are cases which have held that a member of public does not have a 
cause of action under negligent misrepresentation against a publisher, it is suggested 
by Lamkin412 that such a cause of action does exist under section 552: 
Under these criteria, publishers who have a reasonably narrow and distinct 
class of readers will not escape liability merely because of their status as a 
publication. At the same time, publications directed at a more general 
audience, which would be severely constrained if they were held liable to a 
wide and diverse audience, will not be so charged. 
Similarly, a supplier of information, such as the producer of a professional ES, may 
be held liable to a limited, identifiable class of professional users for whom the 
information is specifically intended. Lamkin413 admits though that the class of 
patients receiving advice from the physicians using the ES's will probably be too 
broad in terms of the Restatement. 
411 Prosser and Keeton 7 4 7. 
412 1994 ELJ 759-760. 
413 1994 ELJ 760. 
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2.5.3 Misrepresentation leading to strict liability 
In Cardozo v True414 the defendant purchased a cookbook of exotic recipes using 
tropical ingredients. One of the ingredients was the Dasheen plant, which while safe 
for consumption when cooked, is poisonous when eaten raw. The defendant became 
very ill after she ate a piece of the raw plant and she brought an action for damages 
against the seller of the book because of inter alia, a violation of an implied warranty 
under the UCC.415 The court found that the implied warranty was limited to the 
physical characteristics only, such as the binding and the printing, and not to the 
information contained within.416 Although the situation in Cardozo pertained to 
parties bound in a contract, the decision was followed in similar situations permitting 
recovery on a warranty theory without regard to privity in contract.417 It seems that, 
in these cases, the distinction between contract and tort becomes blurred and strict 
liability is imposed.418 
In the case of Winter v GP Putnam's Sons419 the plaintiffs gathered and ate 
mushrooms using their purchased copy of The Encyclopedia of Mushrooms, 
published by the defendant, as their guide. Relying on descriptions in the book they 
ate some poisonous mushrooms after which they became so ill that they required 
liver transplants. The court held that the publishers did not have a duty to verify the 
accuracy of information in their books and were not liable for injuries resulting from 
erroneous information and stated that "(t)he purposes served by products liability ..... 
are focused on the tangible world and do not take into consideration the unique 
414 Supra. 
415 See ch 3 par 2.6.2 supra. 
416 Supra 1056. 
417 Prosser and Keeton 7 49 and the authorities cited there in fn 86. 
418 Ibid. 
419 (1991) 938 F 2d 1033 (9th Cir). 
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characteristics of ideas and expression."420 The argument of the plaintiff that the 
mushroom guide should be analogised to aeronautical charts and therefore found to 
be a product subjected to strict liability,421 was rejected by the court. The reason 
for this is that in contrast to the guide, aeronautical charts are highly technical tools. 
Lamkin argues that MES's are definitely "highly technical tools" due to the significant 
amounts of time, money and expertise they require to develop and the fact that they 
can only be used effectively by trained professionals. 
The unreported case of Carter v Rand McNally & Co422 offers better authority for 
the liability of ES producers based on publisher's liability. In this case a teenage girl 
was severely injured with a burner and alcohol while performing a science 
experiment, described in a textbook published by the defendant. The plaintiff claimed 
inter alia that the publishers " .. .failed to use due care in designing the experiments 
and adequately warn about the dangers to the experiments ... "423 The court found 
the defendant liable for the plaintiff's injuries and held that in the case of a product 
such as a book which has the primary purpose of the conveyance of information that 
is potentially dangerous if improperly communicated, the physical book and its 
contents must be regarded as an entity. 
First Amendment concerns 
American courts have been reluctant to find for damages based on publisher's liability 
because of the threat to the right to free speech contained in the First Amendment 
to the American Constitution.424 In South Carolina State Ports Authority v Booz-
420 Supra 1034. 
421 See par 1.2 supra. 
422 No 76-1864-F (0 Mass) cited by Lamkin 1994 ELJ 763 fn 153. 
423 Lamkin 1994 ELJ 764. 
424 See ch 4 par 6.3.1 supra. 
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Allen & Hamilton, Inc, 425 a government agency of Carolina commissioned the 
defendant to prepare a report on certain findings after which it claimed the report 
contained inaccuracies which led to actual economic loss being suffered by the 
plaintiff. In defense of a subsequent claim by the plaintiff, the defendant argued that 
the First Amendment protected it from liability.426 The court rejected the defense 
as it found the report to consist of objective factual data which does not warrant the 
protection of the First Amendment.427 The holding in the South Carolina 
decision428 can easily be transposed to MES's, as the data contained in the 
knowledge base of a MES also consists of objective and verifiable facts acquired from 
the corpus of medical knowledge and consequently does not need any First 
Amendment protection.429 The very nature of an ES also negates First Amendment 
concerns. In contrast to cases where a newspaper article is suppressed, the 
suppression of an ES will not have the effect that society is deprived of its rightful 
knowledge, as ES's are merely a compilation in a more accessible and available form 
of expert knowledge that already exists and is accessible.430 
3. Strict liability 
3.1 Vicarious liability 
An employer is liable, regardless of fault, for the torts of her employees_ ars_~rvant~ 
-- . . --
425 (1987) 676 F Supp 346 (DOC). 
426 Supra 34 7. 
427 Supra 349. The court noted that the defendant's report consisted of "objective 
factual data" which does not need First Amendment protection "because of the 
greater objectivity and hardiness of commercial speech". 
428 Supra. 
429 Lamkin 1994 ELJ 766. 
430 Ibid. 
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committed in the course of their employment.431 Justification for vicarious liability 
is a rule of policy whereby employers are viewed as better able to absorb and 
distribute such losses, together with the argument that strict liability of an employer 
renders a greater incentive to carefully select, instruct and supervise servants and to 
take every precaution in seeing that the enterprise is conducted safely. 432 Whether 
a person is an employer is determined according tQJbe C()!ltr~l t~st which inclu~:s_,, __ _ 
the right to control. 433 T~e employer is only liable for torts committed by the 
employer within the scope of employment which refers to those acts so closely 
connected to with what the employee is employed to do, that they may be regarded 
as methods of carrying out the objectives of employment.434 Conduct of 
independent contractors is not subject to vicarious liability. This general rule of non-
liability is subjected to so many exceptions that Prosser and Keeton435 doubts the 
validity thereof. Apart from vicarious liability, the employer may also incur personal 
liability for any negligence of her own in connection with the work to be done as she 
is required to exercise reasonable care in selecting a competent and experienced 
contractor.436 The employer also has a duty to inspect the work after it is 
completed to ensure that it is safe.437 The courts have also found in certain cases 
that the employer has a non-delegable duty, and consequently held such a defendant 
vicariously liable for the negligence of an independent contractor although the 
431 Fleming (1) 189; Prosser and Keeton 501. 
432 Prosser and Keeton 500-501. 
433 Peeples v Kawasaki Heavy Industries Limited (1979) 288 Or 143 603 P 2d 765. 
434 Prosser and Keeton 502. 
435 At 509-516. 
436 United States v Arez (1981) 248 Ga 19 280 SE 2d 345; Deitz v Jackson (1982) 
57 NC App 275 291 SE 2d 282. 
437 Prosser and Keeton 510. 
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employer herself has done everything reasonably required of her.438 An example 
is the liability of a landowner for negligent injuries caused as a result of inefficient 
repairs by an independent contractor. 439 The criterion which is used to determine 
whether a duty is non-delegable or not, is whether the responsibility is of such an 
important nature to the community that the employer should not be permitted to 
transfer it to another.440 
3.2 Products liability 
3.2.1 General 
American law has made a cardinal contribution to tort theory with the development 
of strict liability for defective products.441 It provided the model for the EU Directive 
on Product Liability,442 which is now in force throughout all European member 
countries.443 It evolved by means of an extension of guarantees of qualitv implied 
in the sale of goods between the buyer and seller, to the relationship between the 
manufacturer and consumer as well. 444 As recovery between buyer and seller was 
based on strict or negligence liability in contract for breach of warranty and governed 
exclusively by the UCC in all states, the continuing extension of the UCC into tort law 
beeame cumbersome and inefficient.445 It was realised that the imposition of strict 
438 See the numerous cases cited by Prosser and Keeton 511 especially footnotes 23-
41. 
439 Lineaweaver v John Wanamaker Philadelphia 1930 299 Pa 45; 149 A 91. 
440 Prosser and Keeton 512. 
441 Fleming (1) 190. 
442 85/374. 
443 See ch 5 part II par 8 infra. 
444 Fleming(1) 190; Prosser and Keeton 692. 
445 Prosser and Keeton 692. 
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liability on manufacturers and sellers for physical harm to persons and things was 
rather based on the policy consideration that the defendant ought to be liable for 
damaging events caused by defects that made the product more dangerous than it 
would otherwise be, than on conventional contract notions. 446 The courts began to 
apply strict liability theory in tort almost simultaneously with the adoption of Section 
402A of the Second Restatement of Torts by the American Law Institute in 1964, after 
which it was applied throughout the country.447 The initial focus on manufacturing 
defects has by now spilled over to design defects and a failure to warn on the part 
of the manufacturer. The only requirement is that the product must be unreasonably 
defective and dangerous. Claims are frequently being redressed by large awards of 
punitive damages to compensate for a conscious indifference to the safety of the 
public and also taking account of the corporate defendant's wealth.448 The defining 
of a test for what is defective remains a problem. The consumer-expectation test is 
more meaningful to the buyer than to the third parties who are frequently among the 
injured; the test is often supplemented by balancing the risk of damage caused by 
the product against the utility of the design of the product. The product is also 
deemed to be defective if a prudent manufacturer, knowing of the risk, would not 
have marketed it. Strict liability covers personal injury and damage to other property 
than the defective product itself; damage to the defective product itself and economic 
loss is generally claimed in terms of the contract between the buyer and seller.449 
The decision to subject the manufacturer and other suppliers of a product to strict 
446 Ibid. 
447 Prosser and Keeton 694. 
448 Fleming (1) 190; Cole 1990 CLJ 158; Prosser and Keeton 692 et seq. 
449 Restatement (Second) of Torts par 402A; Fleming(1) 190; Prosser and Keeton 
678. The All has released a tentat1ve draft of the Restatement (Third) of the Law 
of Torts in which the area of products liability has been reconsidered: All (24 July 
1997) Available www: http://www.ali.org/alirfortpl.htm. 
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liability is a matter of public policy. 450 Although the distinction between products 
and services is of primary importance, policy concerns such as loss-spreading, 
compensation, equitable allocation of the burden of proof, the encouragement of new 
technological developments and the prevention of accidents are consciously furthered 
by the courts when imposing strict liability.451 Strict liability is the most 
advantageous theory for a plaintiff since only causation and resulting damages need 
to be proved, not that a duty of care was owed by the defendant.452 Commentators 
are divided as to whether strict liability should be imposed on computer programs 
causing physical injury.453 
3.2.2 Elements of product liability 
Section 402(A) of the Restatement(Second) of Torts provides: 
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer 
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject 
to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user 
or consumer, or to his property, if 
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a 
product; and 
450 Fleming(1) 191; Cole 1990 CLJ 174. 
451 Ibid. Prosser and Keeton 692 extracts three basic ideas from the various policy 
considerations advanced for the imposition of strict liability in tort: (1) the costs of 
damaging events due to defective products can best be borne by their 
manufacturers (a risk-bearing theory), (2) accident prevention can be promoted by 
the adoption of strict liability and the elimination of the necessity of proof of 
negligence, (3) even if fault or negligence is the primary justification for product 
liability, proof thereof should no longer be required because of the difficulty and 
high cost of doing so. 
452 Lamkin 1994 ELJ 740. 
453 Proponents of strict liability are Gill 1986 HTLJ 484; Schmal 1992 L T 1-12; 
Birnbaum 1988 CLJ 156, whereas opponents include Cole 1990 CLJ 182-184; 
Turley 1988 CLJ 475-476. 
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(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer 
without substantial change in the condition in which it is 
sold. 
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although 
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the 
preparation and sale of his product, and 
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or 
entered into any contractual relation with the seller. 
3.2.2.1 Product 
337 
Any kind of product that is sold is protected as long as it is in a defective condition 
and unreasonably dangerous. 454 In this requirement lies the main difference 
between strict liability and negligent liability for products in tort. 
3.2.2.2 Defect 
A product is defective if it is unreasonably dangerous due to 
(1) a flaw in the product present at the time it is sold; (2) a failure to warn about an 
inherent risk; and (3) a design defect.455 
3.2.2.3 Producer 
The producer is a seller including the manufacturer and all those in the marketing and 
distribution chain subsequent to the manufacture-seller. A seller must, however, be 
a merchant in the business of selling, and not for example, a housewife.456 The 
manufacturer of a component part that contains a flaw is strictly liable as producer 
except where the defect lies in the manner of its use in an assembled product, 
454 Prosser and Keeton 695. 
455 Prosser and Keeton 694-695. 
456 Prosser and Keeton 705. 
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whereupon the manufacturer of the assembled product is held strictly liable as the 
producer.457 Retailers and wholesalers are strictly liable for the defective products 
they sell.458 Endorsers, licensors and franchisees are generally not held strictly 
liable for the defective products they sell as the products are not sold under their 
trade name. However, the courts have not yet announced settled principles for 
determining such liabilities. 459 
3.2.2.4 Damage 
Only physical harm to persons or property is compensable in terms of section 402(A); 
economic and commercial losses are not recoverable in terms of strict liability.460 
Furthermore, because liability for personal injuries and physical damage to property 
is based on policy considerations, the duty to avoid such harm is imposed by law and 
cannot be excluded in a contractual provision.461 Damage to the defective product 
itself is recoverable on the basis of strict liability but may be excluded in negotiated 
disclaimers. 462 
457 Prosser and Keeton 705-706. 
458 Their liability on a strict basis is supported by various policy reasons such as their 
more favourable position to bear the costs of accidents due to the defectively 
dangerous products they sell, than the purchaser for use, and the goal of accident 
prevention which is best served by the imposition of strict liability on the retailer. 
Cf Prosser and Keeton 704-707. 
459 Prosser and Keeton 707. 
460 Such losses are only recoverable in contract: Prosser and Keeton 708. 
461 Prosse and Keeton 708: see also ch 3 par 2.6.1 2 supra. 
462 Keystone Aeronautics Corp v RJ Enstrom Corp ( 197 4) 499 F 2d 146 (3rd Cir). 
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3.2.2.5 Causation 
The product defect must be the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injury.463 
3.2.3 Defences 
Contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk were abolished by the 
courts as defences to a claim based on strict liability.464 The reason is because the 
doctrine of comparative negligence, whereby contributory negligence only diminishes 
and does not bar recovery from the plaintiff, developed after the new tort action of 
products liability and the courts were still following the ali-or-nothing doctrines of 
common law.465 With the current development of a comparative fault system, most 
states are adopting legislation in which contributory negligence is recognised as a 
defence that diminishes recovery in proportion to the plaintiffs fault.466 The 
following defences against a claim based on products liability have been recognised 
by the courts: misuse of a kind which is not reasonably foreseeable, voluntary and 
unreasonable negligent use knowing of the defective condition and appreciating its 
dangers. Both these defences are regarded as intervening conduct constituting a 
superseding cause.467 The state-of-the-art defence is acknowledged by some 
courts, provided reasonable care was exercised and the risk was completely 
undiscoverable at the time the product was put on the market.468 
463 Prosser and Keeton 712. See also par 3.2.2.6 infra with regard to the defences 
of misuse that constitute a superseding cause. 
464 McCown v International Harvester Co (1975) 463 PA 13 342 A 2d 381; Cepeda 
v Cumberland Engineering Co (1978) 76 NJ 152 386 A 2d 816. 
465 Prosser and Keeton 710-712. 
466 Eg the Uniform Comparative Fault Act of 1978: see Prosser and Keeton 712. 
467 Johnson v Clark Equipment Co (1976) 274 Or 403 547 P 2d 132. 
468 Prosser and Keeton 700. 
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3.2.4 Summary 
Although there have not been any software liability cases adjudicated in terms of no-
fault liability, it is believed that the courts will have no difficulty to impose strict liability 
on software causing physical injury, provided all the elements of strict liability are 
present. This means that only standard, mass produced and- marketed software will 
qualify in terms of the policy issues outlined earlier. 
The basic elements of a products liability cause of action applied toES's are: (a) the 
ES must be a product; (b) the defendant must be a seller of the ES; (c) the ES must 
reach the injured party without substantive alteration; (d) the ES must be defective; 
and (e) the defect must be the source of the injury. 
(a) The ES must be a product 
As stated previously,469 the most important question in a product liability analysis 
is whether an ES can be regarded as a product or a service because section 402A 
only applies to products. It may be accepted that in the case of a corporeal 
commercial product such as a motor car there is clearly a tangible product and in the 
case of a haircut, there is clearly a service being rendered. Problems arise in cases 
where this distinction becomes blurred as in the case of a service that produces an 
end-product as well. In the case of custom or bespoke software where a software 
development contract has been entered, a service is procured to produce a product, 
namely the ES. In such cases the courts consider secondary factors, such as the 
type of defect in the. product and the commercial distinction between products, to 
come to a finding. 470 Manufacturing defects and mass produced systems generally 
indicate a product, whereas design defects under a development contract are usually 
found in a service. 
469 Ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra. 
470 Lamkin 1994 ELJ 742. 
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According to Cole471 , the ES as a product must be interpreted within the context of 
its defined environment. This means that the developer of the ES can only be held 
liable for the output of the ES as it represents knowledge in the domain for which it 
is designed. The developer cannot be held liable to all third parties for the various 
meanings attached to it outside the domain. The ES together with its actions within 
its domain, but independent from the meaning of the action external to its domain, is 
the "product". This can be illustrated by the case of Cardozo v True472 where the 
court found that a bookseller was not liable to a cookbook purchaser who was 
poisoned because there was no indication in the recipe that an ingredient is 
poisonous if left uncooked. The bookseller, unlike the author, was not selling the 
information for application- the product's context was a book rather than as a recipe 
to be used. For the same reason Cole473 is of the opinion that a MES used as a 
tool by a doctor,474 cannot qualify as a product with regard to liability towards the 
patient seeking advice and a course of treatment. Such a MES is limited to the 
specific narrow domain where the interpretation intended represents knowledge within 
that domain and not within the domain of final medical judgement towards any 
individual. The position would be different in the case of aMES intended to be used 
directly by the patient at home475: the intended knowledge would then very well be 
within the domain of final medical judgement for which product liability may be 
incurred towards an injured user-patient. 
(b) The defendant must be a seller of the ES 
Individually designed and constructed ES's do not fall within the meaning of "sell" for 
471 1990 CLJ 160-161. 
472 (1977) 342 So 2d 1053 (Fia Dist Ct App). 
473 1990 CLJ 162. 
4 7 4 An ES of the type embodied in the Intelligent Assistant: see ch 2 par 11 supra. 
475 An ES of the type embodied by the Self-Help System: see ch 2 par 11 supra. 
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purposes of product liability due to the lack of a mass market.476 The sale of ES 
shells477 must not be confused with the ES application itself. ES shells are part of 
the application-building tools and their manufacturers are not the manufacturers of the 
ES product. 
(c) The ES must reach the user without substantial alteration 
The nature of software is to transform an input into an output. This characteristic 
creates two theoretical questions, namely (1) is the input supplied to the ES by the 
user a substantial alteration, and (2) in the case of an ES constructed with the ability 
to learn and modify itself, when is the reasoning process so changed that a 
substantial alteration took place? 
In regard to the first question, Cole478 remarks that because input errors are 
inevitable, the developer cannot be held liable for all consequences of the program 
and the user has a duty to constrain inputs to the· specified domain in which the ES 
operates. The absence of techniques used to prevent input errors such as 
reconfirmation by the user, provisional reasoning by the program and error tracing 
may be unreasonable and therefore result in the liability of the producer although 
substantial alteration took place.479 In respect of the second question, substantial 
alteration would take place when the user extends the knowledge base of the ES. 
This is especially possible in ES's capable of learning.480 If the user is aware of this 
possibility and actually acquired the ES for that very reason, a product liability cause 
476 Cole 1990 CLJ 164. 
477 See ch 2 par 8.1.3 supra. 
478 1990 CLJ 165. 
479 Cole 1990 CLJ 166. If the user makes an inaccurate input, the seller has an 
estoppel defence: Swiss Air Transport Co v Benn (1983) 121 Mise 2d 129 133-34; 
467 NYS 2d 341 344-45 (NY Civ Ct). 
480 See ch 2 par 3.4 supra. 
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of action will not arise. 
(d) The ES must be defective 
The criteria used to evaluate a product has been stated as follows: 
This evaluation of the product in terms of the reasonable expectations of 
the ordinary consumer allows the trier of fact to take into account the 
intrinsic nature of the product. The purchaser of a Volkswagen cannot 
reasonably expect the same degree of safety as would the buyer of the 
much more expensive Cadillac. It must be borne in mind that we are 
dealing with a relative, not an absolute concept. In determining the 
reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, a number of factors 
must be considered. The relative cost of the product, the gravity of the 
potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost and feasibility of 
eliminating or minimizing the risk may be relevant in a particular case. In 
other instances the nature of the product or the nature of the claimed defect 
make other factors relevant to the issue.481 
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As shown before,4&2 a defect causing injury can arise from many parts of an ES 
such as the knowledge base, inference mechanism, interaction language, 
etcetera. 483 The reasonableness of design and defects must be determined with 
reference to the time of product design and not the time an injury occurs.484 The 
ES may be of such a nature that failures are inevitable for example a medical ES 
designed to effect a cure as there is no guarantee of any cure in medicine.485 
Other examples can be found in the field of drugs, which, in the present state of 
knowledge, cannot be made safe for intended and ordinary use.486 Conversely, if 
481 Seattle-First National Bank v Tabert (1975) 86 Wash 2d 145 154; 542 P 2d 774 
779. 
482 See ch 2 par 9.2.1 supra. 
483 See also appendix Ill for the tables of design and execution risk areas. 
484 Ward v Hobart Manufacturing Co { 1971) 450 F 2d 1176 (5th Cir). 
485 Cole 1990 CLJ 169. 
486 Comment (k) to the Restatement(Second) of Torts s 402(a). 
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the ES operates in a predetermined environment such as a tax advisor for a certain 
year, the expectations can be defined more accurately. Decisions as to which 
domains for ES's are unsafe will be determined by juries. 
(e) The ES's defect must be the source of the injury 
Cole states that strict products liability should not be invoked for recovery of pure 
economic loss as developers of ES's cannot be expected to anticipate all possible 
commercial expectations for all potential interpretations of the system's output.487 
4. Conclusion 
In terms of the policy factors considered when determining the nature of a particular 
object for purposes of tortious liability, the following classification can be made with 
regard to the three types of ES's identified in this study: 
The Intelligent Assistant is an interactive ES produced for a professional user to be 
used as a tool or decision-aid in the execution of her professional duties.488 As 
such it is an information product applied with the intervention of a human user to 
produce a service. This type of ES will be viewed as a service subjected to a 
negligence standard of liability even though the system may be mass produced and -
marketed. If the ES is custom made and it entails the delivery of a product, it will still 
be regarded as a service due to the manner of acquisition and the intervention of the 
user. In many instances this type of ES would have been produced in conjunction 
with the user which makes it even more akin to the rendering of a service. 
The Self-Help System is produced for direct use by a non-professional user for advice 
487 Professional Lens Plan v Polaris Leasing Corp (1984) 234 Kan 7 42 755; 675 P 
2d 887 898-99; Cole 1990 CLJ 173. 
488 See ch 2 par 11 supra. 
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or help in any matter.489 If the ES is mass produced and -marketed it is a product 
to which strict liability principles apply even though it provides a service akin to a 
professional service. The fact that the ES replaces the human professional entirely, 
has the result of providing a product, consisting of information, which is relied upon 
without human intervention. 490 
The ES Machine which operates a machine directly without the intervention of a 
human user is considered to be a product for strict liability purposes if it is mass 
produced. If it is a one-of-a-kind application, Turley491 advises that it be treated as 
a service subjected to negligence liability. 
4.1 The use of a defective expert system 
Plaintiffs will have a difficult time in asserting a traditional tort claim against the 
producer of defective systems since a "computer malpractice" claim is not available 
at this stage of development of the ES industry.492 If ES developers are held to an 
elevated standard of care it would increase the cost of ES's and restrict the 
development of a new and growing technology. The same policy condideration 
applies to strict liability. An action based on strict products liability is available to the 
injured party in case of damage caused by the use of an ES that is a product in terms 
of the principles set out above.493 A cause of action against the producers of ES's 
with an intellectual output may lie in publisher's liability which is based on strict 
liability in analogy to the decisions concerning publications where the information 
489 See ch 2 par 11 supra. 
490 See par 2.2 supra. This conclusion concurs with Westerdijk's argument regarding 
decision directing (beslissingssturend) software which, because of the absence of 
an intervening user, he views as a product: see part II par 9.2.3 infra. 
491 1988 CLJ 463. 
492 See par 2.2.2.3 supra. 
493 See par 3.2 supra. 
346 Chapter 5 Comparative law Part 1 
conveyed, rather than the physical product itself, constitutes the main value of the 
product.494 A further cause of action may also be found in the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation, although such actions may be limited to those in privity with the 
information provider and will be limited in jurisdictions that follow the Ultramares 
decision495 approach. 
4.2 The incorrect use of a sound expert system 
Against the users of ES's a plaintiff will have the traditional tort claim based on 
negligence, which in the case of a professional user will be in the form of a 
professional malpractice claim. In certain instances there may also be valid policy 
reasons to assert a strict liability claim for services rendered. 
4.3 The non-use of an expert system 
As in the case of the incorrect use of ES's, injured parties will also have a claim 
based on negligence against the user who fails to use an ES in circumstances where 
such failure constitutes a breach of duty.496 The existence of a duty of care is 
determined according to the foreseeability of harm and legal policy.497 If the loss 
suffered consists of physical injury and damage to property, the cl~im will readily 
succeed but pure economic loss is only recoverable between parties in contract and 
towards third parties of a limited, identifiable class.498 
494 See par 2.5 supra. 
495 Supra. 
496 See par 2.2.1 supra. 
497 See par 2.2.1 supra. 
498 See pars 2.5.2 and 2.2.4 supra. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PART II: EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
1. Introduction 
European Union (EU) law refers to a body of law applicable to and binding 1 on the 
member states of the EU2 which has been developed to harmonise3 European law 
in general.4 The inclusion of a discussion of EU law in this study is necessitated by 
the fact that the delictual liability regimes of the two Continental legal systems as well 
as one of the Anglo-American legal systems that are treated here are those of three 
member states of the EU. 5 The harmonisation of European law has led to the 
inevitable reception of EU law in various areas of the legal systems of all the member 
states, and thus it becomes part of the legal rules of those systems. In all of the 
member states, EU law forms part of the continuing strategy aimed at the formation 
1 See par 6.1 infra with regard to the binding effect of EU law on member states and 
individuals. It is also possible that non-member states who are parties to 
international trade or other agreements with the EU (such as the Lome Convention 
with African countries) are bound by some provisions of EU law in terms of their 
agreements: Cf Steiner 5 et seq; Halberstam 1994 DR 781. In this way even 
South Africa may become bound by the provisions of EU law upon becoming a 
trading partner of the EU: see par 2 infra. 
2 The European Union (EU) was previously referred to as the European Community 
(EC). Since the signing of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union in 1991, 
the term EC was substituted by EU: De Vos 1994 (1) TSAR 2. References to the 
EU Treaty are actually references to the original Rome or EC Treaty that forms the 
basis of the Maastricht Treaty (EU Treaty). 
3 Harmonisation is also referred to as "approximation" and rapprochement in 
French: De Vos 1994 (1) TSAR 2. 
4 On the EU in general, see De Vos 1-13; Jacobs et a/ 2-11; Weatherhill and 
Beaumont 1-23; Shaw 13-17; Steiner 3-23. 
5 The Netherlands and Germany were among the original six member states who 
founded the EU in 1957 with the signing of the Rome Treaty, the United Kingdom 
joined the EU in 1973 upon signing the Treaty of Accession: see par 2 infra. 
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of a "common market"6 in which the elimination of economic and legal barriers that 
inhibit the free transfer of goods across national borders, and the adoption of 
measures to create equal opportunities for competitiveness within the EU for 
businesses belonging to the different member states, is pursued. 7 
During 1985 the EU adopted a directive on product liabilityB for subsequent 
implementation into the national law of the member states. 9 The consequences of 
this EU Directive have been much more significant than merely constituting a uniform 
product liability regime for the EU: it has also served as a model for many other _J 
countries trading with the EU, including the European Free Trade Association (EFTA)f\/\ 
states.,. Hur~gary and Rus~Ja.~~ - The~E~,C~l~~=~ive introdu~~s ~trict liability for. t~~'1)~. · \.. )~ 
producers of defective products that .cause personal injury, death ~r-~!l,mage to \~.,N 
personal property. 11 Each member state is required to pass legislation to provide 
for the implementation of the EU Directive in their national law which will establish a 
6 The common market is a market in which everybody is free to work, invest, 
produce, buy and sell wherever in the member states the conditions for such 
activities, which may not be artificially distorted by subsidies or legislative or other 
state or business practices, are most favourable: Mathewson 1993 L&P/8 1285. 
7 The principle of freedom of movement of goods is the fundamental freedom, the 
"corner-stone" of the EU. The law relating to the free movement of goods is one 
of the principal pillars of the common market. In terms of the EU Treaty it applies 
to all products which are in free circulation in member states, whether they 
originate in member states or in third countries, for example countries which are 
parties to the Federal Trade Agreement: Steiner 70. 
8 EU Council Directive 85/37 4 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations 
and Administrative Provisions of the member States concerning Liability for 
Defective Products, hereafter the" EU Directive". See appendix VI for the full text 
of the EU Directive. The enactment of a strict product liability regime was inspired 
by the development of such liability in the USA: see part I par B 3.2 supra. 
9 See par 8.1 infra on the process of implementation followed in member states. 
10 Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 3. 
11 See par 8 infra. 
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uniform products liability regime within the EU. 12 However, member states are 
permitted a discretion with regard to three of the EU Directive's provisions. 13 Before 
the regime is adopted by a member state, the question of whether the EU Directive 
is binding on public or private parties depends on whether the provisions are "direct~IX"_ 
~ff~2!ive_·_: __ ~r not, as directly effective EU law must be applied by domestic c~4 
Once the EU regime is _adopted, the plaintiff has a choice to institute action in terms 
ofTh~o~wJ..~gi-~e. or in--t~rm~-of the traditional product liabili~ principles of the 
---~ . -
relevant country as the EU Directive confers an additional regime of product liability 
that co-exists with the delictual liability regime of the national law of the member 
states. 15 
The importance of this legislation for the commercial world and consumer sales is 
obvious and with the proliferation of computer products in the home and business, the 
potential application of strict product liability rules to defective software in general and 
ES's in particular, has become an important subject to consider in the production and 
marketing of computer products and services. 16 ES's deserve exceptional attention 
12 Because of the diverging standards of the member states regarding the definition 
of a defective product, the extent of liability, responsible parties and burdens of 
proof in litigation, businesses trading in the EU have found it extremely difficult to 
discover the degree of care required of them, and to determine their exposure to 
liability when manufacturing and marketing products. Hence, the Commission of 
the EU proposed a harmonisation of member state product liability laws as early 
as July 1976: Mathewson 1993 L&PIB 1286; Westerdijk 43. 
13 Arts 15 and 16 of the EU Directive: see par 8.4 infra. 
14 The principle of "direct effectiveness" is of crucial importance to EU lawyers as 
directly effective provisions of EU law must not only be applied by domestic courts, 
but also enjoy priority over any conflicting provisions of national law in terms of the 
principle of supremacy of EU law: Steiner 25. See par 6 infra. 
15 Art 13. Triaille 1993 CLSR 215 sees this retention of other legal instruments as 
a clear indication that the main objective of the EU Directive is the protection of 
consumers and not the harmonisation of laws. Therefore software should be 
included in the definition of product because to do so would benefit consumers: 
see par 9 infra. 
16 Davies 1993 CL &P 99. 
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in this regard because due to their very nature, ES's are more likely than conventional 
software to cause personal and property injury. 17 ES's are frequently used in 
application areas such as medical assistance apparatus, transportation control, and 
safety related products in which a much higher potential exists for those injuries 
provided for in the EU Directive, 18 than in the .case of conventional data processing 
software used in application areas such as home and office management, and pure 
information retrieval systems. 19 An injured user of software who does not have to 
prove the negligence of the producer of defective software has a distinct advantage 
over the user that has to prove that the producer was at fault when producing the 
software. Consequently, the question arises whether the EU Directive applies to 
software.20 With regard to the existence of a cause of action in case of damage 
caused by the use of an ES, it must further be ascertained whether ES software falls 
within the definition of a "product". If it does, ES producers may be held strictly liable 
for damage caused by a defective ES in certain instances. Furthermore, this liability 
may not be contractually excluded.21 In the context of the ES bases of liability 
treated in this study, the current discussion pertains only to liability issues arising 
from the "use of a defective ES", and not to liability issues arising from the "incorrect 
use of a sound ES or the non-use of an existing (sound) ES".22 
17 See ch 2 par 5 supra. 
18 In terms of art 9 of the EU Directive, the damage recoverable is limited to death, 
personal injury and damage to personal property caused by the defective product. 
19 See ch 2 par 4 supra. 
20 The EU Directive is only applicable to "products": see par 8.3.2 infra. On the 
applicability of the EU Directive to software in general, see Davies 1993 CL&P 99-
103; Whittaker 1989 LQR 125-139; Triaille 1991 CL&P217-224 and 1993 CLSR 
214-223; Stuurman 127-147; Heussen 48 (2). 
21 Art 12: see par 8.3.7 infra. 
22 In the latter two instances, the ES's do not qualify as defective products: see ch 
1 par 1.4 supra with regard to the scope of "use of an ES". 
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2. Historical background to the EU 
The EU originated from the institution of the European Economic Community (EEC) 
or the "Common Market" as it was also known during the "reconstruction and 
development" - era in Western Europe after the second World War. 23 The EEC 
came into existence with the Treaty of Rome (EC Treaty) in 1957 and consisted of 
only two institutions, namely the (European) Parliament and the (European) Court of 
Justice (ECJ). The six original member States were France, Germany, Belgium, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Luxembourg.24 Another two institutions, namely the 
Commission and the Council were formed with the signing of the Merger Treaty in 
1965.25 The United Kingdom, Denmark and the Republic of Ireland joined the EU 
with the Treaty of Accession in 1973, followed by Greece in 1979 and Spain and 
Portugal in 1986. It became evident that there were still many barriers to a single 
internal market, and to banish these, a new Treaty, the Single European Act (SEA), 
was signed by the twelve member states during 1986.26 A gr<:"!Ving movement 
towards a more united EU ensued, and in December 1991 the Treaty on the EU was 
signed at Maastricht. 
The new EU Treaty enlarged the scope of EU competence and pledged the member 
states to full economic and monetary union as well as to the development of a 
common foreign and security policy which would eventually lead to a common 
defence policy. In terms of the EU Treaty, the power to adopt legislation remains with 
the member states except in cases where the objectives of the action, by reason of 
23 On the history of the EU in general. see Weatherhill and Beaumont 1-35; Shaw 
21-44; Steiner 1-6; Lasok and Bridge 1-28. 
24 Steiner 3. 
25 In terms of this Treaty, the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) merged 
with the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom): Steiner 4. 
26 This was to be achieved througr. a huge program of harmonisation, especially with 
regard to the provisions relating to the free movement of goods which is the 
corner-stone of the EU: Steiner 69. • 
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its scale or effects, can be better achieved by the EU.27 Although an express 
"federal" goal was not included in the final draft of the EU Treaty, the aims28 of the 
EU Treaty do signify a move towards a federal system. 29 
The focus on economic aspects shifted gradually to include areas of social 
importance as well, hence the designation of "European Community (EC)", now the 
EU. Apart from the purpose of striving for a closer union between the people of 
Europe, the reasons for its establishment were firstly, to reconcile former enemies 
and provide a framework for stability, and secondly, to manage the growing 
interdependence of the European economies. 30 The general aims of the original EC 
Treaty have been amended by the EU Treaty to provide for the extended objectives 
of the SEA: 31 
The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a common market 
and an economic and monetary union and by implementing the common 
policies or activities referred to in Articles 332 and 3a33,to promote 
throughout the Community a harmonious and balanced development of 
economic activities, sustainable and non-inflationary growth respecting the 
environment, a high degree of convergence of economic performance, a 
high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the 
standard of living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and 
solidarity among member States. 
27 Art 3b of the EC Treaty. The EU Treaty expressly confirms the principle of 
"subsidiarity" , which means that the EU only takes action in so far as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be achieved sufficiently by the member 
states: cf Steiner 5 et seq. 
28 Eg full economic and monetary union and a common defence and security policy. 
29 Steiner 5. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Art 2 of the EU Treaty. 
32 These policies and activities include: the adoption of a social charter, health 
protection, consumer protection, civil protection and tourism: Steiner 8. 
33 The general aims of economic and monetary union. 
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The goal is, therefore, a free market ideal comprising a single national market 
enabling equal economic competition between members without artificial legal barriers 
such as differences in consumer protection or environmental regulation. 34 Hence 
the necessity of harmonising or approximating the different laws applicable to the 
same subject. 35 
The idea of a free internal market within the EU and closer union between its 
members has led to a growing demand among other European States to either join, 
or seek special trading relationships with the EU. 36 Member states of the EU are 
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.37 The EFTA countries 
include Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland.38 
South Africa's Department of Trade and Industry is currently involved in negotiations 
with the EU to conclude a bilateral trade agreement establishing a free trade area. 39 
If South Africa does become a trading partner of the EU, the applicability of EU law 
will depend on the provisions in the concluding agreement. Membership of the EFTA 
entails acquiescence to Union rules40 and it may be that South Africa, upon 
becoming a member, will also be bound by the relevant EU law. 41 
34 Shaw 9. 
35 The harmonisation goal has led to numerous policies being adopted by the EU of 
which the policies concerning "information technology" and "consumer protection" 
are relevant to the discussion of ES liability: see par 7 infra. 
36 Cf Steiner 6 et seq; De Vos 1994 TSAR 3. 
37 De Vos ibid 3; Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 9. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Schlesinger 16; Mosia 42; Coetzee 24. 
40 Steiner 6. 
41 Delport 1992 SA Mere LJ 198; Halberstam 1994 OR 781. 
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3. EU law and information technology 
EU law is vitally important to the computer and information technology industries as 
it regulates the ways in which the industries may operate within the EU.42 Non-
compliance with EU law can result in the invalidation of agreements, actions for 
damages and fines of up to 10% of the group world-wide turnovers of the companies 
concerned. Since 1980, differences between the laws of member states have been 
continually eliminated through standardising rules for software protection, product 
liability and computer contracts. Among the most important initiatives to harmonise 
information technology law within Europe43 are the Council Directives on the legal 
protection of computer programs44 ; the protection of copyright;45 the protection 
of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and free movement of 
such data;46 the minimum safety and health requirements for work and display 
screen equipment;47 the liability for defective products;48 general product safety;49 
and standardisation in the field of information technology and telecommunications. 50 
The EU Directive on liability for defective products directly concerns the topic of this 
42 See Cowen and Heeren 302-329 for the ways in which the computer and 
information technology industries are affected by EU law. 
43 · See Baxter and Mckenzie 1996 CLSR 43-51 for a complete list of existing and 
proposed EU measures. 
44 L 122/42 adopted 14 May 1991: Baker and Mckenzie 1996 CLSR 44. 
45 L290 adopted 29 October 1993: Baker and Mckenzie 1996 CLSR 44. 
46 L281/31 adopted 24 October 1995: Baker and Mckenzie 1996 CLSR 45. 
4 7 L 156 adopted 29 May 1990: Baker and Mckenzie 1996 CLSR 46. 
48 L210/29 adopted 25 July 1985: Baker and Mckenzie 1996 CLSR 45. 
49 This directive ensures that the responsibility for the marketing of safe products will 
be placed upon the manufacturers and distributors who will be liable for the 
damage caused by the products which they market. It is intended to establish, on 
a Union level, a general safety requirement for any product placed on the market: 
Davies 1993 CL&P 99. 
50 L36/31 adopted 22 December 1986: Baker and Mckenzie 1996 CLSR 45. 
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thesis as it may be applicable to ES's that are regarded as products. 51 An EU 
directive on liability for defective services has also been proposed, but since it met 
with considerable opposition, consensus has not yet been reached on the adoption 
thereof and discussion among member states continues. 52 The proposed EU 
Directive may be applicable to ES's that are regarded as services or to services 
rendered with the aid of an ES. 53 The EU measures on standardisation may also 
be relevant to the discussion of ES liability as it concerns the Union's commitment to 
51 See par 10 infra. 
52 Cf Baker and Mckenzie 1996 CLSR 45; Davies 1993 CL&P 101. 
The proposal would enable consumers to claim more readily against negligent 
suppliers of services through shifting the burden of proof so that it would be for the 
supplier to prove that she had not been negligent instead of for the consumer to 
prove that negligence had occurred: art 1 (2) of the proposed directive. 
Art 1 (1) reads that "(t)he supplier of a service shall be liable for the damage to the 
health and physical integrity of persons or the physical integrity of movable or 
immovable property including the persons or property which were the object of the 
service, caused by a fault committed by him in the performance of the service." 
In terms of art 1 (3) the behaviour of the supplier of the service who, in normal and 
reasonably foreseeable conditions, ensures the safety which may be reasonably 
expected, will be taken into account when assessing the fault. 
Art 1 (4) states that "the 'mere' fact that a better service existed or might have 
existed at the moment of performance or thereafter, shall not constitute fault." In 
the context of ES liability this would mean that the non-use of an existing ES 
would not necessarily result in the rendering of a defective service: see ch 2 par 
9.2.2 supra. 
53 The proposed directive could affect the supply of software in circumstances where 
it is considered as a service as well as the provision of consultancy services to the 
computer industry: Davies 1993 CL&P 101. In terms of art 2 a service is defined 
as: 
any transaction carried out on a commercial basis or by way of a 
public service and in an independent manner, whether or not in 
return of payment, which does not have as its direct and 
exclusive object the manufacture of movable property or the 
transfer of rights in rem or intellectual property rights. 
Public services intended to maintain public safety (for example the police), 
package travel and waste services are excluded. Member states are continually 
striving to add to the list of exclusions: Davies 1993 CL&P 103. 
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eliminate the legal and technical barriers which force manufacturers to tailor their 
products to meet the different specifications of the member states and to create a 
system of EU standards. 54 The United Kingdom, Germany, the Netherlands and 
France have developed and harmonised an official set of criteria to be used in the 
independent evaluation and verification of the security of information technology 
products and systems, namely ITSEC (Information Technology Standards of the 
European Community). In April 1995 a Council Recommendation was adopted to 
promote the establishment of international recognition of ITSEC principles. 55 
4. Institutions of the EU 
The institutional structure of the EU is sui generis. 56 The most accurate way to 
describe it is a supranational organisation establishing a level of government above 
that of the member states.57 Treaty law and secondary legislation emanating from 
Treaty law create enforceable rights and duties by which the domestic legal systems 
of member states are penetrated. 58 There is no clear separation of powers between 
legislative and executive functions and therefore reference to the Treaties must 
always be made to ensure that the institutions act within their powers. 
The EU consists of four institutions, 59 namely Parliament, the Council of Ministers, 
the Commission and the Court of Justice (ECJ).60 It is the Commission's task to 
54 Baker and Mckenzie 1996 CLSR 50. 
55 Ibid. See also ch 6 par 5.2.2.2 infra with regard to the use of ISO standards. 
56 Shaw 51; Steiner 5. 
57 Ibid. 
58 In this regard there is a great difference between the EU and other international 
institutions, especially in view of the significant influence of the ECJ on the 
development of the law. 
59 Art 4 of the EU Treaty. 
60 Jacobs eta/ 3; Steiner 1 0; Shaw 51; Lasok and Bridge 29 et seq. 
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bring forward proposals for Union legislation which must be approved by the Council 
and sometimes by Parliament before they can be adopted. 61 The ECJ interprets 
Union law through cases brought before it by individuals or member states against 
another state or individual or against the EU.62 The ECJ has to ensure that the law 
is observed during the interpretation and application of the Treaties and it is the 
supreme authority on EU law. 63 
The Council and the Commission are the two most important structures in terms of 
the Community's decision-making process as they share the legislative powers.64 
The binding measures promulgated by these two bodies can be in the form of 
regulations, directives and decisions. 65 Recommendations and opinions are non-
binding. Regulations are binding and directly applicable in all member states, 
directives are implemented by the states themselves adopting appropriate 
measures66 and decisions are only binding on the relevant member state or 
individual to whom they are directed.67 
61 Jacobs et a/3 compares the relationship between the Council and Parliament with 
that of the two houses of a legislature. 
62 Lasok and Bridge 35 summarise the authority of the Court as follows: 
The Court is the custodian of the Treaty, the watchdog of legality 
within the community and the executor of the supremacy of the 
community law over the national laws of the member states in 
case of conflict between the two systems. 
63 Art 164 of the EU Treaty. 
64 De Vos 1994 TSAR 6; Steiner 20. The European Council is the most prominent 
form of cooperation between governments within the Union; it is also the key 
forum for major political decisions in the EU: Weatherhill and Beaumont 75. 
65 Art 189 of the EU Treaty. Cf Steiner 20. 
66 See par 8.1 infra. 
67 Ibid. 
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5. Sources of EU law 
The following sources can be distinguished: 
(a) The EU Treaty and Protocols as amended by the succeeding treaties. 
(b) EU secondary legislation in the form of regulations, directives and 
decisions. 
(c) International agreements entered into by EU institutions on behalf of the 
Union according to their powers in terms of the EU Treaty. 
(d) Judicial legislation of the European courts concerning matters of EU law, 
including that of the ECJ. 
In terms of international law, the law arising from these sources is binding on all 
member states which are obliged under the EU Treaty to take appropriate measures 
to ensure application of these rules. 68 
6. · Enforcement of EU law 
6.1 Nature of EU law 
There is no clear indication in the Treaties with regard to the relationship between 
Union taw and national law and what the effect is of EU law within the domestic legal 
system of the member states. Article 5 of the EU Treaty provides: 
68 Art 5 of the EU Treaty. 
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Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or 
particular, to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of this Treaty or 
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall 
facilitate the achievement of the Community's tasks. They shall abstain 
from any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives 
of this Treaty. 
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Although treaties form part of international law, which is primarily applicable between 
states and not individuals, the ECJ holds a different view with regard to the EU 
Treaty. By accession to the Union the member states have created an autonomous 
legal system in which not only states, but also individuals are the subjects.69 This 
view is enunciated in the following principles: 
• EU law penetrates into national legal systems and must be applied by 
national courts subject to the interpretation, effect and validity thereof by the 
ECJ; 
• individuals can rely on rules of EU law in national courts because they give 
rise to rights which must be protected by the national courts (principle of 
"direct effect"); 
• EU law takes precedence over conflicting national law (principle of 
"supremacy"); 
• organs and constituent bodies of member states are responsible for 
reversing the effects of violations of EU law which affect individuals.70 
The Commission can initiate infringement proceedings against a member state that 
69 See Shaw 14. 
70 Shaw14-15. 
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fails to fulfil its obligations under EU law. 71 
6.2 Direct applicability of EU law 
It is important to know whether given EU legislation is directly effective or not, as 
such law must not only be applied by the domestic courts, but must take precedence 
over any conflicting provisions of national law. 72 Provisions of international law that 
are directly applicable can be directly effective if all the necessary and applicable 
criteria regarding clarity and completeness, and the specific rules and attitudes of the 
relevant member state, are met. 73 Although the EU Treaty provides only that 
regulations are "directly applicable", thereby implying that only regulations may have 
direct effect, the ECJ has extended the principle of direct effect to Treaty articles, 
directives, decisions, and even to some international agreements entered into by the 
EU.74 
A directive is binding in terms of the result to be achieved upon each member state 
to which it is addressed, but leaves the choice of form and methods to the national 
authorities. 75 In other words, directives take effect within the national order via 
71 Art 169 of the EU Treaty; Weatherill and Beaumont 56. 
72 This is due to the principle of "primacy of EU law": lntemationale 
Handelsgesellschaft [1974] 2 CMLR 540; Re Kloppenberg [1988] 3 CMLR 1. See 
Steiner 42 et seq; Westerdijk 47 et seq. 
73 The question of whether a provision is directly effective or not depends on the 
construction, language, purpose and terms on which the EU Treaty or other 
provisions have been incorporated into domestic law: Steiner 25 et seq. 
74 This was done by the ECJ in a series of landmark decisions in terms of the Court's 
jurisdiction under art 177 to give preliminary rulings on matters of interpretation of 
EU law on reference from national courts: NV Algemene Transport- en Expeditie 
Ondememing Van Gend en Loos v Nederfandse Administratie der Belastingen 
[1963] 1 CMLR 1 05; Defrenne v SABENA (no 3) [1978] 3 CMLR 312; Walrave and 
Koch v Association Union Cycliste lnternationale (1975] 1 CMLR 320. See 
Weatherill and Beaumont 293 et seq; Westerdijk 57 et seq. 
75 Art 189 of the EU Treaty. 
Chapter 5 Comparative law Part II 361 
national implementing orders. A directive usually takes effect upon notification of the 
addressed member state and specifies a period of time in which it must be 
implemented into the national law. If a member state fails to implement the directive 
within the time limit, individuals and legal persons may be able to rely on the 
provisions of that directive in dealings with that member state. In the case of Grad 
v Finanzamt Traunstein76 the ECJ held that a directive could be directly effective, 
especially if it is unconditional and if the time-limit given for implementation has 
expired. The Court reasoned that if the states were free to ignore their obligations 
in terms of directives, the useful effect of such obligations would be weakened.77 
Enforcement of EU law will also be less effective if it is left only to the Commission 
to act in terms of articles 169 and 170 of the EU Treaty against the offending 
states.78 A directive cannot be directly effective before the time-limit has expired.79 
Although only regulations have to be published in the Official Journal (OJ) of the EU, 
it has happened frequently that directives have also been published in the OJ, 
especially where they applied to all the member states. 80 Directives and decisions 
shall be made known to those to whom they are addressed and be effective from 
such notification.81 Therefore, after notification the EU Directive will have to be 
applied by the national courts of member states who have not yet adopted it into their 
national law. 
76 [1971]2 CMLR 1. See Steiner 29. 
77 Ibid. 
78 In terms of these sections member states can sue one another for breach of 
obligations in terms of EU law. The Commission as guardian of the Treaties who 
represents the objective interests of the Union. has the task of suing the state in 
default: Steiner 31; Lasok and Bridge 372. 
79 Publico Ministero v Ratti [1980] 1 CMLR 96. 
80 Weatherill and Beaumont 116. 
81 Ibid. In fact, directives as well as many decisions are also published in the OJ. 
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7. Treaty policies 
7.1 General 
Apart from policies laid down in the Treaty, new policies emerge in consequence of 
the development of the EU.82 There are two EU Treaty policies relevant to the topic 
of ES's: the one pertains to science and technology, specifically information 
technology as it applies to computer law,83 and the other concerns consumer 
protection, specifically the issue of product liability as well as liability for services 
rendered. Of these policies, only the one pertaining to product liability as provided 
for in Directive 85/37 4 will be discussed as it could have an effect on liability for 
defective software (including ES's). The Directive is, however, only applicable to "a 
defect in a product"84 and therefore it must first be established whether software; 
and in particular ES's, are products in terms of the provisions of the EU Directive.85 
As pointed out earlier 86, one of the characteristics of the technological society of the 
current information age is that consumer products may contain information (in the 
form of a computer program) as a component part of a product, for example an 
automated washing machine driven by a computer chip,87 or products may consist 
mainly of information, for example physical disks containing an ES which advises the 
user on how to complete a tax form. 88 The question then arises whether such 
82 See Lasok and Bridge 543-555. 
83 Lasok and Bridge 553. 
84 Art 1 of EU Directive 85/374. 
85 See par 9 and 10 infra. 
86 Ch 2 par 1 0.1.2 supra. 
87 This refers to software with a material output, for example the ES Machine: see 
ch 2 par 1 0.1.2 supra. 
88 This refers to software with an intellectual output for example the Intelligent 
Assistant and the Self-Help System: see ch 2 par 1 0.1.2 supra. 
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"information products"89 are "products" in terms of the directive.90 
7.2 Policy regarding information technology 
With regard to the harmonisation of computer law the most important initiatives taken 
by the EU are the directive on the protection of semiconductor product designs; the 
directive on the legal protection of computer programs; the directive concerning the 
protection of individuals in relation to the processing of personal data; and the 
directive on the legal protection of databases. 91 
7.3 Policy regarding consumer protection 
Consumer protection is a policy which the EU hopes to achieve by means of 
harmonising legislation through a continuing action program which was started in 
1975.92 The first program (1975-1981) acknowledged that consumers ought to be 
protected against injury or damage to their interests caused by defective products or 
unsatisfactory services. Purchasers of goods should be protected against the abuse 
of power by vendors, particularly against the use of one-sided standard contracts and 
the unfair exclusion of essential rights in contracts. The second program (1981-1985) 
reiterated the objectives of the first program but emphasised the need for legislation. 
A new dimension was also added, namely consumer protection in the field of 
services. The third programme (1985-1988) recommended vigorous legislative 
action and it was during this period that EU Directive 85/374 was issued. Consumer 
protection is at present continuing with a fourth programme in which the emphasis is 
on the protection of economic interests and the laying down of EU standards 
89 See par 9.1.3 infra on the nature and consequences of "information products". 
90 See par 9.3 infra. 
91 See par 3 supra. 
92 Cf Lasok and Bridge 550 et seq. 
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regarding the quality of products. 93 
8. The 1985 EU Directive on liability for defective products94 
8.1 Background to the EU Directive 
Figures indicate that 40-45 million people are injured and between 20 000 and 45 000 
people die each year in the EU because of accidents befalling consumers. 95 As the 
main cause of consumer accidents lies in the distribution of defective products, a 
serious concern of the common market of the EU has been the nature of the different 
liability regimes of the member states relating to defective products. 96 Many of the 
civil codes of the EU countries do not specifically address product liability concerns, 
leaving injured consumers to rely on the principles of contractual and delictual liability. 
Apart from the fact that product liability is excluded in many standard consumer 
contracts,97 the requirement of privity in contract is not necessarily present in a 
relationship between the injured consumer or bystander, and the manufacturer.98 In 
negligence actions on the other hand, the consumer bears the burden of proof of 
negligence on the part of the manufacturer. 99 The differing standards between 
member states regarding the description of a defective product, the extent of liability, 
responsible parties, and burdens of proof in litigation have caused problems to 
manufacturers in ascertaining the degree of care required of them and in predicting 
93 Ibid. 
94 Hereafter the "EU Directive". 
95 Triaille 1993 CLSR 214. 
96 Triaille 1993 CSLR 214; Mathewson 1993 L&P/8 1285. 
97 See ch 3 pars 2.4.1 2.8 supra. 
98 See ch 3 pars 1.2 2.8 supra. 
99 See ch 5 part I pars A 2.3 B 2.3 supra and part Ill pars A 2.2.3 B 2.2.2 infra. 
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their exposure to liability when distributing across western Europe. 100 To address 
this concern, the Commission 101 proposed a harmonisation of member state product 
liability laws which led to the issuing of the Directive on liability for defective 
products 102 by the Council103 in terms of which all member states have to pass 
legislation whereby a single new products liability regime is established within the EU. 
The aim of the EU Directive is to balance the interests of the consumers and the 
producers (manufacturers) through establishing "liability regardless of fault" in the 
case of producers of defective products. 104 The liability of the producer is, 
therefore, not based on negligence and does not depend on the existence of a 
contract. The rationale behind this measure is that it is regarded as unfair for the 
victim to be without a legal remedy even in circumstances where the producers 
cannot be blamed for the damage caused. 105 In practice the consumer does bear 
the costs of this increased protection as producers insure themselves against the risk 
and add the cost thereof to the market price of the product. All member states had 
to introduce the EU Directive into their national legal systems by the end of July 1988. 
In the United Kingdom, it was done through the CPA, 106 in Germany through the 
Product Liability Act of 1989 (Produkthaftungsgesetz: PHG) 107 and in the 
100 Mathewson 1993 L&PIB 1285. 
101 See par 4 supra. 
102 The EU Directive 85/374. 
103 See par 4 supra. 
104 Triaille 1993 CLSR 214; Westerdijk 42; Mathewson 1993 L&PIB 1287. 
105 Contra, however, Martinek 1995 TSAR 641 who states that the reason for allowing 
member States the option of retaining the development risk-defence, as is 
discussed in par 8.3.8 supra, is because of the apparent unfairness of holding the 
producer liable for a risk that could not be foreseen: see part Ill par A 5.6.7 infra. 
It is my submission they should indeed be held liable for such a risk as it is unfair 
to burden the victim therewith: see ch 7 infra. 
106 See ch 5 part I par A 3.2 supra. 
107 See ch 5 part Ill par A 5.6.6 infra. 
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Netherlands through the Wet Produktenaansprake/ijkheid contained in sections 185-
193 of the Nieuwe Burgerlijke Wetboek (NBW). 108 
8.2 Objectives of the EU Directive 
The preamble to the EU Directive justifies the approximation of the product liability 
laws of member states because the many legal divergences (i) lead to a distortion of 
competition; (ii) affect the free movement of goods; and (iii) entail a different degree 
of protection of the consumer that is not compatible with a common market for all 
consumers. 109 From these reasons two main objectives are apparent, namely the 
harmonisation of product liability laws and the protection of consumers against 
personal and property damage. According to Triaille, 110 it seems that the main 
objective of the EU Directive is the protection of consumers and that 
harmonisation comes second. 111 He contends further that by analysing and 
establishing the objectives of the EU Directive, one may obtain a good indication of 
the way in which it should be interpreted to apply to matters like software, which are 
not explicitly included in the scope of the Directive. 112 He therefore concludes that, 
because of this overriding objective of consumer protection, the provisions of the EU 
Directive should be interpreted widely to permit applications to products such as 
108 See ch 5 part Ill par B 3.3 infra. 
109 Triaille 1993 CLSR 215; Westerdijk 42; Mathewson 1993 L&P/8 1287. 
110 1993 CLSR 215. This opinion is based on two reasons: (a) the fact that it is left 
to the national legislators to implement the directive as they see fit; thereby giving 
them the scope to vary in their legislation; and (b) the fact that the directive does 
not replace existing national laws but only gives victims another legal instrument 
to employ in order to obtain redress. 
111 This opinion is confirmed by Mathewson 1993 L&PIB 1288. 
112 Ibid. See also par 9.1 infra. 
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computer programs, as such an interpretation would serve the interests of 
consumers. 113 
8.3 Principles of the EU Directive 
In the following paragraphs, certain selected principles of the EU Directive, which are 
viewed as the more relevant ones for purposes of this study, are discussed. The full 
text of the EU Directive is given in appendix VI. 
8.3.1 Strict liability 
The producer shall be liable for damages caused by a defect in her product even in 
the absence of any fault or negligence on her behalf or of a breach of contract with 
the claimant. 114 The victim must prove the damage suffered, a defect in the 
product and a causal link between them. 115 It is therefore clear that the Directive 
establishes a system of strict liability 116 of the producer in case of a defect in a 
product. The provisions of the EU Directive only has effect by enactment of 
implementing legislation by the member states, the Directive's terms are not self-
113 1993 CLSR 220. Although Mathewson 1993 L&PIB 1291 doubts that "immaterial 
movable goods such as software" is covered by the EU Directive, he does not 
discuss and analyse the issue and it is clear that he did not seriously investigate 
the possibility of software falling within the ambit of the definition of a product in 
terms of the Directive. However, many commentators including authors of text 
books, accept that software, on its own or as part of another consumer product, 
is a product for purposes of product liability in terms of the EU Directive: cf 
Tapper 245; Reed 1993 CL&P 149; Singleton 1994 CL&P 167; Rowland and 
Rowland 237; Bott et at 236; Reed(2) 74; Konig 71; Junker 210; Heussen(2) 48 
2; Jauernig et a/1 007; Vander Klaauw-Koops 89; Stuurman and Vandenberghe 
1669; De Raadt 172; Westerdijk 81. 
114 Art 1. 
115 Art 4. 
116 liability without fault. 
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executing. 117 
8.3.2 Type of products 
A "product" includes all movables which can be the subject of economic activity 
except primary agricultural products, game and electricity. 118 The product can be 
incorporated into or be part of another movable (for example the radio in a car) or 
immovable (bricks of a house) good; and it does not have to be for sale or transferred 
to the user; it is sufficient that it is put at the disposal of the public. 119 Immovable 
goods and services are excluded. 120 It is uncertain whether intangible goods are 
included.121 Member states do, however, have a discretion to include primary 
agricultural products and game within the meaning of "product" in its national 
legislation.122 
8.3.3 Liable persons 
In terms of article 1 liability is imposed on the producer. 123 A producer is defined 
as the manufacturer of a finished product, the producer of raw material or the 
manufacturer of a component part. 124 Producers therefore include all persons 
117 Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 3. 
118 Art 2. Primary agricultural products refer to products of the soil, stock-farming and 
fisheries. 
119 Triaille 1993 CLSR 215; Westerdijk 45; Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 4. 
120 A directive on liability for defective services has been proposed: Triaille 1991 
CL&P 217. See par 3 supra. 
121 See par 9.1.3 infra. 
122 Art 15. 
123 Par 8.3.1 supra. 
124 Art 3(1 ). 
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engaged in the production of finished products, components, raw materials and, since 
member states may include agricultural products within the scope of these 
provisions, 125 even producers in the agricultural sector are included. If the 
producer's identity cannot be established, the importer will be held liable, 126 and if 
neither of them can be identified, all suppliers will be held liable towards the 
victim. 127 Therefore, all distributors and retailers of a product, regardless of the 
country of origin, may be held strictly liable for damage caused by the product. 
However, each supplier or importer of a product can exclude themselves from the 
definition of "producer" if they can point to another producer further up in the chain 
of distribution within a reasonable time. 128 In the case of multiple liable parties, 
they will be held jointly and severally liable.129 
8.3.4 Defective product 
A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person is 
entitled to expect, taking into account the following circumstances: 130 
(a) the presentation of the product; 
(b)· the use to which it could reasonably be expected the product would be put; 
125 Par 8.3.2 supra. 
126 Art 3(2) holds liable "any person who imports into the Community a product for 
sale, hire, leasing or any form of distribution in the course of his business." 
127 Art 3(1) also holds any person liable ''who, by putting his name, trademark or 
other distinguishing feature on the product, presents himself as its producer. 
128 Art 3(3). Contra the position in the USA, where all sellers of a product are jointly 
and severally liable, including all persons in the chain of distribution: Restatement 
(Second) of Torts 402A. See also part I par 8 3.3 supra. 
129 Art 5. 
130 Art 6(1 ). 
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(c) the time when the product was put into circulation. 
From the above it is clear that the EU Directive uses an objective approach to 
evaluate the producer's duty of care towards the user. 131 A product is also not 
regarded as defective only because a better product was subsequently put into 
circulation. 132 
8.3.5 Damage 
Only damage caused by death, personal injury and damage to private items of 
property other than the defective product itself are covered by the directive, 133 
provided the damage is more than 500 ECU. 134 Thus, application of the EU 
Directive in case of damage not caused by death or personal injury is limited to 
property other than the defective product itself, which is intended for private use or 
which has been privately used by the victim. Damage to commercially-u~~d property 
therefore does not give rise to liability and the threshold price ensures that minor 
losses to property are borne by the victims themselves. 135 Member states may 
impose an upper limit of 70 million ECU on a producer's total liability for damages 
resulting from death or personal injury caused by identical items with the same effect. 
Such a ruling can be advantageous to producers and/or their insurers in case of a 
class action based on damage caused by identical defective products.136 This 
provision is optional and member states have a discretion whether to implement it or 
131 The "consumer expectation" test: Mathewson 1993 L&P/8 1291. 
132 Art 6(2). 
133 Art 9. 
134 ECU refers to European Community (monetary) Units. 
135 Triaille 1993 CLSR 216; Hoffman ar.d Hiii-Arning 4. 
136 See ch 4 par 6.4 supra with regard to the institution of class actions. 
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not.137 
Pure economic loss is not recoverable under the EU Directive but may be claimed in 
terms of the applicable national law, if the latter permits such a claim. Recovery of 
non patrimonial damages, for example compensation for pain and suffering, is also 
not provided for in the EU Directive, but may, like economic loss, be claimed under 
the traditional product liability rules of the relevant country. 138 
8.3.6 Causality 
The plaintiff has to provide evidence of a causal link between the defective product 
and the damage. 139 The EU Directive does not give any explanation or instruction 
with regard to causation. The determination of a causal link is left to the different 
individual theories of causation of member states.140 Where the damage is caused 
both by a defect in the product as well as by the act or omission of a third party, the 
liability of the producer will not be reduced. 141 The producer's liability may be 
reduced or disallowed where there is contributory negligence by the victim. 142 
8.3.7 Exclusions of liability 
The EU Directive prohibits contractual disclaimers and limitations of the liability of "the 
137 Art 16. 
138 Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 9. 
139 Art 4. 
140 For example, the Netherlands use adequate causation: see part Ill par 8 2.2.4 
infra; Germany uses adequate causation: see part Ill par A 2.2.4 infra. 
141 Art 8(1). 
142 Art 8(2): See par 8.3.8 infra. 
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producer arising from this Directive in relation to the injured person". 143 Exemptions 
from liability arising from other grounds, for example a contract, remain valid. 
Furthermore, the prohibition of disclaimers are only applicable to the injured person, 
with the result that exemptions remain in effect between the different links of the 
production and distribution chain. 144 
8.3.8 Defences 
The EU Directive contains several defences which may be advanced by the producer. 
The producer's liability may be reduced or disallowed if the injury results from both 
a defect in the product and the fault of the injured person or of any person for whom 
the injured person is responsible. 145 The liability of the producer will, however, not 
be reduced if the damage is caused both by a defect in the product and by the act 
or omission of a third party. 146 A limitation period of three years from the date on 
which the claimant became aw~re of the damage, applies 147 and a ten-year period 
of repose which starts on the date which the producer put the product into circulation, 
is provided for in the EU Directive. 148 
The EU Directive provides the producer with the following absolute defences against 
143 Art 12. 
144 See Triaille 1993 CLSR 216. 
145 Art 8(2). This situation is also referred to as comparative negligence, which 
describes the incidence of taking the defendant's negligence into account when 
determining liability. See also the situation of contributory negligence of the 
plaintiff in the national systems investigated: part I pars A 2.4 and B 2.4 supra; 
part Ill pars A 2.3 and B 2.3 infra. 
146 Art 8 (1 ): See par 8.3.6 supra. 
147 Art 10. 
148 Art 11. 
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claims for damages: 149 
(a) The non-distribution-defence 
The producer is not liable if it is proved that someone else put the product into 
circulation. 150 The distribution of the defective product must be the result of a 
business decision of the producer; the latter will therefore not be liable in the case 
of theft of the product. 
(b) The later-defect-defence 
The producer is not liable if it is proved that, having regard to the circumstances, it 
is probable that the product was not defective when put into circulation. 151 The 
defect which caused the damage must have existed at a point in time which falls 
within the producer's sphere of influence. This defence does not aid the producer if 
a design defect exists or a failure to instruct is involved because such defects affect 
the product from the start of production. 
(c) The non-commercial-defence 
The producer is not liable if the product was not manufactured for sale or any other 
form of distribution for economic purposes, and was not manufactured or distributed 
in the course of the producer's business. 152 The first requirement exempts the 
producer from liability if it was not intended to make a profit from the products. In 
these cases the defective product is not an object of commercial activity. The 
149 Art 7. The titles of the defences are those used by Martinek 1995 TSAR 638-642. 
See also Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 7-9. 
150 Art 7(a). 
151 Art 7(b). 
152 Art 7(c). 
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underlying policy reason for this defence is that it is inappropriate to hold the 
producer strictly liable in circumstances where the liability risk and cost cannot be 
passed on to the consumer through the price of the product. However, the second 
requirement makes the producer liable the moment the product is manufactured in 
the course of her business, irrespective of whether she intended to make a profit or 
not. 153 
(d) The legal-compliance-defence 
The producer is not liable if the defect is due to compliance of the product with 
mandatory regulations issued by public authorities. 154 Martinek155 points out that 
this provision frees the producer from the dilemma of "either disobedience or liability". 
However, the defence cannot apply if the relevant regulations only prescribe a 
minimum standard; it must be mandatory, leaving the producer with no choice.156 
(e) The state-of-the-art-defence or development-risk-defence 
The producer is not liable for defects in a product which, in light of the state of 
sGientific and technical knowledge at the time when the product was put into 
circulation, was not such that the existence of the defect could be discovered. 157 
Member states are allowed a discretion in the implementation of this defence.158 
153 Cf Martinek 1995 TSAR 640. 
154 Art 7(d). 
155 1995 TSAR 640. 
156 Technical standards such as the German Industrial Standards (Deutsche Industria 
Normen: DIN), are not peremptory legal provisions but only voluntary 
recommendations unless they are referred to in a statute: see part Ill par A 5.5 
infra. See also the discussion with regard to ISO 9000 inch 6 par 5 infra. 
157 Art 7(e). 
158 Art 15(1)(b). 
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The option to exclude this defence in member state legislation is highly controversial 
as it is contrary to the EU Directive's allocation of burden of proof: the denial of the 
defence allows a plaintiff to litigate successfully if she can demonstrate that 
subsequent developments in scientific knowledge prove that the product had a defect 
when it was originally placed on the market. Permitting recovery against the producer 
in these circumstances actually contravenes article 6 of the EU Directive which 
qualifies the consumer's expectation standard by limiting it to that of product safety 
at the time the product was marketed. 159 If a member state decides to disallow this 
defence, the Commission must be so informed in order to convey this information to 
the other member states. 160 Of all the member states, only Luxembourg has 
declined to implement this defence. 161 
(f) The sub-supplier's defence 
Manufacturers of component parts are not liable if the defect is due to the design of 
the product into which the component has been fitted, or to the instructions given by 
the manufacturer of the finished product. 162 The producer of the finished product 
stays responsible to the consumer for all previous stages of production. 163 
8.4 Summary 
The EU Directive constitutes a strict products liability regime throughout the EU. This 
strict liability regime exists in addition to the other liability regimes already in 
159 See par 8.3.4 supra. Cf Mathewson 1993 L&P/8 1293. 
160 Art15(2). 
161 Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 9. 
162 Art 7(f). 
163 See Martinek 1995 TSAR641-642. 
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existence in the national legal systems of the member states. 164 Plaintiffs may 
therefore recover their losses in terms of different liability regimes. 165 In essence, 
the EU Directive provides that the producer, which includes any person involved in 
the chain of supply, even the importer, shall be liable to compensate victims for any 
personal injury or injury to private property caused wholly or in part by a defect in the 
product. 166 The plaintiff does not have to prove any negligence on the part of the 
producer, only that the product was defective, that the damage has occurred and that 
there is a causal link between the defect and the damage. 167 The damage which 
may be claimed for is limited to that caused by the death or personal injury of the 
victim, and to property of a type intended for private use, other than the defective 
product itself. 168 This liability towards the injured consumer may not be excluded 
or limited. 169 The Directive essentially protects consumers from harm caused by 
unsafe products, therefore the loss which is compensated is limited to personal and 
property injury and excludes any further consequential and economic loss. 
Various defences are provided for in the Directive, the development-risk-defence 
being the most important.170 The typical case groups of product defects that have 
crystallised under general product liability principles, are manufacturing defects, 
design defects and instruction defects (also referred to as "failure to warn" 
164 Mathewson 1993 L&PIB 1294. 
165 Mathewson 1993 L&P/8 1294 notes that this failure of the EU to eliminate other 
alternatives for consumer relief creates potential unpredictability regarding claims 
instituted under other regimes of liability, which is an obstacle to harmonization. 
166 See pars 8.3.1 8.3.3 8.3.5 supra. 
167 See par 8.3.6 supra. 
168 See par 8.3.5 supra. 
169 See par 8.3.7 supra. 
170 See par 8.3.8 (e) supra. 
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defects). 171 It must be noted that a manufacturing defect is established by the mere 
existence of such a defect, in that a product was manufactured which deviated from 
the specifications set by the producer herself. The latter two defects on the other 
hand can only be established taking into account the reasonableness of the conduct 
of the manufacturer. 172 Therefore, it has been stated that, in practice, these cases 
reintroduce fault-based elements of negligence into the strict product liability regime 
of the EU. 173 
Although the primary aim of the Directive is to constitute a uniform product liability 
regime, member states are allowed a choice in the implementation of three 
provisions, namely (i) the imposing of liability for primary agricultural products; 174 
(ii) disallowing the development-risk-defence; 175 and (iii) imposing the limit of 70 
million ECU on damages for personal injury caused by identical items with the same 
defect. 176 For purposes of software liability only the latter two choices are relevant 
and will be considered in further discussion. The EU Directive primarily protects the 
final consumer, as can be seen from the prohibition of contractual exemption of the 
producer's liability in relation to the injured party only. 177 
171 See par 8.3.8 supra. 
172 In terms of art 6 of the EU Directive a product is defective when it does not 
provide the safety which a person is entitled to expect, taking all the 
circumstances into account: see par 8.3.4 supra. The existence of a design 
defect is determined by reference to industry custom, usage, the state-of-the-art, 
economic factors and consumer expectations. In respect of an instruction fault or 
a failure to warn, the adequacy of the warning is determined with regard to the 
producer's knowledge of the danger to the customer: see Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 
7; Martinek 1995 TSAR 641. 
173 See Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 6-7; Martinek 1995 TSAR 643-644; Westerdijk 225. 
174 Par 8.3.2 supra. 
175 Par 8.3.8 supra. 
176 Par 8.3.5 supra. 
177 Par 8.3.7 supra. 
378 Chapter 5 Comparative law Part II 
9. The applicability of the EU Directive to software 
9.1 Introduction 
Because the EU Directive does not refer explicitly to software, its applicability thereto 
has to be established according to the general ambit of the Directive. 178 First of all 
it must be determined whether software is a product in terms of the EU Directive. 
Once that is established, the conditions for the application of the EU Directive as they 
would pertain to software, are investigated with a view to reach a conclusion in 
respect of ES liability incurred under the EU Directive's product liability regime. 179 
In this regard notice can be taken of the objectives of the EU Directive as they may 
serve as guidelines for the interpretation of the provisions of the EU Directive.180 
Furthermore, it must be determined whether software is tangible or intangible, and 
what effect the informational nature of software has on the provisions of the EU 
Directive. These questions must be determined in the light of the provisions of the 
EU Directive. 181 
9.1.1 Objectives of the EU Directive 
If it is accepted that the primary objective of the Directive is the protection of 
consumers, it can be argued that the inclusion of software within the meaning of a 
"product", is justified by the fact that such an interpretation would undeniably serve 
the interests of consumers. 182 
178 CfTriaille CL&P 1991 218-224 and 1993 CLSR 217-220; Davies 1993 CL&P 101-
1 02; Whittaker 1989 LQR 135-137; Stuurman 129-141; Westerdijk 89. 
179 Art 2: see par 8.3.2 supra. 
180 See par 9.2 infra. 
181 Triaille 1991 CL&P 222; Triaille 1993 CLSR 218. CfWesterdijk 90-92. 
182 It was already shown that ES software in particular has a great potential for injury 
to person and property: see par 9.3 supra. 
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9.1.2 Is software a product or a service? 
The Directive can only apply to software if software is a product and not a service. 
Another directive is being drafted to cover liability for defective services. 183 It was 
seen that the question whether software is a service or a product is solved in Anglo-
American law by applying the "essential nature test". 184 According to this test, the 
essence of the contract is examined to determine whether it constitutes the providing 
of a service, in which case the software is a service, or the delivering of a product, 
in which case it is regarded as a product. 185 Triaille argues that the "essence" of 
the contract is always precisely the tailored software which is delivered. 186 
According to him software always remains a product although the "making available" 
of the software may be in the form of a service. 187 He compares it to the way in 
which restaurants operate; they clearly provide a service but the food they serve 
remains a product. 188 
Regarding the argument advanced by some commentators that the distribution of 
standard software entails delivery of a product but custom software entails the 
rendering of a service, Triaille argues that in both instances the software at the end 
of the process consists of the same material qualities (the disks or a CD Rom) and 
points out that what is today custom - fitted can tomorrow become standardised and 
sold as package software on the mass-market. 189 He concludes by stating that, 
183 See par 3 supra. 
184 Ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 and ch 5 part I 8 1.2 supra. 
185 Ibid. However, policy considerations also play a role: see ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 and 
part I 8 1.2 supra. 
186 Reed(2) 74-75 and Konig 104 are of the same opinion. 
187 1993 CLSR 217; Westerdijk 92. 
188 Ibid. 
189 1993 CLSR 217. 
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although software may be the object of a service, it is not a service as such which 
can therefore be excluded from the scope of the EU Directive, in other words, the 
fact that software is sometimes provided in the context of a service situation, does 
not automatically exclude software from the scope of the EU Directive. 190 Triaille's 
view is in my opinion the correct one, software is a product whether it forms part of 
a service or not. 191 
9.1.3 Is software tangible? 
Although there is no reference to tangibility in the EU Directive, Triaille 192 concludes 
that the EU Directive is not applicable to intangible products. Therefore, if software 
is intangible the provisions of the EU Directive is not applicable thereto. Electricity 
is explicitly stated to be a product in the EU Directive, 193 which may lead to the 
interpretation that all other intangible things are excluded. 194 This interpretation is 
arrived at by arguing that if an ~xpress provision is necessary for a borderline case 
such as "electricity", it means that all other intangible products are excluded. 
Triaille 195 points out that the reason for the express provision is that electricity is 
considered as energy and not as a good or a product in some countries, and 
therefore no other meaning should be attached to it. He is of the opinion though, that 
the Directive is not applicable to intangible goods, because of the many other 
provisions that would be difficult to understand in the context of intangible products. 
For example, what would the meaning of raw materials used in the production 
190 Triaille 1993 CLSR 218. 
191 In terms of the EU Directive it is immaterial how the product is put at the disposal 
of the public: see par 8.3.2 supra. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Art 2. 
194 The unius inclusio est alterius exclusio - rule: see Steyn 50 et seq. 
195 1993 CLSR 218. 
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process referred to in article 3(1) be?; who would the producer or importer of 
immaterial goods be?; how would a trademark be affixed on it and what would 
constitute a component part?196 It therefore seems as if the Directive is only 
applicable to tangible goods because of the provisions mentioned in the previous 
paragraph and also because of the main objective of the EU Directive, which is to 
protect consumers from damage suffered from defective products. 197 
The tangibility of software is sometimes inferred from the distinction between the 
software's material support (the program disks or the CD Rom) and the content (the 
information contained in the software itself). It is then contended that the former is 
material and thus a product but the latter is immaterial and not a product. 198 
Consequently, the EU Directive would apply in cases where damage is caused by a 
defect in the support material but not by a defect in the information contained in the 
software. In situations where software is transferred independently of material 
support by means of cable, radio, etcetera, the EU Directive will then not be 
applicable, but if the software is incorporated into a material support, the EU Directive 
will apply. 199 Such a distinction may lead to very unfair results for the victim to 
whom it really makes no difference in what form the software is acquired. This 
argument loses sight of the fact that a computer program at its origin, is always 
integrated on a material support, whether it is part of the hardware or on disk, 
etcetera. 
Of greater importance is the distinction between the medium and the information 
contained in the medium, and the damage that may be caused by a defect in the 
medium and the information respectively. 200 Although the physical medium of 
196 Ibid. 
197 See par 9.1.1 supra. 
198 Triaille 1993 CLSR 219. See also ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra. 
199 See Triaille 1993 CLSR 219. 
200 Triaille 1991 CLSR 219. 
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software such as a disk, is easily covered by the definition of a tangible product, it is 
difficult to imagine damages caused exclusively by the medium. As the medium does 
not ordinarily possess any dangerous parts such as sharp edges, etcetera which can 
injure a person, damage to a person or property cannot easily be imagined. However, 
such a medium will be defective if it does not provide the safety which a person is 
entitled to expect and a person who consequently suffers damage of a type covered 
by the EU Directive will obtain compensation after establishing a causal link between 
such a defect and the damage.201 What is much more likely to envisage, is 
damage caused by the application of the contents of the medium, namely the 
information contained in the software, for example personal injury caused by taking 
the wrong medicine prescribed by a defective ES. The question then arises whether 
it can be said that the information is a product which causes damage when defective, 
or whether damage is only caused through the intervention of a human, raising the 
issue of causality.202 
The argument is also advanced that because the main importance of software lies in 
the intangible contents of the medium consisting of "information", the medium such 
as the disks, etcetera through which the information is transferred, is not indicative 
o~ the true nature of software, therefore software as a whole is intangible and cannot 
be· regarded as a product.203 Apart from the fact that this argument is difficult to 
reconcile with the situation of books and audio cassettes, which are clearly products, 
it loses sight of the way in which information manifests itself.204 To argue that 
software is intangible because it consists of intangible information, loses sight of the 
fact that although the information is beyond the perception of human beings, it does 
201 See par 8.3.5 supra. 
202 See par 9.2.3 infra. 
203 See ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra. 
204 Triaille 1993 CLSR 217. 
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not mean that there is no material substance. 205 Rights, for example intellectual 
property rights and ownership rights, do not have material substance and cannot have 
an impact in the material world except through human intervention. Such rights are 
immaterial and intangible by nature. 206 However, the same is not true in the case 
of software; once it is introduced to a computer, changes that are "material" and 
"tangible" are definitely brought about: in a personal computer words will appear on 
the screen and may be printed on paper; 207 and in the case of a robot, the 
software will effect functioning and movement.208 In this regard the functional 
distinction in software is important: software with a material outpuf09 may directly 
cause damage whereas software with an intellectual outpuf10 can only cause 
damage through the actions of a human user.211 According to Triaille, 212 software 
with a material output amounts to a product but software with an intellectual output 
is not a product. 
Geldenhuys'213 theory with regard to information concurs with the above outline: 
Information originates firstly in a person's cognitive thought, thereafter it is presented 
in some or other form depending on the kind of information. Information that is 
manifested in an "information carrier" that has a material substance is a product, 
205 Ibid. 
206 Triaille 1993 CLSR 218. 
207 Thus this would create a so called "hard copy". 
208 This dual character of software, in that it is at the same time a list of instructions 
as well as a device which will effect the working of a machine (like a mechanical 
device) is unique and in a sense, responsible for all the discussion on the means 
for legal protection: Triaille 1993 CLSR 218 et seq. 
209 Eg the ES Machine: see ch 2 par 1 0.1.2 supra. 
210 Eg the Intelligent Assistant: see ch 2 par 10.1.2 supra. 
211 See ch 2 par 1 0.1.2 supra and par 9.2.3 infra. 
212 1993 CLSR 220. 
213 Geldenhuys 531; see also ch 2 par 9.1 supra. 
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unlike information manifested in an information carrier that does not have a material 
substance, for example an immaterial property right. 214 By definition, software must 
then always be tangible as the instructions it consists of are necessarily materialised 
in some or other form, otherwise it would not be software but still only information 
residing in the brain. 215 
Westerdijk216 distinguishes software, which he defines as instructions to a computer, 
from "instructive information", which he defines as instructions to a human,217 and 
is of the opinion that whereas the former may be a product for purposes of strict 
liability in terms of the EU Directive, the latter (which he calls an "information 
product")218 is not: 
De nadruk dient hierbij echter sterk te liggen op de directheid van de 
sturende kracht en de daardoor veroorzaakte schade. Software kan zonder 
menslijke tussenkomst schade veroorzaken; bij instructies gericht tot de 
mens is dit echter nimmer het geval. lnformatie in het algemeen, of 
instructies in het bijzonder sturen en be'invloeden slechts de wilsvorming. In 
het laatste geval doet zich pas schade voor indien een mens op basis van 
die instructies tot handelen overgaat. De schade word derhalve op indirecte 
wijze veroorzaakt door de instructies. In dat geval kan mijn inziens niet 
worden geconcludeerd dat de instructies de hoedanigheid van een produkt 
aannemen. 
However, the situation becomes more complicated in cases where the instructive 
214 Ibid. 
215 Cf Van der Merwe ix who points out the remarkable distortive effect that the 
misconception of the true nature of information in relation to things (or objects) has 
had not only in our in law, but in other legal systems as well. According to Van der 
Merwe 1985 SACC 132 the inability of the SA common law rules of theft to deal 
with incorporeal things originate from the rigid classification of subjective rights 
adopted from the German Pandectists. The solution offered by Van der Merwe is 
to include incorporeal things within the category of things that may be stolen. 
216 At 4. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Westerdijk 206. 
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information is derived from the use of software, in other words where the software 
consists of instructive information.219 According to Westerdijk,220 such software 
does not automatically qualify as a product to which the strict product liability 
provisions of the EU Directive applies, it may constitute an information product to 
which the EU Directive is not applicable. In such cases it must be established 
whether the information was generated by the software itself (door software 
gegenereerde informatie), as in the case of artificially intelligent programs such as 
ES's, 221 or whether the information was generated by the individual and only made 
accessible through software, as in the case of, for example, a database program 
(door software toegankelijk gemaakte software). Westerdijk222 is of the opinion that 
software in the first-mentioned instances constitutes a product to which product 
liability applies but software referred to in the second type of cases amounts to 
information products to which product liability does not apply.223 Although Triaille 
is also of the opinion that the EU Directive is not meant to apply to information, he 
does concede that there are different categories of information which makes it 
impossible to apply a single rule of liability.224 "Information" must therefore be 
clearly distinguished from "software". 
In conclusion it seems that most commentators are in agreement that the software 
and its medium constitute a tangible product to which the EU Directive applies, but 
that the information contained within the software-medium is intangible and cannot 
219 Westerdijk 208. 
220 Ibid. 
221 Westerdijk 210. 
222 At210242. 
223 This conclusion is also closely related to the issue of causality which is discussed 
later: see par 9.2.3 infra. 
224 1991 CL&P 222 223. 
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always be regarded as a product. 225 In cases where the information in the software 
effects a material output it should be regarded as a product. In cases where the 
information in the software leads to an intellectual output it must be ascertained 
whether the software itself generated the information, in which case it is a product to 
which product liability principles applies in case of damage, or whether the 
information was generated by the human user with the help of the software, in which 
case it is not a product but intangible information to which product liability principles 
do not apply.226 In my view all software is tangible and should be regarded as 
products as I believe that the information contained in software is always manifested 
in some or other material form. 227 
9.2 Conditions for the application of the Directive to software 
In the previous paragraph it was established that software is a product within the 
ambit of the EU Directive.228 In order to claim compensation in terms of this 
Directive, the injured party has to prove that the software is defective, that the type 
of damage suffered is covered by the EU Directive, and that a causal link exists 
between the defect in the software and the damage suffered. 229 
225 There is some authority for the opinion that the Commission itself confirmed this 
view in an answer to a Member's question on this issue in Parliament, to which the 
Commission stated that the directive does apply to software: Triaille 1993 CLSR 
220; Westerdijk 78-80. However, a binding interpretation for a directive can only 
be given by the ECJ: see par 6 supra. 
226 According to Westerdijk 210 these types of software consist of instructive 
information generated by a human and only made more accessible through the 
use of the software. 
227 See also Geldenhuys' theory regarding "information carriers" discussed above. 
228 Par 9.1 supra. 
229 See par 8 supra. 
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9.2.1 Defective software 
In terms of the EU Directive,230 software is defective when it does not provide the 
safety which a person is entitled to expect when taking into account: 
• the presentation of software, which may refer to the users's manual as 
well as the screen display; 
• the use to which the software could reasonably be expected to be put, 
which in the case of safety-related software may require stricter criteria, 
especially in applications where human lives may be endangered, for 
example in aircraft piloting systems or in medical apparatus;231 and 
• the time when the software was put into circulation. 
With regard to the time factor, it must be noted that the safety to be expected from 
software may evolve as rapidly as does the development of software.232 However, 
there may also be an arrangement whereby regularly updated programs are delivered 
(maintenance agreement),233 in which case the time factor will not diminish the 
producer's liability in the course of time. However, a software program may not be 
regarded as defective just because a newer version is more effective, something 
which happens often in the case of software.234 The problem with the notion of 
defective software is the fact that it is universally accepted that software is never 
230 Art 6: see par 8.3.4 supra. 
231 See ch 2 par 4 supra. 
232 Triaille 1993 CSLR 20. 
233 See ch 3 par 2.6.2.2 supra. 
234 Art 6(2): see par 8.3.4 supra. 
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100% bug-free.235 The degree of safety which one can expect is, therefore, a 
policy issue. 
A software producer may advance the "state-of-the-art-" or the "development-risk-
defence"236 against a claim based on defective software if such defence is 
maintained in the relevant national legislation.237 In terms of the development-risk-
defence, a software producer will not be liable if it is proved that the state of scientific 
and technical knowledge at the time when the software was put into circulation, was 
not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered.238 There must 
be no possibility at all that the defect could have been discovered.239 If it is 
accepted that there is no software which is 100% bug-free, it follows that it is 
impossible to guarantee beforehand that a program does not contain any defect.240 
Consequently, producers of software may almost always have the development-risk-
defence available for damage caused by bugs in their software as the state-of-the-art 
in software technology is such that a defect cannot easily be prevented. The 
availability of this defence contradicts the strict liability nature of the EU Directive 
regime.241 
Standardisation and certification of software has the following impact on the liability 
235 Computer scientists agree that it is absolutely impossible to guarantee in advance 
that a program will not contain any defect: Triaille 1993 CLSR 221; Stuurman 141; 
Tapper 257; Reed(2) 68. 
236 See par 8.3.8 supra. 
237 In terms of art 15(1 )(b) of the EU Directive, member states have a discretion 
whether to retain the development-risk-defence in their national law or not: see par 
8.3.8 supra. 
238 Art ?(e). 
239 Triaille 1993 CSLR 221; Westerdijk 278. 
240 Triaille 1993 CLSR 221; Stuurman 141; Tapper 257; Reed(2) 68. 
241 See par 8.3.8 (e) supra. 
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of software producers in terms of the EU Directive: 
If the defect in the software is due to a mandatory standard issued by public 
authorities, the software producer cannot be held liable due to the availability of the 
legal-compliance-defence,242 but a claim may be instituted against the 
standardisation body.243 If a producer has voluntarily followed existing standards 
such as DIN244 or ISO 9000,245 and a defect which causes damage nevertheless 
occurs, it can be argued that the software would probably not be considered defective 
in terms of the provisions of the EU Directive, 246 as it may be expected that such 
existing standards represent the current prevailing state of technical art as well as the 
level of safety which the user is entitled to expect in terms of the consumer 
expectation test.247 However, compliance with voluntary standards does not ipso 
facto exclude liability or constitute a development-risk-defence if it can be shown that 
the producer should have taken more precautions. 248 
Certified software which does not comply with the requirements of the certificate will 
be considered defective as the certificate forms part of the "presentation of the 
product", 249 and people are entitled to rely on such a certificate.250 Defective 
software that causes damage even though it does comply with the certification 
242 Art 7(d): see par 8.3.8 supra. 
243 Cf Triaille 1993 CSLR 221; Martinek 1995 TSAR 640-641. 
244 Deutche lndustrie Normen (German technical standards): see part Ill par A 5.5 
infra. 
245 International Standards Organisation 9000: see ch 6 par 5 infra. 
246 Art 6.1. 
247 See par 8.3.4 supra. 
248 Triaille 1993 CSLR 221; Martinek 1995 TSAR 640. 
249 In terms of art 6.1 (a) of the EU Directive: see par 8.3.4 supra. 
250 Triaille 1993 CSLR 221. 
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requirements, would entitle the producer to rely on the development-risk-defence as 
it can be said that "everything has been done but nothing could be detected". 251 
9.2.2 Damage caused by software 
The application of the EU Directive to software is limited by its definition of damage, 
namely only damage caused by death, personal injury and damage to private 
property. 252 Software programs which cause financial loss only {pure economic 
loss) are not covered by the EU Directive.253 The type of damage covered by the 
EU Directive is frequently caused in a direct way by software with a material output 
such as is found in a software-driven robot or machine,254 whereas software with 
an intellectual output which serves as a source of information, rarely causes direct 
damage to health or property.255 However, in the latter case damage may be 
caused indirectly through the actions of the user following a decision based on the 
information received from the software. An example is the patient who suffers bodily 
injury as a result of taking incorrect medicine prescribed by a doctor using a defective 
drug-dispensing ES as an aid. In these cases the question arises whether a sufficient 
causal link exists between the defect in the software and the damage caused.256 
9.2.3 Causality in cases of defective software 
In the case of software effecting a material output, physical damage can be caused 
251 Triaille 1993 CLSR 222. 
252 Art 9. 
253 Art 9: see par 8.3.5 supra. 
254 Eg the ES Machine: see ch 2 par 11 supra. 
255 ES software such as the type embodied in the Intelligent Assistant, may indirectly 
cause personal injury in the case of a MES, for example: see ch 2 par 4.2 supra. 
256 See par 9.2.3 infra. 
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directly by defective software. 257 As explained earlier,258 such software is usually 
incorporated in a machine, and the activation of the software sets the machine in 
motion or to work?59 The software has the same function as a mechanical device, 
therefore a direct causal link can be established between the defective software and 
damage incurred because of it. In the case of software with an intellectual output, 260 
Triaille261 states that physical damage can only result from a decision based on the 
information given to the user of the program, therefore it cannot be said that the 
software caused the damage, as the intervening user always effects a break in the 
causal chain. 262 According to Triaille/63 product liability is only meant to apply 
to software with material outputs and not to software with intellectual outputs. To 
hold otherwise would mean that product liability should be applied to all instances 
where information is given to a user, whether in the form of a book or even through 
the services of an information provider such as a doctor or lawyer. 264 In other 
words, what Triaille actually means is that software with an intellectual output 
amounts to "information" which cannot be regarded as a product. 265 This view of 
257 See ch 2 par 10.1.2 supra. 
258 Ibid. 
259 Eg the ES Machine: see ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
260 An output consisting of information that does not bring about a direct material 
output: see ch 2 par 1 0.1.2 supra. 
261 1993 CLSR 223. 
262 Triaille 1991 CL&P 220; 1993 CSLR 221. In other words, the intervening user 
constitutes a novus actus which breaks the chain of causation: see ch 6 par 5.3 
infra. 
263 1993 CLSR 223. 
264 Triaille 1991 CL&P 223. 
265 See also the opinion of Westerdijk 9 who regards some software with an 
intellectual output as an information product (instructieve informatie) which cannot 
be regarded as a product for the purposes of product liability, and some software 
as a product to which the principles of product liability apply: see par 1.3 supra. 
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software with an intellectual output lies at the heart of all contention with regard to 
software as a product. 266 As stated earlier, the classification of software such as 
an ES of the type embodied in the Intelligent Assistant which essentially provides a 
service, as a product, confuses the the traditional policy issues that exist with regard 
to a product and a service. 267 In my view this distinction between the different 
types of output in software is just as irrelevant as the distinction between the 
tangibility and intangibility of software in the determination of a product for the 
purposes of product liability. A product should be defined as any object or res which 
complies with the objectives of the policy reasons behind the applicability of a special 
regime for product liability principles, namely that of a commodity available to the 
public on the commercial market which should be safe to use and for which the 
producer or manufacturer is in the best position to detect and prevent defects causing 
damage and to absorb and spread the risk of such damage. 268 
Triaille also fails to distinguish between the two different types of intellectual output 
as pointed out by Westerdijk, 269 namely an intellectual output generated by the 
software itself which brings about a direct effect without assistance by a human user, 
and an intellectual output which is actually generated by the human user with the 
assistance of the software and treats all software with an intellectual output in the 
same manner. An example of the first type of intellectual output is found in ES's and 
other AI programs which give the solution to the user (in other words the 
information is generated by the software itself - beslissingssturend software),270 
whereas examples of the second type are found in more conventional software 
applications such as a database or an informational retrieval system, etcetera which 
266 See ch 2 par 1 0.1.2 supra, ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra, ch 5 part I pars A 1.2 and 
8 1.2 supra, part Ill pars A 1.2 and 8 1.2 infra. 
267 See ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra. 
268 See Stuurman 131. 
269 At 206 242: see par 9.1.3 supra. 
270 Westerdijk 242; see also par 9.1.3 supra. 
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enables the user to work out the solution (in other words the information is 
generated by the human user - beslissingsondersteunend software).271 Triaille272 
is of the opinion that in all cases of software with an intellectual output, the causal 
chain between the software's output and the damage is broken to such an extent that 
it is rather the personal or professional liability of the user than the product liability 
of the producer, that is at stake. Triaille273 admits though, that the fact that the EU 
Directive specifically provides for the situation where damage is caused both by a 
defect in the product as well as by the act or omission of a third party and precludes 
a reduction of the producer's liability in such a case, 274 could be interpreted as an 
objection to his opinion.275 This provision could mean that the producer of a book 
or a computer program would still be strictly liable for the damage caused to the 
client-consumer in the event that a third party such as a doctor causes damage to the 
client-consumer by using erroneous information contained in the book or in the 
computer program. 276 However, he negates this possibility because of two reasons, 
the first being the fact that, ln his opinion, the EU Directive is only applicable to 
damage caused by physical objects and not to damage caused by intangible 
information, and secondly, because the provision could merely be dealing with a case 
of double causality. 277 If information was included in the scope of the EU Directive, 
the notion of causality would have· to be understood in a broad sense which could 
lead to far reaching consequences: would the legal advice of a lawyer amount to a 
product if the information is printed on paper? What about the plans and design of an 
271 Ibid. 
272 1993 CLSR 223. 
273 1993 CLSR 221. 
274 Art 8(1 ): see par 8.3.6 supra. 
275 Triaille 1993 CLSR 221. 
276 Triaille 1991 CL&P 221. The objective of this provision is clearly to protect the 
end-consumer of the product and to ensure an action against the producer of the 
defective product. 
277 Ibid. 
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architect? The system would then be applicable to many traditional services, which 
is surely not the intention of the EU legislator. 278 Triaille279 concludes by stating 
that information is not a single category to which the same system of liability can be 
applied, the whole context in which the information is provided must be considered 
in order to decide which system of liability should be applied. 280 According to him 
an ES amounts to information to which the EU Directive does not apply, because to 
hold otherwise would mean that the author (the producer) of for example, a MES 
would be held strictly liable in situations where a doctor, rendering the same advice 
as that generated by the MES, would only be held liable on the grounds of 
negligence.281 The application of a strict liability regime to such new products as 
ES's could also hinder new technological development.282 In my view, Triaille 
correctly states that information cannot be classified in a single category but it is my 
contention that software, including ES's of the type embodied in the Intelligent 
Assistant, is not information and constitutes a product. Whether the software as a 
product has caused the damage in a given situation depends on the circumstances 
and is a question of causation which is to be determined in terms of the national 
legal system's theory of causation. 
Westerdijk283 convincingly argues that the question of causality in these cases 
depends firstly, as already shown, on the type of intellectual output effected, and 
secondly, in the case of software akin to a product, on the foreseeable use of that 
278 The EU is considering a Directive specifically for services: see par 3 supra. 
279 1991 CL&P 222. 
280 The USA treatment of software liability also illustrates that there cannot be a 
uniform theory of product liability -the discussion involving software products take 
into account the way in which the software was developed, the form in which it is 
distributed, the parties involved in the production, and the type of application: see 
part I par B 1.2 supra. See also Stuurman 131 et seq. 
281 Triaille 1991 CL&P 223. 
282 Ibid. 
283 At 243. 
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software. The foreseeable use to which such software can be put may lie in 
supporting decision making (beslissingsondersteunend) or directing decision making 
(beslissingssturend). 284 An example of software that is beslissingsondersteunend 
would be an MES which is used by a doctor in determining the appropriate treatment 
for a patient. 285 In such cases the doctor would use the MES as a tool or an aid 
which, together with other aids and the doctor's inherent expert knowledge, would 
enable her to come to a professional decision during the rendering of professional 
services. When damage occurs because of wrong advice given by a doctor relying 
on a defective ES, it cannot be said that the defective software directly caused the 
damage, the doctor's professional intervention breaks the chain of causation in these 
circumstances.286 Consequently, there is no causality between the damage and the 
defective ES and therefore, according to Westerdijk,287 such an ES cannot be 
regarded as a product for purposes of product liability. An example of 
beslissingssturend software would be an MES produced and distributed for use by 
lay-persons to furnish them with a diagnosis without having to go to the doctor, the 
so-called "doc-in-a-box" kind of system?88 In these cases there are no intervening 
doctors rendering a professional opinion, the ES itself comes to a decision upon 
which the user acts. When such a user consequently suffers harm because of wrong 
advice given by the defective ES, damage was caused directly by the ES, leaving the 
causal chain intact. Such software can therefore be regarded as products to which 
product liability applies.289 
284 Westerdijk 243. 
285 Eg an ES of the "Intelligent Assistant" type: see ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
286 The doctor may have acted negligently in relying on the defective ES which could 
lead to a malpractice claim against her: see ch 6 par 6 infra. 
287 Ibid. 
288 Eg an ES of the type illustrated by the "Self-Help System": see ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
289 Westerdijk 243. 
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For Westerdijk,290 the difference between the two types of software with intellectual 
outputs lies in the direct effect or not of the output on the damage. In the first 
example of beslissingsondersteunend software a direct effect does not exist between 
the software and the damage, but in the second example of beslissingssturend 
software, a direct effect does exist with no break in the chain of causation between 
the defect and the damage. Westerdijk's argument that product liability provisions 
should not be applicable to software supporting decision-making, but only to software 
directing decision-making, is really based on the break in the causal chain between 
the defect and the damage, and not because the supporting decision making software 
cannot be regarded as a product. 
In my opinion the different intellectual outputs of the two types of software do not 
have anything to do with their nature. Both are products, marketed and distributed as 
such, the only difference between them lies in the way they are used. In the case of 
software that supports decision making, the final decision upon which the conduct is 
based is made by the human user and not by the software system, therefore it cannot 
be said that only the defect in the product caused the damage. It also seems as if 
the EU Directive specifically provides for this type of situation by not allowing the 
liability of the producer to be reduced when damage is caused both by a defect in the 
product and the conduct of a third party.291 This means that in the case of harm 
caused through the use of a defective ES the liability of the producer of the defective 
software will not be reduced because of the user's negligence in relying on the 
software. In other words, the producer still incurs product liability towards the injured 
party, irrespective of the conduct of an intervening user. As against the injured party, 
the producer's liability may be reduced or even totally disallowed where there is 
contributory negligence on the part of the injured person.292 
290 Ibid. 
291 Art 8(1) EU Directive 85/374. 
292 Art 8(2) EU Directive 85/374. 
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9.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion it seems that software which does not amount to pure information and 
does not constitute the rendering of a service can be regarded as a product in terms 
of the EU Directive. If all the requirements for liability in terms of the EU Directive are 
met, the producers of such defective software will be liable for certain damage 
incurred by such defects.293 In the many cases of defective software leading to 
pure economic loss only, the strict liability principles of the EU Directive will not be 
applicable as a result of the limitation of the regime to damage consisting of personal 
injury and injury to private property. 294 In cases where the latter types of damage 
are incurred, the product liability regime instituted by the EU Directive puts the injured 
user in the favourable position of not having to prove the producer's fault with regard 
to the defective software,295 and of being able to institute a claim for damages 
against a much wider circle of liable persons, irrespective of any exemption clauses 
contained in standard form contracts.296 Because of the ability in terms of the EU 
Directive to hold the producer of a defective component part of a product liable for 
damage caused by the use of such a product in its entirety,297 it is possible to hold 
the author of the defective part of the software liable for the damage caused.298 If 
the supplier of software is unable to identify the author responsible, the supplier will 
be ·liable for the damage caused, and so too will the importer of the product into the 
EU.2ss 
293 See par 9.2.1 supra. 
294 See par 9.2.2 supra. 
295 See par 9.2.1 supra. 
296 See pars 8.3.1 and 8.3.3 supra. 
297 See par 8.3.3 supra. 
298 Eg the DA in case of a defect in the knowledge base of the ES. 
299 Ibid. 
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It is submitted that the application of the EU Directive to software should not be 
determined by the technical and commercial peculiarities of software, as technology 
changes too fast to make it practical to have legal liability depend on such 
technicalities. Furthermore, it makes no difference to the victims whether software 
was acquired in the form of a standard package or custom made software, or whether 
it is tangible or not, they are only aware of the damage it caused. 
10. Application to expert systems 
In the case of harm suffered because of a defective ES, the victim may institute a 
claim for damages in terms of the product liability principles adopted by the relevant 
member state in pursuance of the EU Directive, if all the necessary requirements 
have been met. 300 This means, in the first instance, that the ES must be a 
product.301 According to the principles set out above,302 the types of ES's 
identified in this studyl03 will q• •alify as products for purposes of product liability in 
terms of the EU Directive whenever the software does not constitute the providing of 
a service and a material output is effected.304 In the case of ES's effecting an 
intellectual output, commentators are of the opinion that the EU Directive will not be 
applicable. One commentator requires a further distinction to be made in software 
with an intellectual output, namely between a software system that generates a 
decision by itself (decision directing software) which is a product, and a software 
system that facilitates a decision by the user (decision supporting software) which is 
not a product. 305 As the ECJ has not decided any cases on this issue yet, the final 
300 See par 8.3 supra. 
301 See par 9.1.2 supra. 
302 See par 9.1.3 supra. 
303 See ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
304 Eg the ES Machine: see ch 2 par 11 supra. 
305 See pars 9.1.3 9.2.3 supra. 
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position remains uncertain. By definition, the Self-Help System belongs to the first 
group306 and is therefore a product to which the provisions of the EU Directive are 
applicable, and the Intelligent Assistant belongs to the second group, 307 which 
means that such ES's cannot be regarded as products and therefore the EU Directive 
principles cannot be applied to claims arising from them. 308 Even if ES's of the type 
embodied in the Intelligent Assistant are regarded as products, as is my 
submission, 309 product liability would not follow automatically in the case of damage 
caused by such a system, as the existence of a causal link will have to be 
established first. 310 If such ES's are products to which the EU Directive product 
liability principles apply, the producer will be liable for the victim's personal and 
private property damage sustained irrespective of the negligent conduct of an 
intervening user.311 Liability of the producer towards the intervening professional 
user will seldom arise as the type of damage ordinarily sustained by the latter falls 
outside the ambit of the EU Directive. 312 Because it is accepted that software 
cannot be completely error-free, the determination of defective software is a policy 
decision in which the adherence to current software standards and the adoption of 
a certified quality assurance system during the production of software indicates that 
the software complies with the consumer expectation test. 313 In such cases the 
306 The Self-Help System is an interactive ES produced for in-home use by lay-
persons to advise them on professional and other matters: see ch 2 par 11 supra. 
307 The Intelligent Assistant is an interactive ES produced for use by a professional 
person as a tool or decision-aid in the practising of her profession: see ch 2 par 
11 supra. 
308 According to Triaille and Westerdijk: see par 9.2.3 supra. 
309 See par 9.2.3 supra. 
310 Ibid. 
311 Due to the provisions of Art 8(1) of the EU Directive: see par 9.2.3 supra. 
312 The professional person will more likely sustain economic injury as a result of the 
defective software, and commercially-used property is excluded from the ambit of 
the Directive: see par 8.3.5 supra. 
313 See par 9.2.1 supra. 
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producer will in all probability succeed with the development-risk-defence in that the 
state of scientific development is such that, notwithstanding appropriate standards· 
and assurance systems having been followed, the defect could not have been 
detected. 
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CHAPTER 5 
PART Ill: CONTINENTAL LEGAL SYSTEMS 
A. Germany 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Tortious liability 
1.1.1 General 
The German legal system is dominated by legislation in the form of codes which must 
be applied in the light of the Basic law of the German constitution (Grundgesetz).1 
The German civil code2 unified and codified all German civil law and is still 
applicable after the unification of East Germany with the German Democratic 
Republic. The law of the Federal Republic was almost completely adopted in the new 
Lander (states of Germany) and the BGB applies to all transactions concluded after 
3· October 1990 in all parts of Germany. Transactions concluded before this date 
remain subject to the East German civil code. 3 The codified system has been 
criticized because the provisions do not reflect the social and economic concerns of 
modern times and there is no opportunity for flexible interpretation as the courts are 
only expected to apply the law and not to interpret it. 4 
1 For a general overview of German legal history and legal development, see Foster 
1-29; Zweigert and Kotz 138-162; Markesinis 1-8. 
2 Burger/iches Gesetzbuch: BGB. 
3 Zivilgesetzbuch: ZGB. 
4 Foster 54. 
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Germany's membership of the EU5 leading to the reception of EU law in Germany, 
has had a prominent influence on the German legal system.6 The influence of EU 
law is of particular importance in determining ES liability in the light of the EU 
Directive on Product Liability7 which effected a new products liability regime in 
German tort law.8 
German tort law is based on a system of compensation and the Code provides for 
claims for damages for personal injury9 as well as property damage. 1° Claims may 
be instituted for pecuniary loss, including loss of earnings, as well as for non-
pecuniary loss which includes pain and suffering. 11 However, social security and 
private insurance is effecting a change in the primary aim of tort law, which is to 
compensate the victim, as most of the personal injury litigation is undertaken not by 
the latter, but by die Kasse or die Gesellschaft as subrogees. 12 
5 European Union: see ch 5 part II supra. 
6 An example is EU Directive 85/37 4 which was implemented via the 
Produkthaftungsgesetz: PHG of 1989: see par 5.6 infra. EU law has supremacy 
over all inconsistent national law: lntemationale Hande/sgesel/schaft [1974] 2 
· CMLR 540; Re Kloppenberg [1988] 3 CMLR 1. See also part II par 6.2 supra; 
Foster 59-63; Steiner 42-53. 
7 85/374. 
8 See par 5.6 infra. 
9 Par 842-7 BGB. 
1 0 Par 848-51 BGB. 
11 Markesinis 913 et seq. 
12 In such circumstances, compensation rules are replaced by rules allocating risks 
and costs: Markesinis 908; Zekoll 1989 AJCL 817. 
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1.1.2. Forms of liability 
Based upon the Gemeines Recht, German tort law also13 has its roots in Roman law 
where the most important forms of delictual liability arose from iniuria, furtum and the 
lex Aquilia. 14 Delictual liability is regulated in the delict provisions of the BGB in 
paragraphs 823-852 under the title of Unerlaubte Handlungen in the book on 
Schuldverhaltnisse. 15 German law does not have only a general delictual ground 
of liability on which a claim for damages can be based, nor is it made up of various 
types of torts casuistically developed as in Anglo-American tort law. 16 Instead, the 
BGB compromises by providing for three basic types of tortious liability in paragraphs 
823 I, 823 II and 826 BGB (Unerlaubte Handlung im eng Sinne) as well as containing 
provisions for some specifically defined tortious situations. 17 Instances of strict 
liability are regulated in specific statutes not incorporated in the BGB.18 In order to 
identify all the relevant causes of action that may arise from damage caused by the 
use of ES's, 19 the liability for unlawful actions of other persons (vicarious liability), 
13 Similar to the South African law of delict: Neethling et at 8. 
14 Zweigert and Katz 291. 
15 Jauemig et a/973-1 058; Medicus 330-405; Markesinis 12-17; Zweigert and Katz 
292-296. 
16 For the history of German tort law in general, see Zweigert and Katz 291-299; 
Markesinis 21-27. 
17 For example the seduction of a woman (par 825 BGB) and liability for defective 
buildings (par 836 BGB): Zweigert and Katz 293; Markesinis 23-24 676-692; 
Medicus 400-404 352 353-355 376-378 382-384; Staudinger 824 447-496 498-
504; Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 30-32. 
18 For example the Luftverkehrsgesetz (Air Traffic Act) of 1936, the 
Strassenverkehrsgesetz (Road Traffic Act) of 1952 and the Arzneimittelgesetz 
(Pharmaceutical Products Act) of 1976: Cf Markesinis 692-710; Medicus 331 381 
385-393. 
19 The various legal relationships involved was pointed out inch 2 par 10.2 supra. 
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regulated by the provisions of paragraph 831 BGB is also considered.20 
The three basic types of liability regulate liability that arises as a result of injury 
caused in an unlawful and blameworthy manner which violates a legal interest of the 
victim, 21 the contravention of a protective law, 22 and the intentional causing of 
unlawful damage;23 vicarious liability is also discussed.24 Liability in terms of 
paragraph 826 BGB is not relevant to this discussion of ES liabilities because of the 
element of intention. 25 
1.1.3 Joint wrongdoers 
In terms of paragraphs 830 I and II BGB, joint wrongdoers ( Gesamtschuldner) who 
acted in common design are jointly and severally liable for damage caused 
irrespective of their individual contribution.26 The situation with regard to several 
concurrent wrongdoers (Nebentaterschaft)27 is not specifically provided for in the 
BGB, but according to Markesinis, it will be treated similarly to joint wrongdoers which 
20 On vicarious liability in general, cf Markesinis 676-685; Medicus 375-378; 
Zweigert and Kotz 324-330. 
21 · Par 823 I BGB. 
22 Par 823 II BGB. 
23 Par 826 BGB. 
24 Par 831 BGB. 
25 Liability for intentional conduct is excluded from the scope of this study: ch 1 par 
1.4 supra. Martinek points out that although par 826 BGB can serve as a basis for 
tortious product liability, its application is in practice restricted to very few cases: 
1995 TSAR 630-631. The reason is that the provision requires the defendant to 
have caused the damage in a wilful and malicious manner with a high degree of 
reprehensibility, which is not commonly found in the situation of product liability. 
26 Markesinis 906; Medicus 407-409. 
27 This refers to the situation where several wrongdoers caused the whole or part of 
the damage without being in consort. 
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means that in the absence of proof of what damage each tortfeasor caused, the 
courts will hold all of them responsible for the full extent of the damage.28 
Contribution among wrongdoers is possible in terms of paragraph 840 BGB. 29 
1.2 Software liability 
In the case of damage caused by the wrongful and negligent use of an ES, liability 
in terms of paragraph 823 I 8GB, which is analogous to the general delictual action 
in South African law,30 may ensue if an infringement of one of the protected rights 
specified in paragraph 823 I BGB has taken place.31 This action will be available 
to the plaintiff in case of damage caused by a defective ES, the incorrect use of an 
ES as well as the non-use of an ES. However, although cases involving delictual 
liability incurred by the use of software have not yet been before the German courts, 
German computer law commentators32 are of the opinion that damage caused by 
the use of defective computer software should rather be addressed in terms of the 
principles relating to product liability (Produkthaftung):33 
Die Regeln der Produkthaftung werden bei Computerleistungen eine 
bedeutende Funktion haben. Rechtlich bilden die Regeln der 
Produkthaftung ein wichtiged Auffang becken fOr aile Faile, die durch die 
Vertragshaftung nicht erfasst werden, inbesonders die technisch 
unvermeidbaren Fehler. 
28 Markesinis 906; Medicus 406-407. 
29 Ibid. 
30 See ch 3 par 3.1 supra. 
31 For example, in the case where a user is bodily injured by over-exposure to a 
radiation machine driven by an ES, ie an ES Machine. In such a case the user's 
protected rights concerning her body and health are injured: see par 2.2.1 infra. 
32 Heussen (2) 48 2; Junker 209. 
33 Heussen(2) 48 2. 
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These principles are regulated by the provisions of the general delictual action in 
paragraph 823 I BGB, the protection against violation of statutory regulation in 
paragraph 823 II BGB and the 1989 Produkthaftungsgesetz:PHG (Product Liability 
Act). 34 The injured party may inter alia institute an action based on paragraph 823 
II BGB against a manufacturer who culpably violated a Schutzgesetz (a special 
statutory provision intended for the protection of others). 35 In the area of product 
liability, the following statutes inter alia, have been recognised as protective laws: the 
Arzneimittelgesetz (Pharmaceutical Products Act), the Geratesicherheitsgesetz 
(Machine Safety Act) and the Pflanzenschutzgesetz (Plant Protection Act). 36 
The question whether computer programs are Sachen in terms of the BG837 has to 
be decided first in order to determine whether they qualify as products for purposes 
of product liability.38 The reason is that both in terms of the traditional product 
liability principles developed under paragraphs 823 I and II BGB, as well as in terms 
of the new regime under the PHG, "products" are coupled with Sachen.39 A produkt 
is defined as " .. jede bewegliche Sache ... " (any movable object).40 Sachen are " .. nur 
korperliche Gegenstande."41 It is also obvious from the German authorities 
consulted, that the law of sale is made applicable to transactions for the acquisition 
of software which means that software needs to be regarded as a Sache in terms of 
34 Markesinis 79-95; Martinek 1995 TSAR 628. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Laws are continuously being enacted to protect consumers against defective and 
dangerous products as a result of the increasing legal harmonization of the EU: 
Martinek 1995 TSAR 629; see also part II par 7.1 supra. 
37 Par 90. 
38 Konig 71; Heussen (2) 48 2; Junker 207; Martinek 1995 TSAR 636. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Par 2 PHG. 
41 Par 90 BGB. 
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paragraph 90 BGB.42 A defect in the software is also regarded as a Sachmangel 
to be adressed in terms of contractual principles of the law of sale. It is therefore 
necessary to examine the nature of software in general in order to determine whether 
ES's fall within the ambit of Sachen.43 
Some view computer programs as incorporeal (unkorperlich) goods.44 When a 
contract for the acquisition of software is concluded, the software medium 
(Datentrager) is unimportant in contrast to the real object of the contract which is this 
incorporeal performance (geistige Leistung), an immaterial good. The Datentrager 
as the embodiment of the incorporeal performance only has a transport function and 
cannot be seen as a product. The opposing view regards computer programs as 
things ( Sachen/gegenstand) by means of which various forms of programming can 
be distinguished.45 The effect of this view is that software is regarded as a product 
to which product liabiiity may attach. This view was confirmed by the Federal 
Supreme Court (Bundesgerichthof:BGH) which held that the software medium 
together with the embodied program is a corporeal thing.46 Computer programs are 
often compared to books when determining whether they are corporeal.47 According 
to one view, the book together with its text (Druckschrift), is a corporeal object 
(Sachen}, and according to another, it has a dual nature (Doppelnatur) consisting of 
the corporeal text and incorporeal content (geistigen Gut) which can be split through 
for example, speech. 48 The difference between a computer program and a book lies 
42 Konig 71 ; Heussen(2) 48 2 et seq; Junker 207. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Software is described as "geistiges Gut", "geistige Leistung": Konig 73. 
45 Heussen (2) 48 2-3. 
46 "Datentrager mit darin verkorperten Programm stellen korperliche Sachen (par 90 
BGB) dar": BGH VIII 325/89. 
47 Konig 104. 
48 Ibid. 
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in the ability to extract the incorporeal content of a book from the corporeal medium, 
by way of a lecture ( Vorlesung) for instance, without losing the identity of the book. 
A computer program on the other hand, is always presented in a corporeal form in 
order to be functional and the content cannot be extracted in the same way as 
applies to a book. Although a computer program can be transmitted through data 
transmission (datenfemObertragung) without the corporeal program being transferred, 
it does not mean that it is incorporeal: at the end of the transferred program a 
corporeal program has to be produced again.49 The information alone cannot 
control or drive the computer, it must be in the form of a computer program, and 
therefore software cannot be regarded as pure information. 50 Neither can the 
incorporeal content of a computer program be enjoyed in the same way as a book 
of poetry can if it is read out to an audience. In contrast to poetry, it is unlikely that 
the same pleasure can be found in the reading out of the source code of a computer 
program.51 
ES's (Expertensysteme) as a manifestation of AI (KOnstliche lntelligenz) is regarded 
as incorporeal in nature by some writers because of the knowledge base - component 
which contains knowledge (information) used to solve a problem.52 Konig53 points 
out, however, that although the knowledge base can be compared to a human mental 
exercise it does not differ from any other computer program with regard to the control 
it exercises over the computer. In this respect there is no difference between an ES 
and other conventional data-processing software. Furthermore, the fact that the ES 
49 Konig 105. See also part I pars A 1.2 B 1.2 and II par 9.1.3 supra; Trialle 1993 
CLSR 217. 
50 Konig 104. Contra Westerdijk's opinion at 206 et seq that both a book as well as 
a computer program can be regarded as "instructive information" neither of which 
is then a product for the purposes of product liability: see part II par 9.2.3 supra. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Konig 100-101. 
53 Ibid. 
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shell, 54 which consists of a conventional computer program is regarded as corporeal, 
necessarily results in the whole ES being regarded as corporeal. 55 Junke~6 is of 
the opinion that the informational nature of ES's may lead to liability on the same 
basis as was held in the famous "comma error" case (Kommafehler decision). 57 In 
this case a patient nearly died because of an overdose of a certain drug due to a 
printing error in a medical textbook which prescribed 25% instead of 2,5% of the 
substance in question. The BGH refused to grant an award of damages against the 
publisher of the book, as it was of the opinion that the duty to take care that the 
information is correctly published, lies with the author and not the publisher. 58 The 
court nevertheless accepted that the incorrect information caused the plaintiffs 
damage and viewed the book as a Sache which was defective in its intangible form, 
namely that the information was incorrect.59 From this decision it can be inferred 
that the intangibility of software would not prevent the BGH from viewing it as a 
product to which product liability principles may apply in cases where incorrect 
information causes the damage. 60 In other words, an incorrect ES which causes 
damage would then be regarded as a defective product. Although there is no direct 
case law on the issue whether information as such can be regarded as a product to 
which product liability principles apply may apply, it seems that such an eventuality 
is not impossible in the light of the Kommafeh/er decision.61 
54 See ch 2 par 8.1.3 supra. 
55 Konig 100. 
56 At 207. 
57 BGH NJW 1970 1963. See also Westerdijk 164 et seq. 
58 Supra 1964. Contra the position of publishers in American law: part I par 2.5 
supra. 
59 Supra 1964. 
60 Junker207. 
61 Supra. 
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A computer program can be either an object (Sache) or part of an object 
(Sachbestandteile). 62 In the latter case, the program acquires the corporealness of 
the object of which it forms a part, for example the CD-ROM software which is built 
into a computer, forms a corporeal object together with the computer.63 The 
corporeal nature of software is not influenced by the distinction between custom and 
standard software (Individual- und Standard-Software), nor between system - and 
application software.64 Neither does the question whether the software is acquired 
in terms of a sale (Kauf) or a contract for the provision of a service (Werkvertrag), 
make a difference to the product nature of software. 65 It can therefore be concluded 
that software, including ES's, is of a corporeal nature and falls within the definition of 
a produkt for the purposes of product liability principles. All three types of ES's, 
namely the Intelligent Assistant, the Self-Help System and the ES Machine can 
therefore be regarded as products, and their producers may accordingly be liable 
where defects in the products causes harm to others.66 
2. Paragraph 823 I BGB 
2.1 Introduction 
In terms of paragraph 823 I BGB a person who wilfully or negligently injures the life, 
body, health, freedom, property, or other similar right of another contrary to the law 
is bound to compensate him for any damage arising therefrom.67 The cause of 
62 Junker 207. 
63 Junker 208. 
64 Konig 115; Junker 208. 
65 Ibid. See also Westerdijk 165. 
66 See par 6 infra. 
67 (1) Wer vorsatzlich oder fahrlassig das Leben, den Korper, die Gesundheit, die 
Freiheit, das Eigentum oder ein sonstiges Recht eines anderen widerrechtlich 
verletzt, ist dem anderen zum Ersatze des daraus entstehenden Schadens 
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action giving rise to the duty to compensate for damage occurs when the following 
requirements are satisfied: (1) there must have been an act which violated one of the 
interests protected; and (2) caused damage; (3) the violation of the right must have 
been unlawful and not justified; and (4) the violation must have taken place 
intentionally or negligently. 
2.2 Requirements 
2.2.1 The act 
The act must be conscious human behaviour which may be in the form of a positive 
act that violates a protected right, or an omission where there is a duty to act. 68 The 
rights and interests protected by paragraph 8231 BGB are life, body, health, freedom, 
property, or any "other right" (sonstiges Recht). "Other rights" refer to other 
absolute69 rights such as the rights of an established and operating business, 
patents, copyrights, personality rights and privacy rights.70 
2.2.2 Unlawfulness 
Unlawfulness is established when one of the protected rights specified in paragraph 
823 I BGB is violated or an established duty is breached without a ground of 
justification, such as self-defence, consent, etcetera being present. German law 
holds that apart from the infringement of one of the specified interests, unlawful 
conduct (Rechtswidrigkeit) also connotes behaviour without the "care" required in 
verpflichtet. 
68 Medicus 344-363; Markesinis 35-67; Staudinger 123-443; Zweigert and Kotz 293-
296. 
69 A right is "absolute" if it is effective against all other persons. This is in contrast 
to relative rights such as rights arising under a contract which can only be 
infringed by parties to the underlying contractual relation: Martinek 1995 TSAR 
434; Markesinis 59. 
70 Ibid. Cf Medicus 344-363; Staudinger 123-443. 
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society.71 The "care required in society" actually consists of the duty to safeguard 
the public against harm.72 In the case of liability for omissions the duty-oriented 
approach becomes even more necessary. The idea that a preceding or potentially 
dangerous activity or state of affairs gives rise to a duty of care, originated from the 
development of liability for omissions, culminating in the well-known 
Verkehrssicherungspflichten. 13 The term Verkehrssicherungspflichten means that 
whenever a source of potential danger which is likely to affect the interests and rights 
of others is established in everyday life by an activity or through property, there is an 
obligation or duty to ensure protection against those risks created. For the 
manufacturer this general duty to safeguard the public against harm means that all 
protective measures which are reasonably necessary to avoid predictable harm of the 
consumers by the product, must be undertaken. In principal only safe products may 
be marketed, therefore manufacturers will be liable for defective goods produced and 
distributed by them.74 If the risk of unsafe products is unavoidable, for example in 
the case of immanently dangerous products or new products, the manufacturer has 
a duty to design the product in a way that keeps that risk as low as possible and to 
instruct and warn consumers of the danger.75 Violation of these duties constitutes 
unlawful conduct by the manufacturer.76 Another situation giving rise to a 
Verkehrssicherungspflicht, occurs when a professional person causes damage to 
someone in the execution of her professional duties.77 
71 Zweigert and Kotz 294; Markesinis 68 ; Medicus 335; Staudinger 281-286. 
72 Martinek 1995 TSAR 435. 
73 Markesinis 75. 
7 4 Martinek 1995 TSAR 435-436; Markesinis 79-95; Heussen(2) 48 4. See also par 
5.4 infra with regard to the duties incumbent upon a producer of manufactured 
goods. 
75 See the discussion of typical product defects: par 5.5 infra. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Markesinis 7 et seq; BGH NJW 1990 726. 
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2.2.3 Fault 
The requirement of fault consists of either intention or negligence. 78 Negligence 
consists of a lack of the degree of care generally regarded as necessary in society 
and if the harm was caused during some specialist activity, the court looks at the 
degree of care exercised by the average member of that group whether they are 
professional or not. 79 Although the plaintiff has to prove all the elements of a claim 
in terms of paragraph 823 I BGB, the courts reversed the burden of proof with regard 
to fault in cases involving product liability.80 
2.2.4 Causation 
There must be a causal connection between the conduct and the consequential harm. 
Causation is determined by a two-fold enquiry, the first to establish factual causation 
by applying the conditio sine qua non theoryB1 and the second to establish legal 
causation by applying the adequate causation theory. 82 The doctrine of adequate 
causal connection applied by the German courts holds that a causal connection exists 
when the conduct of the defendant is such that "it was apt to lead to the result which 
occurred, taking things as they normally happen and ignoring very peculiar and 
improbable situations which men of the world would not take into account". 83 
78 Medicus 341-342; Markesinis 72; Staudinger 361-374; Zweigert and Katz 293-
294; Jauernig eta/ 264. 
79 (1) Der Schuldner hat, sofem nicht ein anderes bestimmt ist, Vorsatz und 
Fahrlassigkeit zu vertreten. Fahrlassig handelt, wer die im Verkehr erforderliche 
Sorgfalt ausser acht /asst: Par 276 BGB. 
80 BGHZ 51 91: see par 5.2 infra. 
81 The "but-for'' test of Common law, also known as the theory of elimination 
(Hinwegdenken). The same test is used in South African law to determine factual 
causation: ch 3 par 3.3.4.2 supra. 
82 Markesinis 95-99; Staudinger 56-62. 
83 RGZ 158 38. 
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2.2.5 Damage 
Damage consists of patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss, and paragraph 823 I BGB 
sanctions the recovery of damages for personal and property injury in an unlimited 
amount. 84 Damages for pain and suffering are recoverable in terms of paragraph 
847 BGB. In the context of ES liability the compensation of pure economic loss as 
part of the protection of the right to property in terms of paragraph 823 I BGB 
warrants further discussion. German Jaw displays the same reluctance as the 
common Jaw of Anglo-American countries, to compensate pure economic Joss (reiner 
Vermogenschaden) through the law of tort. 85 The reason is the same as in Anglo-
American law, namely the fear of the indeterminacy of claims and amounts potentially 
involved,86 coupled with the fact that paragraph 823 I BGB only protects certain 
specified rights, which does not include a general patrimonial right because such a 
right is not included in the definition of a sonstiges Recht. 87 Although pure 
economic loss can therefore not be claimed in terms of paragraph 823 I BGB, this 
rigid rule of non-compensation has been relaxed in some situations, mainly through 
the expansion of contract law.88 However, pure economic loss may be claimed in 
terms of paragraph 823 II BGB.89 The exclusion of liability in negligence, including 
gross negligence, for damage caused to consumers is precluded.90 
84 Medicus 358; Markesinis 42; Staudinger 163-167; Hoffman and Hiii-Aming 30. 
85 Markesinis 43; Martinek 1995 TSAR 632-633. See also part I pars A 2.2.3 and 
8 2.2.4 supra. 
86 Ultramares Corp v Touche 1931 255 NY 170: see part I par 8 2.2.4 supra. 
87 Markesinis 43 et seq ; Medicus 358; Staudinger 171. However, pure economic 
loss is compensable under the provisions of par 823 II BGB as the latter does not 
prescribe the protected rights: see par 3 infra. 
88 NJW 1977 2073. See also Markesinis 49-59. 
89 See par 3 infra. 
90 Par 11 (7) of the General Business Conditions Act. See Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 
32. 
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The two contractual solutions used to allow claims for economic loss are (i) contracts 
in favour of third parties (Vertrage zugunsten Drifter) and (ii) the doctrine of 
transferred loss (Drittschadensliquidation). In both these methods the tort duty is 
shaped by the underlying contract.91 -In terms of the method described in (i), a third 
party C has the right to demand performance of a contract which is in existence 
between two other parties, A and 8;92 and in terms of the method described in (ii) 
contractant A is allowed to recover damages suffered by a third party C as a result 
of a breach of contract, from the other contractant B. 93 Contractant A may also 
assign her claim to the injured third party C.94 The result of both these methods is 
that through the medium of contract, the plaintiff (who is not a party to the contract) 
succeeds with her claims (including claims for pure economic loss) and the extent of 
the defendant's liability remains similar to that which had been agreed to in terms of 
the contract. 95 
2.3 Defences 
The defence of consent to injury or risk of injury (Einwilligung) may be advanced 
91. Markesinis 50. 
92 The origin of this judge-made contractual device stems from the necessity of 
providing plaintiffs with greater protection against defendants who benefit from the 
immunity conferred by the very limited regulation of vicarious liability as found in 
par 831 BGB : see par 4 infra. Cf Markesinis 50-51. 
93 This doctrine of transferred loss is based on the notion of good faith which was 
developed to ensure that the defaulting party in a contract does not benefit from 
the fact that the loss has been shifted from the creditor to the third party: RGZ 62 
331. This right of the third party is controlled, lest it exposes the contractor to an 
unlimited number of claims, by allowing it only where the special relations between 
her and the creditor caused the loss to be shifted: Markesinis 55. 
94 RGZ 62 331. 
95 The defendant is therefore not more extensively liable towards the third party than 
she would have been if sued by her co-contractor. In this way the problem of 
indeterminacy, referred to often by the common law systems (see part I pars A 2.5 
and B 2.5.2 supra), is overcome by German law: Cf Markesinis 50-58. 
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against a claim in terms of paragraph 823 I BGB as a defence excluding 
Rechtswidrigkeit. 96 Contributory fault (consisting of intention as well as negligence) 
of the plaintiff may be taken into account to reduce the damage suffered. 97 
3. Paragraph 823 II BGB 
In terms of this paragraph a person who wilfully or negligently infringes a statutory 
provision intended for the protection of others, has the same obligation (as found in 
paragraph 823 I BGB) to compensate for personal and property damage caused by 
such an infringement (Schadensersatzpflicht), as well as the possibility to restitute 
pure financial loss.98 The element of unlawfulness is contained in the violation of 
a protective norm (Schutzgesetz).99 A Schutzgezetz is any legal provision which 
demands or prohibits a specific action or behaviour and of which the objective is the 
protection of the general public. 100 Such provisions include rules of private and 
public law as found in statutes, by-laws, food- and drug regulations, etcetera. Civil 
liability in terms of paragraph 823 II BGB exists in addition to liability arising on any 
other ground and may therefore overlap with liability in terms of paragraph 823 I BGB 
as well as with liability for breach of the specific enactment concerned. 101 Only 
harm resulting from the injury to the interest protected by the statute is compensable; 
96 Markesinis 68; Medicus 340-341. 
97 Par 254 II BGB. See also Markesinis 103-104. 
98 (2) Die gleiche Verpflichtung trifft denjenigen, welcher gegen ein den Schutz eines 
anderen bezweckendes Gesetz verstosst. 1st nach dem lnhalte des Gesetzes ein 
Vertoss gegen dieses auch ohne Verschulden moglich, so tritt die Ersatzpflicht 
nur im Faile des Verschuldens eins. 
99 Medicus 363-368; Zweigert and Katz 296-297; Staudinger 411 et seq. 
100 Martinek 1995 TSAR 629. 
101 See for example the "chicken pest" case, BGHZ 51 91 which involved product 
liability in terms of par 823 I BGB as well as par 823 II BGB because the 
defendant, a vaccine manufacturer, was in breach of a specific statute enacted for 
the protection of humans and animals: see par 5.2 infra. 
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if the statute in question is thus aimed at preventing personal injury and property 
damage only, pure economic loss cannot be claimed in terms of paragraph 823 II 
BGB. 102 However, because it is not necessary that a specific legal right be 
infringed as is required by paragraph 823 I BGB, pure economic loss can be the 
subject of a claim for compensation. 103 
As in the case of paragraph 823 I BGB, liability in terms of paragraph 823 II BGB is 
always fault-based. 104 Even if the protective statute provides that infringement is 
possible without fault, the duty to compensate arises only if some fault can be 
imputed to the wrongdoer. 105 However, case law has reversed the onus of proof 
and placed it on the defendant. 106 Fault on the part of the defendant is therefore 
presumed unless she can disprove it, a factor which makes an action in terms of 
paragraph 823. II BGB more favourable to a plaintiff. Further requirements for this 
remedy are that the violated norm is a protective norm , in other words that the injury 
that occurred was in fact what the legislator wished to avoid and that the plaintiff 
belongs to the class of persons which the legislator wanted to protect.107 
Paragraph 823 II BGB is an important source of product liability claims as many 
1 02 Zweigert and Katz 296; Markesinis 890; Medicus 365. 
1 03 Martinek 1995 TSAR 629; Hoffman and Hiii-Aming 32. 
104 Martinek 1995 TSAR 630; Markesinis 891; Medicus 366. 
1 05 This is clear from the second part of par 823 II BGB which states that in cases 
where breach of a particular statute imposes liability irrespective of fault, additional 
liability will only be imposed if there was a culpable violation of the protective law: 
see fn 98 supra. 
106 BGHZ 51 91; BGH NJW 1968 1279. The courts have eased the burden of proof 
of the plaintiff by regarding the objective violation of a Schutzgesetz as prima facie 
evidence that it was culpable and that there is a causal link between the violation 
and the damage. In this way the evidential burden is shifted to the defendant: 
Martinek 1995 TSAR 630 et seq. 
107 Markesinis 891-894. 
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protective laws are viewed as protecting consumers of products. 108 
4. Vicarious liability 109 
In German law the liability of employers for the harm caused by their employees 
depend on whether personal fault on the part of the employer contributed to the 
damage. 11° Contrary to most other legal systems in the world, German law follows 
a very different approach with regard to vicarious liability: Masters are held liable for 
their own fault of bad selection or supervision of their servants. 111 In terms of 
paragraph 831 BGB a person who employs another to do work is bound to 
compensate a third party for damage caused unlawfully to the latter by such other 
person during performance of the work. 112 The employer will not be liable if 
ordinary care was exercised in the choice of the employee and if ordinary care was 
exercised in the supply of appliances or implements and the superintendence of the 
work. The consequences of this rule have the anomalous result that a claim for 
damages does not depend on the fault of the actor which is apparent, but on the 
failure of the employer to exercise sufficient control and supervision. 113 
Independent contractors are not servants in terms of paragraph 831 BGB and 
1 08 Examples are the Pharmacy Products Act of 1976 (Arzneimittelgesetz} and the 
Machine Safety Act of 1968 (Gerlltesicherheitsgesetz): see Hoffman and Hiii-
Aming 32; Markesinis 89. 
109 Vicarious liability is dealt with in par 831 BGB, regulating the liability of employers 
for the acts of their employees, and in par 832 BGB which regulates the liability 
of guardians for the acts of their wards: see Markesinis 676-685; Medicus 375-
378. 
110 Zweigert and Kotz 324; Markesinis 676; Medicus 376. 
111 The reason for this is the incorrect assumption by early scholars of Roman Law 
that the principle of no liability without fault applied unqualified also in the case of 
vicarious liability: Zweigert and Kotz 325; Markesinis 677. 
112 Ibid. 
113 Zweigert and Kotz 332. 
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therefore employers are in principle not liable for their actions. 114 An independent 
contractor does not work under the supervision and control of an employer. 
The rule in paragraph 831 BGB has been severely criticized for being unsound in 
policy and various methods have been developed by judges to avoid its effect. 115 
One of these methods that is particularly relevant in the context of liability for ES's, 
is the absolute liability of a legal person for the unlawful acts committed by its organs 
and representatives. 116 Another method consists of holding the entity liable for its 
own defective organisation in terms of paragraph 823 I BGB, the so-called 
"organisational fault". 117 In a case where the plaintiff was injured by risks inherent 
in treatment he was receiving but not adequately warned against, the court held the 
hospital liable in terms of paragraph 823 I BGB for its failure to guide the doctors in 
warning patients. 118 The last method of evading paragraph 831 BGB is by invoking 
the adaptable law of contract, specifically paragraph 278 BGB which imposes strict 
liability upon the debtor for the faults of persons used in the fulfilling of contractual 
obligations.119 
114 There have however been occasions where employers were held liable for 
unlawful actions of independent contractors, where they were negligently selected 
or if they failed to control them in the exercise of their tasks: BGH JZ 1975 733. 
Cf Markesinis 679; Zweigert and Kotz 326; Medicus 373. 
115 Markesinis 685; Zweigert and Kotz 330. 
116 BGHZ 49 19. 
117 NJW 1971 1313. See also par 5.4 infra. 
118 BGH NJW 1956 1106. See also part I par A 3.1 supra with regard to a hospital's 
vicarious liability for the actions of an independent contractor. 
119 Markesinis 687. 
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5. Product liability 
5.1 Introduction 
Konig 120 states that the delictual liability of a software producer 
(Programmhersteller) for errors (Feh/er) in the product should be resolved by applying 
the principles of manufacturer's or products liability to defective computer programs 
(fehlerhafte Computerprogramme). Support for this viewpoint is also found among 
other German authorities. 121 
5.2 Product liability in terms of paragraph 823 I and II BGB 
In the HOhnerpest decision 122 the court rejected all claims based on contract in 
circumstances relating to product liability, and held that the plaintiff only had a claim 
based on delict in terms of paragraphs 823 I BGB and 823 II BGB. The latter claim 
was based on the fact that the defendant was in breach of a statutory provision 
enacted for the protection of humans and animals. 123 Many instances of product 
liability will, in addition to a breach of duty in terms of paragraph 823 I BGB, 
constitute a breach of a protective statute as required by paragraph 823 II BGB, for 
example the Arzneimittelgesetz and the Geratesicherheitsgesetz. 124 Product liability 
claims may only be instructed against the actual manufacturer or producer of the 
product; suppliers or other middlemen and quasi-producers such as importers, are 
not liable for damage caused by defective products. 125 Where the damage is 
120 At 71. 
121 Jaurnig et a/1007; Junker 210. 
122 Supra. 
123 Markesinis 501. 
124 See par 5.3 supra. 
125 BGHZ 67 359. See also Martinek 1995 TSAR 631. 
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attributed to a defective component, manufacturers of the main product may only be 
held liable in cases where the defect is due to the final assembly of the product, or 
where such components were produced according to the instructions of the main 
manufacturer. 126 In all other cases the manufacturer of the finished or main product 
is not liable for the defects of component parts. 127 (However, in terms of the new 
regime under the PHG, manufacturers of component parts and finished products are 
liable alike. 128} 
In a product liability claim in terms of paragraph 823 I BGB, the different duties on 
which the element of wrongfulness is based, have been categorised into similar case 
groups as those developed in American law. 129 Different case groups, categorised 
according to the type of defects found in products, were developed, namely 
manufacture/production faults (Fabrikationsfehler), construction/design faults 
(Konstruktionsfehler), instruction faults (/nstruktionsfeh/er) and observation faults 
(Entwicklungsfehler). 130 
The difference between the application of paragraphs 823 I BGB and II BGB lay in 
the onus of proof, which was changed by the HOhnerpest decision.131 If the claim 
is instituted in terms of paragraph I, the plaintiff must prove the manufacturer's fault, 
whereas if it is brought in terms of paragraph II, the onus is reversed and the 
126 The reason is that the manufacturer has a duty to check and test the components 
properly before using it: BGH NJW 1985 2420; BGH NJW 1980 121. 
127 Martinek 1995 TSAR 633. 
128 Par 4(1) PHG: see par 5.6.4 infra. 
129 See part I par A 2.8 supra. 
130 Markesinis 90-94; Junker 210-211; Martinek 1995 TSAR 438; Medicus 44-49; 
KOnig 216; Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 30-31; Westerdijk 145. For a discussion of 
these case groups in German law, see par 5.5 infra. 
131 See par 5.3 infra. 
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defendant must show that the defect in the product is not due to her fault. 132 As 
the onus of proving the defendant's fault has already been reversed with regard to 
paragraph 823 II BGB, the court in the HOhnerpest case133 found no reason why 
it couldn't also be done with regard to paragraph 823 I BGB, all the more so when 
regard is had to the policy reasons involved 134 as well as the victim's difficulty of 
establishing what is happening in the producer's enterprise. 135 In the past, the 
courts aided the injured party by only requiring proof of a chain of causation which 
indicated an organisational fault in the manufacturer's enterprise. 136 The plaintiff 
only had to prove that the damage was caused by a defect in the product and then 
it was for the defendant to explain the causes of the defect in order to show that she 
was not to blame. 137 The manufacturer could then be exonerated if she proved that 
the defect might have arisen without any organisational fault 
(Organisationsverschulden) on her side. 138 However, in the Hilhnerpest 
decision 139 the court held that the latter procedure does not sufficiently protect 
injured parties in cases of product liability, be they ultimate users or third parties, and 
in such instances the manufacturer-defendant must prove her lack of fault. 
132 Markesinis 89. 
133 Supra. 
134 Namely, the protection of consumers: see part II par 8.2 supra. 
135 Markesinis 89; Zekoll 1989 AJCL 810. 
136 Markesinis 500 et seq. 
137 Ibid. 
138 An extensive interpretation of the organizational fault concept is used by the courts 
to avoid the possibility of the manufacturer being exonerated in terms of the 
presumption of fault in selecting and supervising employees as per par 831 BGB: 
Martinek 1995 TSAR 441. See also par 4 supra. 
139 Supra. 
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5.3 The application of contractual extensions to establish product liability 
Before the HOhnerpest decision, 140 product liability claims were dealt with by 
extending the law of contract by various methods 141 such as discovering an implied 
guarantee towards the consumer, 142 construing a contract in favour of a third 
party143 or applying the theory of "transferred loss".144 One of the advantages of 
a quasi-contractual action, is that the burden of proof lies on the defendant in some 
circumstances, whereas in tort it always lies on the plaintiff. Another advantage is that 
in the case of vicarious liability, the debtor is fully liable for the faults of employees 
in the execution of their contractual obligations, in contrast to paragraph 831 BGB of 
tort law which only makes employers liable for the unlawful acts of their employees 
if they themselves were negligent in selecting or supervising them. 145 
5.4 The Hiihnerpest decision 
German theory of product liability originated in 1968 with the famous "chicken pest" 
(HOhnerpest) decision. 146 The facts of this case were that the plaintiff, a chicken-
farmer, had her chickens inoculated against fowl pest by a veterinarian who used 
contaminated vaccine which was bought from the defendant manufacturing company. 
The plaintiff successfully claimed compensation from the defendant for damage 
140 Supra. 
141 In contrast to the common law countries, the law of contract in civil law countries 
is much more pliable and open to expansion: Markesinis 85; Martinek 1995 TSAR 
432-433. 
142 Markesinis 85. 
143 Vertrag zugunsten Dritter: see par 2.2.5 supra. 
144 Drittschadensliquidation: see par 2.2.5 supra. 
145 See par 4 supra. 
146 BGHZ 51 91. Cf Junker 206; De Jager 228; Westerdijk 144. See also Markesinis 
83-89 for the impact of this seminal judgement on German product liability law. 
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sustained after the death of 4000 chickens due to fowl pest which they contracted 
from the contaminated vaccine of the defendant. After this decision a 
"Schadensersatzanspruch" exists in German law against a manufacturer of defective 
goods in the case of personal or property damage sustained by the purchaser as a 
result of the defective goods where the manufacturer is unable to prove that an 
existing "Verkehrssicherungspflicht" has been adhered to. 147 Delictual liability 
protects the lntegritatsinteresse. 148 As such it is found in the following 
Verkehrssicherungspflicht149 : 
Wer waren in den Verkehr bringt, musst dafOr Sorge tragen, das sie frei 
von Fehlem sind, die Leben, Gesundheit, Eigentum und andere 
Rechtsgoter gefahrden konnen. Schutzobjekt der Produzentenhaftung sind 
bestimmte RechtsgOter und absolut geschOtzte Rechte. 
The main difference between product liability developed by the courts and the general 
law of delict in terms of paragraph 823 I BGB 150 is the "Umkehrung der 
Darlegungs-und Beweislast" (the reversal of the onus of proof). 151 As was seen in 
the discussion of liability based on par 823 I BGB, the wrongdoer's negligent (or 
intentional) causing of the harm must be proved by the plaintiff. 152 In product 
liability cases the courts reversed the burden of proof because of the difficulty the 
plaintiff has to establish the defendant's negligent (or intentional) violation of a duty 
when all the relevant actions take place within the risk sphere of the 
manufacturer. 153 In pursuance of the EU Directive on product liability,154 the PHG 
147 Junker 206; Medicus 47. 
148 In contrast to the Aquivalenzinteresse of the contractual action: Junker 206. 
149 Junker 207. 
150 Par 2 supra. 
151 Junker 207; Medicus 48; Markesinis 89; Martinek 1995 TSAR 440. 
152 Par 2.2.3 supra. 
153 See par 5.4 infra. 
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was enacted in 1989, in terms whereof a parallel regime of strict product liability 
principles came into existence. 155 
5.5 Typical defects 
5.5.1 Fabrikationsfehler 
As stated earlier, 156 a manufacturing defect refers to a defect in an individual 
product caused by a fault in the manufacturing process. 157 The plaintiff has to 
prove that damage resulted from a defect in the product which made it unsuitable to 
be put into circulation. 158 The producer's liability for defects in manufacture can be 
avoided by showing that neither the producer, nor any person in her employ were in 
breach of a duty of care regarding the manufacturing process.159 The manufacturer 
must have taken all the steps reasonably necessary to prevent such defects from 
occurring. Such steps include the institution of quality control and organisational 
measures to ensure the elimination of human or technical failure. 160 It is possible 
that a manufacturer will not incur liability for an isolated defective product, a 
"runaway" or "stray" product, if the manufacturer can show that it would not have 
154 85/374. 
155 See par 5.6 infra. 
156 Ch 2 par 9.2.2 supra. 
157 Markesinis 90; Martinek 1995 TSAR 438. 
158 BGHZ 51 91 105; BGH 1973 1602. See also Medicus 46. 
159 BGH NJW 1973 1602; BGH NJW 1975 1827. The burden of proof on the 
manufacturer is the exculpatory proof in terms of par 831 BGB discussed in par 
4 supra and approximates the strict tort liability required in Anglo-American law: 
see part I pars A 3.1 and B 3.1 supra. 
160 Martinek 1995 TSAR 438. See also ch 6 par 5.2.2.2 infra with regard to ISO 
9000. 
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been revealed by any reasonably necessary measure of organisation and 
supervision. 161 
5.5.2 Konstruktionsfehler 
As stated earlier, 162 a construction defect is a design defect, affecting the entire line 
of a product, and which is usually caused by a fundamental error in the intellectual 
conception of a product. 163 The producer's liability for defective design is more 
problematic than the previous form, Fabrikationsfeh/er, 164 since the plaintiff has to 
prove that the product is defective because the design is defective in such a way that 
it creates an unreasonable risk of danger to any user of the product. 165 The 
defective design must have been avoidable given the existing state of scientific and 
technical knowledge. The determination of standards that must be met by particular 
products are relevant in the context of design errors. Conformity with standards set 
by officially recognised legal institutions such as the Deutsches lnstitut fOr Normung 
(DIN) are required by many administrative regulations. For example, the 
Geratesicherheitsgesetz of 1968 requires that all technical equipment (a term which 
includes safety devices, household appliances, toys, etcetera) meet certain 
s~andards when sold in Germany. 166 The Act specifically refers to "generally 
recognized technical principles and rules (allgemein anerkannte Regeln der Technik) 
which have to be complied with. 167 Compliance with mandatory regulations may 
161 Martinek 1995 TSAR 438; BGH NJW 1973 1602 1603. 
162 Ch 2 par 9.2.2 supra. 
163 Martinek 1995 TSAR 438; Medicus 46; Konig 217. 
164 Par 5.5.1 supra. 
165 BGHZ 67 359; BGH NJW 1990 906. Cf Markesinis 91; Heussen (1) 12 11. 
166 Par 3(1) of the Geratesicherheitsgesetz. 
167 Ibid. 
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even afford the producer a complete defence in terms of the EU Directive, 168 
subsequently enacted in the PHG. 169 In this regard the German Institute for quality 
assurance of software (Giltegemeinschaft Software e. V.) which prescribes minimum 
standards for software according to the Stand der Technik which can be attained 
through the implementation of a quality assurance system, and also acts as a 
certifying body for software, is relevant. 170 Although it is not mandatory for software 
to comply with these standards, non-compliance could constitute an indication of a 
design error which could have been avoided according to the state of scientific 
knowledge, and which could lead to the producer's liability. 171 
5.5.3 lnstruktionsfehler 
In the case of an instruction fault the producer's fault consists of a failure to warn 
consumers in respect of hazards of the product. Such a situation arises in particular 
where there is no instructional literature accompanying the product. In these 
circumstances the product itself is free from any defect but damage is caused through 
the improper use by the consumer in disregarding or neglecting to guard against the 
product's imminent dangers.172 A manufacturer has a duty of care to provide 
adequate instructions and warnings in the case of products like poison, explosives, 
inflammable goods, sophisticated household goods, pharmaceutical products, 
etcetera. 173 The producer's liability for defective instructions arises at the time the 
168 Art 7(d) of the EU Directive: see part II par 8.3.8 supra. 
169 Par 1 (2) 4: see par 5.6. 7 infra. 
170 Herberger 1986 IUR 380. 
171 Ibid. See also par B 3.3.3 infra with regard to the position in the Netherlands, part 
I par A 2.2.2 supra for the position in the UK and par B 2.3 supra for the USA, and 
ch 6 par 5.2.2.2 infra for the position in SA law. 
172 Martinek 1995 TSAR 438. 
173 Ibid. The warnings must be conspicuous, clear and unambigious. 
428 Chapter 5 Comparative law Part Ill 
product is put in circulation. 174 The duty to provide information is linked to the 
intended use of the product and therefore the producer is under no duty to warn 
against dangers arising from use of the product other than that which it is intended 
for. 175 In the case of a primary diagnosis MES for example, 176 this duty of the 
producer could be construed to require a warning to users of such systems that they 
should consult a health professional before acting on any self-diagnosed therapy. 
5.5.4 Entwicklungsfehler 
The producer's liability for development risks (also referred to as observation 
faults) 177 is essentially different from the types of liabilities discussed above. In 
these cases the product will have been manufactured in accordance with the current 
state of technological knowledge but subsequent developments reveal its harmful 
effects. The Verkehrssicherungspflicht relevant in this respect consists of a 
permanent duty of product surveillance as long as the product is being marketed 
(Produktbeobachtung}. 178 This duty entails very harsh consequences for the 
manufacturer: Even after the product is put into circulation, the manufacturer has a 
duty to observe the experiences of consumers with the product and to consider any 
progress of science and technology in regard to the product. 179 The courts have 
declined to make the manufacturer carry this risk as it could hinder technological 
development, and therefore a reversal of the onus of proof such as in the case of a 
174 BGHZ 80 186. 
175 BGH NJW 1981 2514. 
176 A Self-Help System: see ch 2 par 11 supra. 
177 Martinek 1995 TSAR 438. 
178 Medicus 46. 
179 This means that the manufacturer must look out for non-obvious defects as well 
as for changing consumer behaviour: Martinek 1995 TSAR 439. 
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Konstruktionsfehler, does not take place. 180 This defence is also referred to as the 
"state-of the-art defence" of the producer and is included in the EU Directive. 181 
Member states have the option to retain or delete the development risk defence from 
their national legislation. 182 Germany opted to retain this defence. 183 The 
manufacturer does, however, have a duty continually to "observe" the experiences 
of the consumer with the product (Produktbeobachtungspflicht) and to consider any 
progress of science and technology in regard to the product. 184 The manufacturer's 
duty includes having to warn consumers or even to recall the products once they 
become aware or should have become aware of the defect or harmful consequences 
that may ensue. 185 
A notable exception to the availability of this defence is contained in the 
Arzneimittelgesetz, which imposes strict liability on pharmaceutical producers that 
introduce drugs on the market which may have harmful side-effects that are not 
regarded as acceptable by current medical opinion.186 However, liability is limited 
to damages arising from death or bodily injury and a maximum amount of 
compensation is fixed. Victims are free to claim for damages exceeding this amount 
in terms of the normal fault-based procedure found in par 823 I BGB. 187 
180 BGH NJW 1981 1606. Cf Markesinis 93; Martinek 1995 TSAR 438. 
181 Art 7(e): see part II par 8.3.8 supra. 
182 Art 15(8): see part II par 8.4 supra. 
183 Par 1 (2) 5 PHG. 
184 Martinek 1995 TSAR 439; Heussen (2) 48 20. 
185 BGH NJW 1992 560. 
186 Martinek 1995 TSAR 439; Markesinis 94. 
187 Markesinis 94. 
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5.6 Product Liability Act of 1989 (Produkthaftungsgesetz:PHG) 
5.6.1 Strict liability 
In pursuance of the EU Directive on liability for defective products, 188 the PHG 
establishes a regime of strict product liability parallel to that regulated by paragraph 
823 and 831 BGB. 189 The plaintiff has a choice in deciding on which regime she 
wishes to base her claim. 190 
5.6.2 Product 
The Act is applicable to a product (produkt) defined as any movable good even if 
incorporated into another movable or immovable good.191 
5.6.3 Defect 
A product is defective if it does not provide the safety which may reasonably be 
expected, taking into account all the circumstances especially the presentation 
(instructions, advertisements, etcetera) and the use to which one could reasonably 
188 85/374. 
189 On the PHG in general, see Junker 207 et seq; Medicus 49-50; Martinek 1995 
TSAR 424-441 and 629-645; Zekoll 1989 AJCL 809-819; Dielmann 1990 
Hastings I&CLR 425-436; Mathewson 1993 L&PIB 1285-1308; Hoffman and Hiii-
Arning 27-30; Westerdijk 14 7-151. 
190 Par 15 (2) PHG specifically provides that the PHG will not affect any rights of an 
injured party in terms of other rules of liability. According to par 15(1) PHG, liability 
for damages arising from death or bodily injury caused by pharmaceutical products 
cannot be claimed in terms of the PHG. Such claims can only be instituted in 
terms of the Arzneimittelgesetz which imposes strict liability on the producers of 
defective drugs: see also par 5.5.4 supra. 
191 Par 2 PHG. 
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expect the product to be put and the time it was put into circulation.192 The 
producer must take into account any foreseeable misuse of the product which can be 
reasonably expected and which gives rise to a duty to warn and instruct towards the 
consumer. Defectiveness may consist of misleading marketing, or a lack of or 
improper instructions. 193 If the damage was caused in part by the fault of the 
injured party, a proportional reduction of liability can be effected in terms of the 
PHG. 194 A product will not be considered defective solely because a better product 
is subsequently put onto the market. 195 
5.6.4 Producer196 
The producer (Hersteller) is defined as the manufacturer of the finished product or of 
a component part and the producer of any raw material. 197 The manufacturer is 
therefore liable for all the defects in the chain of production of the finished product, 
even if she only assembled the component parts or if the defects were caused by the 
sub-supplier's defective component parts. 198 The manufacturer of the component 
part is not liable though, if the defect is due to the defectiveness of the complete 
192 Par 3 PHG. The same "consumer expectation" test in pursuance of the EU 
Directive art 6(1) is used: see part II par 8.3.4 supra. 
193 In the case of software, the specification and instruction manual is especially 
important: see par 5.5.3 supra. 
194 Par 6 PHG. 
195 Par 3(2) PHG. To hold otherwise, would be counter-productive for product 
innovation: Martinek 1995 TSAR 638. 
196 "Producer'' is referred to here in the sense of the PHG, and does not refer to the 
producer of an ES as discussed inch 2 par 8.2 supra and defined in appendix I, 
although an overlap in meaning does exist: see also part II par 8.3.3 supra. 
197 Par 4 PHG. In this respect the scope of potentially liable parties is considerably 
widened compared to traditional liability principles in terms of par 823 I BGB. See 
also Zekoll 1989 AJCL 812. 
198 Martinek 1995 TSAR 635. 
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product or to the instructions of the manufacturer of the complete product. 199 The 
quasi-producer, namely any person who, by putting her name, trademark or other 
distinguishing feature on the product, presents herself to the consumer as the 
producer, is also liable in terms of the PHG. 200 So too is any importer of a product 
into the EU.201 If the producer cannot be identified, each supplier is treated as a 
producer and will be liable unless the victim is informed of the identity of the 
producer, importer or supplier of the product within one month of such a request.202 
In the case of more than one producer so defined being liable for the same damage, 
their liability is joint and several. 203 Contractual exclusion of liability is not allowed 
in terms of the PGH and is declared void. 204 
5.6.5 Fault 
Fault is not required.205 
5.6.6 Damage 
Damage for which a claim for damages can be instituted is limited to that arising from 
the death of a person, bodily injury and injury to property other than the defective 
product itself (andere Sache), which is utilised for private use.206 Damage arising 
from death or bodily injury caused by the use of pharmaceutical products is excluded 
199 Art 7(f) of the EU Directive enacted in par 1 (3) PHG. 
200 Par 4(1) 2 PHG. 
201 Par 4(2) PHG. 
202 Par 4(3) PHG. 
203 Par 5 PHG. 
204 Par 14 PHG. 
205 See par 5.6.1 supra. 
206 Par 1 PHG. 
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from the operation of the Act. 207 The criterion of private use demonstrates that 
product liability in terms of the PGH does not cover damage to commercial property. 
Only consumers who are natural persons and acquire products for personal or 
household purposes, are protected by the statute. 208 A ceiling of OM 160 million 
is placed on the total amount of compensation a defendant is liable for in the event 
of damage caused by a single product or more products affected by the same 
defect.2°9 In this respect the PHG deviates from the provisions set by the EU 
Directive210 in that a financial liability cap is set for claims arising from a single 
product as well as for many products with the same defect.211 Property damage 
under OM 1250 cannot be claimed for in terms of the PHG, 212 and no recovery of 
pure economic loss is permitted.213 
5.6. 7 Causation 
The personal and property damage suffered by the defendant must have been 
caused by the defect in the product.214 
207 Par 15(1) PHG. 
208 Users of ES's such as the Intelligent Assistant which are specifically produced for 
commercial use, would therefore not qualify for protection in terms of the Act. 
209 Par 10(1) PHG. The imposition of financial caps on claims grounded in strict 
liability laws is a part of German legal tradition: see Hoffman and Aming-Hill 28. 
An example is the Arzneimittelgesetz: Markesinis 892. 
210 Art 16(1). 
211 The EU Directive only provides for a liability cap to be put on claims arising from 
multiple products with the same defect: see Hoffman and Hiii-Aming 28; Zekoll 
1989m AJCL 813; Dielmann 1990 Hastings I&CLR 433. 
212 Par 11 PHG. 
213 See Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 28; Zekoll 813; Dielmann 1990 Hastings I&CLR 432. 
214 Par 1 (1) PHG. 
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5.6.8 Defences 
The PHG215 contains all the defences provided for in the EU Directive,216 
including the optional state-of-the-art or development risk defence. All of these 
defences, if proved by the producer, may lead to non-liability in spite of all the other 
constituent requirements being met. These defences are the non-distribution-
defence,217 the later-defect-defence,218 the non-commercial-purpose-defence,219 
the legal-compliance-defence, 220 the state-of-the-art-defence221 and the sub-
supplier's defence. 222 The earlier discussion of these defences in regard to the EU 
law is mutatis mutandis applicable and will not be repeated here.223 However, 
some particulars with regard to the legal-compliance-defence and the development 
risk defence need further attention. 
In terms of the legal-compliance-defence a producer is not liable for a defect in a 
product which is due to mandatory regulations issued by public authorities. 224 
Technical standards such as D/~25 are not mandatory legal provisions but only 
recommendations which can be adhered to voluntarily, unless such standards are 
215 Par 1 (2) PHG. 
216 See part II par 8.3.8 supra. 
217 Par 1(2) 1 PHG. 
218 Par 1 (2) 2 PHG. 
219 Par 1(2) 3 PHG. 
220 Par 1 (2) 4 PHG. 
221 Par 1 (2) 5 PHG. 
222 Par 1 (3) PHG. 
223 See part II par 8.3.8 supra. 
224 Par 1 (2) 4 PHG: see also part II par 8.3.8 (c) supra. 
225 See par 5.5.2 supra. 
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prescribed by a statute. They then become mandatory legal provisions.226 
Compliance with recommended standards may, however, create a rebuttable 
presumption that the product was not defective in terms of the consumer expectation 
test.227 
With regard to the development risk defence, it must be noted that since Germany 
has chosen to retain this defence in terms of the option provided for by the EU 
Directive, no general liability for development risks exists except in terms of the 
Arzneimittelgesetz referred to above.228 The producer's ability to discover the 
defect must be determined objectively, namely by asking whether the state of science 
and technology would have enabled a scrupulous producer to discover the 
defect. 229 Some commentators230 are of the opinion that the retention of this 
defence has resulted in there not really being a difference between the strict product 
liability principles of the PHG and the presumed fault-principle of the traditional 
liability regime in terms of paragraph 823 I BGB. However, Dielman231 points out 
that the manufacturer will only escape liability if the defect was not detectable in the 
light of all the relevant, objective, expert knowledge available at the time, whereas 
previously the manufacturer's fault had to be proven, a much harder task. 
The PHG further provides that where it is in dispute whether liability is excluded 
226 Martinek 1996 TSAR 640; Heussen (1) 12 54. 
227 Par 3 PHG: see par 5.6.3 supra. See Dielmann 1990 Hastings I&CLR 428-429; 
Zekoll 1989 AJCL 814. 
228 See par 5.5.4 supra. 
229 Because the PGH institutes a strict liability regime, the determination of the 
producer's subjective ability to discover the defect is irrelevant. See also Hoffman 
and Hiii-Arning 28. 
230 Medicus 49; Martinek 1995 TSAR 641; Zekoll 1989 AJCL 811. 
231 1990 Hastings I&CLR 429. 
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pursuant to these defences, the burden of proof lies on the producer.232 
Martinek233 notes that the defences provided for in the PHG express the long 
recognized defences in traditional German product liability law. 
5.7 Summary 
Product liability claims may arise under paragraphs 823 I BGB, 234 paragraph 823 
II BGB235 and the PHG.236 In terms of paragraphs 823 I and II BGB, damages 
may be claimed for personal and property injury caused negligently.237 The latter 
provisions of the BGB are referred to as the old or traditional regime of products 
liability. This traditional regime exists alongside the new product liability regime 
instituted by the PHG in pursuance of the EU Directive on liability for defective 
products,238 in terms whereof the producers of such products are held strictly liable 
for the personal and property damage caused by such a loss. Product liability in 
terms of the new regime is now strict in theory as well as in practice, except for 
development risks in non-pharmaceutical products. 239 
A product liability claim may be based on paragraph 823 I BGB only if an 
infringement of the specified rights of the injured party has occurred.240 This will 
232 Par 1 (4) PHG. 
233 1995 TSAR 638. 
234 See par 2 supra. 
235 See par 3 supra. 
236 See par 5.6. supra. 
237 Damages for pain and suffering is recoverable under par 847 BGB: see par 2.2.5 
supra. 
238 85/374: see part II par 8 supra. 
239 See par 5.6.1 supra. 
240 See par 2.2.1 supra. 
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typically be the case where the loss caused arises from the death, bodily injury or 
property damage of the plaintiff. 241 Pure economic loss cannot be claimed in terms 
of paragraph 823 I BGB. 242 A claim for damages under this paragraph is 
unlimited. 243 The plaintiff will have to prove that her damage was caused by the 
defective product and that the producer acted unlawfully and with fault in this regard. 
Unlawfulness is present when one of the judge-made duties developed in German 
case law is breached by the producer. 244 These duties are all derived from the 
specific duty of the producer to safeguard the public against harm.245 A claim 
based on product liability may only be instituted against the producer who is the 
actual manufacturer of the defective product. 246 In the context of software, the 
manufacturer-producer actually refers to the developer of the software (and ES).247 
In the case of a product consisting of component parts, the manufacturer of each 
component is liable for the defect in that component. 248 Although liability in terms 
of paragraph 823 I BGB is fault-based, the courts have come to the aid of the plaintiff 
in product liability cases and reversed the onus of proof of fault. 249 Once the 
plaintiff has proved that her damage was caused by a defective product of the 
producer, the latter must prove that the defect was not due to her fault. The 
exclusion of liability in negligence is not permitted towards consumers. 250 The 
241 Ibid. 
242 Ibid. 
243 See par 2.2.5 supra. 
244 See par 5.5 supra. 
245 The Verkehrssicherungspflicht: see par 5.4 supra. 
246 See par 5.4 supra. 
247 See ch 2 par 8.2.4 supra. 
248 See par 5.4 supra. 
249 Ibid. 
250 See par 2.2.5 supra. 
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defectiveness of the product is judged in terms of the safety which a consumer can 
expect from the ordinary use of the product.251 German product liability law also 
recognises the well-known product liability defects. 252 With regard to design 
defects, it is noted that conformity with set standards for particular products are taken 
into account when deciding whether such a defect could have been avoided given the 
existing state of scientific and technical knowledge. 253 Producers may advance the 
development risk defence without experiencing a reversal of the onus of proof like in 
cases involving other types of defects. 254 A producer is therefore not liable if the 
state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time the product was put on the 
market, was not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered.255 
Where the injury caused by a defective product also violates a protective statute, 
liability in terms of paragraph 823 II BGB may be incurred and damages may be 
claimed accordingly.256 A product liability claim based on paragraph 823 II 8GB 
may be instituted against the producer of a defective product where the latter is at the 
same time in breach of a Schutzgesetz enacted for the protection of consumers. 
Damages may be claimed for personal, property and pure economic loss if such loss 
arises from the injury protected in the statute, 257 provided that fault on the part of 
t~e producer with regard to the causing of damage can be proved.258 In this regard 
251 See par 5.5 supra. 
' 252 Namely manufacturing defects, design defects, failure to warn defects and 
development risk defects: see also part I pars A 2.8 and 8 3.2.3 supra. 
253 See par 5.5.2 supra. 
254 See par 5.5.4 supra. 
255 Ibid. This defence is also known as the state-of-the-art defence: see part I A par 
3.2.2.2 supra. 
256 See par 5.4 supra. 
257 See par 3 supra. 
258 This is the case even when the protective statute provides for an infringement 
without fault: see par 3 supra. 
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the courts have also eased the burden of the plaintiff by holding that the violation of 
the Schutzgesetz constitutes prima facie evidence that it was done with fault and that 
the violation caused the damage. 259 The evidential burden then shifts to the 
producer to show the absence of fault or causation. 
In terms of the PHG, the injured plaintiff need only prove that a product distributed 
after January 1990260 is defective and that there is a causal connection between it 
and the injury caused, whereupon personal and private property damage will be 
recompensed without the necessity of proving any fault on the part of the 
defendant. 261 Liability for death and personal injury is limited to an amount of DM 
160 million and with regard to property damage, a threshold limit of DM 1250 
exists.262 Damages for pain and suffering, pure economic loss and damage to 
commercial property can only be claimed in terms of the traditional fault liability 
regime imposed by the BGB.263 Unlike the position under the traditional liability 
regime constituted by paragraphs 823 I and II BGB, a claim in terms of the PHG may 
be instituted against a wide variety of possible defendants including importers, 
suppliers and anyone holding themselves out as producer of the product by labeling 
it with their name or trademark. 264 An area of contention is the controversial 
decision not to impose liability for development risks which, coupled with the 
application of the safety expectation test in the case of design and failure to warn 
defects, are factors which still emphasise individual fault as a requirement for 
liability.265 In other words, much the same results as under established tort 
259 See par 3 supra. 
260 This is the date on which the Act came into operation: par 16 PHG. 
261 See par 5.6.1 supra. 
262 Pars 823 I and II BGB: see par 5.6.5 supra. 
263 Par 5.6.5 supra. 
264 See par 5.6.4 supra. 
265 See par 5.5 supra. 
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principles are achieved. 266 
According to Markesinis267 and · Martinek268 it is doubtful whether the two regimes 
will in practice give rise to different results as the courts' development of tortious 
product liability based on the fault principle closely approximates the no-fault 
approach of strict product liability.269 The reasons are the reversal of the burden 
of proof in regard to the producer's negligent violation of duty applicable in tortious 
product liability in terms of paragraph 823 I BGB,270 and the high requirements set 
by the courts to discharge this burden, which almost always results in a failure by the 
producer to succeed in raising a successful defence.271 
6. Conclusion 
Liability for software in German law may be addressed through actions based on the 
general delictual liability provision contained in paragraph 823 I BGB, the protective 
norm regulation in paragraph 823 II BGB, the vicarious liabiliy provision contained in 
paragraph 831 BGB, and the strict liability provisions of the PHG. 
6.1 The use of a defective expert system 
Liability for software in German tort law clearly revolves around products liability.272 
German computer law sources have no difficulty in classifying all software, even AI 
266 See Zekoll 1989 AJCL 816. 
267 At 546. 
268 1995 TSAR 644. 
269 See par 5.4 supra. 
270 Par 5.4 supra. 
271 Martinek 1995 TSAR 644. 
272 See par 1.2 supra. 
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software such as ES's which are acknowledged to consist mainly of information, as 
products. 273 
The professional liability of software producers, outside of contractual liability, is not 
contemplated by any of the sources consulted, and there is no indication that the 
software industry in Germany is formally recognised as a profession. On the contrary, 
commentators urge injured plaintiffs to base their software liability actions for 
damages on a products liability regime. 274 
6.1.1 Liability of the producers 
In the case of damage caused by the use of a defective ES, the producers will be 
liable in terms of product liability principles towards the injured party.275 Such a 
claim may be based on the traditional product liability regime developed in terms of 
the general tortious liability provisions contained in paragraphs 823 I BGB or 823 II 
BGB, or on the new regime constituted by the PHG, provided all the necessary 
requirements for each of the distinctive actions have been met.276 The differences 
between the two regimes have already been stated and will not be repeated here, 
save to point out the main advantages of a claim in terms of the PHG, which consist 
firstly of the fact that fault does not have to be proved and secondly, of the fact that 
there is a wider variety of potentially liable defendants. 277 The main disadvantages 
of such a claim are the inability to claim for pure economic loss and non-patrimonial 
loss, and the financial limitation on the maximum amount to be claimed.278 Claims 
273 Ibid. 
274 See par 1.2 supra. 
275 It was concluded that an ES can be regarded as a product: see par 1.2 supra. 
276 See par 5.6 supra. 
277 See pars 5.4 and 5.6 supra. 
278 See par 5.6.5 supra. 
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for this type of damage may be instituted in terms of paragraph 823 I and II BGB. 279 
Although a reversal of the onus of proof takes place in the case of a product liability 
action in terms of the latter provisions of the BGB, it is not as convenient as the 
provisions in the PHG which does not require proof of any fault on the part of the 
defendant. 280 
6.1.2 Liability of the users 
An action for damages under paragraph 823 I BGB may be instituted by an injured 
party against a professional or non-professional user in cases where the use of a 
defective ES caused an infringement of one or more of the protected rights.281 As 
there is no provision for a general patrimonial right to be protected, an action under 
paragraph 823 I BGB for pure economic loss cannot be instituted against the users. 
The use of a defective MES, for example, that causes bodily injury will, however, fall 
within the ambit of paragraph 823 I BGB. The plaintiff will have to prove that the user 
acted unlawfully by not complying with a duty of care, which duty is established by 
the courts through the development of various Verkehrssicherungspflicten. 262 In the 
case of a professional user, a duty of care exists towards clients, which duty may 
include the testing and checking of an aid such as an ES before using it. 283 The 
fauU of the user also has to be proved.284 In the event that a Schutzgesetz was 
violated during the use of a defective ES causing damage, a claim based on par 823 
II BGB may be instituted by the plaintiff. 285 
279 See pars 2.2.5 and 3 supra. 
280 See par 5.6.1 supra. 
281 See par 2.1 supra. 
282 See par 2.2.2 supra. 
283 Ibid. 
284 See par 2.2.3 supra. 
285 See par 5.4 supra. 
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6.2 The incorrect use of a sound expert system 
In the case of damage caused by the incorrect use of an ES, a cause of action based 
on paragraphs 823 I and II BGB may be instituted against the user if all the 
requirements have been met. 286 
6.3 The non-use of an expert system 
The non-use of an ES will be actionable under paragraph 823 I BGB if one of the 
protected interests have been violated, the defendant has acted unlawfully and 
negligently by not using the ES and such non-use has caused damage to the 
plaintiff.287 Whether the non-use is seen as an omission or positive negligent 
conduct, unlawfulness will be determined by the current 
Verkehrssicherungspflicten. 288 If the non-use of an ES violated a Schutzgesetz, 
damage caused by such violation may be claimed in terms of paragraph 823 II 
BGB.2as 
286 See pars 2.2 3 and 4 supra. 
287 See par 2.2 supra. 
288 See par 2.2.2 supra. 
289 See par 3 supra. 
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B. The Netherlands 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Delictual liability 
1.1.1 General 
Dutch civil law has been greatly influenced by French law. The 1838 Dutch Civil 
Code was virtually copied from the French Civil Code. References to German law 
have become more common though, and the New Dutch Civil Code bears a greater 
likeness to the BGB than to the Code Civil of France. The influence of the law of 
Switzerland and Austria is also discernible and, like in the case of Germany, there is 
a growing reception of European law into Dutch civillaw.290 Since 1947 jurists have 
been. drafting a new Civil code in an effort to to adapt the Code to precedents 
established by case law. Book 6 of the Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek (NBW) contains 
the law of obligations: The part dealing with unlawful acts (onrechtmatige daad), 
forms the Dutch law of torts.291 The law of torts is regulated in articles 162-197 of 
Book 6. The provisions of the new law (nieuwe recht) are based on those contained 
in sections 1401-1406 of the previous Burgerlijk Wetboek (BW), which have over the 
years elicited a substantial amount of jurisprudential literature still relevant to some 
areas of delictual liability. Very little literature concerning Book 6 of the NBW has 
appeared yet. For this reason reference will be made in discussion to comments 
applicable to articles 1401-1406 BWwhere still relevant in regard to articles 162-197 
NBW Book 6 NBW came into operation during January 1992. The main new 
development in the law of delict in terms of the NBW is a shift from liability based on 
fault to liability based on risk. 292 
290 Hondius 34. 
291 Hondius 35. 
292 See par 4.1.2 infra. 
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In Dutch law there is a close relationship between insurance and delictual liability. 
The question is asked by various writers whether the traditional point of departure in 
regard to delictual liability, namely that every person is responsible for her own 
damage except in special circumstances, is still acceptable in these modern 
times. 293 It is experienced as unfair that persons should as a rule be held liable 
for damage which were not caused by themselves but by wrongdoers, and that the 
success of any redress against the latter, depends on whether the victim is able to 
prove a claim against the wrongdoer. The contention is that liability claims should be 
devolved onto the whole community via obligatory insurance cover. 294 This trend 
towards social insurance is discernible throughout Europe.295 The possibility of 
introducing such cover for South Africa in the context of medical professional liability 
was also raised recently by Strauss. 296 
The issue of insurance has also arisen with regard to information technology in the 
Netherlands. The risk of liability may be insured against by means of an 
Aansprake/ykheids Verzekering Bedrijven (AVB)-policy in terms of which personal-, 
property- and resulting damage suffered by third parties is covered.297 This type 
of insurance developed historically from a need to be insured against claims arising 
from damage caused by onrechtmatige daad in terms of sections 1401-1407 BW. 
In keeping with the form of damage typically sustained in onrechtmatige daad, the 
293 On the role of insurance in aansprakelijkheidsrecht in general, see Asser 24-27; 
Schut 3-14; Michiels van Kesssenich-Hoogendam 54-56. 
294 Ibid. 
295 Zekoll 1989 AJCL 817. See also the position in German law: par A 1.1.1 supra. 
296 During an informal lecture at UNISA in April 1996, titled "Mediese 
Beroepsaanspreeklikheid: is die huidige bedeling aanvaarbaar?", Strauss ventured 
the opinion that an obligatory insurance scheme along the lines of the New 
Zealand Accident Insurance scheme, might be the answer to the growing number 
of professional malpractice claims against health professionals in South Africa. 
297 Van der Klaauw-Koops 93; lnsinger and Pot-Merlin 81. 
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AVB-policy is limited to personal- and property damage.298 However, it has recently 
b~~ome possible for the information technology industry in the Netherlands to acquire 
insurance cover from the Beroeps Aansprakelijkheids Verzekering (BA V), in terms 
whereof also pure economic loss caused by professional malpractice (beroepsfouten) 
in respect of third parties are covered.299 The significance of the occurrence of 
insurance for delictual liability is that it supports the trend of moving away from a 
system of compensation towards a system of indemnification, which points to a 
system of liability without fault. 
1.1.2 Provisions regulating delictual liability 
Personal liability arising from an unlawful act is regulated in one general provision: 
article 162 paragraph 1, which states that a person who causes damage to another 
person by the commission of an unlawful act ( onrechtmatige daad) which can be 
attributed (toegereken) to the actor must compensate that other person for the 
damage caused. 300 A claim based on onrechtmatige daad in the context of liability 
for ES's may arise from damage caused by the unlawful acts of other persons 
(vicarious liability), the possession of things (zaken), defective products, and through 
the application of principles of liability regulating legal persons and their organs. Of 
these claims, only the actions in terms of the general provision pertaining to personal 
liability,301 the provisions regulating product liability302 and the provisions relating 
to vicarious liability303 will be discussed, as they constitute the principal actions for 
298 lnsinger and Pot-Merlin 81. 
299 Van der Klaauw-Koops 93; lnsinger and Pot-Merlin 82. 
300 "(Sic) is er aansprakelijkheid wanneer iemand jegens een ander een 
onrechtmatige daad pleegt die aan de dader kan worden toegerekend, en 
waardoor aan die ander schade is toegebracht." Cf Asser 28; Schut 15. 
301 Art 162 NBW 
302 Arts 185-193 NBW 
303 Arts 169-172 NBW 
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claims for damages arising from the use of ES's as defined.304 With regard to the 
remaining causes of action, namely liability for damage caused by zaken and the 
liability of legal persons, a brief outline of the relevant provisions are given in the next 
two paragraphs for the purpose of identifying all applicable delictual causes of action 
in the event of damage caused by the use of ES's. 
(a) Liability for damage caused by zaken305 
In respect of liability for damage caused by things (zaken), the NBW has introduced 
a major new development in the law of tort. 306 Whereas in the past the legal 
regulation of such instances was based on a presumption of fault that could be 
rebutted by the defendant, articles 173-183 NBW now create strict liability for the 
possessor of zaken. 307 Liability is established for defective things (gebrekkige 
zaken), dangerous matter (gevaarliijke stoffen), dangerous buildings (gevaarlijke 
opstallen) and animals (dieren). The possessor of each of these things is held strictly 
liable if the zaak vo/doet niet aan de eisen die men daaraan in de gegeven 
omstandigheden mag stellen, een bijzonder gevaar voor personen of zaken oplevert 
en dit gevaar zich verwezen/ijkt, 308 except where the zaak is used in the practising 
of a business in which case the person practising the business is held liable and not 
the possessor of the thing. 309 The possessor of a zaak is "degene die zaak feitelijk 
304 See ch 1 4.1 supra for the scope and limitation of the problem statement. 
305 In other countries this type of liability is treated as liability caused by dangerous 
activities eg Gefahrdungshaftung of Germany and s 520 of the Restatement 
(Second) on Torts of the United States: cf Asser 146. 
306 Asser 146. 
307 See Schrage 1996 THRHR 144; Asser 141 et seq; Westerdijk 245-250; Schut 147 
et seq. 
308 Art 173(1) NBW. 
309 Art 181 NBW. 
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onder zich heeft".310 Liability of the possessor is expressly excluded in the case of 
damage caused by a defective product falling within the ambit of the product liability 
provisions enacted in articles 185-193 NBW311 Asser notes two reasons for this 
exclusion, namely: (i) the avoidance of double risk liability involving the possessor 
and the producer; and (ii) the unfairness of holding a possessor liable in cases where 
even the producer is not held liable, for example where the product does not comply 
with the definition of a produkt. 312 An exception is made in the following situation, 
namely where the producer is protected against liability in terms of the product liability 
guidelines because the defect did not exist at the time the product was introduced on 
the market.313 In such cases, it is reasonable to expect the possessor to carry the 
risk of the defect as the defect may have originated through the use of the product 
by the possessor. 314 The possessor will then be strictly liable under these 
provisions relating to gebrekkige zaken if the product constitutes the necessary 
danger. The intention of the exclusion in article 173(2) NBW is clearly to ensure that 
liability for defective products which caused personal and property damage is 
primarily actionable in terms of article 185 NBW.315 However, the provisions of 
article 173 NBW supplements the function of article 185 NBW in that pure economic 
loss and damage to commercial property caused by a defective product, may be 
claimed for in terms of the said article 173 NBW 316 The provisions of article 173 
NBW does not exclude a claim based on the general provision for onrechtmatige 
daad in terms of article 162 NBW.317 
310 Westerdijk 245. 
311 Art 173(2) NBW 
312 See par 3.3.2 infra. 
313 See par 3.3. 7 infra. 
314 Asser 156. 
315 Asser 156; Westerdijk 246. 
316 Ibid. 
317 Ibid. 
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Because software is a zaak, 318 the provisions in terms of article 173 NBW will be 
applicable to situations where damage is caused by the use of ES's. 319 As such 
it can be a useful supplement to the strict product liability provisions contained in 
articles 185-193 NBW 
(b) Liability of legal persons and their organs 
A claim in terms of article 162 NBW can be instituted against a legal person because 
of an unlawful act committed by one of its organs or by someone whose conduct can 
be regarded as the conduct of the legal person by the community.320 In the latter 
instance the fault of the actor is presumed to be the fault of the legal person and 
therefore the legal person itself is regarded as having committed the unlawful act and 
is directly liable in terms of article 162 NBW. If in addition, the unlawful act was 
committed by an organ of the legal person it is possible that liability as a subordinate 
in terms of article 170 NBWexists simultaneously with liability in terms of article 162 
NBW. As general principle it is accepted that, except where such personal liability 
is excluded by statute, the organ of the legal person is also liable for the damage 
caused along with the legal person, if its conduct was in conflict with the 
zorgvuldigheidsnorm. 321 
1.1.3 Joint wrongdoers 
A distinction is made between mededaderschap and schadetoebrenging in 
318 Seepar1.2infra. 
319 See Westerdijk 246. 
320 New ground was broken in the decision of HR 1979-04-06 NJ 1980 34 where it 
was held that not only the conduct of an organ of the legal person should be 
regarded as the act of the legal person, but that the deciding factor is rather "of 
de betreffende handeling in het maatschappelijk verkeer als gedraging van de 
rechtspersoon heeft te gelden." Cf Asser 226. 
321 Asser 231. 
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groepsverband (in turba). The latter concept refers to the situation where it is 
uncertain which member(s) of the group actually caused the damage, and the former 
concept refers to the situation where each wrongdoer caused some or a part of the 
damage suffered.322 In both instances the plaintiff has a choice of defendants as 
all are jointly and severally liable for the damage caused.323 Contribution is 
possible between wrongdoers: 324 
De aangesprokene die de schade heeft betaald, kan regres nemen op in 
principe aile deelnemers aan het groepsoptreden, en wei voor gelijke delen 
omdat de solidariteit - grondgedachte van de groepsaansprakelijkheid - dit 
meebrengt, tenzij de billijkheid een andere verdeling vordert (bijv. in geval 
van opzet van een der deelnemers.)325 
Action may be instituted for pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary loss 
( smartegeld). 326 
1.2 Software liability 
The question whether software is a movable thing (zaak) or a service (dienzt) has 
also elicited extensive debate among Dutch jurists. 327 If software is regarded as a 
roerende zaak it falls within the definition of a produkt subjected to product liability 
both in terms of the traditional principles as well as the new regime enacted in 
conformance to the 1985 EU Directive. 328 As the issue has not yet arisen in Dutch 
322 Art 6:198 lid 1 NBW Schut 118. 
323 Ibid. 
324 Schut 120. 
325 Art 6:315 lid 2 NBW 
326 Schut 188. See also par 2.2.3 infra. 
327 Vander Klaauw-Koops 89; Stuurman and Vandenberge 1669-1672; De Raadt 
172-174. 
328 The EU Directive on product liability 85/374: see part II par 8 supra. 
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courts, it may even be that the ECJ (European Court of Justice) will eventually clarify 
the legal status of computer programs. 329 The arguments against software as a 
product are similar to those advanced by German and EU law commentators, 330 
namely that software is incorporeal and therefore not a movable object; that it is 
tantamount to information and information as such was definitely not contemplated 
by the EU to be within the framework of a product; that it is a service and therefore 
definitely outside the ambit of the EU Directive; and that, were it the intention of the 
European legislator to include software as a product it would have explicitly stated so 
as it did with electricity. 331 
In contrast to these objections are the pragmatic opinions of Verkade332 who 
connects the nature of software to the nature of the medium on which it exists (it is 
commonly accepted by Dutch jurists that the drager van software consists of a 
roerende zaak, even if it is transmitted electronically via the computer); and Stuurman 
and Vandenberghe333 who find it impossible not to view software as a product in 
the light of the very crucial socio-political motivation for the issuing of such a directive 
by the EU namely the protection of consumers. According to them it is illogical to 
accept that it was intended to provide protection in the case of all consumer products 
except software. The only reason why it was not specifically provided for is that the 
329 Van der Klaauw-Koops 88. 
330 See par A 1.2 and part II par 9.1 supra. 
331 Cf art 1 of the EU Directive 85/374 as well as art 6:187 NBW, which specifically 
includes electricity within the definition of a product. 
332 Cited by Vander Klaauw-Koops 89. 
333 1988 NJB 1672. They raise the following interesting question at 1671: "hoeveel 
juridische waarde moet worden toegekend aan het onstoffelijke karakter van 
software ..... wat het recht als een zaak beschouwt, wordt uitsluitend bepaald door 
de eisen van het praktisch rechstleven". 
The relevance of the corporealness of things in the light of technological 
developments is also questioned by Katsh 3-20 in his exposition of the new 
technological environment and the new interpersonal and institutional relationships 
that it fosters. 
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EU drafters did not have enough knowledge of new technology. 334 According to the 
latter commentators, software is a product to which product liability principles apply. 
Westerdijk, 335 whose theory was discussed under the exposition of product liability 
according to the EU Directive,336 draws a distinction between software that is 
beslissingsondersteunend (supporting decision making), which he states is not a 
product, and software that is beslissingssturend (directing decision making) which, 
according to him, is a product. In my view the Dutch courts will follow the pragmatic 
opinion of Verkade and Stuurman and Vandenberghe in holding software to be a 
product. Neither do I think that the courts will follow Westerdijk's theory of distinction 
between beslissingsondersteunend and beslissingssturend software because, as 
stated earlier, 337 the fact that an intervening user breaks the causal chain between 
a defective product and the resulting damage has no bearing on the nature of the 
software; it still remains a product but the requirement of causation may be excluded. 
2. Onrechtmatige daad in terms of article 162 NBW 
2.1 Introduction 
From the provisions of article 162 NBW five requirements of a delict can be 
distinguished: unlawful act (onrechtmatige daad), fault (toerekenbaarheid), damage 
(schade), causation (oorzaak) and the theory of relativity (relativiteit).338 Although 
the last mentioned requirement is treated as a seperate element by Asser, it actually 
forms part of the first requirement, namely that of onrechtmatige daad, under which 
334 1988 NJB 1671-1672. See also Triaille 1991 CL&P217-224 and 1993 CLSR214-
228 as well as the discussion pertaining to the applicability of the EU Directive to 
software: part II par 9 supra. 
335 At 81-95. 
336 See part II par 8 supra. 
337 See part II par 9.2.3 supra. 
338 Asser 28. 
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heading it will be treated in this discussion. 339 
2.2 Requirements 
2.2.1 Onrechtmatige daad 
The conduct may consist of a positive action (doen) or a failure to act (nalaten). The 
conduct itself must be unlawful. Manufacturing a defective product does not per se 
constitute unlawful conduct, it must first be established whether the release of the 
defective product in the community constitutes unlawful conduct.340 Article 162 
NBW is not intended to regulate product liability issues arising from a defective 
product per se because of the separate articles devoted to it in the NBW. 341 
Unlawfulness consists of "een inbreuk op een recht en een doen of nalaten in strijd 
met een wettelijke plicht of met hetgeen volgens ongeschreven recht in het 
maatschappelijk verkeer betaamt, behouden de een en ander aanwezigheid van een 
rechtvaardigings grond."342 The ongescreven recht refers to the general norms 
adhered to in society,343 in other words, the boni mores or the legal convictions of 
the community. In qualifying conduct as unlawful, the judge does not have to state 
the specific norm in abstracto, as long as the norm is properly motivated according 
to the special circumstances of each case.344 The domain of a general duty of care 
cannot be comprehensively specified as it is continually developing. The formulation 
339 Par 2.2.1 infra. See also Fokkema and Hartkamp 104 who states that liability for 
damages in tort requires four elements: unlawfulness, fault, damage and a causal 
connection. 
340 Asser 29-31. 
341 Art 6:185 NBW infra. 
342 Art 6:162 NBW. 
343 Asser 45. 
344 Asser 46; Schut 71. 
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of the zorgvuldigheidsnorm entails a balancing of the interests of the plaintiff and the 
defendant as well as the concretisation of an open-ended norm by taking into account 
legislation, codes of conduct, analogous cases and the legal convictions of the 
community. 345 The norms considered by the courts are distinguishable into three 
main categories; (1) those pertaining to the physical infringement of personal and 
property interests, (2) those pertaining to the infringement of patrimonial interests, 
and (3) those pertaining to the violation of immaterial interests. Article 162 
paragraph 2 states that the infringement of a subjective right, an act or omission 
violating a legal duty, and conduct in conflict with the maatschappelijk zorgvuldigheid 
(the ongeschreven recht) constitutes an unlawful act. 
(a) Infringement of a subjective right 
In the context of this study, the most important acknowledged subjective rights are 
personality rights (persoonlijkheidsrechten) and patrimonial rights 
(vermogensrechten). Other rights include property rights (zakelijke rechten) and 
special rights (bijzondere rechten) such as the bewoningsrecht of the lessee. 346 
(b) Violation of a legal duty 
Violation of a legal duty takes place not only when an act is committed in conflict of 
a statutory prescription or prohibition such as found in criminal regulations, but also 
when a legal duty of a general nature is contravened. 347 The general duties cannot 
be exhaustively defined as they have been recognised in a vast variety of situations 
of which the most frequent involve the safety of other people's person and 
345 HR 1940-04-18 NJ 1941 130; HR 1983-06-24 NJ 1984 801; HR 1986-06-27 NJ 
1987 191. 
346 Schut 63. 
347 HR 1982-09-17 NJ 1983 278. 
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property. 348 An example of the latter is found in building regulations, the 
contravention of which would be unlawful.349 
(c) Conflict with the maatschappelijke zorgvuldigheid or the ongeschreven 
recht 
The ongeschreven recht refers to the criteria introduced by the Hoge Raad (HR) in 
1919 in the renowned Lindenbaum-Cohen decision,350 namely " een handelen of 
nalaten dat ..... indruist hetzij tegen de goede zeden, hetzij tegen de zorgvuldigheid 
welke in het maatschappelijk verkeer betaamt ten aanzien van eens anders persoon 
of goed." Goede zeden refers to moral norms as far as they are accepted by the 
social community as (ongeschreven) legal norms.351 An agreement conflicting with 
the good morals of society will also constitute a delict towards a third party. 352 The 
criterion de zorgvuldigheid die in het maatschappelijk verkeer betaamt ten aanzien 
van eens anders persoon of goed is embodied in the ongeschreven recht referred 
to in article 162.353 This criterion is explained by Asser354 as follows: 
De mens moet rekening houden met de omstandigheden dat hij deel 
uitmaakt van de samenleving en behoort daarom in zijn handel en wandel 
348 Fokkema and Hartkamp 104. 
349 Schut 56. 
350 HR 1919-01-31 NJ 1919 161. This decision ended a period of uncertainty 
regarding the precise content of the element of unlawfulness. See Asser 29-33 
and Schut 46-51 for an overview on the historical development of the element 
unlawfulness. 
351 Asser 44; Schut 73. 
352 HR 1927-01-13 NJ 1927 279. This was in effect also found in the Lindenbaum-
Cohan decision supra, where the agreement between Cohen and the servant of 
Lindenbaum, which was in conflict with the good morals of society, caused 
damage to Lindenbaum, the third party. 
353 HR 1962-04-06 NJ 1965 116. 
354 At 45. 
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de belangen van zijn medemensen zoveel mogelijk te ontzien. Van hem 
kan niet verlangd worden dat hij dit steeds doet met verwaarlozing van zijn 
eigenbelangen, en evenmin dat hij in al zijn gedragingen ten aanzien van 
eens anders persoon of goed de uiterst denkbare zorgvuldigheid in acht 
neemt. Hij moet zijn eigen belangen en die van een ander tegen elkaar 
afwegen en zich daarbij Iaten leiden door hetgeen in de maatschappij als 
behoorlijk wordt aanvaard. Neemt hij - ook zonder in strijd te komen met de 
wet of de goede zeden of zonder inbreuk te maken op eens anders recht -
niet de zorgvuldigheid in acht die in het maatschappelijk verkeer ten 
aanzien van eens anders persoon of goed betaamt, dan handelt hij 
onrechtmatig. 355 
Article 163 NBW has also adopted the Schutznormteorie356 of the BGB according 
to which there is no civil liability if the damage caused falls outside the scope of the 
rule violated or it is suffered by persons whom the rule was not intended to 
protect. 357 The doctrine of relativity (relativiteitsleer) refers to the Schutz norm or 
Normzwecl?58 doctrine of German law which states that C's act can be unlawful 
towards A without being unlawful towards B, with the result that loss incurred by B 
cannot be claimed from C in a case where the act normally protects A.359 However, 
because an act can be in conflict with more than one norm at a time, it may happen 
that the wrongdoer incurs liability based on a statutory protective norm as well as a 
zorgvuldigheidsnorm. 36° For example, conduct in conflict with a statutory duty 
intended to protect A may also still give rise to a claim by injured party B because it 
is also in conflict with the zorgvuldigheidsnorm owed to the community. 
355 See the general criterion of reasonableness, the boni-mores test which is applied 
to determine unlawfulness in the SA law of delict: ch 3 par 3.3.2.1 supra. 
356 The protective norm theory found in par 823 II BGB: see par 2.2.2 supra. 
357 Fokkema and Hartkamp 104. See also par 2.2.2 supra. 
358 See par 823 II BGB in terms whereof the parties held liable are those gegen ein 
den Schutz eines anderen bezweckendes Gesetz verstosst: Schut 54. See also 
par 2.2.2 supra. 
359 Asser 85; Schut 51-62. 
360 Ibid. 
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2.2.2 Toerekenbaarheid 
In terms of article 162 paragraph 3 NBW kan de onrechtmatige daad aan de dader 
worden toegerekend indien zij te wijten is aan zijn schuld of aan een oorzaak die 
krachtens de wet of de in het verkeer geldende opvattingen voor zijn rekening 
komt. 361 Article 1401 BW provided that aansprakelijkheid treedt in wanneer een 
onrechtmatige daad is gepleegd en door schuld van de dader daardoor aan een 
ander schade is toegebracht. According to Asser, 362 both provisions mean that a 
person is held morally and physically responsible for the harmful results caused by 
an unlawful act. The wrongdoer is responsible for the consequences of actions for 
the commission of which she can be blamed and therefore the unlawful act is imputed 
(toegerekend) to her.363 Although the plaintiff must prove the defendant's fault, it 
is regarded as so probable when the act and its unlawful character have been 
established, that the court presumes it exists until rebutted by the defendant.364 
The onus is therefore on the defJndant to prove an absence of fault. 
The difference between the old article 1401 BW and the new article 162 NBW, 
namely that toerekening is expressly included in the latter, means that liability for an 
unlawful act is now also possible without fault being present. 365 Accordingly, liability 
based on risk is also included in the concept of toerekenbaarheid in addition to the 
traditional fault-based liability.366 Risk liability is determined by the convictions of 
361 "An unlawful act can be imputed to its author if it results from his fault or from a 
cause for which he is answerable according to law or common opinion" : translated 
by Fokkema and Hartkamp 105. 
362 At 68. 
363 Asser 68. 
364 Asser 72; Fokkema and Hartkamp 105. 
365 Asser 68; Schut 110. 
366 Ibid. 
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the community (verkeersopvattingen). 367 Asser mentions various examples of 
situations where the community would establish liability without fault necessarily being 
present on the part of the wrongdoer, for example injuries sustained by spectators 
during sporting events, environmental damage and product liability. 368 
The liability of professionals (aansprakelijkheid voor beroepsfouten) is regulated in 
accordance with the ordinary principles of liability. 369 The test for schuld of a 
professional is whether the professional in question acted as a reasonable 
professional person would have acted (een redelijk handelend vakgenoot). 370 
According to Asser, 371 confusion reigns with regard to the precise meaning of 
schuld and it has been used to connote inter alia the blameworthiness of the 
wrongdoer, negligence (onachtzaamheit) in contrast to intention (opzet), as well as 
unlawfulness. 372 
2.2.3 Schade 
In terms of Dutch law all damage suffered is in principle compensable. 373 Damage 
consists of patrimonial (vermogenschade) and non-patrimonial loss (ideele schade). 
ldeele schade is only compensated when it is sanctioned by law and if it was cuased 
by intentional violation of a personality right.374 Patrimonial damage consists of 
367 Ibid. 
368 At 83. 
369 Michiels van Kessenich-Hoogendam 14. 
370 Michiels van Kessenich-Hoogendam 21. 
371 At 70. 
372 Schut 111 notes that the concept of fault is taking on an objective character. 
373 Asser 26. 
37 4 Schut 188. 
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property- and personal damage (zaak- en persoonschade) as well as pure economic 
loss (zuivere vermogensschade). 375 According to Schut,376 liability insurers do 
not provide insurance against pure economic loss and the courts have a conservative 
attitude in granting such compensation. 377 As stated earlier, 378 the fact of 
insurance also plays a role in the question of whether a claim is granted or not. 
Nevertheless, Dutch law does not draw a principled distinction between pure 
economic loss and other types of loss as is done in other jurisdictions, all kinds of 
damage being recognised as compensable in principle. 379 
2.2.4 Oorzaak 
A causal relationship must exist between the act and the damage.38° Causation 
consists of factual and legal causation.381 Factual causation is determined 
according to the conditio sine qua non theory or the hypothetische 
eliminatiemethode. 382 Between 1927 and 1970, legal causation was determined 
according to the theory of adequate causation whereby the wrongdoer was only liable 
for damage that was reasonably foreseeable at the time of the commission of the 
delict. 383 In 1970 the Hoge Raacf84 held that foreseeability of damage alone was 
375 Asser 26-27; Schut 197-198. 
376 Ibid. 
377 Schut 185. 
378 Par 2 supra. 
379 HR 1961-06-16 NJ 1961 444; HR 1985-04-12 NJ 1985 625. See also Asser 26; 
Schut 185 and 196. 
380 Asser 84; Schut 78. 
381 Ibid. 
382 Schut 80. 
383 Fokkema and Hartkamp 101. 
384 HR 1970-03-20 NJ 1970 251. 
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not sufficient to meet the requirement of causation; it must also be determined 
whether it is reasonable to impute the damage to the wrongdoer. 385 According to 
Schueas causation consists of the following components in terms of the nieuwe leer. 
1. een conditio sine qua non - verband, te bepalen via de 
hypothetische eliminatiemethode; 
2. een feitelijke en juridische causaal verband, te bepalen aan de 
hand van het criterium van de objectieve waarschijnlikkeid (regel) 
of dat van de kansverhoging (uitzondering); 
3. een toerekeningsverband, te bepalen aan de hand van ook 
andere factoren dan de voorzienbaarheid van de schade zeals 
de aard van de aansprakelijkheid en van de schade. 
2.3 Defences 
Conduct is not unlawful if the injured party consented thereto; the maxim volenti non 
fit iniuria applies in Dutch law.387 "Toestemming voorkomt dat een onrechtmatige 
daad ontstaat."388 Consent is therefore not regarded as a ground of justification 
(rechtvaardigingsgrond) as the latter supposes the existence of an unlawful act 
which, under these circumstances, does not exist.389 Liability for unlawful conduct 
m~y be avoided by risico-aanvaarding (assumption of risk) if the injured parties were 
aware of the possibility that damage may be incurred, and therefore acted on their 
own responsibility.390 Schue91 states that there is a difference of opinion whether 
an assumption of risk excludes unlawfulness, or whether it precludes the existence 
385 Fokkema and Hartkamp 101; Schut 97. 
386 At 97. 
387 Schut 74. 
388 Schut 74. 
389 Ibid. 
390 Ibid. 
391 At 77. 
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of an onrechtmatige daad because of eigen schuld. 
3. Product liability 
3.1 Introduction 
It has already been shown392 that software is regarded by most commentators as 
products, to which product liability principles apply. As such the provisions of articles 
162 NBW, 173 NBWand 185-193 NBWare relevant. 
3.2 Development of product liability law 
As in Germany, product liability developed from case law decided on the provisions 
relating to onrechtmatige daad. 393 Liability of the manufacturer for defective 
products which caused personal and bodily injury was recognised by the Dutch courts 
as a violation of the zorgvuldigheidsnorm.394 In this regard the typical case groups 
of product defects was also developed by Dutch courts in accordance with the 
zorgvuldigheidsnorm, namely produktiegebreken (manufacturing defect), 
ontwerpgebreken (design defect) and presentatiegebreken (presentation or "failure 
to warn" defect).395 
Traditionally, the courts held that the injured consumer bore the burden of proving all 
elements of such a claim, including negligence on the part of the manufacturer, in 
accordance with the fault basis of delictual liability in terms of article 162 NBW.396 
392 See par 8 1.2 supra. 
393 Art 162 NBW. See also par 2.2.supra. 
394 Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 66; Schut 149. See also par 2.2.1 supra. 
395 Westerdijk 223-229. 
396 See par 2.2.2 supra. 
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However, the hardship of this burden was soon realised and in 1973 the Hoge Raad 
reversed the burden of proof in respect of the element of fault. 397 From then 
onwards, the claimant only had to prove that the product was put into circulation in 
a defective condition and that the defect caused the injury. The fault of the 
manufacturer is then presumed unless she can disprove it. In terms of the general 
provisions relating to delictual liability, product liability of the producers could be 
excluded provided the latter did not act in bad faith. 398 Recoverable damages 
include actual damages, damages for pain and suffer~ng and for pure financial 
loss. 399 
3.3 Wet Produktenaansprakelijkheid 1990 
3.3.1 Strict liability 
On 1 November 1990, new le~islation implementing the EU Directive on Liability for 
Defective Products400 came into operation in the Netherlands.401 The provisions 
were first incorporated in articles 1407a-1407j BW and now appear in Book 6, 
sections 185-193 NBW As such it forms part of the law relating to onrechtmatige 
daad and exists concurrently with the traditional forms of liability discussed 
above.402 The Dutch legislator accepted the EU Directive virtually without 
deviation, 403 thereby creating product liability based on the risk liability of the 
397 HR 1973-02-02 NJ 1973 315. See also Hoffman and Arning-Hill 66. 
398 Hoffman and Arning-Hill 68. 
399 Ibid. 
400 85/374. 
401 Wet Produktenaansprakelijkheid 1990. See Van der Klaauw-Koops 88; Hoffman 
and Arning-Hill 65; Westerdijk 215. 
402 Par 2 supra. 
403 Van der Klaauw-Koops 88. 
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producer: "De producent is aansprakelijk voor de schade, veroorzaakt door een 
gebrek in zijn produkt".404 The Wet closely follows the guidelines provided by the 
EU Directive, and therefore most of the discussion of EU law earlier, 405 is mutatis 
mutandis applicable here. 
3.3.2 Product 
A "produkt" is "een roerende zaak"406 and "zaken zijn voor menselijke beheersing 
vatbare stoffelijke objecten".407 A product is therefore a movable and humanly 
controllable tangible object.408 Although the position of software has not yet been 
clarified by the Hoge Raad, it seems that software may be regarded as a product for 
the purposes of product liability principles.409 
3.3.3 Defect 
A product is defective if it does not provide the safety that can be expected taking 
into account all the circumstances, especially the presentation of the product, the 
reasonable use it is going to be put to and the date on which it is released to the 
public.410 Van der Klaau~11 notes that software should provide a high measure 
of safety because the public at large is usually ignorant of the quality of software and 
relies strongly on the capabilities of information technology. 
404 Art 1 of the EU Directive; art 185 NBW 
405 See part II par 8 supra. 
406 Art 187 NBW. 
407 Art 3:2 NBW 
408 See Westerdijk 297. 
409 See par 1.2 supra. 
410 Art 186 NBW. 
411 At 88. 
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According to De Raadt412 the only one way to prevent damage caused by defective 
products is through quality assurance and quality control.413 Quality assurance 
influences the design as well as the production process of the product. In terms of 
the product liability principles established by the EU Directive, all circumstances must 
be considered when determining whether the design or instruction of a product 
provides the safety that can be expected.414 If the producer can show that a 
functional quality control system was followed, it will be a factor taken into account 
in determining the zorgvuldigheidsnorm with regard to design and instruction defects 
and may lead to the exclusion of such a producer's liability.415 Quality control 
procedures used in the information technology industry is called "certification" 
(certificering) and is done by the lnstituut voor Certificering van lnformatie 
Technologie.416 Certified software is presumed to have been designed with the 
necessary care and produced according to current norms or standards. De 
Raadt417 puts it thus: 
Certificering geeft, voor zover het om een goed kwaliteitsborgingsysteem 
gaat, een vermoeden dat de normen zorgvuldig zijn opgesteld en dat het 
produk volgens die normen is geproduceerd. Certificering hangt een norm 
aan het antwerp en de instructie. Bij de afweging of het antwerp 
respectievelijk de instructie de veiligheid biedt welke men mag verwachten, 
zal de rechter de certificering dan ook in aanmerking nemen. 
412 At 179. 
413 Stuurman and Vandenberghe 1668 also refers to the quality control of software 
and raises the question whether software shouldn't be subjected to compulsory 
testing. In terms of art 7 of the EU Directive 85/374 compliance with regulating 
standards must be taken into account when the producer's liability is determined: 
see part II par 3.2.7 (d) supra. See also par A 5.5.3 supra, part I pars A 2.2.2 and 
B 2.2.2.3 supra and ch 6 par 5.2.2.2 infra. 
414 Art 6(1) EU Directive. 
415 See par 2.2.1 supra. 
416 De Raadt 182. 
417 At 179. 
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It is, however, still possible for a production fault to occur in spite of a good quality 
assurance system having been followed. In such a case the producer will be held 
strictly liable in terms of the principles created by the EU Directive of 1985.418 
Vandenberghe419 motivates the strict liability of the producer of software as follows: 
Where human life and individual property are at stake, only the highest 
standards are good enough( .. ) We see no reason why in the computer and 
information age those new (software) industries should be allowed to be 
more negligent with regard to safety than their traditional counterparts ( ... ) if 
nowadays software producers really feel that they are unable to make 
software which meets the standards of safety required by the directive, they 
should seriously consider to stay out of those areas which can create a 
threat to life or property ( ... ) There is plenty of money to be made in less 
dangerous areas; those who want to go into dangerous ones should know 
what they are doing. 
3.3.4 Producer 
The producer is the manufacture" of the final product, the raw material or a part of 
the product, or anyone who puts a mark of distinction on the product. Any importer 
of the product into the EU is also regarded as a producer and if a producer cannot 
be established, the supplier is regarded as the producer.420 This liability cannot be 
excluded by agreement with the injured party. 
3.3.5 Damage 
Only personal (letselschade) and property damage (zaakschade) other than damage 
to the defective product, with a further provision limiting the damage to zaakschade 
for private use, may be claimed.421 A maximum amount of damage in terms of the 
418 De Raadt 180. 
419 "Software bugs: a matter of life and liability", cited by Triaille 1993 CLSR 225 fn 
63. 
420 Art 187 NBW 
421 Art 190 NBW See also Van der Klaauw-Koops 91. 
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optional provision in the EU Directive422 is not imposed, and the lower threshold of 
recoverable property damage is fixed at 1263,85 Gulden.423 
3.3.6 Causation 
The injured party will have to prove a causal connection between the damage 
suffered and the defective product.424 Causation is determined in the same way as 
for the onrechmatige daad.425 
3.3. 7 Defences 
Apart from incorporating all the defences provided for in the EU Directive, the Dutch 
Act has also retained the development risk defence.426 If the producer successfully 
raises this defence, the question immediately arises as to the unlawfulness of such 
releasing of defective software onto the public market, which may lee:a:J to liability in 
terms of article 162 NBW.427 
3.4 Summary 
Product liability claims may be instituted in terms of the general delictual liability 
provision contained in article 162 NBW428 and in terms of the new strict product 
422 Art 16: See part II par 8.3.5 supra. 
423 Hoffman and Arning-Hill 66. 
424 Art 188 NBW. 
425 See par 2.2.4 supra. 
426 Art 185 NBW. 
427 See par 2 supra. 
428 See par 2 supra. 
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liability regime which was enacted in pursuance of the EU Directive429 in articles 
185-193 NBW430 
In terms of article 162 NBW a claim for any type of loss, including pure economic loss 
and non-patrimonial damage,431 may be instituted against the manufacturer of a 
defective product if the distribution of such product to the community is unlawful. This 
will be the case if the manufacture and distribution of a defective product is in conflict 
with a zorgvuldigheidsnorm owed to the community.432 Although liability in terms 
of article 162 NBW is fault-based, the courts have reversed the onus of proof of fault 
in product liability cases with the result that the manufacturer has to disprove 
negligence on her part once damage caused by the defective product has been 
shown.433 Risk liability for unlawful conduct is in any case possible in terms of 
article 162 NBW if sanctioned by the verkeersopvattingen, 434 which has been done 
in cases of product liability. 435 Liabiliy in terms of article 162 NBW may be excluded 
by agreement. 436 
In terms of the strict liability provisions in article 185-193 NBW, a claim for personal 
and private property damage caused by defective products may be instituted against 
the wide range of producers defined in the provisions.437 As the Dutch legislator 
429 85/374. 
430 See par 3.3 supra. 
431 See par 2.2.3 supra. 
432 See par 2.2.1 supra. 
433 See par 3.2 supra. 
434 See par 2.2.2 supra. 
435 See par 3.2 supra. 
436 See par 2.2 supra. 
437 See par 3.3 supra. 
468 Chapter 5 Comparative law Part Ill 
incorporated the provsions of the EU Directive438 virtually word for word, the 
requirements are not repeated here except to note that the development risk-defence 
was retained but a maximum amount for damage caused by similar defects in 
identical products was not enacted.439 The same criticism with regard to the 
practical difference between the old and new regimes of product liability advanced by 
commentators of German law,440 can be noted in regard to Dutch law. 
4. Vicarious liability 
Responsibility for the acts of other persons are regulated by articles 169-172 NBW 
In terms of the nieuwe recht, the basis of liability is not the same for all categories 
of persons. Some are grounded on liability based on fault, and some on risk 
liability.441 However, all of them442 confer liability on a person because of the 
unlawful act of another.443 The categories of persons relevant to this discussion are 
employers and their subordinates (employees) as well as non-subordinate persons 
participating in the business as independent contractors. Employers are responsible 
for the unlawful acts committed by their employees performed during the execution 
of their duties444 and persons carrying on a business are liable for the unlawful acts 
committed by their engaged independent contractors during the execution of their 
instructed tasks. The liability of employers for the unlawful acts of their non-
438 85/374. See part II par 8 supra. 
439 The imposition of these provisions are optional in terms of the EU Directive: see 
par 8.4 supra. 
440 See par A 5. 7 supra. 
441 Asser 73. 
442 With the exception of children: Asser 73. 
443 Asser 112. Although arts 169-172 BW refer to "fout" and not "onrechtmatige 
daad", the obvious relation to art 162 NBWimplies that an "unlawful act" is meant. 
444 Art 170. 
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subordinates committed during work done on instructions of the employers are based 
on the eenheid van onderneming.445 The underlying reason is that it makes no 
difference to the injured party whether the unlawful act is committed by the 
subordinate of the business or by the independent contractor who was instructed to 
do the work. 446 
5. Conclusion 
Liability for software in the Dutch law of delict is regulated by article 173 NBW which 
provides for the liability of the possessor for damage caused by gebrekkige zaken, 
the general provisions regulating onrechtmatige daad contained in article 162 NBW, 
the product liability provisions contained in articles 185-193 NBW, and the vicarious 
liability provisions contained in articles 169-172 NBW. 
5.1 The use of a defective expert system 
Although it has not been decisively stated, it seems that software can be regarded 
as a product to which product liability principles may apply.447 One Dutch 
commentator,448 distinguishes between software directing decision making449 
which is a product, and software supporting decision making450 which is not a 
product.451 In the former instance product liability principles will apply whereas in 
445 Asser 136; Schut 146. 
446 Art 171: Cf Asser 136 et seq; Schut 146. 
447 See par B 1.2 supra. 
448 Westerdijk: see par 1.2 supra. 
449 Eg an ES Machine, because it has a direct material output: see ch 2 par 11 supra. 
450 Eg an Intelligent Assistant, because it has an indirect intellectual output: see ch 
2 par 11 supra. 
451 See part II par 9.2.3 supra. 
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the latter instance the general provision relating to onrechtmatige daad will be 
applicable. 452 
During the comparative law investigation, a reference to the professional liability of 
the developers in case of damage caused by defective software could not be found, 
nor is there any indication that the software industry in the Netherlands is regarded 
as a profession. 
5.1.1 Liability of the producers 
The developers of an ES may firstly be liable in terms of onrechtmatige daad when 
damage is caused by the use of a defective ES.453 Liability will be based on 
product liability454 in which case the plaintiff only has to prove that the product was 
distributed in a defective condition, and that the defect caused the injury, whereupon 
the fault of the developer is presumed until disproven.455 Damages for any type of 
loss can be claimed and liability for such damage can be excluded. 456 
An action based on strict product liability may also be instituted against the producers 
in terms of article 185 NBW.457 
5.1.2 Liability of the users 
An action for damages based on article 162 NBW may be instituted by the injured 
452 Westerdijk 202. 
453 Art 162 NBW see par 2.2 supra. 
454 See par 3.2 supra. 
455 See par 3.2 supra. 
456 See par 3.2 supra. 
457 See par 3.3 supra. 
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party against the user of a defective ES if the use of such system constitutes an 
unlawful act in terms of the appropriate zorgvuldigheidsnorrnen.458 Once the 
unlawfulness of the act has been estasblished, the fault of the user will have to be 
proved unless the act is of such a nature that it can be imputed (toegerekend) to the 
user.459 In the case of a professional user,460 the latter's fault is determined in 
accordance with the conduct of a reasonable vakgenoot, in other words the standard 
of skill and competence of the profession of the defendant is taken into account when 
the negligence of the professional user is determined. 
The injured party may also institute an action against the possessor of a defective ES 
in terms of article 173 NBW (liability for gebrekkige zaken) for damage suffered as 
a result of the use of the system in a dangerous situation.461 This action constitutes 
strict liability and can only be instituted to claim damage which is not compensable 
in terms of the strict product liability provisions of article 185 NBW. The injured party 
will therefore only be able to claim for pure economic loss against the user of the ES 
as personal and property damage is actionable against the producer of the ES.462 
5.2 The incorrect use of a sound expert system 
Where damage is caused by the incorrect use of an ES, the user may be liable 
towards the injured party in terms of article 162 NBW based on the requirements of 
onrechtmatige daad, if such use constitutes an unlawful act.463 
458 See par 2.2.1 supra. 
459 See par 2.2.2 supra. 
460 Eg during the use of the Intelligent Assistant. 
461 See par 1.1.2 supra. 
462 Art 185 NBW 
463 See par 2.2.1 supra. 
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5.3 The non-use of an expert system 
The non-use of an ES will be actionable in terms of onrechtmatige daad if the 
defendant's conduct was negligent in not using the ES and damage was caused as 
a result of the failure to use it.464 The unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct will 
be determined according to the zorgvuldigheidsnormen.465 
464 See par 2.2.1 supra. 
465 Ibid. 
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COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY: SUMMARY 
Software liability is regulated by strict products liability and liability based on 
negligence. In all of the legal systems investigated, the developers of software may 
incur strict products liability or fault-based liability in terms of the applicable traditional 
tort regime towards parties injured by defective software, including ES software. 
Depending on the various legal relationships in existence among the producers of 
software, the developer may also incur vicarious liability for the unlawful acts of the 
designers and/or the DE of the ES.466 Under strict product liability principles, action 
may be instituted against the developer under whose name the software is 
distributed.467 Insurance is one way in which the producer can devolute the risk of 
product damage onto all the consumers of the product. The EU Directive clearly 
adopted a "consumer's expectation" standard in terms of which the defectiveness of 
a product is judged by its lack of safety rather than its fitness for use. 468 The major 
importance of the EU Directive fnr its members are the no-fault liability system and 
the interdiction of exemption clauses. 
The applicability of products liability principles to ES software depends firstly on 
whether software can be regarded as products. This question is of primary 
importance in all the legal systems investigated and spurred a fiery debate among 
computer law commentators as to the actual nature of software.469 The discussion 
centres around the contentious issue of whether software should be regarded as a 
product or a service since compensation of damage caused by the former may be 
based on strict liability principles, whereas damage caused by a defective service is 
based on negligence principles. Even where product liability is based on fault, a "" 
466 See part I pars A 3.1 and B 3.1 supra, part Ill pars A 4 and B 4 supra. 
467 See part II par 8.3.3 supra. 
468 See part II par 8.3.4 supra. 
469 See part I pars A 1.2 and B 1.2 supra, part II par 9 supra, part Ill pars A 1.2 and 
B 1.2 supra. 
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claim for damages is benefitted by a reversal of the onus of proof of negligence on 
the part of the manufacturer.47° Factors which play a role in the classification of 
software are the tangibility of the software, the functional characteristics of the 
software, the informational nature of software, the commercial distinctions in software 
and the specific application of the software. There is an interesting difference 
between the Dutch/German approach on the one hand and the English/American 
approach on the other hand: the first two countries define a product in terms of the 
classification of an object goed/Sache, whereas the Anglo-American approach centres 
on the policies on which liability is based.471 The strict product liability regime 
mandated by the EU Directive makes producers liable for defects in their products 
without the consumers having to prove any fault or negligence on their part. The 
reason why the Directive imposes strict liability is found in the same policy 
considerations used by American courts when applying the same standard, namely 
that the manufacturer is able to minimize the risk of a defect, is best informed about 
the existence of a defect when the product was put into the stream of commerce, and 
can protect against liability exposure through insurance coverage, the cost of which 
is spread across the consumers of the product. The range of potential defendants 
is much wider than under the traditional contract or negligence theories of the EU 
countries, specifically the Netherlands and Germany.472 This means that the injured 
user has a better chance of finding a solvent defendant under the EU Directive 
principles.473 Product safety standards and quality assurance systems play an 
important role in the determination of the question whether a product is defective.474 
Compliance with the latter points to non-defectiveness as it represents the current 
state of safety which a consumer may expect. Non-compliance with these standards 
470 See part I pars A 2.3 and 8 2.3 supra, part Ill pars A 5.4 and 8 2.2.2 supra. 
471 Ibid. 
472 See part Ill pars A 5 and 8 3 supra. 
473 See part II par 8.3.3 supra. 
474 See part I pars A 3.2.3 and 8 3.2.3 supra, part II par 9.2.1 supra, part Ill pars A 
5.6.3 and 8 3.3.3 supra. 
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and production systems may also indicate the presence of negligence on the part of 
the developer. 
Professional liability refers to the responsibility in general of the professional person 
in the exercise of her profession.475 As such, it also has to do with criminal and 
disciplinary laws but for the purposes of this discussion, it is limited to the 
professional's civil liability to compensate damage caused by improper performance 
of professsional duties. Weir points out that in most countries, professional liability 
is not generally treated as a distinct topic but rather in terms of the individual 
professions such as physicians, attorneys, architects, etcetera. Although the bulk of 
professional liability is usually discussed under the law of contract, tort law plays a 
central role in professional liability as the exercise of professional functions in itself 
imposes a duty of care. In common law countries liabilities in contract and tort co-
exist.476 In the legal systems of other countries, professional liability is also 
founded on the professional's conduct in a given situation falling short of standards 
expected by law.477 Professional liability is essentially the responsibility for breach 
of "a legal duty of care" regardless of its origin: contractual, statutory or 
otherwise.478 This duty may in certain circumstances, operate in favour of third 
parties.479 Although certain legal systems such as the German for example, apply 
contractual rules in these cases, it does not affect the true nature of this liability which 
is essentially tortious. 
The two common elements on which liability for professional negligence is based, is 
475 Weir 6-3. 
476 See ch 2 par 2 supra. 
477 Weir 6-4. 
478 Ibid. 
479 Eg in the case of a defective Intelligent Assistant the developers who are viewed 
as professionals may incur professional liability towards the injured clients of the 
user of the ES. 
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(i) the violation of a duty of care; and (ii) conduct based on fault. 480 
(i) The duty of care 
In the common law systems it consists of the question whether the professional owes 
a duty of care in the circumstances; in Germany whether there is a Schutzinteressen, 
Schutzpflichten or Verkehrssicherungpflichten; and in the Netherlands whether a 
zorgvuldigheidsnorm has been breached. The recognition of a duty of care is a 
matter of policy which varies from time to time and place to place. The binding effect 
in the absence of a contract is the confidence of the public in professionals because 
they profess specialized knowledge and skills and government and state reinforces 
this confidence by granting .licenses for the practice of the different professions after 
official examinations of necessary qualifications. In this regard the adherence to 
product safety standards and quality assurance procedures are indicative of the 
standard of skill of the profession and non-compliance therewith may point to 
malpractice. 481 
(ii) Liability for fault 
There still exists a trend favouring fault-based liability in contrast to other areas where 
liability without fault is observed.482 The reason therefore is found in the traditional 
tendency of courts all over the world to allow for errors of professionals. It is realised 
that the injury to a professional's reputation when found negligent, is serious. On the 
other hand, Weir483 points out that the increase of professional liability insurance 
480 See part I pars A 2.7 and B 2.2.2.3 supra, part Ill pars A 2.2.3 and B 2.2.2 supra. 
481 See eg the situation in the UK: part I par A 2.7.2 supra. 
482 Weir 6-10. 
483 At 7. 
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is causing a relaxation of the courts' special treatment of professional liability.484 
The professional is of course liable for personal fault, vicariously and as the person 
in charge of an organised enterprise. 
The question whether the KE and the programmers, who design and build the system 
should be liable for computer malpractice arises. The USA has not yet reached the 
stage of recognition of such status.485 Cole486 is of the opinion that although the 
overall field and practice of computer programming and software engineering is 
growing so rapidly that an extension of common law principles may be necessary to 
protect the public in this area, the field can nevertheless not be regarded as a 
profession because of the lack of a legislative or otherwise established standard for 
the underlying profession of computer programmer and a software or knowledge 
engineer in the USA. Computer programming and software engineering in the United 
Kingdom is recognised as a profession that forms part of the larger engineering 
profession.487 The British Computer Society (BCS) is the conirolling body of 
software and computer engineers which falls under the larger umbrella body of the 
Engineering Council, a national statutory body. As such the profession is subject to 
professional conduct scrutiny and adheres to a set code of ethics and minimum 
programming standards.488 In Germany and the Netherlands the software industry 
does not have professional status. 489 
According to Weir there are two basic views with regard to the purpose and effect of 
484 See part I pars A 1.1.1 and B 1.1.1 supra, part Ill pars A 1.1.1 and B 1.1.1 supra. 
485 See part I par B 1.2 supra. 
486 1990 CLJ 208. 
487 See part I par A 2.7 supra. 
488 Ibid. 
489 See part Ill pars A 1.2 and B 1.2 supra. 
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the doctrine res ipsa /oquitur. 490 In terms of the first view, as found in the United 
States, the doctrine is not an independent rule of evidence but only a summary of a 
situation in which it is inferred from the occurrence of an accident that the negligence 
of the defendant caused it.491 The rule therefore simply establishes a prima facie 
case which can be rebutted by the defendant by adducing of new evidence. In 
contrast, English courts as well as some courts in the USA attribute a more 
fundamental effect to the rule of res ipsa loquitur, regarding it as a distinct rule of 
evidence in its own right.492 The result is that in terms of this second view, a legal 
burden of proof is laid upon the defendant. The effect of this operation of the rule is 
to move away from fault towards strict liability. Weir notes that this is in line with a 
general policy trend found throughout common law countries, towards easing the 
plaintiff's burden of proving negligence in an attempt to provide increased protection 
to the consumer.493 In civil law countries such as Germany, proof of fault and 
causation is approached differently: the court establishes a presumption of fact 
regarding negligence or causation as prima facie evidence which can be rebutted by 
the defendant. This prima facie evidence (Anscheinbeweiss) only has the result of 
lowering the plaintiff's burden of proof, not of reversing it.494 In cases involving 
gross negligence, a direct inversion is effected by requiring the defendant to prove 
the absence of fault or of the causal connection between fault and injury.495 Such 
a reversal of the onus of proof is applied in regard to product liability actions in terms 
of the traditional fault regime.496 The practical result is that liability based on fault 
is abandoned for strict liability. 
490 Weir 6-58. 
491 See also part I pars A 2.3 and B 2.3 supra. 
492 Ibid. 
493 Weir 6-59. 
494 See part Ill par A 2.2.3 supra. 
495 Weir 6-62. 
496 See part Ill pars A 5.4 and B 2.2.2 supra. 
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CHAPTER 6 
DELICTUAL LIABILITY ARISING FROM THE USE OF EXPERT 
SYSTEMS: 
SOUTH AFRICAN LAW 
1. Introduction 
This chapter deals with the third and last objective of this study, namely a discussion 
of the .Y~IiOl1§_ ~elictual causes of action thatrnay lie in South African law against the 
g!_9_9uce~ and~ of ES's as defined. 1 The delictual liability will be discussed with 
reference to the three types of ES's already identified2 and within the scope of use 
determined.3 When delict as a possible underlying basis of liability within the ES 
context was discussed earlier, it was pointed out that g_atrimonial ~nd non-:-P~~rif!IQ!.'J!I 
los~u~ustained by tb~ use .. of E~. are in principle actionable under th~lex Aquilia .. 
·---·- ... ,- ,_- "•• -· ··--..:.-----···~--- ·~-- " 
an~ !_~e a9tion for pain and suffering4 if the basic requirements for a delict in our law 
are met.5 As exclusions and limitations of the delictual liability of the producers are 
.,.L-----~-
frequently contained in contracts concluded with us~rs,6 the delictual liability 
identified will only be aJ?pli_cable between users an~ producers if -~u.c_~. ~~clu~t~~~~r.~ 
... §l.b~_ent, inv~!!ft or outlawed. In the case of injured parties not in a contractual 
- ' ~""--- .......... __ ' -·-
1 See ch 1 par 1.4 supra. 
2 The Intelligent Advisor, the Self-Help System and the ES Machine: see ch 1 par 
1.1 supra and ch 2 par 11 supra. 
3 The scope of use of ES's consists of (1) the use of a defective ES, (2) the 
incorrect use of a sound ES and (3) the non-use of an existing ES: see ch 1 par 
1.4 supra. 
4 As the discussion is limited to damage caused by negligent conduct only, the 
actio iniuriarum is not applicable: see ch 1 par 1.4 supra. 
5 Ch 3 par 3.3.6 supra. 
6 See ch 3 par 2.4 supra. 
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relationship with the producers, the limitation or exclusion of delictual liability does not 
normally arise. 
It is evident from the comparative law study of bases of liability for ES's, as well as 
from the application of the general requirements for delictual liability in South African 
law to the situation where damage is caused by the use of ES's, that with regard to 
the liability of the producers, a defective ES can be equated to a defective product 
~-- -- --
~~!~if19 the possibilityof.mar:tufacturer's or products liability. A defective,_~~can al~o 
amount to the making of a ,o~gjig.~nt misstat~roEtlll·-by th~ producer to the us~as 
4o ,_,, ,,., "< , ·~· _ •"~,~-··-··· • • • ., ., "~•·"·-··-•"" '·••-
well as to the injured third party. The professionaiJia.bUitx (in the sense of delictual 
-~····· .. '.,_, ···-· ···---~~·~· 
.~-
liability) of the producers may also come into play. With regard to the liability of the 
users, the use of a defective ES, the incorrect use and the non-use of an ES may 
result in the professional liability of the professional user towards the party injured 
by her conduct, and ordinary delictual ~ability in the case of a non-professional user. 
~~.J!iiUSed by thE!J19n:."'a~ of an e>dsting ES bring$.Jnto playJhe rule~relatiog 
, ·~·····~"""'···-:·.,..._,,,·,, .. ,-..(;;:~ ' ., . , ... ~-- "'-
to omissions. In the instances mentioned, harm could ·have been suffered by the ~ .... 
~~9f::91J~Lmi~d party or both. In the case of more than one party being delict~lly 
.. ___ , ":"• 
liable for the same damage, for instance the d~vei.Qper and the supplier, the claim 
~---· ~- -
may be instituted against any one of the two parties mentioned or against both jointly 
as they are joint wrongdoers who will be jointly and severally liable to the injured 
party.7 Where any of the above delicts are committed by employees of the 
producers or users, the latter two groups will also be ~ica(~Jtab.l§Jo the injured 
_ _..,._--· ., ---·--
parties for the delicts committed by their employees. 8 
7 See ch 3 par 3.5.2 supra. 
8 See ch 3 par 3.4.2 supra. 
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2. ·· · Negligent misrepresentation 
2.1 Introduction 
Misrepresentation is a form of damnum iniuria datum whereby the wrongdoer makes 
an incorrect or misleading representation in a wrongful and culpable manner to 
another person who acts on it to her detriment.9 Neethling et af 0 restricts their 
discussion of this specific form of damnum to misrepresentations causing pure 
economic loss, "since no specific problems attach to Aquilian liability for a 
misrepresentation causing damage to property or impairment of personality." The 
reasons are firstly that in the case of personal and property damage there is a clear 
infringement of a subjective right which is absent in the case of pure economic loss; 
secondly, that in the first case, the fear of overwhelming potential liability does not 
arise.11 For them, the problematic issue relating to negligent misrepresentations 
therefore lies in the type of dai'T!-age caused, irrespective of the type of conduct which 
causes the harm. According to this view, liability for negligent misrepresentations 
may be regarded as part of the wider problem of liability for negligently caused pure 
economic loss. 12 Boberg, 13 again, sees the problem as revolving around the 
nature of the conduct causing the harm: misrepresentation consists of negligent 
statements and they are problematical because "words are more volatile than deeds. 
They travel fast and far afield. They are used without being expended and take effect 
9 Cf Neethling et a/286 et seq; Boberg 58 et seq; Vander Merwe and Olivier 311 
et seq. A distinction must be drawn between the situation under discussion and 
misrepresentations which induce a contract. The latter is not relevant in this 
discussion: see Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost 1991 4 SA 559 (A) 570. 
10 At 286. 
11 Ibid. 
12 See Boberg 61; Hutchison 1978 SALJ 515. 
13 At 58. 
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in combination with innumerable facts and other words. "14 Because an inaccurate 
statement may easily be conveyed to many other people who act on it to their 
prejudice, there is a fear of "liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate 
time to an indeterminate class", 15 which is aggravated by the propensity of 
misstatements to cause pure economic loss. According to Midgley, 16 it can be said 
that harm caused by statements is not prima facie wrongful and therefore other 
factors are relevant in determining whether liability is reasonable. 
The issue is clearly to limit the availability of the remedy for negligent representations 
rather than to deny its existence. 17 In Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika 
Bpk18 the Appellate Division confirmed that liability for negligent misrepresentations 
is actionable in terms of the actio legis Aquilia. 19 This decision ended a long history 
of uncertainty regarding the actionability of a claim based on negligent statements 
that started as far back as 1889 when our courts, in pursuance of English law,20 
simply denied such an action. 21 According to Rumpff CJ,22 the •·ear of limitless 
liability could be allayed by the courts through giving sufficient attention to the 
14 Per lord Pearce in Hedley Byrne v Heller [1964] AC 465: see also ch 5 part I par 
A 2.5 supra. 
15 The famous words of Cardozo J in Ultramares Corporation v Touche (1931) 255 
NY 170, 174 NE 441: see ch 5 part I par B 2.5.2 supra. 
16 (1) 70. 
17 SA Bantoetrust v Ross en Jacobz 1977 3 SA 184 (T) 187; Greenfield Engineering 
Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 4 SA901 (N) 915; EG Electric 
Co (Pty) Ltd v Franklin 1979 2 SA 702 (E) 705. 
18 1979 3 SA 824 (A). 
19 See also Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1984 2 SA 888 (A) 
904; Bayer SA (Pty) Ltd v Frost 1991 4 SA 559 (A) 568. 
20 Derry v Peek (1889) 14 AC 337. 
21 Dickson and Co v Levy 11 SC 33. 
22 Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk supra 832-833. 
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elements of wrongfulness, negligence and causation:23 
Na my mening kan en behoort die eisgrond in die onderhawige saak in die 
uitgebreide trefgebied van die lex Aquilia geplaas te word. Hieruit sou volg 
dat, volgens ons heersende norme, daar onregmatigheid vereis word en 
skuld. Die vrees van die sg oewerlose aanspreeklikheid kan ook aileen dan 
besweer word, indien by elke gegewe geval dit die taak van die Hof is om 
te beslis of daar in die besondere omstandighede 'n regsplig op die 
verweerder gerus het om nie 'n wanbewering teenoor die eiser te doen nie, 
en ook of die verweerder in die lig van al die omstandighede, redelike sorg 
uitgeoefen het, onder andere, om die korrektheid van sy voorstelling vas te 
stel. 
2.2 Requirements 
2.2.1 The ad 
..-.:~~----
483 
The act consists of a misrepresentation by word or deed which may be in the form 
of an omission24 or a commission.25 The existence of a misrepresentation is a 
~-~ ··" '"""·..,.....····_-;:----· 
fact~al question which depends on the circumstances.26 In the case of an ES with 
an intellectual output the incorrect information that is produced by a defective ES 
amounts to a negligent misrepresentation on the part of the developers towards the 
user or a third party such as the user's client; for example where damage is caused 
by the use of a defective Intelligent Assistant. The developers, including the designers 
and the DE are the authors or actors of the misrepresentation. In the same 
circumstances the user could have made a negligent misrepresentation towards her 
client based on the incorrect information in the defective ES. 
23 Supra 832. 
24 McCann v Goodall Group Operations (Pty) Ltd 1995 2 SA 718 (C) 722. 
25 Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1984 2 SA 888 (A) 911; Bayer 
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Viljoen 1990 2 SA 647 (A) 652; Administrateur, Natal v 
Trust Bank van Suid Afrika Bpk supra fn 833. 
26 Neethling et a/ 287. 
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2.2.2 Wrongfulness 
Wrongfulness is found either in the infringement of a subjective right or in the breach 
of a legal duty.27 In the case of negligent misrepresentations a clear-cut subjective 
right can usually not be identified, therefore wrongfulness lies in the breach of a legal 
duty.2s 
The decisive question is therefore whether the defendant was under a legal duty not 
to make a misrepresentation (whether in the form of a misstatement or by other 
conduct) to the plaintiff.29 Another way of putting it is to ask whether the defendant 
was under a legal duty to furnish the correct information in the particular 
circumstances. 30 The existence of such a duty is determined according to the 
reasonableness criterion (the boni mores)31 which enable the courts to develop 
practical guidelines from case law. From the case law it can already be deduced that 
there is in principle no legal duty to furnish the correct information in an informal 
situation.32 A ~~~aLc:J_uty to furnish the correct informatton.exlsts tnthe fg_llowing 
~ ~---------" - -c•", 
circumstances: 
(a) In case of a statutory duty to furnish the correct information. 33 
27 See ch 3 par 3.3.2.1 supra. 
28 Boberg 62; Neethling et a/ 288. 
29 Boberg 59. 
30 Neethling et al 288. 
31 See ch 3 par 3.3.2.1 supra. See also Pretorius 229 et seq. 
32 Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk supra 834. 
33 International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley 1990 1 SA 680 (A) 694. 
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(b) In case of a contractual undertaking to furnish correct information34 or 
where the accuracy of the information is guaranteed.35 
(c) Where a_Qo_ntr~9!ual relationship exists between the parties (without the 
undertaking mentioned in (b) above), there is a duty inter partes to furnish 
the correct information with regard to matters arising from the contract and ' 
its implementation. 36 
(d) Where a person holds a specific public office and furnishes information in 
an official capacity. 37 
(e) Wt!~re a l?_e.rson exclusively ~?~~~~~~~~~fo~~ati~n be~~ of a p~rticular 
occupationJ~high.loformation__cannoLbao.b.t~ined in another manner.36 ~; -~ ~-' 
- "i,L.:; /l d, a t!- !> (\., .J .... P t t~t - 1 '0 ! ? f - , -~ 
. . , 
(f) Where a person furnishes information in a professional capacity.39 
Factors (b) and (c) will be applicable in the case of a custom made ES as a contract 
will exist between the developers and the user of the ES. 
The above mentioned factors are not a numerus clausus, many more such factors 
--..,.,......-.----·-·-·------- , ... - .. ·:-:::::.::..;.::;;:.:.::-
34 Herschel v Mrupe 1954 3 SA 464 (A) 490. 
35 Administrator, Natal v Bijo 1978 2 SA 256 (N) 261. 
36 Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost supra 575. 
37 Herschel v Mrupe supra 488; EG Electric Co (Pty) Ltd v Franklin supra 705; 
Perlman v Zoutendyk supra 328. 
38 . E.G.EieQtric Co (Pty) Ltd v Franklin supra 706; Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
Frost supra 575; Cuuj~ Motpr_s(f?r~tQriC1)(PtylLtdvMQtpr(Jnionlns Co Ltd190t--
3 SA 872 (T) 876; Herschel v Mrupe supra 472. 
39 Siman and Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank supra 913; Lillicrap, Wassenaar 
and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd supra 509. See also Pretorius 
289-294. 
486 Chapter 6 South African law 
may c~stallise, and it must be remembered that the l~gal duty indicated by the 
---::·~:~::...-~-..... ~~~" . 
presence of these factors, must exist towards the particular plaintiff. This will only 
be the case if the defendant, at the .. time of givinQ the. infarmation ... J~n-~~-or 
s~~!~el~ foresa~~!lJ>_. th~JD1l:Jr~d p~rti~s_wo.u.ldJ2e.40 Notwithstanding the 
presence of these factors, the court may still refuse to find that a legal duty exists if 
it is of the opinion that liability could lead to a "multiplicity of actions" which could be 
"socially calamitous". 41 As a result of the Lillicrap decision42 it also seems as if the 
courts, because of policy reasons, will not readily recognise a delictual action in 
cases where breach of contract, based on a negligent misrepresentation, caused pure 
economic loss. In cases where a negligent misrepresentation is made during the 
performance of professional duties in terms of a contract, the plaintiff will only have _ 
' I .. VI (11 
a contractual action for damage caused. 43 ·r <.F ~" t f\_._--~--.-. c, 
~f\ .. ) ' ! .; . \·' .'·. e,Jl\./ 
' I ··. .«.,.1--· ~-·<. 
With regard to negligent misrepresentations in the form ~fo-~~!!l~e':!~n those 
which cause physical harm,44 additional factors need to be considered before liability 
is imposed.45 These factors include the nature of the statement and the context in 
which it was made,46 the truth of the statement,47 the-J).4rpose ofthe statemenland. 
40 International Shipping Co v Bentley supra 694; Bayer South Africa (Ply) Ltd v 
Frost supra 575; EG Electric Co (Pty) Ltd v Franklin supra 706. 
41 EG Electric Co (Ply) Ltd v Franklin supra 706; International Shipping Co (Ply) Ltd 
v Bentley supra 94; Siman and Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd supra 
914. 
42 Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd supra 499-
500. 
43 Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost supra 570. See also ch 4 par 2.6 supra. 
44 Bristow v Lycett 1971 4 SA 223 (RA). 
45 Administrateur Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk supra 832-833; Siman & Co 
(Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd supra 913-914; Bayer SA (Pty) Ltd v Frost 
supra 568; Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Ned perm Bank Ltd 1994 4 SA 
747 (A) 770. 
46 For example, whether the statement was made seriously and in a business 
context: Siman & Co (Pty) Ltd v Barclays National Bank Ltd supra 913. 
Chapter 6 South African law ;{:~ .. / 4 -/ \A J\ .~ r{,. /'l c· ,t:;. 487 .~ 
------------------------------------~/-~-~--~--~-d~/---------.1 A~ 
the defendant's knowledge of the purpose, the relatibnsi]JQJ>e~~~rt __ the parties,48 
-·- -,~---------.. 
for example whether it was made in a professional capacity, the issue of reliance on 
the defendant's knowledge and skill in regard to the information conveyed, by third 
parties as well as by the plaintiff, whether the defendant took any reaonable 
precautions to ensure the accuracy of the statement, and any other general 
considerations of public policy, fairness and equity that may cause the court to deny 
o,-c"-· £ r a -~~r~dy. The nature of the harm,49 whether the~-=~~Jgr.~~~~as well as 
thefseverity and extent of the harm is important. An example of such considerations 
is "where a finding in favour of the plaintiff raises the spectre of limitless liability or 
places an undue or unfair burden upon the (defendant)".50 Another example is the 
decision of the Appellate Division51 that public policy requires a claim based on a 
negligent statement to be denied where damages is claimed for the breach of a 
contractual duty to perform professional work. 
2.2.3 
Once it has been established that a duty to furnish the correct information existed, 
and this duty was breached, the wrongdoer acted unlawfully, and for liability to follow 
it must be established whether the wrongdoer acted negligently. In terms of the test 
fo(negligence, the court will ask whether the defendant acted in the manner in which 
47 Midgley (1) 70 notes that truth should not always be a defence in case of a 
materially false statement as there are instances where a duty could be owed not 
to disclose the truth about another. 
48 For example, whether it is contractual. 
49 Where the harm consists of pure economic loss, additional policy considerations 
apply: Lillicrap, Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington Bros (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 
475 (A) 509. See also par 3.2 infra. 
50 Standard Chartered Bank of Canada v Nedperm Bank Ltd supra 771. See also 
EG Electric Co (Pty) Ltd v Franklin supra 706. 
51 Lillicrap, Wassenaar & Partners v Pilkington Bros (SA) (Pty) Ltd supra 500; Bayer 
SA (Pty) Ltd v Frost supra 570; lndac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 
1992 1 SA 783 (A) 796. 
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a reasonable person would have acted in the circumstances. In this respect the 
reasonable foreseeability and preventability of damage is applicable. 52 Any 
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff must also be kept in mind. 53 
2.2.4 Causation 
Factual causation is determined firstly by establishing a factual causal link between 
the misrepresentation, the misunderstanding and the damage through applying the 
conditio sine qua non test. 54 This means that the plaintiff must have acted in a 
certain way because she believed the misrepresentation to be true and as a result 
of so acting, loss was suffered.55 Legal causation is determined by means of the 
flexible criterion laid down in S v Mokgethi.56 In terms of this criterion the question 
is whether a sufficiently close nexus exists between the wrongdoer's act and the 
consequence to justify the imposition of liability, taking into account policy 
considerations based on reasonableness, equity and justice. The exi~g tests for 
,/ 
legal causation such as adequate causation, forese~ability, etcetera are factors which 
~ .. 
may play a role in using the flexible criterion. 57 
2.3 Application to expert systems 
In the case of a defective ES the misrepresentation consists of wrong or incorrect 
information supplied by the producers to the user or a third party via the ES. 58 
52 See ch 3 par 3.3.3.2 supra. 
53 See ch 3 par 3.3.2 supra. 
54 See ch 3 par 3.3.4.2. supra. 
55 Ibid. 
56 1990 1 SA 32 (A). See also ch 3 par 3.3.4.3 supra. 
57 International Shipping Co (Pty) Ltd v Bentley supra 702-704. 
58 Tapper 
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Because of their nature, it is only possible for a misrepresentation to occur in an ES 
with an intellectual output such as the Intelligent Assistant and the Self-Help 
System.59 The developers would have foreseen the reliance of the users on an ES 
specifically designed and produced for that purpose and would therefore be liable on 
the basis of a negligent misrepresentation. In the case of the incorrect use of an ES, 
the users of such a system could also be liable on the basis of a negligent 
misrepresentation if they give the wrong advice due to the incorrect use of the 
system. 
3. Pure economic loss 
3.1 Introduction 
Pure economic loss comprises patrimonial loss that does not result from damage to 
the property of the plaintiff or ~rom injury to the person of the plaintiff.60 Liability for 
economic loss may only occur if all the delictual requirements are met. 61 However, 
as it is usually not difficult to establish the requirements of conduct and fault in this 
regard, the following discussion is limited to the element of wrongfulness. Although 
the infringement of a subjective right does sometime occur with regard to liability for 
pure economic loss,62 it is exceptional and courts almost always find wrongfulness 
in the breach of a legal duty.63 In order to determine whether a legal duty to avoid 
59 See ch 2 par 11 supra. 
60 Neethling et a/ 280 et seq; Boberg 1 03 et seq; Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v 
Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd 1982 4 SA 371 (D); SA Petroleum Refineries 
(Pty) Ltd v Osborne Panama SA 1980 3 SA 653 (D); Franschhoekse Wynkelder 
(Ko-op) Bpk v SAR & H 1981 3 SA 36 (C). 
61 See ch 3 par 3.3.5 supra. 
62 Eg in the case of unlawful competition: see Neethling et a/281; Vander Walt 35. 
63 Cases in fn 109. 
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pure economic loss exists, the boni mores test is used.64 
3.2 The duty to avoid pure economic loss 
The following factors may determine the existence of a legal duty where economic 
loss is caused: 65 
(a) Knowledge of damage to the plaintiff 
If the defendant knew or subjectively foresaw that her conduct would cause damage 
to the plaintiff, the court would find that a legal duty exists.66 In other words, regard 
is had to an example of a dadersubjektiewe faktor, namely the subjective knowledge 
or foresight of the defendant in terms whereof the wrongfulness of a defendant's 
conduct is limited to plaintiffs whose identity is known at the time of committing the 
act.67 This subjective knowledge of the defendant must not be confused with the 
64 Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd supra; lndac 
Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd supra. See also ch 3 par 3.3.2.1 supra. 
65 . These factors are not a numerus clausus, as the court in Arthur E Abrahams and 
Gross v Cohen 1991 2 SA 301 (C) 307 309 noted: 
Setting the boundaries of liability ex delicto for causing what has come to be styled as 
pure economic loss not flowing from physical damage has been a major concern of 
Western Courts in recent times. The problems involved in so doing are reasonably well 
known and I do not intend to review them generally yet again .... A defendant may be 
held liable ex delicto for causing pure economic loss unassociated with physical injury 
but before he is held liable it will have to be established that the possibility of loss of 
that kind was reasonably foreseeable by him and that in all the circumstances of the 
case he was under a legal duty to prevent such loss occurring. It is not possible or 
desirable to attempt to define exhaustively the factors which would give rise to such a 
duty because new situations not previously encountered are bound to arise and societal 
attitudes are not immutable. 
66 Coronation Brick v Strachan Construction Co (Pty) Ltd supra 386; McLelland v 
Hulett supra 464; lndac v Volkskas Bank Ltd supra 799; Kadir v Minister of Law 
and Order supra 743; Arthur E Abrahams and Gross v Cohen supra 311. 
67 Coronation Brick (Pty) Ltd v Strachan Construction Co supra 387; Neethling et al 
283-284; Boberg 146. 
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objective reasonable foreseeability of harm used in English tort law to establish a duty 
of care. 68 Such foreseeability is, in South African law used in regard to the 
determination of negligence.69 In the case of ES's it can be argued that at least in 
the case of a custom ES, the developer would have known who the users of the 
system are, and therefore may be liable for the loss suffered. It can also be argued 
that in the case of a standard Intelligent Assistant, the developer would also have 
sufficient knowledge of the particular class of persons, for example doctors in the 
case of aMES, that will rely on the information. 
(b) Practical measures to prevent the loss 
The ease and affordability with which the defendant could have taken practical steps 
to prevent the economic loss, are taken into account. 70 In this regard the probable 
success of the steps, the reasonableness or not of the expenses involved and the 
relative ease with which such steps could have been taken, are relevant.71 In the 
context of ES liability the application of product safety standards and quality 
assurance procedures can be regarded as relatively uncomplicated and economical 
measures which can be taken to help prevent loss from occurring.72 
(c)· Professional knowledge and competence 
The professional defendant has a duty not to cause pure economic loss to others who 
68 Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika supra 833-834. See also ch 5 part 
I par A 2.2.1 supra. 
69 Neethling et a/ 284 130. 
70 Coronation Brick v Strachan Construction Co supra 384; McLelland v Hulett supra 
465; Arthur E Abrahams and Gross v Cohen supra 312. 
71 Ibid. 
72 See par 5.2.3.2 infra. 
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rely on her expertise and knowledge. 73 The professional user will therefore be liable 
for such loss caused to her client during the use of an ES. If the developer of the ES 
is a professional, such as the DE, she will also be liable for the loss. 
(d) Extent of the risk 
In situations where there is a high degree of risk of economic loss, the need for 
protection is acknowledged. 74 The Self-Help System has a high degree of risk in the 
domain of financial advice and developers who produce such systems for the benefit 
of lay-users should insure themselves against this risk. 75 
(e) Extent of the loss 
Defendants in situations which may lead to indeterminate liability or are "fraught with 
an overwhelming potentialliabilty", or would lead to a "multiplicity of actions" which 
could be "socially calamitous", do not have a legal duty to avoid damage in the form 
of pure economic loss.76 According to Neethling et a/,77 Van Aswegen78 and 
Pretorius,79 this consideration cannot be applied rationally by the courts and is in 
any event a factor more relevant to the element of legal causation, which is directly 
concerned with the extent of liability, than to wrongfulness. The nature of ES 's are 
73 This is especially true in the case of collecting bankers: lndac Electronics (Pty) Ltd 
v Volkskas Bank Ltd supra; UDC Ltd v Bank of Credit and Commerce Zimbabwe 
Ltd 1990 3 SA 529 (Z). 
7 4 Eg in relation to a cheque: lndac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd supra. 
75 See also (f) infra. 
76 Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd supra 916-
917. 
77 At 285. 
78 1993 THRHR 192-193. 
79 At 283-285. 
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such that it could lead to multiple actions, especially ES 's of the type embodied in 
the Self-Help System which is available as a standard package to the public. 
(f) Insurance 
The fact that the defendant can protect herself against economic loss by obtaining 
insurance cover, is taken into account.80 
3.3 Application to expert systems 
From the various factors discussed above,81 it can be deduced that a legal duty to 
prevent the causing of pure economic loss definitely exists on the part of the 
producers in the case of such damage caused by an Intelligent Assistant and the 
Self-Help System as they would know for what purpose the ES is going to be used. 
Where the producer is regarded as a professional person, such as the DE or the KE, 
there is in any case a duty on such a defendant not to cause financial harm to 
others.8·2 The professional user of a defective ES will also incur liability for pure 
economic loss on the same basis. 
4. · Omissions 
4.1 Introduction 
Our law does not recognise a general duty on an individual to take positive steps to 
prevent an infringement of another's interest which causes loss, since the imposition 
of such a general duty would place a too heavy a burden on individuals in the 
80 lndac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd supra 799. 
81 Par 3.2 supra. 
82 See par 3.2 (c) supra. 
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community. 83 Therefore, a person does not act wrongfully when she fails to act 
positively to prevent harm to another. 84 Liability will only follow if there is a legal 
duty to act positively to prevent harm from occurring and the defendant fails to 
comply with this duty. 85 For this reason, it is more appropriate to make use of 
breach of a legal duty than an infringement of a subjective right to determine 
wrongfulness. The question whether a legal duty has been breached is established 
in terms of the objective reasonableness criterion, the boni mores or the general legal 
convictions of the community. 86 
4.2 The duty to act 
In terms of tffi,e.._~~~t. all relevant factors which may point to the a legal 
•., 
duty to act musfbe·ccrnsidered, and although there is no numerus clausus of such 
factors, the following may indicate the existence of a legal duty to act positively by 
using an existing ES: prior conduct, control of a dangerous object and a special 
relationship.87 
83 Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A) 596: 
As uitgangspunt word aanvaar dat daar in die algemeen geen regsplig op 'n 
persoon rus om te verhinder dat iemand anders skade ly nie, al sou van so 'n 
persoon verwag kon word, op suiwer morele gronde, dat hy daadwerklik optree 
om die skade te verhinder. 
See also Nkumbi v Minister of Law and Order 1991 3 SA 29 (E) 35; Macadamia 
Finance Ltd v De Wet 1991 4 SA 273 (T) 278. 
84 See Neethling et a/50 et seq; Van der Merwe and Olivier 24 et seq; Van der Walt 
29 et seq; Boberg 210 et seq. 
85 Minister van Polisie v Ewels supra 597. 
86 Minister van Polisie v Ewels supra 597; Nkumbi v Minister of Law and Order 
supra 35; Macadamia Finance Ltd v De Wet supra 278. See ch 3 par 3.3.2.1 
supra. 
87 These factors are not indispensable for the existence of a legal duty, they only 
contribute to influence the convictions of the community that in those particular 
circumstances, the defendant has a legal duty to act positively to prevent harm: 
see Neethling et a/ 55 et seq. 
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(a) Prior conduct88 
A person who creates a new source of danger through positive conduct acts prima 
facie wrongfully when she subsequently fails to prevent damage to another person.89 
Although the view that such prior conduct is an indispensable condition for liability on 
the ground of an omission prevailed in our law for a long time, 90 it is now clear that 
such conduct is only one of several considerations which may indicate the existence 
of a legal duty to act, 91 determined in accordance with the general reasonableness 
criterion.92 An example of such prior conduct would be the situation where a doctor 
performed an operation which results in complications for the patient. It then 
transpires that the further injuries suffered by the patient as a result of the 
complications could have been prevented by the use of an existing MES, but the 
doctor failed to use the system. In such an instance the applicaton of the 
reasonableness criterion may very well result in a finding that a legal duty to use the 
MES to prevent further harm rested on the doctor if regard is ha~ to the prior 
operation and the professional relationship between doctor and patient. 93 
88 The omissio per commissionem rule: Neethling eta/51-55. 
89 Minister van Polisie v Ewels supra 596-597. 
90 The so-called "municipality cases" in which it was found that municipalities could 
only be held liable for poor construction and repair of roadways (if a new source 
of danger was created by prior conduct) since there was no general duty on them 
to maintain roads: Halliwell v Johannesburg Municipal Counci/1912 AD 659; De 
Villiers v Johannesburg Municipal Council 1926 AD 401; Comah v Durban City 
Council 1958 2 SA 140 (D). See further Neethling et a/ 52 et seq. 
91 Regal v African Supers/ate (Pty) Ltd 1963 1 SA 1 02 (A) 1 06 1 09; Minister of 
Forestry v Quathlamba (Pty) Ltd 1973 3 SA 69 (A) 82; Minister van Polisie v 
Ewels supra 597. 
92 See ch 3 par 3.3.2.1 supra. 
93 See par 6 infra. 
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(b) Control of a dangerous object 
A person who exercises control over a dangerous object or situation such as a fire, 94 
a dangerous animal,95 etcetera has a legal duty to prevent others from coming to 
harm by such objects or situations. 96 After a legal duty has been established, 
damage caused by the failure to control the situation is regarded as prima facie 
wrongful. 97 These situations are sometimes difficult to distinguish from cases where 
a person already has control of a dangerous object and then fails to exercise proper 
control as a reasonable person would have done. Such cases do not involve 
omissions but rather the negligent positive conduct, a commissio (the negligent 
exercise of control). The mere control of property and the failure to exercise control 
which causes prejudice to another is not per se unlawful. In Administrateur, 
Transvaal v Van der Merwe98 damage was caused by a fire that broke out on the 
side of a public road and in the absence of a firebreak, spread to a nearby farm. 
Since the road was under the control and supervision of the Aministrator of 
Transvaal, the respondent alleged a legal duty was breached through failing to make 
a firebreak. The court held that that the crucial issue with regard to the control of 
94 · In Minister of Forestry v Quathlamba (Pty) Ltd supra a fire had broken out on the 
State's property and had been extinguished. The next day another fire broke out 
and fanned by a gale-force wind, became uncontrollable. After traversing a 
firebreak it spread to the plaintiff's farm where it caused extensive damage. The 
Appeal Court confirmed the view that a landowner who becomes aware of a fire 
on the land under his control has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to control 
or extinguish the fire even though he did not cause the fire. 
95 In S v Fernandez 1966 2 SA 259 (A) the court held that a legal duty rests on the 
owner of a baboon kept in a cage to ensure that the animal is securely enclosed 
and cannot escape to injure others. 
96 King v Arlington Court (Muizenberg) (Pty) Ltd 1952 2 SA 23 (C); Wolff v Foto 
Helga (Pty) Ltd 1986 1 SA 816 (0); Ablort-Morgan v Whyte Bank Farms (Pty) Ltd 
1988 3 SA 531 (E); Oosthuizen v Homegas (Pty) Ltd 1992 3 SA 463 (0); Sv 
Fernandez supra. Cf Neethling et a/ 56-58. 
97 Neethling et a/ 57. 
98 1994 4 SA 347. 
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property is whether the precautionary measures which should have been 
implemented, can reasonably and practically be expected from the defendant in the 
circumstances. The court found that taking all the facts into account, inter alia the 
afford ability and proportionality between the potential damage and cost of prevention, 
the objective criterion of reasonableness did not require the taking of precautionary 
measures such as making firebreaks, the appellant's omission was accordingly not 
unlawful. 99 An example of ES liability could be found in the situation of a supervisor 
of a nuclear plant or a similar undertaking, who fails to use an ES Machine that 
functions as a radioactive material warning system, and consequently injury is caused 
to the workers in the plant. 
(c) A special relationship 
The existence of a special relationship between parties may indicate that one party 
has a duty to prevent harm to the other party.10° For example a contractual 
relationship, 101 the relationship between policeman and citizen 102 and between an 
employer and employee. 103 Neethling et af04 notes however, that it is uncertain 
whether the relationship alone will give rise to a legal duty.105 Each case should 
be judged in the light of the boni mores criterion to determine whether a duty exists. 
99 Supra 364 F. 
100 Neethling et al60; Vander Merwe and Olivier 45-46; Boberg 212; Vander Walt 
33. 
101 Cathkin Park Hotel v JD Makesch Architects 1993 2 SA 98 0/'1); Bayer South 
Africa (Pty) Ltd v Frost 1991 4 SA 559 (A). 
102 Minister van Polisie v Ewels supra. 
103 Silva's Fishing Corporation v Maweza 1957 2 SA 256 (A) 
104 At 60. 
105 See also Van der Merwe and Olivier 46; Van der Walt 33. 
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In Cathkin Park Hotel v JD Makesch Architects106 the plaintiffs instituted action for 
the recovery of damages suffered in consequence of a fire in their hotel, against the 
defendants who designed and constructed the hotel. The action was based on the 
actio legis Aquiliae and the damages claimed consisted of patrimonial damages 
arising from physical damage to property. The defendants raised exceptions to the 
particulars of claims in that the plaintiffs were limited to their contractual rights and 
had no cause of action based in delict. The court held firstly, that in pursuance of the 
decision in Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) 
Ltd, 107 the mere fact that a claim might also have been brought and pleaded as a 
claim for damages ex contractu, does not bar a claim for damages in delict. Although 
the duty of care arose in relation to obligations assumed by the defendants pursuant 
to a contractual relationship, it merely sets out the field of origin of the duty of care. 
The facts pleaded must only establish a delictual cause of action. 108 The 
fundamental question is therefore whether the respondents have alleged sufficient 
facts to constitute a cause of action for damages in delict, and since the court found 
that in the case of physical injury to person and property the Aquilian action clearly 
lay, the exceptions had to be dismissed.109 
In the context of ES liability, the special relationship which exists between a 
professional person and her client, namely a contractual relationship for the rendering 
of professional advice, may not be sufficient to give rise to a duty to use an existing 
ES. Regard should also be had to other factors such as the type of damage caused. 
On the other hand, where an ES is used as an aid like the Intelligent Assistant, the 
use thereof may form part of the general standard and level of skill of the profession, 
106 Supra. 
107 1985 1 SA 475 (A). 
108 At 100 E. 
109 At 103 G. 
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and failure to use it could point to professional negligence. 110 
4.3 Application to expert systems 
The failure to use an ES will either constitute negligent positive conduct because the 
wrongdoer fails to exercise reasonable control in an activity or it will constitute an 
omission in that an ES is not used in a situation where there is a legal duty on the 
wrongdoer to use the system. The existence of such a duty depends on several 
factors and all relevant circumstances must be taken into account. In principle a 
person will not act wrongfully by failing to use an ES to prevent harm to others unless 
the boni mores test determines otherwise. In terms of the boni mores test, it may be 
found that a professional person who, during the rendering of professional services 
does not make use of an existing Intelligent Assistant or ES Machine and 
consequently damage is incurred, breaches a legal duty to act.111 
5. Products liability 
5.1 Introduction 
In the case of damage caused by the use of a defective ES, the producers of any of 
the three identified types of ES's may incur delictual liability based on products 
liability. 112 Products liability refers to the manufacturer's liability for loss caused by 
a defective product. 113 As such, it does not form a separate ground of delictual 
liability in our law, but is a form of damnum iniuria datum, compensable in terms of 
110 See par 6 infra. 
111 See par 4.2 (c) supra. 
112 See ch 3 par 3.3.6.1 supra. 
113 See in general on products or manufacturer's liability, Van der Walt 1972 THRHR 
284 et seq; De Jager 1987 THRHR 34 7 et seq; Boberg 193 et seq.; Neethling 
et a/ 304 et seq; Snyman 1980 CILSA 177 et seq. 
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the lex Aquiliae, which is based on fault. 114 In the event that non-patrimonial loss 
is suffered as a result of a product defect, the injured party will have the action for 
pain and suffering at her disposal. 115 Neethling et af 16 remarks that the 
increasing industrialisation and mechanisation of modern society results in the 
constant potential of prejudice to the individual which is created by defective 
consumer products. Van der Walt117 puts it thus: 
Hierdie gevaar van defekte produkte is sender sy keuse of mede-
seggenskap, elke individu se konstante metgesel. In die voor-industriele 
tydvak was verbruikersgoedere basies beperk tot natuurlike 
landbouprodukte en die betreklik ongekompliseerde produkte van die tuis-
en kleinnywerheid. Die verbruiker kon sender veel kundigheid die 
kwaliteitsgeskiktheid beoordeel. In 'n eeu van industrialisasie, 
outomatisasie en ongekende tegnologiese prestasie is die geweldige 
verskeidenheid van verbruikersprodukte dikwels oorspronklik verpak of 
meganies van aard. Die gewone verbruiker het n6g die besondere kennis 
van n6g die toegang tot en insig in die gekompliseerde produksieproses om 
die verborge gebreke van sy aangekoopte produk te ontdek. 
In the case of software the words of Van der Walt are even more appropriate if the 
specific nature of software is taken into account as well as the general state of 
ignorance of the ordinary software user regarding the workings of a computer and the 
design and production of a software system. In the case of ES software the 
technological disadvantage of the consumer-user is even more accentuated, due to 
their complex and composite nature.118 
114 In contrast to the development of a strict products liability regime in other 
countries, especially after the enactment of the EU Directive on liability for 
defective products: see ch 5 Comparative law study: Summary supra. 
115 See ch 3 par 3.2 supra. 
116 At 305. 
117 1972 THRHR 224-225. 
118 See ch 2 par 5 supra. 
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5.2 Requirements 
According to our positive law the Aquilian action applies to this type of liability and the 
remedies applicable are the Aquilian action in the case of patrimonial loss sustained 
and the action for pain and suffering for certain types of non-patrimonial loss in the 
case of negligent bodily injury. 119 Since the basis of South African products liabilty 
law was firmly established in Aquilian liability from the start, it was not necessary for 
our courts to invent contractual applications and artificial extensions in the 
development of a substantive products liability law. 120 Another reason is the fact 
that pure economic loss is in principle actionable in delict. 121 
All the elements of a delict must therefore be present before the manufacturer will be 
liable. The plaintiff will have to prove that the manufacturer acted wrongfully and 
culpably which conduct caused damage. Because South African law relating to 
products liability is still undeveloped much can be learnt from compaleitive law in this 
regard. 122 In A Gibb and Son (Pfy) Ltd v Taylor and Mitchell Timber Supply Co 
(Pty) Ltd, supra, the first case of its kind before a South African court, Coetzee J 
( 460) commented on the dearth of South African academic writing on the topic 
"products liability" and accepted the necessity of referring to American and English 
119 Lennon Ltd v BSA Company 1914 AD 1; Cooper and Nephews v Visser 1920 AD 
111; Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Viljoen 1990 (2) SA 647 (A); A Gibb and Son 
(Pty) Ltd v Taylor and Mitchell Timber Supply Co (Pty) Ltd 1975 (2) SA 457 0/'1); 
Combrinck Chiropraktiese Kliniek (Edms) Bpk v Datsun Motor Vehicle Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd 1972 (4) SA 185 (T). 
120 Contra the development of products liability in the foreign countries investigated: 
see ch 5 parts I and II supra. 
121 See par 3.1 supra. 
122 A comparative study of products liability law was undertaken of England: see ch 
5 part I par A 2.8 and 3.2 supra; LJSA: see ch 5 part I par 8 3.2 supra; the EU: 
see part II par 8 supra; Germany: see ch 5 part Ill par 5 supra; and the 
Netherlands: see ch 5 part Ill par 3 supra. 
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law in this respect. 123 However, Van der Merwe and De Jager124 note that the 
sparsity of cases is not a true reflection of the topicality of part of this part of the law 
as claims for compensation of damage caused by defective products are more often 
settled outside the court. 125 
5.2.1 The act 
The requirement of an act is satisfied through the conduct of the manufacturer which 
consists mainly of the control and organisation of the complex process of industrial 
production. 126 According to De Jager127 these acts of control and organisation are 
human and have an essentially individualistic character which can be governed by the 
mind of the manufacturer and should therefore be explained in terms of the causal 
theory of the act. The acts may consist of a commissio or an omissio. 128 
5.2.2 Wrongfulness 
5.2.2.1 Breach of a legal duty 
Wrongfulness lies either in the infringement of a subjective right or in the breach of 
a legal duty. 129 In the case of products liability wrongfulness is found in the breach 
123 Neethling et a/ 306. See also ch 5 Part 1 supra. 
124 1980 SALJ 83. 
125 The reasons are inter alia the high cost of litigation and the need of well-known 
manufacturers to protect their identities: Van der Merwe and De Jager 1980 SALJ 
83. 
126 De Jager 1978 THRHR 352; Vander Walt 1972 THRHR 239. 
127 1978 THRHR 352. 
128 See ch 3 par 3.3.1 supra. 
129 See ch 3 par 3.3.2 supra. 
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of a legal duty. 130 The reason why a breach of duty must also be present in the 
case of a defective product causing personal and property injury ·(which in itself 
constitutes an infringement of a subjective right which is prima facie unlawful), lies 
in the indirect consequences of the manufacturer's act. 131 Acts which directly cause 
harm can be judged solely by their harmful consequences but acts which indirectly 
cause harm are only unlawful when they also violate a legal duty. 132 A 
manufacturer {or in the case of software, a producer) has a duty according to the 
legal convictions of the community to prevent the distribution of defective products on 
the market which will harm the interests of the consumer. 133 The causing of 
damage by a defective product is therefore in principle wrongful in that it is a violation 
of this legal duty. Consequently, the product must be defective in order to constitute 
wrongful conduct by the manufacturer. 134 
5.2.2.2 Defective product 
The question whether a product is defective can only be answered with regard to the 
legal ~onvictions of society (boni mores}. 135 Generally, a product that is 
unreasonably dangerous will be considered as defective. 136 A product is 
unreasonably dangerous if in the circumstances, it does not meet the expectations 
130 Neethling et a/ 306; De Jager 627 et seq and 1978 THRHR 354 et seq; Snyman 
1980 C/LSA 188. 
131 De Jager 1978 THRHR 347. 
132 De Jager 1978 THRHR 356. 
133 The boni mores test is applied: see ch 3 par 3.3.2.1 supra. 
134 Van der Walt 1972 THRHR 241. 
135 Van der Walt 1972 THRHR 241; Neethling et a/ 306; De Jager 359; Van der 
Merwe and De Jager 1980 SALJ 88. 
136 De Jager 1978 THRHR 360; De Jager 632 et seq; Neethling et a/ 306. 
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of the reasonable consumer with regard to its safety. 137 This definition of a 
defective product is also used in the Second Restatement of Torts 138 and in the EU 
Directive on liability for defective products, 139 also referred to as the "consumer 
expectation" test. 140 Products that are dangerous according to their form and 
content such as knives or cigarettes, cannot be regarded as defective because a 
reasonable consumer would be aware of the safety risk in using them. 141 The state 
of human science and technology and the necessity of experimenting must be taken 
into account when determining the defectiveness of a product. 142 It is inevitable 
that that some products will be dangerous at a given time of development, for 
example new drugs that may have as yet undetermined side effects. 143 In this 
regard mention must be made of the development risk defence or, as it is also known 
the state-of-the-art defence which originated in the USA and was adopted in the strict 
product liability legislation of all but one of the EU member states. 144 In terms of 
this defence a manufacturer will not be liable for damage caused by a defect in a 
product if it is proved that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time 
when the product was put into circulation, was not such that the existence of the 
defect could be discovered. 145 In the case of software the question may be asked 
whether the consumer does not as a rule expect that there will be faults in the 
137 Van der Walt 1972 THRHR 242; De Jager 1978 THRHR 358. 
138 Paragraph 402A: see ch 5 part I par B 3.2.2.2 supra. 
139 85/374 Art 2: see ch 5 part II par 8.3.4 supra. 
140 See ch 5 Comparative law: summary supra. 
141 Neethling eta/ 306. 
142 Van der Walt 1972 THRHR 242; De Jager 1978 THRHR 366. 
143 Van der Walt 1972 THRHR 242. 
144 Only Luxumbourg declined to incorporate this optional defence in terms of the EU 
Directive: Hoffman and Hiii-Arning 9. See also ch 5 part II par 8.3.8 supra. 
145 Cfart 7(e) of the EU Directive, par 1(2) 5 PHG, art 185 e NBW, and s 4(1)e CPA. 
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software as it is well-known that completely bug-free software does not exist. 146 
Because it is universally accepted that software, including ES's, are not 100% bug-
free, the degree of safety which can be expected is a policy issue. 147 The typical 
case group of defects developed in other product liability regimes are also 
distinguished in South African law, 148 namely manufacturing or production defects, 
design defects, instruction defects and the latest group, development risk defects 
(also called observation faults). 149 
The following duties of conduct in accordance with the criterion of reasonableness, 
are distinguished in determining the unlawfulness of the manufacturer's act: 
A general duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that defective products do not 
reach the market or, if they do, to withdraw them from the market, or to take steps 
to ensure that no harm arises from the presence of the product on the market; 150 
a duty to take into account the most recent knowledge available at the stage of 
planning and design; a duty to inspect and to control the product when manufactured; 
a duty to provide potential users with directions for use; a duty to warn users against 
inherent dangers in the product; a duty to withdraw the product from the market once 
a defect was detected after release. In determining the above duties factors such as 
the type of product, 151 the nature of the manufacturer's business enterprise, the 
146 See ch 2 par 9.2.2 supra. 
147 This approach is followed by Anglo-American as well as European computer law 
commentators: Triaille 1993 CLSR 221; Stuurman 141; Tapper 257; Reed(2) 68. 
148 De Jager 1978 THRHR 364. 
149 De Jager 1978 THRHR 364-366. For a definition and discussion of the various 
defects, see ch 5 part Ill par 5.5.4 supra since they have the same meaning and 
content in SA law. 
150 Vander Merwe and De Jager 1980 SALJ 88; De Jager 1978 THRHR 359; Van 
der Walt 1972 THRHR 228. 
151 The producers of ES's in safety-related applications for example, will be subject 
to stricter measures than the producers of ES's in computer games applications. 
506 Chapter 6 South African law 
customs and practices followed in a particular trade or industry, 152 the knowledge 
and expertise of potential purchasers and users of the product, 153 the cost of safety 
measures, and the fact that consumers are required to run a certain degree of risk 
in exchange for a product for which the need supersedes its hazardous qualities, 154 
are taken into account. As more and more duties are concretised according to the 
reasonableness criterion, manufacturers will become increasingly certain about the 
steps they should take to act lawfully. 155 In the final analysis the general duties will 
have to be concretised for each type of case, including cases where ES's are used. 
With regard to software products it can already be stated that a paramount duty of 
a developer of software would be the adherence to universally-acknowledged 
software standards and quality assurance production systems such as the ISO 9000 
series. 156 If a software developer has followed existing standards and applied 
quality assurance procedures, and a defect nevertheless occurs, it may be argued 
that the product is not defective as it was designed and produced in accordance with 
the current state of scientific knowledge, and it probably complies with the consumer 
expectation test. Software producers and users should take note as a general 
152 Eg the existence of specific product safety standards and the application of quality 
assurance systems during the production process such as the ISO 9000 
standards: see par 5.2.3.2 infra. 
153 For example, in the case of an Intelligent Assistant it may be assumed that the 
instructions and warnings accompanying the ES will be read and followed by a 
professional user, whereas in the case of a Self-Help System the instructions will 
have to be clear and simple enough to be understood by a lay-user. 
154 For example a vaccine against a life-threatening disease which may itself cause 
serious harm. 
155 Many duties are already specified in legislation, for example the Medicines and 
Related Substances Act 101 of 1965 which provides for the protection of 
consumers injured by defective pharmaceutical products; and the Fertilizers, Farm 
Feeds, Agricultural Remedies and Stock Remedies Act 36 of 1947 which protects 
consumers against inter alia herbicides. 
156 This duty is evident from the comparative law investigation in regard to software 
liability: see Comparative law conclusion part Ill supra. 
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principle to adhere to quality assurance standards wherever possible. 157 
' 
5.2.3 Negligence ) 
5.2.3.1 Test for negligence 
Once it has been established that the manufacturer acted wrongfully, it must be 
determined whether she acted negligently. 158 The manufacturer's conduct must be 
tested against the care that the reasonable person would have exercised in the 
particular circumstances. In terms of the test for negligence it must be asked whether 
the damage was reasonably foreseeable and preventable. 159 In the decision of A 
Gibb and Son (Pty) Ltd v Taylor and Mitchell Timber Supply Co (Pfy) Ltd160 , the 
court held that a dealer (supplier) may, in some circumstances, be delictually liable 
for defects in a product which caused damage. The facts of the case was that the 
plaintiff, who was a building contractor, acquired a defective scaffold plank from the 
defendant, the dealer, on account of which an employee of the plaintiff sustained 
some injuries. After the plaintiff had compensated the employee he claimed a 
contribution ex delict from the defendant on the grounds that the defendant was 90% 
contributorily negligent to his damage. The court held that the liability of the dealer 
depended on the question whether there was a duty to take reasonable care in 
detecting defects. Such a duty to inspect does not arise where a reasonable dealer 
in the position of the defendant, expects a search for defects by the client which will 
probably bring a defect to light. In casu the court found there was no duty to inspect 
because a reasonable timber merchant would have expected a building contractor to 
157 For a discussion of quality assurance, see par 5.2.3.2 infra. 
158 De Jager 640 et seq. 
159 Boberg 194; De Jager 595-596; A Gibb and Son (Pty) Ltd v Taylor and Mitchell 
Timber Supply Co (Pty) Ltd supra 464-465. 
160 Supra. 
508 Chapter 6 South African law 
inspect scaffoldinging for possible defects before using it. Damage was therefore not 
foreseeable and negligence absent. 
In analogy to the duty to inspect of the builder above, it can be said that the user of 
software has a duty to inspect the software before applying it. 161 
5.2.3.2 Quality assurance 
Negligence can also relate to the lack of control measures and a failure to adhere to 
product standards which is related to quality assurance in the case of software. 162 
In other words, a producer of software may be found negligent if the necessary 
control measures were not put into effect. At the same time, these measures may 
serve as a determinant of the standard of skill applicable during the production of 
software as was suggested in other jurisdictions.163 This would first of all entail 
conformance to relevant standards and codes of practice where they exist.164 
Thereafter a risk analysis of the application area should be undertaken 165 in order 
to select techniques for specification, design, development and implementation that 
161 See also the inspection duty of a medical professional referred to in ch 5 part I par 
2.2.2.2 supra. 
162 See the discussion of the ISO 9000 standards series: par 5.2.2.2 infra. 
163 See ch 5 part I and II supra. 
164 Bott et a/237. In Bevan Investments v 8/ackha/1 and Struthers [1973] 2 NZLR 45 
the court stated: 
A design which departs from substantially from relevant 
engineering codes is prima facie a faulty design unless it can be 
demonstrated that it conforms to accepted engineering practice by 
rational analysis. 
165 See appendix Ill for an example of a risk analysis demonstrating the evaluation of 
application areas and possible defaults. 
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will achieve the appropriate level of integrity in the finished product. 166 During 
system design and -construction, continuous testing and debugging procedures 
should be adopted to increase the reliability of the system. 167 In the final analysis 
an external quality assurance and control of software through a certification 
process such as the ISO 9000 quality assurance control system should be 
implemented before abandoning control: 
Users have always been concerned about the quality of software. The term 
software quality is considered to be an oxymoron - it has even earned its 
own variation of Murphy's law: 
If builders made buildings the way programmers create software, the first 
woodpecker would destroy civilization. 168 
Since the beginning of the nineties there has been a world-wide trend of software 
developers conforming to international quality standards such as those embodied in 
the ISO 9000 series of standards. 169 The international standard ISO 9001 for 
software is the leading external quality standard for software. It .:;iovides broad 
guidance on how to implement, maintain and improve a quality system capable of 
ensuring high-quality software. The standard is important because it is becoming the 
only way in which users can judge the competence of a software developer. It has 
be_en adopted by more than 130 countries. Each country has its own institution of the 
ISO 9000 series of standards as well as its own process of attaining such 
accreditation. In South Africa the process is regulated by the South African Bureau 
166 See Bott et a/ 238-256 for an overview of appropriate software engineering 
procedures. 
167 The consequences of not testing was also pointed out by an American court in 
Helling v Carey 83 Wash.2d 514, 519 P.2d 981 (1974): see also ch 5 Part I par 
supra. 
168 Quinnell 75. 
169 lnce 1. 
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of Standards (SASS) and the standard is known as SABS ISO 9001. 170 
Quality assurance means assuring that a product or service does what a customer 
expects it to do. "Fitness for purpose" is a central concept of quality assurance and 
implies that there is a description of the purpose an artefact is intended to perform. 
With regard to software systems the requirements are contained in a document 
referred to as the system specification. 171 According to lnce, 172 the modern and 
sophisticated view of quality assurance is to associate it with various quality factors. 
Some of the more important quality factors are: 
• correctness - the software system must actually conform to its system 
specification 
• maintainability - the ease with which the system can be changed 
• portability - the effort required to transfer a system from one hardware 
platform to another 
• testability- the ease with which a system, or part thereof, can be tested 
• usability - the effort required to learn, operate and interrupt a functioning 
system. 173 
170 The SABS has drafted a series of three codes of practice dealing with quality 
systems to be used for external quality assurance purposes when conformance 
to specified requirements is to be assured by the supplier. SABS 1. 
171 lnce2. 
172 2. 
173 Usability often poses a serious problem in systems because developers tend to 
think only about the front-end of a project, consequently an inadequate interface 
is hastily bolted on at the end of the development. The result is that although the 
system satisfies all the functions in its system specification, it is grossly unusable 
due to a very poor interface: see lnce 4. 
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• reliability - the ability of the system to keep on executing with little 
interruption to its functioning. 174 
• efficiency - the degree to which computing resources are used in an 
application. 
• integrity- the extent to which the system and its data are immune to access 
by unauthorized users 
• reusability- the ease with which chunks of software in one system can be 
moved to another system. 
• interoperability - the ability of a system to operate in conjunction with 
another software system. 
The way in which it is ensured that these quality factors will be present in the 
completed software system is through the adoption of a quality system. The quality 
system is embodied in the quality manual. Not all the abovementioned quality factors 
need to be present in every system as the type of system determines which factors 
will be used, strengthened or omitted. In the case of a safety-critical system such as 
a fly-by-wire ES, there has to be exceptionally high correctness and reliability quality 
factors. 
----~ 
5.2.3.3 Res ipsa loquitur 
It is generally accepted to be very difficult to prove fault on the part of the 
manufacturer because of the absence of fault in the production process or because 
the injured party cannot obtain proof of fault because of the fact that the technological 
17 4 In safety-critical systems with a material output such as the ES Machine, this 
quality factor is expected to be totally present. 
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production process is complicated. 175 In the case of ES's both these difficulties are 
manifest. 176 Neethling et af 77 states that this hardship of the prejudiced party 
should be alleviated in the same way as in Anglo-American law, 178 which is through 
the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 179 They suggest that the res 
ipsa loquitur inference of negligence should at least be applied in cases where a 
consumer proves that she was prejudiced by a defective product which was in that 
defective state when the manufacturer abandoned control over it. 180 In such cases 
the res ipsa loquitur doctrine should be used to expedite proof of negligence of the 
manufacturer. 
Our courts are not opposed to applying the doctrine where policy considerations 
justify it. 181 In the case of software the application of this doctrine is very 
appropriate since the production of software consists of a complicated procedure and, 
especially in the case of ES software, involves many parties. However, the doctrine 
has a very limited meaning in our law.182 It is not a presumption based on a rule 
of law, but merely an inference of negligence to be used when the facts justify it.183 
175 Neethling et a/ 307; Van der Walt 1972 THRHR 242-243. 
176 See ch 2 par 9.1 supra. 
177 At 307. 
178 See ch 5 part I par A 2.3 supra. 
179 See ch 3 par 3.3.3.5 supra. 
180 See also De Jager 1978 THRHR 364; Neethling and Potgieter 1990 De Jure 375-
376. 
181 Combrinck Chiropratiese Kliniek (Edms) Bpk v Datsun Motor Vehicle Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd 1972 4 SA 185 (T); Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Viljoen 1990 2 SA 
647 (A) 661-662. 
182 See ch 3 par 3.3.3.5 supra. 
183 See Schwikkard et a/ 382; Hoffman and Zeffert 552; Scmidt 165. 
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In Groenewald v Conradie184 Rumpff J states the principle as follows: 
Ten slotte is dit wenslik om te beklemtoon dat die gebruik van die 
uitdrukking res ipsa loquitur, streng gesproke aileen dan van pas is 
wanneer dit nodig is om enkel en aileen na die betrokke getuienis te kyk 
sander die hulp van enige ander verduidelikende getuienis. Aileen as die 
gebeurtenis op sigself en in sy eie lig beskou word, behoort die uitdrukking 
gebesig te word omdat anders die beperkte betekenis daarvan vertroebel 
mag word. 
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An inference of fact is actually a mode of thought which is employed in the absence 
of direct evidence. As such, the inference cannot affect the incidence of the burden 
of proof, but may give rise to an evidential burden. 185 In Sardi v Standard and 
Genera/Insurance Co Ltif 86 the court remarked: 
The maxim has no bearing on the incidence of the onus of proof on the 
pleadings. It is invoked where the known facts, relating to negligence, 
consist of the occurrence itself (Groenewald v Conradie 1965 {1) SA 184 
{A) at 187F). The occurrence may be of such a nature as to warrant an 
inference of negligence. As Innes CJ pertinently insisted in Van Wyk v 
Lewis 1924 AD 438 at 445. 'It is really a question of inference.' 
Also in Bayer South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Viljoen187 the Appellate Division restricted the 
doctrine to the application of instances where the circumstances of the case give rise 
to an inference of negligence, thereby not really alleviating the plaintiffs burden. 188 
The defendant does not have to prove to she was not negligent, she only has to 
show that the facts are equally consistent with a finding not involving negligence, or 
she may adduce sufficient evidence of proper care to create an element of doubt 
184 1965 1 SA 184 (A). 
185 See ch 3 par 3.3.3.5 supra. See also Schwikkard eta/ 382; Hoffman and Zeffert 
552; Schmidt 165. 
186 Supra 7800. 
187 1990 2 SA 647 (A) 661-662. 
188 Neethling eta/ 308. 
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· sufficient to destroy a balance of probability. 189 The lack of defects or errors cannot 
be ensured during complicated manufacturing processes and it is inevitable that some 
defective products will reach the market. Even if it can be inferred from the fact that 
a defective product had reached the market that the manufacturer did not act in 
accordance with her duty of care, she will be able to prove her innocence in most 
cases through giving a reasonable explanation that excludes an inference of 
negligence. 190 In the case of an ES developer it will even be easier to give a 
reasonable explanation in the light of the many parties involved in the production of 
an ES. 
5.2.4 Damage 
Damage may consist of patrimonial and non-patrimonial loss. Where the latter form 
of loss is incurred, the injured party will be able to claim damages with the action of 
pain and suffering. Patrimonial loss, including pure economic loss can oe claimed 
with the Aquilian action. 
5.3 Strict liability 
Vah der Walt, 191 with whom Neethling et a/ agrees, 192 states that products liability 
should, ultimately, be based on liability without fault: 193 
189 Arthur v Bezuidenhout and Mieny supra; Hoffman and Zeffert 554. 
190 The res ipsa loquitur - doctrine does not reverse the onus of proof: Arthur v 
Bezuidenhout & Mieny 1962 2 SA 566 573. The defendant need not prove that 
she was not negligent, she need only show enough evidence of proper care to 
raise a doubt. Cf De Jager 645. 
191 1972 THRHR 243; see also De Jager 1978 THRHR 365-366. 
192 308. 
193 Neethling et a/ 308. 
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Die aanvaarding van 'n skuldlose aanspreeklikheid in geval van produkte-
aanspreeklikheid kan deur verskeie ander faktore geregverdig word: die 
openbare belang in die fisies-psigies welsyn van die mens vereis dat die 
hoogste mate van beskerming teen defektiewe verbruikersgoed; die 
vervaardiger skep deur sy bemarking en advertensie die vertroue by die 
publiek dat sy produk veilig is; die strange aanspreeklikheid dien as 
aansporing om die uiterste mate van sorg aan die dag te le; die 
vervaardiger is; vanuit ekonomiese oogpunt gesien, die beste in staat om 
die skadelas te versprei deur prysverhoging en versekering. 
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De Jager194 proposed in 1978 already that at least manufacturing {production) 
defects should incur strict liability. Manufacturing defects result from defects that 
developed in the actual manufacturing process or in the control mechanism applied 
by the manufacturer after production to remove defective products before distribution 
on the market. These types of defects occur in spite of stringent control measures 
and the manufacturer will in many cases be able to prove that she was not negligent. 
There are also cogent policy reasons for the strict liability of the manufacturer in 
these cases. The manufacturer can regard such a defect as part of the production 
risk which is contained in the production cost and is insurable. 195 
It is my contention that delictual liability in the case of personal and property injury 
caused by the use of a defective ES should be on a strict or no-fault basis. The 
imposition of strict liability can be achieved either by way of legislation or through the 
extension of existing common law principles. The imposition of strict liability 
principles in this instance is in conformance with the world-wide trend towards 
consumer protection applicable to products in general. 196 
194 At 648; see also De Jager 1978 THRHR 365. 
195 De Jager 1978 THRHR 366. 
196 See the arguments advanced in regard to the access-to-justice movement in ch 
4 par 3.2.1 supra. 
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5.4 Defences 
The most important defences against a products liability claim are voluntary 
assumption of risk, contributory negligence and abnormal use of the product. 
5.4.1 Voluntary assumptron of risk 
The injured party who uses the product while knowing of the defect, consents to the 
risk of injury and cannot claim for damage incurred. 197 Consent to risk of injury is 
a ground of justification which excludes the unlawfulness of the act. 198 The user 
of an ES such as the Self-Help System, who is aware of the danger in relying on the 
system's advice, may therefore not be able to rely on a products liability claim. 
5.4.2 Contributory negligence 
The contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not an absolute defence; if proven it only 
results in the apportionment of the damage suffered by each party in accordance with 
their relative degrees of fault. 199 A consumer who negligently fails to follow 
instructions for use of the product or ignore warnings, may be contributory negligent. 
In the case of software the instructions and warnings for use may be contained in the 
program itself. 
197 De Jager 1978 THRHR 372. 
198 See par 3.3.2.4 supra. 
199 S 1 (1 )(a) of the Apportionment of Damages Act 34 of 1956: see ch 3 par 3.3.3.6 
supra. 
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5.4.3 Abnormal use 
The abnormal use of a product is a factor that may contribute to a finding that the 
producer did not act wrongfully or negligently.200 Abnormal use of an ES would 
therefore be a factor in the determination of wrongfulness according to the 
reasonableness criterium (the boni mores). 201 If the consumer uses the product in 
a manner for which the product was not intended, it is unlikely that the manufacturer 
will be found negligent since the abnormal use of a product will not be reasonably 
foreseeable. 202 
5.5 Application to expert systems 
The following statement by Van der Merwe and De Jage~03 is very relevant 
concerning the question whether strict liability should be introduced into South African 
product liability: 
The final decision is a matter of legal policy, depending on the degree of 
protection that is considered desirable for the consumer or a category of 
consumers on the one hand, or a specific trade or industry on the other 
hand. 
In my opinion a high risk of potential injury exists for the category of consumers 
consisting of the users of ES's of the type embodied by the Self-Help Machine as 
there is currently no peremptory standards or control mechanisms protecting users 
from defective software. 204 The traditional delictual remedies based on fault puts the 
plaintiff in the difficult position of having to prove negligence on the part of the 
200 De Jager 1978 THRHR 373. 
201 See ch 3 par 3.3.2.1 supra. 
202 Neethling eta/ 307; De Jager 659. 
203 1980 SALJ 83. 
204 The ISO 9000 series may be implemented to render quality assurance. 
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software producer - an almost impossible task in the highly sophisticated domain of 
artificial intelligence. In analogy to the protection given to consumers of defective 
products in other countries, 205 the South African legislator should enact strict liability 
legislation for defective software causing direct personal- and property injury. 
6. Professional liability 
6.1 Introduction 
Professional liability refers to the liability of a member of a profession for professional 
conduct. 206 In the context of ES liability, the injured party may have a delictual 
claim based on professional liability against the professional user of the ES where the 
damage is caused during the exercising of professional services. The user may also 
have a claim based on professional liability against the developers of an ES in the 
light of the specific nature of an ES, namely the provision and embodiment of expert 
or professional knowledge to the user via the ES.207 In this regard a "computer 
malpractice" action has already been suggested by Anglo-American computer Jaw 
writers.208 
6.2 The nature of professional liability 
According to Pretorius209 the following characteristics denote a profession: 
(a) The nature of a professional's work is skilled and specialised, a substantial 
205 See ch 5 part I pars A 3.2 and 8 3.2 supra, part II par 8 supra and part Ill pars A 
3 and 8 3 supra. 
206 See ch 3 par 2.7 supra. 
207 See ch 2 par 10.1 supra. 
208 See ch 5 part I par 8 2.2.2.3 supra. 
209 14-16. See also Jackson and Powell 1-4. 
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part thereof is mental rather than manual and a period of theoretical and 
practical training is required before work of a certain standard can be 
performed. 
(b) Members of a profession adhere to a moral code beyond the general duty 
of honesty and are expected to provide a high standard of service for its 
own sake. 
(c) Members of the profession usually belong to a controlling body which 
regulates admissions and uphold standards by issuing codes of 
professional conduct. 
(d) Most professions have a high status in the community which is conferred 
either by way of legislation210 or common consent of the community.211 
Although some of the traditional characteristics have blurred with the increase of 
occupations achieving professional status, they are still a characteristic of most of the 
new professions. 212 
For an occupation to become a profession, the community expects that 
.. its practitioners enjoy the privileges of controlling their own entry and 
regulating their own conduct. It means that they must have specialised 
skills acquired by intellectual and practical training, that they have a high 
degee of detachment and integrity, and, above all, that they have a strong 
sense of responsibility and an exceptional committment to the interests of 
their clients which transcends all other committments. 213 
21 0 See for example the Medical, Dental and Supplementary Health Service 
Professions Act 56 of 197 4. 
211 For example the clergy. 
212 Jackson and Powell16. 
213 Quotation from The Times of 5 January 1980 cited by Jackson and Powell 2 fn 7. 
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The question arises whether the computer programming and software engineering 
field may qualify as a profession in terms of the above requirements. The computer 
programming field is not instituted by legislation, neither are the practitioners thereof 
subjected to a controlling body and unfortunately it doesn't seem as if they are held 
in a higher regard by the community. Assuredly their work is highly skilled and 
consists only of mental work. However, although a period of compulsory practical 
training is not formally required, in practice this is usually the case, depending on the 
software-employer. 
With regard to the question whether the producers, specifically the developers of an 
ES, may be held to a professional standard depends on whether it can be said that 
computer programming and software engineering in general forms part of a 
profession in which its members may be subjected to malpractice suits. The situation 
in South Africa was explained to me in a telephonic conversation with Mr Simon 
Reynolds, president of the Computer Society of South Africa at the time, who said 
that there had been an active movement to attain professional status for the 
information industry in South Africa, but that this was met with considerable 
opposition from government bodies. The reason for this is apparently a lack of 
consensus among parties as to whether the industry complies with all the 
requirements of a profession. According to Mr Reynolds, even the defining of 
"information technology" is seen to be problematic.214 Mr Reynolds, who is also a 
member of the British Computer Society (BCS), is unsure whether South Africa 
should follow the British example in classifying "software engineers" with the 
engineering profession because of the great diversity that already exists among the 
different types of engineers, for example between a mechanical and a civil engineer. 
Another reason for not joining the engineering profession is the fact that, although 
214 Opponents to the idea of software professionals argue that information 
technology, of which software engineering forms a part, can never be a profession 
in own right because of its "vehicle-like" nature with regard to other vocations. By 
this is meant the fact that the information industry's whole existence and primary 
function lies in the support and enhancement of other vocations or professions 
such as the medical profession, architects, lawyers, etc. 
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engineers used to develop many of their own computer systems, there are now 
system developers that provide a much more specialised service. According to him 
"Information Technology" should stand alone and be recognised as a profession in 
its own right. Another significant factor in the debate regarding the quest for 
professionalism, is the vocational entry examinations organised by the Information 
Technology Users Council (ITUC). ITUC is a voluntary organisation consisting of 
more or less 150 major information technology companies in South Africa, with whom 
prospective employees can take a vocational examination which subsequently 
certifies that the holder possesses of certain competencies and skills. Although this 
certificate is not a requirement for employment in the information industry, it is seen 
as a definite advantage. In my view this points to the need for a more formal 
regulation and setting of standards which should be recognised by the legislature, 
thereby rendering formal professional status to the software engineering field. The 
actions of ITUC point to a need for regulation which is recognised by the industry 
itself and which it is attempting to attain through self-regulation. 
Although it cannot be stated that the field relating to computer programming is 
regarded as a fully-fledged profession in South Africa yet, it is only a question of time 
before a more formal adherence to set standards is enforced. The astounding 
expansion of computer applications into more and more domains and households is 
urging the necessity for standardisation throughout the community. This need has 
also been identified by the EU which is striving for the recognition and enforcement 
of international standards. Software producers and users should take note as a 
general principle to adhere to quality assurance standards wherever possible. This 
would first of all entail conformance to relevant standards and codes of practice 
where they exist. 215 Thereafter a risk analysis of the application area should be 
215 Bott et a/237. In Bevan Investments v Blackha/1 and Struthers [1973}2 NZLR 45 
the court stated: 
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taken216 in order to select techniques for specification, design, development and 
implementation that will achieve the appropriate level of integrity in the finished 
product. 217 During system design and -construction, continuous testing and 
debugging procedures should be adopted to increase the reliability of the system.218 
In the final analysis an external quality assurance and control of software through 
a certification process such as the ISO 9000 quality assurance control system 
should be implemented.219 The steps set out are a suggestion of the content of 
minimum guidelines to be followed in the profession of software engineering. A 
failure to follow one or more of them, may constitute negligence. Such guidelines 
could form the basis of setting minimum standards that could develop into a 
professional standard for the construction of software application systems 
independent of the subject domain. 
6.3 Determination of negligence of professionals 
The main effect of a professional liability claim is that in the determination of 
negligence, a higher_§.ta.nd.arQ_Qf care than that of an ordinary reasonable person is 
,.-....... ..-.-···· . ,._..~- ~~ .... "~---··-~---.~ .... 
A design which departs from substantially from relevant 
engineering codes is prima facie a faulty design unless it can be 
demonstrated that it conforms to accepted engineering practice by 
rational analysis. 
216 See appendix Ill for an example of a risk analysis demonstrating the evaluation of 
application areas and possible defaults. 
217 See Batt et a/ 238-256 for an overview of appropriate software engineering 
procedures. 
218 The consequences of not testing was also pointed out by an American court in 
Helling v Carey (1974) 83 Wash 2d 514; 519 P 2d 981: see also ch 5 Part I par 
2.2.2.2 supra. 
219 See par 5.2.3.2 supra. 
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required from a professional in the practising of a profession.220 The standard of 
skill and competence may be set by current standards and codes of conduct in the 
relevant profession.221 A failure to comply with the relevant standard of skill and 
competence of the reasonable expert in the same circumstances may result in 
negligent behaviour. 
6.4 Professional liability towards clients 
It is trite law that the relationship between a professional and her client constitutes 
a duty of care on the part of the professional towards the client, which duty exists 
separately from the contractual relationship existing between them.222 Adherence 
to the requirements of a delict is of course a prerequisite for such delictual 
liability223 and if it is complied with, the plaintiff in this situation will have an action 
based on contract as well as on delict to claim compensation for damage incurred. 
The resultant concurrence of actions does not inhibit a plaintiff suffering personal or 
property damage, but in the case of pure economic loss, our courts are not willing to 
acknowledge the concurrence of a delictual action in cases where a contract exists 
between the parties.224 
6.5 Professional liability towards third parties 
Another implication of professional liability is the delictual liability of members of a 
profession for loss caused in their professional capacity to third parties. In general it 
220 See generally Jackson and Powell15-18; Neethling et a/129-130; Pretorius 400-
403; Midgley(1) 146-148; Midgley(2) 120-132. 
221 See ch 3 par 3.3.3.3 supra. 
222 Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 
(A) 499-500. 
223 Ibid. 
224 Ibid; see also ch 4 par 2 supra. 
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can be said that a member of a profession would not be delictually liable towards co-
contractants for pure economic loss but will be delictually liable towards third parties 
for such loss caused unlawfully and culpably. 225 The general principles of delict 
must be applied to determine the liability of the professional in each case. 226 
6.6 Application to expert systems 
6.6.1 Professional liability of the producers 
The application of professional liability principles with regard to liability incurred by the 
DE who is a professional or expert in the field of knowledge of the ES, usually 
occasions no difficulty. It is expected of an expert who professes to do just that, 
namely to exercise the care of a reasonable expert in the same position. If the defect 
of the system is due to a flaw in the knowledge base because of the negligence of 
the DE, the malpractice suit should be evaluated according to the profession of the 
DE.227 In other words, a fault in the knowledge base of a medical ES supplied by 
a medical expert, will be judged in terms of a medical profession standard. A 
problem may arise if the domain in which the injury arises, is in itself not subject to 
professional liability, and the ES is elevated to a higher standard of care than is 
expected from the human counterpart in the same domain.228 
6.6.2 Professional liability of the users 
The professional liability of the users will only arise in the context of the Intelligent 
Assistant and the ES Machine. Where an ES is incorrectly used by a professional 
225 Neethling et a/ 284. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Cole 1990 CLJ 210. 
228 Ibid. 
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user, the user will be liable for damage caused wrongfully and negligently. As there 
are no special rules pertaining to this situation and the usual delictual requirements 
qualified by the professional expertise of the user applies, no further discussion is 
offered. In the case of the use of a defective ES, the situation is comparable to that 
of a professional using a defective tool in the practising of her profession. 
Professional liability for the failure to use an existing ES in circumstances where the 
use thereof would have prevented harm, must be considered in the light of the 
principles relating to a wrongful and culpable omission on the part of the user. The 
use of a defective ES by a professional user can be equated to the use of defective 
instruments or equipment by a medical practitioner. Apart from a claim against the 
manufacturer of defective equipment, an injured party may also have a claim against 
the practitioner based on the latter's negligence.229 The doctor's liability will depend 
on whether she was aware or ought reasonably to have been aware of the defect in 
the apparatus.230 In Dale v Hamilton231 the doctor's failure to inspect and ensure 
the safe functioning of an X-ray apparatus which caused severe burns i..., the patient, 
was found to be negligent since there had been a duty on him to see that the 
apparatus was safe. In another decision232 the Appellate Division refused to hold 
a doctor liable for injuries caused to a patient by the breaking of the needle of a 
syringe which showed no visible signs of a latent defect. The professional user 
therefore has a duty to inspect and test an ES before using or relying on it in the 
practising of her profession. If such a test does not reveal a defect and the user could 
not reasonably have been aware of the defect, the user cannot be held liable for any 
resultant loss. The non-use of an ES may amount to an omissio, which is a failure 
to act positively to prevent loss.233 In general a person is not liable on the grounds 
229 Claassen and Verschoor 52-54; Strauss 264-266. 
230 Strauss 265. 
231 1924 WLD 184. 
232 Mitchell v Dixon 1914 AD 519. 
233 See Neethling et al 50 et seq; Midgley(1) 48; Boberg 210. 
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of an omission that causes harm to another.234 For liability to occur the omissio has 
to be wrongful which will be the case if there is a legal duty on the defendant to act 
positively in the circumstances. The question whether such a duty exists, must be 
determined according to the legal convictions of the community.235 Neethling et 
af36 points out that certain factors which may indicate the existence of a legal duty 
to act positively, have crystallised over the years. One such relevant factor is the 
existence of a special relationship between the parties. 237 This relationship may 
consist of a contractual relationship such as the one in existence between the user 
and her client. A legal duty does not necessarily arise merely from the existence of 
a special relationship and each case will have to be determined in the light of the 
boni mores criterion. It is doubtful whether, at this stage of the development of ES 
technology the non-use of an ES would amount to a wrongful omissio. 
7. Vicarious fiabflity, 
Persons are usually only responsible for their own actions, but there are 
circumstances in which the law imposes liability on a person who did not have any 
personal involvement in the causing of damage, such as an employer with regard to 
d~licts committed by her employees. Vicarious liability is the only common law form 
of liability without fault that is applicable in the context of ES liability.238 Vicarious 
liability exists where a person is liable without personal fault for a delict committed by 
234 There is no general duty on a person to prevent harm being caused to another: 
Minister van Polisie v Ewels 1975 3 SA 590 (A}; Nkumbi v Minister of Law and 
Order 1991 3 SA 29 (E) 35. 
235 Minister van Polisie v Ewels supra; Kadir v Minister of Law and Order 1992 3 SA 
737 (C). 
236 51 et seq. 
237 Neethling et al60; Cathkin Park Hotel v JD Makesch Architects 1993 2 SA 98 0N) 
1 00; Greenfield Engineering Works (Pty) Ktd v NKR Construction (Pty) Ltd 1978 
4 SA 901 (N). 
238 See ch 3 par 3.4 supra. 
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another person. 239 The imposition of this form of liability is based on policy 
reasons240 and factors playing a role in the imposition of liability include: control 
over another's activity, the creation of risk, who benefits from the activity, and who 
can afford to pay for damages incurred.241 It applies in cases where there is a 
particular relationship between persons namely that of an employer-employee, 
principal-agent and motor car owner-motor car driver.242 The rationale for the 
employer's liability is found in the risk or danger theory in terms whereof the 
employer is held liable on the grounds of fairness and justice, for the work of the 
employee which creates risk of harm (commission of delicts).243 
The requirements for an employer's vicarious liability for the delict of an employer are 
the following: 244 
(a) An employer-employee relationship must exist at the time the delict is 
committed. 
There must be a connection between the activity of the employee and the employer's 
business. 245 This connection is sometimes established by the "creation of risk" 
principle which is an enquiry into the risk of harm associated with the employment of 
239 Midgley(1) 23. 
240 Hosten eta/ 847. 
241 Boucher v Du Toit 1978 3 SA 965 (0) 971; DuPlessis v Fau/1985 2 SA 85 (NC). 
242 Neethling et a/ 352. 
243 Neethling et a/ 352 et seq; Van der Merwe and Olivier 508 et seq. 
244 Neethling et a/ 353-358. 
245 Mkize v Martins 1914 AD 382 390; Estate van derBy/ v Swanepoe/1927 AD 141 
152; Gibbins v Williams, Wright en Mostert lngelyf 1987 2 SA 82(T) 90; Minister 
of Law and Order v Ngobo 1992 4 SA 822 (A) 830; Maca/a v Maokeng Town 
Council 1993 1 SA 434 (A) 441; 
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the person. 246 The question whether a person is an employee or an independent 
contractor is determined by the presence or absence of control over them, as well as 
the circumstances of each specific case. 247 In the case of employment, a contract 
of service248 exists in terms of which the employer exercises control or authority 
over the employee. In the case of an independent contractor a contract of 
~:;_.~·· --· . - ---··-·--··----··--
[TJMd.ate~~-~--~~l! __ be --~:nder:~-~~it~9ut being 
subject to the control of another. 250 Several factors are taken into account to 
~ --
determine whether a person is a servant or an independent contractor. One of them 
is the ~I" test in terms whereof the power or capacity to.control, rather 
than factual control, is the decisive factor. 251 
The vicarious liability of hospitals may be referred to here as, similar to a software 
house making use of independent professionals to produce a software program, the 
situation arises where professional staff are contracted to render services to patients 
in the hospital. In Mtetwa v Minister of Healtft52 the court overruled previous South 
African decisions253 which, in pursuance of antiquated English doctrine, held that 
246 Maca/a v Maokeng Town Council supra 441. 
247 See also ch 3 pars 2.6.1.3 and 2.6.2.2 supra with regard to contractual liability. 
248 Locatio conductio operarum. 
249 Locatio conductio operis. 
250 Smit v Workmen's Compensation Commissioner 1979 1 SA 51 (A); Van der 
Merwe and Olivier 510. 
251 Neethling et a/ 353-355; Van der Merwe and Olivier 513-514. See also 
Rodrigues vAlves 1978 4 SA 834 (A) 842; Gibbins v Williams, Muller, Wright en 
Mostert lngelyf 1987 2 SA 82 (T) 90. Van der Walt 1976 THRHR 399 points to 
the development of this right to control test in England, the "organisation test", and 
states it implies that a person whose work forms an integral part of another's 
business organisation is regarded as a servant for whose wrongful act the 
employer is liable: see ch 5 part I par A 3.1 infra. 
252 1989 3 SA 600 (D). 
253 See Lower Umfolozi District War Memorial Hospital v Lowe 1937 NPD 31; St 
Augustine's Hospital (Pty) Ltd v LeBreton 1975 2 SA 530 (0). 
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a hospital authority is not liable for the negligent conduct of its professional staff 
during the execution of their professional duties.254 In casu, the court stated that the 
defendant could be held liable as an employer for the delicts of staff irrespective of 
the professional or administrative nature of their duties. 255 The court in Mtetwa256 
pointed out that the control test as applied in previous cases has undergone a change 
in modern times which is to be determined as a question of fact: 257 
The degree of supervision and control which is exercised by the person in 
authority over him is no longer regarded as the sole criterion to determine 
whether someone is a servant or something else. The deciding factor is the 
intention of the parties to the contract, which is to be gathered from a 
variety of facts and factors. 
(b) The employee must commit a delict. 
The employer and employee are therefore joint wrongdoers against the injured party 
and the employer has a right of recourse against the employee. 258 
(c) The employee must act within the scope of her employment when the delict 
is committed. 
The employee acts within the scope of employment if the conduct falls within the 
terms of the employment contract, and outside such scope when the employee is 
254 Cf Strauss 300-302; Claassen and Verschoor 98-103. 
255 Supra 606C. 
256 Supra. 
257 Mtetwa v Minister of Health supra 605F. 
258 Botes v Van Oeventer 1966 3 SA 182 (A) 205; Harnischfeger Corporation v 
Appleton 1993 4 SA 479 (W) 487. See also Vander Merwe and Olivier 508-519. 
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disconnected from employment and only promotes her own interests. 259 
The employer-employee relationship is relevant to the ES liability issue under 
discussion in this study. 260 In cases of damage incurred through the use of 
defective ES's, the software developer may be held vicariously liable for the 
programming errors of the KE for example, which caused the malfunctioning of the 
ES, resulting in damage. The KE in such a scenario stays delictually liable and can 
be cited together with the producer as a joint wrongdoer. 261 The question whether 
any one of the producers is a servant or an independent contractor of the developer 
will have to be determined according to the "control test" discussed in (a).262 
\8. Strict statutory liability 
The following enactments of strict liability exist in various South African statutes: 
(a) Legal Succession to the SA Transport Services Act 9 of 1989 
In terms of this act the company that succeeded the SA Transport Services is held 
liable without fault for any fire-damage caused by a train. 263 This liability could be 
attributable to ES use if, for example, an ES is used in the train's operation and due 
to a fault in the ES, fire-damage is caused. 
259 Neethling eta/ 355; Van der Merwe and Olivier 514; Scott 135. See also 
Minister of Police v Rabie 1986 1 SA 117 (A) 134 for the test to be employed in 
order to determine whether the actions of a public servant fall within or outside the 
scope of employment. 
260 See ch 2 par 1 0.2.1 supra. 
261 Neethling eta/ 355. 
262 Supra. 
263 Clause 2(1) schedule 1 of the Act. 
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(b) Aviation Act 74 of 1962 
S 11 (2) of the Act holds the owner of an aircraft strictly liable for damage caused by 
the aircraft by assuming intent on the part of the owner. 264 In the example of the 
"fly-by-wire" aeroplane given earlier,265 injured parties will have an action based on 
strict liability for loss sustained against the owner of the aircraft. 266 The owner of 
the aircraft will in turn have a claim for damages against the developer of the 
defective ES. 267 
(c) Nuclear Energy Act 92 of 1982 
S 41 ( 1) of the Act makes the holder of certain nuclear licences strictly liable for all 
nuclear damage caused during the holder's period of responsibility. In case of 
damage caused through the use of an ES in the above instance, the relevant holder 
of such a license will be held strictly liable toward the injured parties. 
(d) Electricity Act 54 of 1986 
S 19 of the Act creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence on the part of the 
eleCtrical undertaking,268 which does not constitute absolute strict liability. 
264 Neethling et a/ 360 fn 158. 
265 Ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
266 See ch 3 par 2.6.2 supra. 
267 
268 Neethling et a/ 361 fn 167 criticizes this effect of the Act because of the high risk 
of damage that is created by electricity. Cf Van der Merwe and Olivier 556. 
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9. Joint wrongdoers 
In terms of our common law, joint wrongdoers are people who co-operate 
consciously to commit a delict, and people who contribute causally to the same 
harmful result through independent wrongful conduct are regarded as concurrent 
wrongdoers. 269 The Apportionment of Damages Acf70 presently regulates the 
position. In terms of the Act the common-law distinction between joint and concurrent 
wrongdoers is abolished; only the term joint wrongdoers is retained and it is defined 
as "persons who are jointly or severally liable in delict for the same damage".271 
Joint wrongdoers may be sued in the same action and the court may order them to 
be jointly or severally liable and that payment by one of them shall absolve the others 
to the plaintiff. The court may also, if all the wrongdoers are before it, apportion the 
damages among them according to their relative degree of fault and give judgement 
against each of them for his/her part of the damage. 272 A defendant has a right of 
recourse from a joint wrongdoer if the joint wrongdoer is notified of the action before 
litis contestatio. 273 
wrongdoers. 274 
The Act applies to negligent as well as intentional 
In the context of ES's it is possible that the developer or producer of the system, 
tog.ether with the other members of the development team such as the DE, KE, 
toolbuilder and the DE may be regarded as joint wrongdoers with the result that the 
provisions of Act 34 of 1957 will have to be considered when their liabilities are 
determined. Where the use of a defective ES causes injury, the user of the defective 
269 Neethling et a/ 257. 
270 Act 34 of 1957. 
271 s 2(1 ). 
272 S 2(8). Cf Neethling et a/ 258. 
273 s 2(2). 
274 Randbond Investments v FPS (Northern Region) (Pty) Ltd 1992 2 SA 608 (W). 
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ES may also be a joint wrongdoer, depending on the circumstances.275 
10. Conclusion 
10.1 The Intelligent Assistant 
The Intelligent Assistent is an interactive ES produced for use by a professional user 
as a tool or decision-aid in the practising of her profession. 276 Due to the nature 
of this particular type of ES, harm may be caused to the injured party because of a 
defect in the system, the incorrect use of the system or because an existing system 
was not used in circumstances where use thereof could have prevented the harm 
from ensuing. In all three instances mentioned, the user-wrongdoer is a professional 
person. This type of ES may consist of standard or custom software acquired from 
the producers by way of any of the accepted modes of acquisition established and 
discussed earlier.277 In the case of harm caused by a defective :.ystem, the 
producers may be liable towards the injured parties on the basis of products liability 
or a negligent misrepresentation.278 The possibility of a claim against the 
developers of a defective system based on their professional liability can only arise 
in_ respect of the liability of the DE who belongs to a recognised profession, since the 
software industry is not acknowledged as a profession yet. 279 
275 All the criteria for delictual liability must be fulfilled. 
276 See ch 2 par 11 supra. 
277 See ch 3 par 2.6 supra. 
278 See par 5.5 supra. 
279 See par 6.6.1 supra. 
534 Chapter 6 South African law 
1 0.2 The Self-Help System 
The Self-Help System is produced for in-home use by lay persons to advise them on 
diverse matters ranging from professional services such as the rendering of legal 
advice, to technical matters such as how to clean a swimming pool280 and as such 
is only used by non-professional users. This type of ES consists of standard software 
which is usually acquired from suppliers by way of a sale or lease. In the case of 
harm caused to an injured party because of a defective ES, a claim may be instituted 
against the developers of the system based on products liability or on negligent 
misrepresentation.281 Once again, the DE may incur professional liability if the 
defect in the ES originates from the domain knowledge contained in the knowledge 
base. The Self-Help System carries a great risk of potential harm to the lay- user, 
especially those systems endeavouring to furnish professional advice in areas where 
damage to person or property is likely to occur.282 The ordinary plaintiff is rendered 
powerless either by way of standard exclusion clauses in case of parties bound by 
contract, or by the hardship of proving negligence on the part of the producers. For 
these reasons, it is proposed that strict liability principles be adopted to hold 
producers liable to users in order to furnish compensation for loss suffered. ES's 
such as these are consumer products to which the policy reasons for the imposition 
of ·strict liability principles apply. Legislation in analogy to the product liability 
legislation of the EU and its member States should be implemented to effect this 
solution.283 The legislation would only be applicable to defective ES software that 
causes harm to the persoh and property (other than the defective product itself) of 
the injured party and any exclusion of such liability should be proscribed. It may be 
advisable to limit the amount of compensation that can be claimed by determining 
280 See ch 2 par 11 supra. 
281 See par 5.5 supra. 
282 For example a medical diagnostic ES: see ch 3 par 9.2.2 supra. 
283 See ch 5 part II par 8 supra. 
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maximum damages. The possibility of a professional liability action against the 
developers of the system, once again arises. 
10.3 The ES machine 
The ES machine is an ES which forms part of a commercial product and is therefore 
a component part of the end-product. This type of ES produces a material output and 
can be used by a professional or non-professional user. In the case of harm caused 
by the ES Machine as a result of defective ES software, the injured party may, apart 
from the primary claim based on products liability against the manufacturer of the 
main product, 284 also have a products liability claim against the producers of the 
defective ES. As in the case of the previous two types of ES's, the possibility of a 
claim based on the professional liability of the DE may also arise.285 Where harm 
is caused to a third party by the incorrect use or non-use of the system via a 
professional or non-professiona: user, the same liability principles apply to them as 
those applicable to the users of the Intelligent Assistant referred to above?86 
284 For example 
285 Par 6.5.1 supra. 
286 Par 2.1 supra. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Observations and comments 
In this study an investigation was made of civil liability issues arising from the use of 
a particular type of software applications program namely expert systems (ES's). The 
appellation "expert systems" is already indicative of the very distinctive nature of 
these computer programs which lies in the ability to provide the user with expert 
advice or assistance in the solving of a problem or the execution of a task. 1 As such, 
ES's find application in a variety of areas, many of which are· either safety-related, 
such as a "fly-by-wire" aviation system in an aeroplane2 or others which are designed 
to replace specific professional services such as a medical expert system (MES) to 
diagnose illnesses.3 It is therefore obvious that a grave risk of potential personal 
injury exists in the event of a fault in the ES, or when a sound ES is incorrectly used, 
or even when an existing ES is not used. In such circumstances it must be 
determined who the liable parties are, what the basis of their liability is and if the 
liability principles of our civil law are sufficient to solve the problem. 
The investigation of ES liability-issues necessarily encompasses the whole spectrum 
of software liability. Because of this, many of the liability principles may be applicable 
to software in general. After an investigation of the nature and structure of ES's, two 
main groups of possible liable parties were identified, namely the producers and the 
users.4 Thereafter all the possible contractual and delictual causes of action that can 
1 See ch 2 par 2.2 supra. 
2 See ch 1 par 1.1 supra. 
3 See ch 2 par 4.2 supra. 
4 See ch 2 par 8 supra. 
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be brought against these two groups for the institution of claims for damages arising 
from injuries caused by the use of expert systems, as defined,5 were determined. 
This was done by applying the general principles of the law of contract and the law 
of delict to the situation involving expert systems. 6 The producers will only incur 
liability from the use of a defective ES, whereas the users are at risk of incurring 
liability from the use of a defective ES, the incorrect use of a sound ES, as well as 
the non-use of an existing ES. 
During the investigation of contractual causes of action it became apparent that most 
software computer contracts contain liability exclusion clauses whereby especially the 
developers of software are exonerated from any injurious consequences of their 
efforts. 7 Unlike the position in England and America, 8 South African users are not 
protected against such clauses by general legislative measures.9 Because many 
software contracts are entered into between South African users and English or 
American software developers, the effect of exclusion clauses in their legal systems 
were discussed for the benefit of South African users.1° For the same reason a 
discussion of the effect of a foreign "choice of law" clause in a contract entered into 
between a South African party and a foreign party was given.11 The various types 
o_f software acquisition contracts were identified in terms of the general principles of 
the law of contract and it was pointed out that in the normal course of events, two 
5 Namely the use of a defective ES, the incorrect use of a sound ES and the non-
use of an existing ES: see ch 1 par 1.4.1 supra. 
6 See ch 3 pars 2 and 3 supra. 
7 See ch 3 par 2.4.2 supra. 
8 In both these jurisdictions unconscionable exemption clauses are outlawed: see 
ch 3 par 2.6.1 supra. 
9 The SALC is currently investigating the possibity of protective legislation in this 
regard: see ch 3 par 2.4.2 supra. 
10 See ch 3 par 2.6.1 supra. 
11 See ch 4 par 4.4 supra. 
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types of contracts are entered into when software is acquired: (1) an acquisition 
contract existing between the supplier and customer-user; and (2) a licensing contract 
which exists between the developer and the user of the software. 12 It was pointed 
out that in the case of shrink-wrap licensing agreements, the rules relating to the so-
called "ticket cases" will have to be followed in order to ascertain whether a valid 
contract came into being. 13 Because such a contract will in many cases not be 
validly concluded, rendering the developers' exemption clause ineffective, the user 
may have a delictual action against them in case of a defect in the system. In many 
cases the user will have both a contractual and a delictual action, therefore a 
discussion of the principles of concurrence was necessary. 14 The discussions of 
copyright, alternative dispute resolution forms and the effect of the Bill of Rights on 
civil liabilities were included for the benefit of the user entering into a software 
contract and also to furnish motivation for my argument that the delictual liability of 
the producer for damage caused by a defective expert system which is distributed on 
the mass market for direct use by a non-professional user should be grounded in 
strict liability.15 
The final objective of this study was to discuss the various forms of delictual liability 
arising from the use of expert systems. For this purpose a comparative law study 
was undertaken, consisting of the legal systems of the two main members of the 
Anglo-American common law family, the United Kingdom and the United States and 
two continental law countries, the Netherlands and Germany. 16 No comparative law 
study is complete without referring to the influence of the steadily growing European 
12 See ch 3 par 2.5 supra. 
13 See ch 3 par 2.5.2 supra. 
14 See ch 4 par 2.2 supra. 
15 See ch 4 pars 2.5 and 5.3 supra. 
16 See ch parts I and Ill supra. 
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Union. 17 In the field of information technology in particular, the EU is exerting a 
strong influence and their current program of moving towards the standardization of 
differing national standards applicable to information technology products are 
commendable. 18 However, the most important influence of the EU is found in the 
adoption of the Directive on liability for defective products which was implemented by 
the member States including England, the Netherlands and Germany. In terms of this 
Directive, strict products liability for personal and property injury caused by a 
defective product is instituted as an additional regime of liability. 
Liability for the use of defective software, including expert systems, is foremostly 
treated as products liability by all the legal systems investigated, provided the 
software can be regarded as a product. In this regard the distinction between a 
product and a service and the policy considerations behind them, plays a decisive 
role. 19 Products are synonymous to mass-produced tangible goods which can be 
sold or leased; services consist of a unique provision of intangible information or 
advice in terms of a contract for the rendering of services. Products are subject to 
strict liability whereas services are subject to negligence liability. Software is not a 
class-name to be characterised under either a product or a service: the nature of 
software differs according to a commercial and functional distinction as well as the 
specific application of the software. 20 The classification of ES's have proved to be 
especially contentious as a result of their complex nature. ES's of the type embodied 
in the Self-Help system and the ES Machine are regarded as products but the 
Intelligent Assistant has led to conflicting views. The problem stems from the fact 
that this type of ES consists of a culmination of a product and a service: advice from 
professionals that are usually given in a much more intimate and personal reliance 
situation is now available as a product, bringing different policy issues into play. In 
17 See ch 5 part II supra. 
18 ITSEC: see ch 5 part II par 3 supra. 
19 See ch 3 par 2.6.1.1 supra. 
20 See ch 2 par 10.1 supra. 
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addition, a further problem consists in the presence of an intervening user who may 
break the chain of causation between the defect and the damage. The overall opinion 
seems to be that this type of ES should rather be regarded as a service and not a 
product. 21 Whether software is regarded as a product or a service, consensus is 
reached that both should pass the "fitness for purpose" test. In this respect the 
application of product standards and quality assurance procedures are imperative. 
In the case of products liability compliance with the latter will negate the breach of a 
duty and point to the non-defectiveness of a product.22 In the determination of 
negligence of the developer, compliance with standards and quality control 
procedures may result in the absence of negligence. 
South African delictual principles are based on fault necessitating proof of negligence 
on the part of the developer which is almost impossible in the case of defective 
software due to the highly technical and complicated processes involved. The 
application of res ipsa loquitur is insufficient to help the plaintiff in t~is hardship.23 
For this reason it is argued that the liability of the developers for defective ES's 
should be based on strict liability. It will also be in line with the world wide access to 
justice movement which favours consumer protection and a doctrine of human 
rights. 24 The enactment of legislative measures to protect the interests of certain 
types of holders of rights are not uncommon in our law: for example, in the case of 
the interests of inventors and authors the generalising approach has been replaced 
by statutes to cope with those very distinctive rights. 25 Statutory regulation for the 
protection of certain private law interests may also be recommended for practical 
21 Comparative law conclusion: ch 5 supra. 
22 See ch 6 par 5.2.2.1 supra. 
23 See ch 6 par 5.2.3.3 supra. 
24 See ch 4 par 3.7 supra. 
25 The Patents Act 57 of 1978 and the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. 
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reasons. 26 The imposition of strict liability may also require the enactment of 
legislation.27 In this study it is argued that claims for damages arising from personal 
and property damage caused by the direct use of ES's available on the mass market 
should be grounded on strict liability principles in analogy to the product liability 
regime followed in other jurisdictions. 28 
The possibility of a computer malpractice action against the developers of defective 
software systems have been raised in other jurisdictions.29 Such an action only be 
instituted against a professional person who causes damage during the execution of 
her professional skills. A professional person's standard of skill and expertise is also 
higher than that of an ordinary person and it is not usual for a member of a 
profession to contract out of liability for damage caused by professional 
negligence. 30 Of all the legal systems researched, only England recognises 
software engineering as a profession and consequently holds software developers 
liable in terms of a professionGI standard of negligence. 31 Attention should be given 
to the attaining of professional status by the computer programming industry in South 
Africa as it would promote the achievement of higher standards in the development 
of software and contribute to the development of software products that are more "fit 
for use". Because of the absence of professional status among software developers 
26 See Neethling 1992 1 Codicil/us 4-18 on the effect of computers on private law 
regarding the protection of privacy, trade secrets, patents and copyright. Although 
Neethling submits that the general delictual principles regulating personality 
protection in our law can be utilised effectively to achieve private law data 
protection, he advocates legislation (for practical reasons) to regulate such 
protection. 
27 Eg the Aviation Act 74 of 1962 s11: see ch 3 par 3.4 supra. 
28 For example in the UK, USA, Germany and the Netherlands: see ch 5 parts I and 
Ill infra. 
29 See ch 5 part I pars A 2.7 and 8 2.2.2.3 supra. 
30 See ch 6 par 6.2 supra. 
31 See ch 5 part I par A 2.7 supra. 
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it may also be difficult for injured parties to hold developers who lack the necessary 
skill and expertise, liable in terms of the imperitia culpae adnumeratur maxim, 32 for 
damage incurred. 
2. Conclusion 
Although it is inevitable that the law trudges slowly behind technological development, 
it is imperative that urgent attention is given to the liability issues arising from the use 
of high-technology applications such as expert systems which, by their very nature, 
carry an inherent risk of potential injury. The reason for urgency lies in the veritable 
software application explosion that is currently taking place on the commercial 
market. Standard package and custom software is becoming available at an 
astounding rate and ranges from virtual reality computer games to highly 
sophisticated professional systems that enable users to perform tasks they would 
otherwise not be competent or ~ualified to do. Many of these systems operate in 
fields of expertise that are statutorily controlled in the public's interest and in which 
the human operators or practitioners are required to register professionally before 
they may commence operating. At the moment these systems are distributed and 
applied for use unchecked without having to comply with any set standards or 
requirements which increases the possibility of faults leading to damage. Professional 
status should be given to the programming industry and the liability of developers of 
software, including ES's shoulq be grounded in strict liability. This should be attained 
through specific legislation on the model of the EU Directive on liability for defective 
products. 33 
32 See ch 3 par 3.3.3.3 supra. 
33 85/374: see ch 5 part II par 8 supra. 
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3. Recommendations 
3.1 Expert systems are products 
During this investigation it was shown that all software should be regarded as 
products, irrespective of their type of output, 34 or the way in which they were 
acquired. 35 ES's as a particular type of software would then also qualify as a 
product in terms of which strict liability principles may apply. 
3.2 Professional status for the software industry 
The software industry should be recognised as a profession in order to promote 
higher standards of software programming and to hold developers of software liable 
to a higher level of skill and expertise. 
3.3 Software standards and quality assurance procedures 
The application of software standards and quality assurance procedures should be 
peremptory in the production of software products. Non-compliance with current 
international standards such as the ISO series must be taken into account when 
determining the defectiveness of a software product and also in the test for 
negligence with regard to software and ES liability. 
3.4 Strict liability for software 
Software liability should be based on strict liability because of the policy 
considerations based on consumer protection and the ability of the producers to 
spread their losses via insurance and the hardship of the injured party to prove 
34 le the functional distinction: see ch 2 par 1 0.1.1 supra. 
35 le the commercial distinction: see ch 2 par 1 0.1.1 supra. 
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negligence on the part of the developer. In this regard it was shown that the 
development of res ipsa loquitur will not suffice to relieve the injured party since our 
courts are not as inclined as the Continental courts to effect a complete reversal of 
the burden of proof of negligence in such cases, or to require an impossibly high 
standard of rebuttal. The only way in which a speedy and effective strict liability 
regime can be effected is through legislation. This legislation should be in accordance 
with the EU Directive on liability for defective products and could contain a financial 
limit as to the total amount of damages which can be claimed for the same defect in 
similar products. 
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DEFINITION OF BASIC EXPERT SYSTEM TERMINOLOGY 
TERM 
Algorithm 
Application software 
Artificial intelligence (AI) 
Backward chaining 
Bespoke software 
Binary system 
Bug 
Certainty factor 
DEFINITION 
A formal procedure guaranteed to produce correct or 
optimal solutions; the most useful and least numerous 
sequence of steps required for solving a specified 
problem or achieving a certain goal; the fundamental 
process used by a program and developed by the 
human creativity of a programmer. 
Software that performs a specific task for a user, such 
as word processing, auditing or playing a game. 
The part of computer science concerned with 
developing intelligent computer programs; 
program development geared toward simulating 
human behaviour which permits the perception of 
intelligent replications of human thought patterns. 
An inference paradigm or method which is goal-
directed in that the system starts with the desired goal 
and works backwards in order to establish the facts 
needed to prove it. 
Software that is especially written to meet the 
particular requirements of the user; custom software 
A system consisting of only two states and using 0 
and 1 to depict the two states. 
A programming error, syntax misuse or logical 
misconstruction that causes a program to run 
improperly. This expression has been derived from the 
early days of computing when moths flew into a room-
sized computer and caused a breakdown. 
A number that measures the certainty or confidence 
one has that a fact or rule is valid. 
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Computer program 
Custom software 
Customized software 
Cyberspace 
Data 
Database 
Debug 
Domain expert (DE) 
Domain knowledge 
End-user 
Expert system (ES) 
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A set of statements or instructions capable of causing 
a machine having information-processing capabilities 
to indicate, perform, or achieve a particular function, 
task or result; software. 
Software written to meet a customer's unique 
specifications; bespoke software. 
Existing software that is modified or supplemented to 
meet a particular customer's unique specifications. 
The space entered when communicating electronically; 
electronic space. 
A statement(s) of fact or a unit(s) of information. 
-· 
A collection of data in structured files which are 
retrievable and subject to manipulation; a body or set 
of related information. 
To completely remove any programming errors from a 
software system. 
A person who through years of training and 
experience has become extremely proficient at 
problem solving in a particular domain. 
Knowledge about the problem domain, eg knowledge 
about geology with reference to an expert system for 
finding mineral deposits. 
The person who uses the finished expert system; the 
person for whom the system was developed. 
A computer program or a collection of computer 
programs using expert knowledge to solve problems in 
the specific domain of knowledge. 
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Expert-system-building 
tool 
Expert system shell (ES 
shell) 
Expert system toolbuilder 
Explanation facility 
Firmware 
Forward chaining 
Frame 
Hacker 
Hard copy 
Hardware 
Appendix I 
The programming language and support package 
used to build the expert system. 
A system containing only an inference engine and a 
knowledge representation formalism without the actual 
knowledge. 
The programmer that builds the expert-system-tool 
used to build the expert system. 
That part of an expert system that explains how 
solutions were reached and justifies the steps used to 
reach them. 
Computer material comprised of hardware and 
software 
An inference paradigm or method which is data-
directed in that the system works forward from known 
facts to reach the desired goal. 
A knowledge representation method that associates 
features with nodes representing concepts or objects. 
The features are described in terms of attributes 
(called slots) and their values. 
A person who gains unauthorised access to the 
computer of another 
A permanent representation of computer output, eg a 
print-out. 
The physical components of a computer system, eg 
the computer itself. 
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Heuristic 
Hypermedia 
Hypertext 
Inference engine 
Inference paradigm 
Input data 
Knowledge 
Knowledge acquisition 
Knowledge base 
Knowledge-based system 
(KBS) 
Knowledge engineering 
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A rule of thumb or simplification that limits the search 
for solutions in domains that are difficult and poorly 
understood. 
Hypertext accompanied with audiovisual techniques; 
evolved hypertext. 
Non-sequential writing; text that branches and allows 
choices to the reader. 
That part of a knowledge-based system or expert 
system that contains the general problem-solving 
knowledge. 
The technique or search strategy used by the 
inference engine to access and apply the domain 
knowledge; also called the inference method. 
Data that is supplied to a computer system. 
The information a computer program must have to 
behave intelligently. 
The process of extracting the requisite domain 
knowledge from the domain expert and articulating it 
for representation in the expert system. 
The portion of a knowledge-based system or expert 
system that contains the domain knowledge. 
A program in which the domain knowledge is explicit 
and separate from the program's other knowledge. 
The process of building expert systems. 
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Knowledge representation The process of structuring knowledge about a problem 
in a way that makes the problem easier to solve. 
Knowledge engineer (KE) The person who designs and builds the expert system 
and is responsible for the knowledge acquisition from 
the domain expert. 
Knowledge update facility The part of an expert system that updates the 
knowledge base. 
Neutral network A knowledge representation method consisting of a 
network of concepts connected the same way as 
neurons in the brain. 
Non-professional user A person who is a layman in the domain of the ES 
and uses it to acquire professional advice or to 
execute a task. 
Operation system software Software that facilitates use of application software or 
manages the internal functions of the computer, such 
as the way information is loaded into the memory 
Output data Data that is received from a computer system. 
Package software Software that is mass-produced and distributed which 
is available to the public as a package. Also known as 
an "off the shelf' system. 
Producer The designer, developer or supplier of an expert 
system. 
Production rule A formal way of specifying a recommendation, 
directive, or strategy, expressed as IF premise THEN 
conclusion or IF condition THEN action. 
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Professional user 
Real-world problem 
Representation 
Search 
Semantic net 
Skill 
Software 
Support environment 
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A person of professional calling who uses an ES while 
rendering professional services eg a doctor, lawyer, 
etc. 
A complex, practical problem of which the solution is 
useful in some cost-effective way. 
The process of formulating or viewing a problem so 
that it will be easy to solve. 
The process of skilfully sifting the set of possible 
solutions to a problem so as to efficiently find an 
acceptable solution in an efficient manner. 
A knowledge representation method consisting of a 
network of nodes, standing for concepts or objects, 
connected by arcs describing the relations between 
the nodes. 
The efficient and effective application of knowledge to 
produce solutions in some problem domain. 
A computer program (a set of statements or 
instructions capable of causing a machine having 
information-processing capabilities to indicate, perform 
or achieve a particular function, task or result); a 
program description (underlying information 
determining the instructions to be incorporated in the 
program), supporting material (documentation, user 
instructions, etc), or a set of several of these 
elements. 
Facilities associated with an expert-system-building 
tool that help the user interact with the expert system. 
These may include sophisticated debugging aids, 
friendly editing programs, and advanced graphic 
devices. 
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Symbol 
Symbolic reasoning 
Tool builder 
Toy problem 
User 
User friendly 
Virus 
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A string of characters that stands for some real-world 
concept. 
Problem solving based on the application of strategies 
and heuristics to manipulate symbols standing for 
problem concepts. 
The person who designs and builds the expert-
system-building tool. 
An artificial problem, such as a game or an unrealistic 
adaptation of a complex problem. 
Any person who uses an expert system, such as an 
end-user, a domain expert, a knowledge engineer, a 
tool builder, or a support staff member. 
Easy to learn and use. 
A set of computer instructions hidden in a computer's 
operating system or attached to a standard computer 
program. Benign viruses are designed to infect a 
computer without doing any actual damage to the 
computer or data. Malicious viruses attack computer 
systems in various ways, often disguising the damage 
caused until it is extensive. 
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LIST OF EXPERT SYSTEMS ILLUSTRATING THEIR 
APPLICATION AREAS 
Appendix II 
DOMAIN ES PROBLEM/TASK 
Aviation FLY-BY-WIRE Piloting control system. 
Chemistry DENDRAL Infers a compound's molecular structure from mass 
spectral and nuclear response data. 
CLONER Helps the molecular biologist design and create new 
molecules. 
SECS 
Computer DART 
Systems 
XCOM 
Electronics ACE 
EURISKO 
SOPHIE 
Engineering REACTOR 
DELTA 
Helps chemists synthesise complex organic 
molecules. 
Helps diagnose faults in computer hardware 
systems. 
Configures VAX-11/780 computers. 
Diagnoses faults in telephone networks. 
Helps design 3-D microelectronic devices. 
Teaches fault diagnosis in electrical circuits. 
Helps operators diagnose and treat nuclear reactor 
accidents. 
Helps identify and correct malfunctions in 
locomotives. 
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DOMAIN 
Geology 
Medical 
Military 
Science 
Law 
LITHO 
MUD 
ES 
PROSPECTOR 
PUFF 
ABEL 
BLUE BOX 
MYCIN 
ADEPT 
ACES 
TATR 
TAXMAN 
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PROBLEM/TASK 
Helps geologists perform oil well log analysis. 
Helps diagnose and treat problems related to drilling 
fluids used in drilling operations. 
Helps geologists evaluate the mineral potential of a 
region. 
Diagnoses lung disease by interpreting data from 
pulmonary function tests. 
Helps diagnose acid-base and electrolyte disorders. 
Helps diagnose and treat various forms of clinical 
depression. 
Helps diagnose and treat bacterial infections. 
Performs situation assessment by interpreting 
intelligence sensor reports. 
Performs the cartographer's job of map labelling. 
Helps Air Force targeteers develop plans for 
attacking enemy airfields. 
Assists in the investigation of legal reasoning and 
legal argumentation in the domain of corporate tax 
law. 
JUDITH Helps a lawyer reason about civil law cases with 
reference to the German Civil Code. 
TAX ADVISOR Assists with tax and estate planning for clients with 
large estates. 
LOS Assists in settling product liability cases. Given a 
description of a product liability case, it calculates 
defendant liability, case worth and an equitable 
settlement amount. 
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TABLE 1 DESIGN RISK AREAS 
RISK AREA DEFINITION EXPOSURE RISK/ 
CANDIDATE 
Mission Concept of the A faulty Designer 
statement completed concept results 
application. in a faulty 
application. A 
target for 
blame is 
sought when 
users fail to 
use the system 
as anticipated. 
Knowledge An organized Knowledge- K E, DE, 
base collection of base content developer 
declarative and errors are 
procedural incurred during 
relationships knowledge 
that represents acquisition, 
expertise or representation, 
heuristics in a and verification. 
domain. 
Accessed by a 
search 
program. 
Target Group or type If target au- Designer, 
audience of users for dience isn't developer 
whom the carefully 
system is identified, 
designed doesn't par-
ticipate in the 
design, re-
ceives in-
adequate 
training and 
documentation, 
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RISK AREA DEFINITION 
Explanation Provides input 
subsystem interpretation 
and result 
rational~ for 
users. 
Type and User needs 
extent of user and recom-
input mendations, 
target-market 
information, 
and other data 
are used to 
determine 
target-user 
characteristics 
beyond mere 
audience 
identification. 
EXPOSURE 
and doesn't 
contribute to 
maintenance 
and enhance-
ment decisions, 
users will think 
the system in-
adequate and 
output may be 
applied 
inappropriately 
or incorrectly. 
Inadequate 
explanation 
subsystem can 
confuse users, 
leading to 
erroneous input 
and output. 
Terminology 
can be also 
misinterpreted. 
If input 
requirements 
are not 
matched with 
the knowledge 
and skills of 
targeted users, 
they may input 
information 
incorrectly, 
resulting in in-
valid output 
that can lead to 
erroneous 
solutions. 
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RISK/ 
CANDIDATE 
KE, designer 
Developer, 
designer, KE 
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RISK AREA DEFINITION EXPOSURE RISK/ 
CANDIDATE 
Number of Application Single results Case: single 
results design should can mislead results-
consider user- the user into designers 
driven results. deciding that developer; 
Single results only one multiple 
are directive: solution, which results-
multiple results may be in- users 
provide options appropriate, is 
to be con- possible. Mul-
sidered by the tiple results 
user as input require the 
for another user to use 
selection or them as input 
decision. for determining 
another 
selection or 
decision. 
Knowledge- Origin of the An inaccurate, DE 
base source knowledge and incomplete, or 
rules of the out-of-date 
knowledge knowledge 
base of the base can result 
system. The in inaccurate, 
accuracy of the incomplete, or 
application is inappropriate 
directly output, leading 
proportional to to erroneous 
the accuracy, decision rna-
completeness, king. Experts 
and current- may provide in-
ness of the correct infor-
knowledge mation and not 
base. understand the 
information or 
requirements. 
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RISK AREA DEFINITION EXPOSURE RISK/ 
CANDIDATE 
Training Instruction and Many expo- Depends on 
documentation sures may if user or 
necessary for have the same developer 
user to use the results, in- did the 
system appro- eluding over- training. 
priately. sight of the Training: 
Should be need for train- not offered 
provided soon ing, training (designer, 
after dis- that doesn't developer); 
tribution of the adequately inadequate 
application. cover system (developer, 
functioning and designer); 
maintenance, offered but 
training offered not attended 
but not atten- (supplier, 
ded, training users); 
taken but taken but 
ignored. Any ignored 
of these can (user). 
result in 
hardware or 
software failure 
due to user 
mishandling. 
Maintenance Should be Planned: Developer, 
planned and knowledge designer, DE, 
responsive. base should be KE, supplier 
Planned main- updated, 
tenance inclu- validated, and 
des system distributed 
updates and when new and 
revised or corrective 
appended knowledge 
documentation arises. 
and provides 
quality system 
functioning. 
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RISK AREA 
Problem 
definition 
DEFINITION 
System glitches 
require 
responsive 
maintenance. 
Users should 
be able to 
expect manu-
facturer's 
prompt atten-
tion to system 
malfunction. 
User support 
systems are a 
part of main-
tenance 
planning. 
Detailed 
definition, 
bounding, and 
description of 
the problem or 
task to be 
addressed by 
the system. 
EXPOSURE 
Responsive: 
modification of 
an on-line 
system is 
nightmarish; 
locating the 
needed know-
ledge-based 
file is nearly 
impossible. 
Support 
systems: 
ensuring that 
support staffs 
knowledge and 
skills are up-to-
date; support 
in heuristic 
knowledge and 
technical 
expertise must 
be current and 
available to 
users. 
Problem is 
larger than 
anticipated and 
lacks definition; 
system inade-
quately 
resolves the 
problem. 
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RISK/ 
CANDIDATE 
Designer, 
developer 
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RISK AREA 
System 
documenta-
tion 
DEFINITION 
Written records 
of system 
functioning 
(procedures for 
all functions); 
and mainte-
nance (infor-
mation about 
system func-
tioning, trou-
bleshooting, 
coding, con-
struction, and 
so on). 
EXPOSURE 
Critical 
elements fail to 
be included in 
the system's 
documentation. 
Documentation 
not current or 
readily acces-
sible may result 
in errors and 
injury. 
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RISK/ 
CANDIDATE 
Designer, 
developer 
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RISK AREA 
Inference 
engine 
Program 
User input 
TABLE 2 EXECUTION RISK AREAS 
DEFINITION 
Commercial 
shell: little 
possibility the 
code has bugs 
in the original 
copy of the 
program; how-
ever, data 
corruption can 
happen during 
duplication. 
Programmed: 
faulty coding, 
linking. 
Program bugs 
(not content 
errors) result 
from incorrect 
links or bran-
ches or an 
improperly 
generated rule 
tree. 
Drives the 
branching 
within the 
application. 
EXPOSURE 
Bugs in the 
inference 
engine. 
Can lead to the 
incorrect linking 
of input with 
output, leading 
to poor deci-
sions for 
application of 
output. 
If the user 
improperly keys 
an input or 
makes an 
incorrect input, 
the results will 
probably not 
match user 
intent. 
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RISK/ 
CANDIDATE 
T oolbuilder, 
KE 
Toolbuilder, 
KE 
User 
Appendix Ill 
System output Heuristic 
knowledge isn't 
always 
accurate. User 
must exercise 
judgment. 
Undue user 
reliance on 
system output. 
System output 
can be used 
incorrectly. 
User 
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NO-NONSENSE LICENCE STATEMENT 
LIMITED WARRANTY 
(1) Borland International, Inc. ("Borland") warrants the physical diskette(s) and 
physical documentation enclosed herein (but not any diskettes or 
documentation distributed by the Paradox Runtime Licencee) to be free of 
defects in materials and workmanship for a period of sixty days from the 
purchase date. If Borland receives notification within the warranty period 
of defects in materials or workmanship, and such notification is determined 
by Borland to be correct, Borland will replace the defective diskette(s) or 
documentation. DO NOT RETURN ANY PRODUCT UNTIL YOU HAVE 
CALLED THE BORLAND CUSTOMER SERVICE DEPARTMENT AND 
OBTAINED A RETURN AUTHORIZATION NUMBER. 
(2) The entire and exclusive liability and remedy for breach of this Limited 
Warranty shall be limited to replacement of defective diskette(s) or 
documentation and shall not include or extend to any claim for or right to 
recover any other damages, including but not limited to, loss of profit, data, 
or use of the software, or special, incidental, or consequential damages or 
other similar claims, even if Borland has been specifically advised of the 
possibility of such damages. In no event will Borland's liability for any 
damages to you or any other person ever exceed the lower of suggested 
list price or actual price paid for the licence to use the software, regardless 
of any form of the claim. 
(3). BORLAND INTERNATIONAL, INC. SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ALL 
OTHER WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT 
LIMITED TO, ANY IMPLIED WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY OR 
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. Specifically, Borland makes no 
representation or warranty that the software is fit for any particular purpose 
and any implied warranty of merchantability is limited to the sixty-day 
duration of the Limited Warranty covering the physical diskette(s) and 
physical documentation only (and not the software) and is otherwise 
expressly and specifically disclaimed. 
(4) This limited warranty gives you specific legal rights; you may have others 
which may vary from state to state. Some states do not allow the exclusion 
of incidental or consequential damages, or the limitation on how long an 
implied warranty lasts, so some of the above may not apply to you. 
(5) This licence statement shall be construed, interpreted, and governed by the 
laws of the State of California. If the provision of this statement is found 
void or unenforceable. it will not affect the validity of the balance of this 
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statement, which shall remain valid and enforceable according to its terms. 
If any remedy provided is determined to have failed of its essential purpose, 
all limitations of liability and exclusions of damages set forth in the Limited 
Warranty shall remain in full force and effect. This statement may only be 
modified in writing signed by you and an authorized officer or Borland. 

Appendix V 573 
APPENDIXV 
574 Appendix V 
BUTTERWORTH & CO 
Latent Damage Law - The Expert System 
LICENCE AGREEMENT 
(1) IMPORTANT 
Read this agreement before you open the seal(s) on the facing page. 
Opening the seal(s) on the facing page or using the Software (as described 
below) constitutes acceptance by you of the terms and conditions of this 
agreement. If you do not accept them and you return the" Software entire 
and unopened together with the book with which it is distributed within 
14 days of delivery to you your money will be refunded. 
(2) GRANT OF LICENCE 
Butterworths hereby grants you a non-exclusive licence to use the computer 
programs and data constituting the Latent Damage Expert System ("the 
Software") contained on the diskettes supplied with this agreement (located 
under the sealed flap on the facing page) subject to the following terms and 
conditions. 
(3) PERMITTED AND PROHIBITED USES 
You may: 
1. Use the Software on a single personal computer only for your own 
internal purposes. 
2. Create a single back-up copy. 
All other uses of the Software are prohibited without written permission from 
Butterworths including without limitation: 
1. Copying or otherwise reproducing any part of the Software whether 
from the original or back-up disks except in the ordinary course of 
loading or running the Software. 
2. Distributing, renting, sub-licensing, leasing or selling the Software. 
3. Altering, modifying, adapting, translating, converting to another 
programming language, decompiling or disassembling the Software. 
4. Using or allowing others to use the back-up copy unless the original 
diskettes are defective. 
(4) TITLE 
The Software incorporates or was developed using the Crystal Expert 
System Shell copyright in which is held by intelligent Environments Ltd of 
Richmond. Surrey, UK (1987): Ernst & 'Nhinney Help System copyright in 
which is held by Ernst & Whinney. London, UK. and Direct Technology Ltd, 
London, UK (1988); and Latent Damage knowledge bases and help text 
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files copyright in which is held by the authors. Butterworths owns or is 
otherwise entitled to grant licences in respect of rights granted by this 
agreement. All rights not expressly granted are retained. You have 
purchased only the physical diskettes and a licence to use the Software 
which is leased to you by Butterworths. You do not own any copy of this 
Software. 
(5) LIMITED WARRANTY AND LIABILITY 
If you discover phystcal defects in the media on which the Software is 
distributed, Butterworths will replace the media at no charge to you provided 
you return it to be replaced with proof of purchase to Butterworths within 90 
days of delivery of the Software to you. 
Butterworths excludes any and all implied warranties including warranties 
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose and limits your 
remedies to return of the Software for replacement. Butterworths makes no 
warranty or representation either express or implied with respect to the 
Software, its quality, performance, merchantability or fitness for a particular 
purpose. Butterworths does not warrant that the functions contained in the 
Software will meet your requirements or that the operation of the Software 
will be uninterrupted or error free or that Software defects will be corrected. 
As a result the Software is licensed "as is" and you the licensee assume the 
entire risk as to its quality and performance. 
The Software has been developed only to demonstrate the potential of 
Expert Systems as tools to assist legal professionals. It is not the intention 
of Butterwoths, the authors of the system or their employers that reports, 
reasons or conclusions reached by the Software should be relied upon as 
definitive or accurate legal advice. If you require such advice you should 
obtain it only from professionally qualified legal advisers. 
Butterworths, the copyright owners, the authors and their employers accept 
no responsibility or liability for any loss or damage whether direct, indirect, 
special, consequential or incidental arising out of the use, results of use or 
reliance on the Software or any reports, reasons, or conclusions given by 
it whether or not any negligence of Butterworths, the copyright owners, the 
authors or their employers may be involved. The warranty and remedies 
set forth above are exclusive and in lieu of all others oral or written, 
expressed or implied. 
(6) TERM 
This agreement and your licence to use this Software will terminate if you 
fail to comply with any term or condition of this agreement. You agree upon 
such termination to destroy the Software and the back-up copy. 
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(7) GENERAL 
This agreement shall be governed and construed in accordance with 
English Law and be subject to the jurisdiction of the Courts of England. 
Each of the provisions of this agreement is severable and the invalidity or 
unenforceability of any one or more of them shall not affect the 
enforceability of the remaining provisions. 
This agreement does not affect the statutory rights of a consumer. 
This agreement constitutes the entire agreement between Butterworths and 
you and supersedes all prior agreements oral or written and any other 
communications between us relating to the subject matter of this agreement. 
It may not be altered except in writing signed by both parties. 
(8) ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
By opening the seal(s) on the facing page or using the Software you 
acknowledge that you have read this agreement, understand and agree to 
be bound by its terms and conditions. 
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EU DIRECTIVE ON LIABILITY FOR DEFECTIVE PRODUCTS 
ARTICLE 1 
The producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his product. 
ARTICLE 2 
For the purpose of this Directive 'products' means all movables, with the exception 
of primary agricultural products and game, even though incorporated into another 
movable or into an immovable. 'Primary agricultural products' means the products 
of the soil, of stock-farming and of fisheries, excluding products which have 
undergone initial processing. 'Product' includes electricity. 
ARTICLE 3 
1. "Producer" means the manufacturer of a finished product, the producer of 
any raw material or the manufacturer of a component part and any person 
who, by putting his name, trade mark or other distinguishing feature on the 
product presents himself as its producer. 
2. Without prejudice to the liability of the producer, any person who imports 
into the Community a product for sale, hire, leasing or any form of 
distribution in the course of his business shall be deemed to be a producer 
within the meaning of this Directive and shall be responsible as a 
producer. 
3. Where the producer of the product cannot be identified, each supplier of 
the product shall be treated as its producer unless he informs the injured 
person, within a reasonable time, of the identity of the producer or of the 
person who supplied him with the product. The same shall apply, in the 
case of an imported product, if this product does not indicate the identity 
of the importer referred to in paragraph 2, even if the name of the 
producer is indicated. 
ARTICLE 4 
The injured person shall be required to prove the damage, the defect and the causal 
relationship between defect and damage. 
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ARTICLE 5 
Where. as a result of the provisions of this Directive, two or more persons are liable 
for the same damage, they shall be liable jointly and severally, without prejudice to 
the provisions of national law concerning the rights of contribution or recourse. 
ARTICLE 6 
1. A product is defective when it does not provide the safety which a person 
is entitled to expect, taking all circumstances into account, including: 
(a) the presentation of the product; 
(b) the use to which it could reasonably be expected that the 
product would be put; 
(c) the time when the product was put into circulation. 
2. A product shall not be considered defective for the sole reason that a 
better product is subsequently put into circulation 
ARTICLE 7 
The producer shall not be liable as a result of this Directive if he proves; 
(a) that he did not put the product into circulation; or 
(b) that, having regard to the circumstances, it is probable that the defect 
which caused the damage did not exist at the time when the product was 
put into circulation by him or that this defect came into being afterwards; 
or 
(c) that the product was neither manufactured by him for sale or any form of 
distribution for economic purpose nor manufactured or distributed by him 
in the course of his business; or 
(d) that the defect is due to compliance of the product with mandatory 
regulations issued by the public authorities; or 
(e) that the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put 
the product into circulation was not such as to enable the existence of the 
defect to be discovered; or 
(f) in the case of a manufacturer of a component. that the defect is 
attributable to the design of the product in which the component has been 
fitted or to the instructions given by the manufacturer of the product. 
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ARTICLE 8 
1. Without prejudice to the provisions of national law concerning the right of 
contribution or recourse, the liability of the producer shall not be reduced 
when the damage is caused both by a defect in product and by the act or 
omission of a third party. 
2. The liability of the producer may be reduced or disallowed when, having 
regard to all the circumstances, the damage is caused both by a defect in 
the product and by the fault of the injured person or any person for whom 
the injured person is responsible. 
ARTICLE 9 
For the purpose of Article I, "damage" means: 
(a) damage caused by death or by personal injuries; 
(b) damage to, or destruction of, any item of property other than the defective 
product itself, with a lower threshold of 500 ECU, provided that the item 
of property; 
(i) is of a type ordinarily intended for private use or consumption, 
and 
(ii) was used by the injured person mainly for his own private use 
or consumption. 
Th~s article shall be without prejudice to national provisions relating to non-material 
damage. 
ARTICLE 10 
1 . Member States shall provide in their legislation that a limitation period of 
three years shall apply to proceedings for the recovery of damages as 
provided for in this Directive. the limitation period shall begin to run from 
the day on which the plaintiff became aware, or should reasonably have 
become aware, of the damage, the defect and the identity of the producer. 
2. The laws of Member States regulating suspension or interruption of the 
limitation period shall not be affected by this Directive. 
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ARTICLE 11 
Member States shall provide in their legislation that the rights conferred upon the 
injured person pursuant to this Directive shall be extinguished upon the expiry of a 
period of 10 years from the date on which the producer put into circulation the actual 
product which caused the damage, unless the injured person has in the meantime 
instituted proceedings against the producer. 
ARTICLE 12 
The liability of the producer arising from this Directive may not, in relation to the 
injured person, be limited or excluded by a provision limiting his liability or exempting 
him from liability. 
ARTICLE 13 
This Directive shall not affect any rights which an injured person may have according 
to the rules of the law of contractual or non-contractual liability or a special liability 
system existing at the moment when the Directive is notified. 
ARTICLE 14 
This Directive shall not apply to injury or damage arising from nuclear accidents and 
covered by international conventions ratified by the Member States. 
ARTICLE 15 
1. Each Member State may: 
(a) by way of derogation from Article 2, provide in its legislation that within the 
meaning of Article 1 of this Directive "product" also means primary 
agricultural products and game; 
(b) by way of derogation from Article 7(e), maintain or, subject to the 
procedure set out in paragraph 2 of this Article, provide in this legislation 
that the producer shall be liable even if he proves that the state of 
scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into 
circulation was not such as to enable the existence of a defect to be 
discovered. 
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2. A Member State wishing to introduce the measure specified in 
paragraph 1(b) shall communicate the text of the proposed measure to the 
Commission. The Commission shall inform the other Member States 
thereof. 
The Member State concerned shall hold the proposed measure in 
abeyance for nine months after the Commission is informed and provided 
that in the meantime the Commission has not submitted to the Council a 
proposal amending this Directive on the relevant matter. However, if 
within three months of receiving the said information, the Commission 
does not advise the Member State concerned that it intends submitting 
such a proposal to the Council, the member State may take the proposed 
measure immediately. 
If the Commission does submit to the Council such a proposal amending 
this Directive within the aforementioned nine months, the Member State 
concerned shall hold the proposed measure in abeyance for a further 
period of 18 months from the date on which the proposal is submitted. 
3. Ten years after the date of notification of this Directive, the Commission 
shall submit to the Council a report on the effect that rulings by the courts 
as to the application of Article 7(e) and of paragraph 1(b) of this Article 
have on consumer protection and the functioning of the common market. 
In the light of this report the Council, acting on a proposal from the 
Commission and pursuant to the terms of Article 100 of the Treaty, shall 
decide whether to repeat Article 7(e). 
ARTICLE 16 
1. Any Member State may provide that a producer's total liability for damage 
resulting from a death or personal injury and caused by identical items with 
the same defect shall be limited to an amount which may not be less than 
70 million ECU. 
2. Ten years after the date of notification of this Directive, the Commission 
shall submit to the Council a report on the effect on consumer protection 
and the functioning of the common market of the implementation of the 
financial limit on liability by those Member States which have used the 
option provided for in paragraph 1. In the light of this report the Council, 
acting on a proposal from the Commission and pursuant to the terms of 
Article 100 of the Treaty, shall decide whether to repeal paragraph 1. 
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ARTICLE 17 
This Directive shall not apply to products put into circulation before the date on which 
the provisions referred to in Article 19 enter into force. 
ARTICLE 18 
1. For the purposes of this Directive, the ECU shall be that defined by 
Regulation (EEC) no. 3180/78, as amended by Regulation (EEC) 
no. 2626/84. The equivalent in national currency shall initially be 
calculated at the rate obtaining on the date of adoption of this Directive. 
2. Every five years the Council, acting on a proposal from the Commission, 
shall examine and, if need be, revise the amounts in this Directive, in the 
light of economic and monetary trends in the Community. 
ARTICLE 19 
1. Member States shall bring into force, not later than three years from the 
date of notification of this Di.rective, the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive. They 
shall forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
2. The procedure set out in Article 15(2) shall apply from the date of 
notification of this Directive. 
ARTICLE 20 
Member States shall communicate to the Commission the texts of the main provisions 
of national law which they subsequently adopt in the field governed by this Directive. 
ARTICLE 21 
Every five years the Commission shall present a report to the Council on the 
application of this Directive and, if necessary, shall submit appropriate proposals to 
it. 
ARTICLE 22 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
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